title: External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP
id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
related:
    - id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
    - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    filter_main_empty:
        IpAddress: '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the SMB port.
level: high

title: Hack Tool User Agent
id: c42a3073-30fb-48ae-8c99-c23ada84b103
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings user by hack tools in proxy logs
references:
    - https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb
    - http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|contains:
            # Vulnerability scanner and brute force tools
            - '(hydra)'
            - ' arachni/'
            - ' BFAC '
            - ' brutus '
            - ' cgichk '
            - 'core-project/1.0'
            - ' crimscanner/'
            - 'datacha0s'
            - 'dirbuster'
            - 'domino hunter'
            - 'dotdotpwn'
            - 'FHScan Core'
            - 'floodgate'
            - 'get-minimal'
            - 'gootkit auto-rooter scanner'
            - 'grendel-scan'
            - ' inspath '
            - 'internet ninja'
            - 'jaascois'
            - ' zmeu '
            - 'masscan'
            - ' metis '
            - 'morfeus fucking scanner'
            - 'n-stealth'
            - 'nsauditor'
            - 'pmafind'
            - 'security scan'
            - 'springenwerk'
            - 'teh forest lobster'
            - 'toata dragostea'
            - ' vega/'
            - 'voideye'
            - 'webshag'
            - 'webvulnscan'
            - ' whcc/'
            # SQL Injection
            - ' Havij'
            - 'absinthe'
            - 'bsqlbf'
            - 'mysqloit'
            - 'pangolin'
            - 'sql power injector'
            - 'sqlmap'
            - 'sqlninja'
            - 'uil2pn'
            # Hack tool
            - 'ruler'  # https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/using-outlook-forms-lateral-movement-persistence/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pt-PT; rv:1.9.1.2) Gecko/20090729 Firefox/3.5.2 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)'  # SQLi Dumper
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution
id: 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
status: test
description: This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
references:
    - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1201
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -M pe_inject '
    selection_execute:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -x '
    selection_hash:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - " -H 'NTHASH'"
    selection_module_mssql:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' mssql '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -d '
    selection_module_smb1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -H '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -o '
    selection_module_smb2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' --local-auth'
    part_localauth_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
    part_localauth_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' 10.'
            - ' 192.168.'
            - '/24 '
    condition: 1 of selection_* or all of part_localauth*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Hashcat Password Cracker Execution
id: 39b31e81-5f5f-4898-9c0e-2160cfc0f9bf
status: test
description: Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.md#atomic-test-1---password-cracking-with-hashcat
    - https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=hashcat
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\hashcat.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-a '
            - '-m 1000 '
            - '-r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Tools that use similar command line flags and values
level: high

title: HackTool - Hydra Password Bruteforce Execution
id: aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
references:
    - https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra
author: Vasiliy Burov
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1110.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-u '
            - '-p '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '^USER^'
            - '^PASS^'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software that uses the caret encased keywords PASS and USER in its command line
level: high

title: Password Spray Activity
id: 28ecba0a-c743-4690-ad29-9a8f6f25a6f9
status: test
description: Indicates that a password spray attack has been successfully performed.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#password-spray
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'passwordSpray'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication
id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc
status: test
description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-03-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        userAgent|contains:
            - 'BAV2ROPC'
            - 'CBAinPROD'
            - 'CBAinTAR'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Known Legacy Accounts
level: high

title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
        Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Service Account misconfigured
    - Misconfigured Systems
    - Vulnerability Scanners
level: high

title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols
id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e
status: test
description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ActivityDetails: Sign-ins
        ClientApp:
            - Other client
            - IMAP
            - POP3
            - MAPI
            - SMTP
            - Exchange ActiveSync
            - Exchange Web Services
        Username: 'UPN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication
level: high

title: AWS ConsoleLogin Failed Authentication
id: 6393e346-1977-46ef-8987-ad414a145fad
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects failed AWS console login attempts due to authentication failures. Monitoring these events is crucial for identifying potential brute-force attacks or unauthorized access attempts to AWS accounts.
references:
    - https://naikordian.github.io/blog/posts/brute-force-aws-console/
    - https://help.fortinet.com/fsiem/Public_Resource_Access/7_2_1/rules/PH_RULE_AWS_Management_Console_Brute_Force_of_Root_User_Identity.htm
    - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.001/aws_login_failure/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
author: Ivan Saakov, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
        errorMessage: 'Failed authentication'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate failed login attempts by authorized users. Investigate the source of repeated failed login attempts.
level: medium

title: Account Lockout
id: 2b7d6fc0-71ac-4cf7-8ed1-b5788ee5257a
status: test
description: Identifies user account which has been locked because the user tried to sign in too many times with an incorrect user ID or password.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 50053
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Bitbucket User Login Failure
id: 70ed1d26-0050-4b38-a599-92c53d57d45a
status: test
description: |
    Detects user authentication failure events.
    Please note that this rule can be noisy and it is recommended to use with correlation based on "author.name" field.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Authentication'
        auditType.action: 'User login failed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user wrong password attempts.
level: medium

title: Bitbucket User Login Failure Via SSH
id: d3f90469-fb05-42ce-b67d-0fded91bbef3
status: test
description: |
    Detects SSH user login access failures.
    Please note that this rule can be noisy and is recommended to use with correlation based on "author.name" field.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/view-and-configure-the-audit-log-776640417.html
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/enable-ssh-access-to-git-repositories-776640358.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1021.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Authentication'
        auditType.action: 'User login failed(SSH)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user wrong password attempts.
level: medium

title: External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP
id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
related:
    - id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
    - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 10
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    filter_main_empty:
        IpAddress: '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the RDP port.
level: medium

title: MSSQL Server Failed Logon From External Network
id: ebfe73c2-5bc9-4ed9-aaa8-8b54b2b4777d
related:
    - id: 218d2855-2bba-4f61-9c85-81d0ea63ac71
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects failed logon attempts from clients with external network IP to an MSSQL server. This can be a sign of a bruteforce attack.
references:
    - https://cybersecthreat.com/2020/07/08/enable-mssql-authentication-log-to-eventlog/
    - https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/27800944/EventID-18456-Failed-to-open-the-explicitly-specified-database.html
author: j4son
date: 2023-10-11
modified: 2025-05-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: Must enable MSSQL authentication.'
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 18456
    filter_main_local_ips:
        Data|contains:
            - 'CLIENT: 10.' # filter_range_IP: 10.0.0.0/8
            - 'CLIENT: 172.16.' # filter_range_IP: 172.16.0.0/12
            - 'CLIENT: 172.17.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.18.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.19.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.20.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.21.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.22.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.23.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.24.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.25.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.26.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.27.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.28.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.29.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.30.'
            - 'CLIENT: 172.31.'
            - 'CLIENT: 192.168.' # filter_range_IP: 192.168.0.0/16
            - 'CLIENT: 127.' # filter_loop_back: 127.0.0.0/8
            - 'CLIENT: 169.254.' # fileter_link-local_addressing: 169.254.0.0/16
            - 'CLIENT: <local machine>'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Multifactor Authentication Denied
id: e40f4962-b02b-4192-9bfe-245f7ece1f99
status: test
description: User has indicated they haven't instigated the MFA prompt and could indicate an attacker has the password for the account.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
author: AlertIQ
date: 2022-03-24
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1621
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'multiFactorAuthentication'
        Status|contains: 'MFA Denied'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Users actually login but miss-click into the Deny button when MFA prompt.
level: medium

title: Multifactor Authentication Interrupted
id: 5496ff55-42ec-4369-81cb-00f417029e25
status: test
description: Identifies user login with multifactor authentication failures, which might be an indication an attacker has the password for the account but can't pass the MFA challenge.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1621
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection_50074:
        ResultType: 50074
        ResultDescription|contains: 'Strong Auth required'
    selection_500121:
        ResultType: 500121
        ResultDescription|contains: 'Authentication failed during strong authentication request'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: NTLM Brute Force
id: 9c8acf1a-cbf9-4db6-b63c-74baabe03e59
status: test
description: Detects common NTLM brute force device names
references:
    - https://www.varonis.com/blog/investigate-ntlm-brute-force
author: Jerry Shockley '@jsh0x'
date: 2022-02-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: ntlm
    definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 8004
    devicename:
        WorkstationName:
            - 'Rdesktop'
            - 'Remmina'
            - 'Freerdp'
            - 'Windows7'
            - 'Windows8'
            - 'Windows2012'
            - 'Windows2016'
            - 'Windows2019'
    condition: selection and devicename
falsepositives:
    - Systems with names equal to the spoofed ones used by the brute force tools
level: medium

title: Successful Authentications From Countries You Do Not Operate Out Of
id: 8c944ecb-6970-4541-8496-be554b8e2846
status: test
description: Detect successful authentications from countries you do not operate out of.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
    filter:
        Location|contains: '<Countries you DO operate out of e,g GB, use OR for multiple>'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium

title: Suspicious Rejected SMB Guest Logon From IP
id: 71886b70-d7b4-4dbf-acce-87d2ca135262
status: test
description: Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service
references:
    - https://twitter.com/KevTheHermit/status/1410203844064301056
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210629055600/https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210701042336/https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), KevTheHermit, fuzzyf10w
date: 2021-06-30
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: smbclient-security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 31017
        UserName: ''
        ServerName|startswith: '\1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Account fallback reasons (after failed login with specific account)
level: medium

title: User Access Blocked by Azure Conditional Access
id: 9a60e676-26ac-44c3-814b-0c2a8b977adf
status: test
description: |
    Detect access has been blocked by Conditional Access policies.
    The access policy does not allow token issuance which might be sights≈ of unauthorizeed login to valid accounts.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Cisco BGP Authentication Failures
id: 56fa3cd6-f8d6-4520-a8c7-607292971886
status: test
description: Detects BGP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing
references:
    - https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf
author: Tim Brown
date: 2023-01-09
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: bgp
    definition: 'Requirements: cisco bgp logs need to be enabled and ingested'
detection:
    keywords_bgp_cisco:
        '|all':
            - ':179' # Protocol
            - 'IP-TCP-3-BADAUTH'
    condition: keywords_bgp_cisco
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations
level: low

title: Cisco LDP Authentication Failures
id: 50e606bf-04ce-4ca7-9d54-3449494bbd4b
status: test
description: Detects LDP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate MPLS labels
references:
    - https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf
author: Tim Brown
date: 2023-01-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: ldp
    definition: 'Requirements: cisco ldp logs need to be enabled and ingested'
detection:
    selection_protocol:
        - 'LDP'
    selection_keywords:
        - 'SOCKET_TCP_PACKET_MD5_AUTHEN_FAIL'
        - 'TCPMD5AuthenFail'
    condition: selection_protocol and selection_keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations
level: low

title: Failed Authentications From Countries You Do Not Operate Out Of
id: 28870ae4-6a13-4616-bd1a-235a7fad7458
status: test
description: Detect failed authentications from countries you do not operate out of.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
    selection1:
        Location|contains: '<Countries you DO operate out of e,g GB, use OR for multiple>'
    condition: not selection and not selection1
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: low

title: Huawei BGP Authentication Failures
id: a557ffe6-ac54-43d2-ae69-158027082350
status: test
description: Detects BGP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing.
references:
    - https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf
author: Tim Brown
date: 2023-01-09
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    product: huawei
    service: bgp
    definition: 'Requirements: huawei bgp logs need to be enabled and ingested'
detection:
    keywords_bgp_huawei:
        '|all':
            - ':179' # Protocol
            - 'BGP_AUTH_FAILED'
    condition: keywords_bgp_huawei
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations
level: low

title: Juniper BGP Missing MD5
id: a7c0ae48-8df8-42bf-91bd-2ea57e2f9d43
status: test
description: Detects juniper BGP missing MD5 digest. Which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing.
references:
    - https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf
author: Tim Brown
date: 2023-01-09
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    product: juniper
    service: bgp
    definition: 'Requirements: juniper bgp logs need to be enabled and ingested'
detection:
    keywords_bgp_juniper:
        '|all':
            - ':179' # Protocol
            - 'missing MD5 digest'
    condition: keywords_bgp_juniper
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations
level: low

title: MSSQL Server Failed Logon
id: 218d2855-2bba-4f61-9c85-81d0ea63ac71
related:
    - id: ebfe73c2-5bc9-4ed9-aaa8-8b54b2b4777d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects failed logon attempts from clients to MSSQL server.
references:
    - https://cybersecthreat.com/2020/07/08/enable-mssql-authentication-log-to-eventlog/
    - https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/27800944/EventID-18456-Failed-to-open-the-explicitly-specified-database.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), j4son
date: 2023-10-11
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: Must enable MSSQL authentication.'
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 18456
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This event could stem from users changing an account's password that's used to authenticate via a job or an automated process. Investigate the source of such events and mitigate them
level: low

title: Suspicious Connection to Remote Account
id: 1883444f-084b-419b-ac62-e0d0c5b3693f
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts.
    Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.md#atomic-test-2---brute-force-credentials-of-single-active-directory-domain-user-via-ldap-against-domain-controller-ntlm-or-kerberos
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.LdapDirectoryIdentifier'
            - 'System.Net.NetworkCredential'
            - 'System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.LdapConnection'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low