title: AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
id: db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'GetLoginProfile'
            - 'CreateLoginProfile'
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM LoginProfile listing and/or creation
level: high

title: AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
id: db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: PutUserPolicy
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
        requestParameters|contains|all:
            - '"arn:aws:s3:::<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>/*"'
            - '"s3:GetObject"'
            - '"Allow"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 browser with accidental creation of default Inline IAM policy without changing default S3 bucket name placeholder value
level: high

title: AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation
id: db014773-d9d9-4792-91e5-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'CreateUser'
            - 'CreateAccessKey'
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM User and/or AccessKey creation
level: high

title: Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes
id: 1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1
status: test
description: Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update Application
            - Update Service principal
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: Application URI Configuration Changes
id: 0055ad1f-be85-4798-83cf-a6da17c993b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.
    URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Update Application Sucess- Property Name AppAddress
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via ActivityLogs
id: 09438caa-07b1-4870-8405-1dbafe3dad95
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
    This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
    This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftauthorization
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high

title: Changes To PIM Settings
id: db6c06c4-bf3b-421c-aa88-15672b88c743
status: test
description: Detects when changes are made to PIM roles
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Update role setting in PIM
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legit administrative PIM setting configuration changes
level: high

title: Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
id: a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
status: test
description: Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection_event:
        eventType: 'policy.evaluate_sign_on'
        target.displayName: 'Okta Admin Console'
    selection_positive:
        - debugContext.debugData.behaviors|contains: 'POSITIVE'
        - debugContext.debugData.logOnlySecurityData|contains: 'POSITIVE'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - When an admin begins using the Admin Console and one of Okta's heuristics incorrectly identifies the behavior as being unusual.
level: high

title: PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation
id: 039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d
status: test
description: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Request Approved/Denied
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual admin using PIM.
level: high

title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication
id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc
status: test
description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-03-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        userAgent|contains:
            - 'BAV2ROPC'
            - 'CBAinPROD'
            - 'CBAinTAR'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Known Legacy Accounts
level: high

title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
        Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Service Account misconfigured
    - Misconfigured Systems
    - Vulnerability Scanners
level: high

title: Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices
id: 4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        DeviceDetail.isCompliant: 'false'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Temporary Access Pass Added To An Account
id: fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce
status: test
description: Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account. TAPs added to priv accounts should be investigated
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Admin registered security info
        Status: Admin registered temporary access pass method for user
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator adding a legitimate temporary access pass
level: high

title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols
id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e
status: test
description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ActivityDetails: Sign-ins
        ClientApp:
            - Other client
            - IMAP
            - POP3
            - MAPI
            - SMTP
            - Exchange ActiveSync
            - Exchange Web Services
        Username: 'UPN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication
level: high

title: User Added To Privilege Role
id: 49a268a4-72f4-4e38-8a7b-885be690c5b5
status: test
description: Detects when a user is added to a privileged role.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Add eligible member (permanent)
            - Add eligible member (eligible)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legtimate administrator actions of adding members from a role
level: high

title: Users Added to Global or Device Admin Roles
id: 11c767ae-500b-423b-bae3-b234450736ed
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for users added to device admin roles.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#device-administrator-roles
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: RoleManagement
        OperationName|contains|all:
            - 'Add'
            - 'member to role'
        TargetResources|contains:
            - '7698a772-787b-4ac8-901f-60d6b08affd2'
            - '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: AWS Root Credentials
id: 8ad1600d-e9dc-4251-b0ee-a65268f29add
status: test
description: Detects AWS root account usage
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
author: vitaliy0x1
date: 2020-01-21
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_usertype:
        userIdentity.type: Root
    selection_eventtype:
        eventType: AwsServiceEvent
    condition: selection_usertype and not selection_eventtype
falsepositives:
    - AWS Tasks That Require AWS Account Root User Credentials https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws_tasks-that-require-root.html
level: medium

title: AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity
id: ccd6a6c8-bb4e-4a91-9d2a-07e632819374
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the deletion of an AWS SAML provider, potentially indicating malicious intent to disrupt administrative or security team access.
    An attacker can remove the SAML provider for the information security team or a team of system administrators, to make it difficult for them to work and investigate at the time of the attack and after it.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteSAMLProvider.html
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2024-12-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1531
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'DeleteSAMLProvider'
        status: 'success'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Automated processes using tools like Terraform may trigger this alert.
    - Legitimate administrative actions by authorized system administrators could cause this alert. Verify the user identity, user agent, and hostname to ensure they are expected.
    - Deletions by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If the behavior is known and expected, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: AWS Successful Console Login Without MFA
id: 77caf516-34e5-4df9-b4db-20744fea0a60
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects successful AWS console logins that were performed without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
    This alert can be used to identify potential unauthorized access attempts, as logging in without MFA can indicate compromised credentials or misconfigured security settings.
references:
    - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/vulnerabilities/iam-user-without-mfa/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
author: Thuya@Hacktilizer, Ivan Saakov
date: 2025-10-18
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
        additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'NO'
        responseElements.ConsoleLogin: 'Success'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: Account Disabled or Blocked for Sign in Attempts
id: 4afac85c-224a-4dd7-b1af-8da40e1c60bd
status: test
description: Detects when an account is disabled or blocked for sign in but tried to log in
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 50057
        ResultDescription: Failure
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Account disabled or blocked in error
    - Automation account has been blocked or disabled
level: medium

title: Bitbucket User Login Failure
id: 70ed1d26-0050-4b38-a599-92c53d57d45a
status: test
description: |
    Detects user authentication failure events.
    Please note that this rule can be noisy and it is recommended to use with correlation based on "author.name" field.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Authentication'
        auditType.action: 'User login failed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user wrong password attempts.
level: medium

title: Bitlocker Key Retrieval
id: a0413867-daf3-43dd-9245-734b3a787942
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for Bitlocker key retrieval.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#bitlocker-key-retrieval
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: KeyManagement
        OperationName: Read BitLocker key
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Device Registration or Join Without MFA
id: 5afa454e-030c-4ab4-9253-a90aa7fcc581
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for device registration or join events where MFA was not performed.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#device-registrations-and-joins-outside-policy
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResourceDisplayName: 'Device Registration Service'
        conditionalAccessStatus: 'success'
    filter_mfa:
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'multiFactorAuthentication'
    condition: selection and not filter_mfa
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Github SSH Certificate Configuration Changed
id: 2f575940-d85e-4ddc-af13-17dad6f1a0ef
status: test
description: Detects when changes are made to the SSH certificate configuration of the organization.
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizations/managing-git-access-to-your-organizations-repositories/about-ssh-certificate-authorities
    - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/audit-log-events-for-your-enterprise#ssh_certificate_authority
author: Romain Gaillard (@romain-gaillard)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'ssh_certificate_authority.create' # An SSH certificate authority for an organization or enterprise was created.
            - 'ssh_certificate_requirement.disable' # The requirement for members to use SSH certificates to access an organization resources was disabled.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Allowed administrative activities.
level: medium

title: Guest User Invited By Non Approved Inviters
id: 0b4b72e3-4c53-4d5b-b198-2c58cfef39a9
status: test
description: Detects when a user that doesn't have permissions to invite a guest user attempts to invite one.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Invite external user
        Status: failure
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A non malicious user is unaware of the proper process
level: medium

title: Login to Disabled Account
id: 908655e0-25cf-4ae1-b775-1c8ce9cf43d8
status: test
description: Detect failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 50057
        ResultDescription: 'User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Multifactor Authentication Denied
id: e40f4962-b02b-4192-9bfe-245f7ece1f99
status: test
description: User has indicated they haven't instigated the MFA prompt and could indicate an attacker has the password for the account.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
author: AlertIQ
date: 2022-03-24
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1621
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'multiFactorAuthentication'
        Status|contains: 'MFA Denied'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Users actually login but miss-click into the Deny button when MFA prompt.
level: medium

title: Multifactor Authentication Interrupted
id: 5496ff55-42ec-4369-81cb-00f417029e25
status: test
description: Identifies user login with multifactor authentication failures, which might be an indication an attacker has the password for the account but can't pass the MFA challenge.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1621
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection_50074:
        ResultType: 50074
        ResultDescription|contains: 'Strong Auth required'
    selection_500121:
        ResultType: 500121
        ResultDescription|contains: 'Authentication failed during strong authentication request'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Password Reset By User Account
id: 340ee172-4b67-4fb4-832f-f961bdc1f3aa
status: test
description: Detect when a user has reset their password in Azure AD
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: YochanaHenderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: 'UserManagement'
        Status: 'Success'
        Initiatedby: 'UPN'
    filter:
        Target|contains: 'UPN'
        ActivityType|contains: 'Password reset'
    condition: selection and filter
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator or confirmed user action.
level: medium

title: Privileged Account Creation
id: f7b5b004-dece-46e4-a4a5-f6fd0e1c6947
status: test
description: Detects when a new admin is created.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message|contains|all:
            - Add user
            - Add member to role
        Status: Success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A legitimate new admin account being created
level: medium

title: Successful Authentications From Countries You Do Not Operate Out Of
id: 8c944ecb-6970-4541-8496-be554b8e2846
status: test
description: Detect successful authentications from countries you do not operate out of.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
    filter:
        Location|contains: '<Countries you DO operate out of e,g GB, use OR for multiple>'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium

title: Suspicious Login Activity Classified By Google
id: 38360161-76c4-4283-842e-efcf997dafc8
status: experimental
description: Detects Google Workspace login activity that's classified as suspicious by Google.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/understanding-audit-logs
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#suspicious_login
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#suspicious_login_less_secure_app
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#suspicious_programmatic_login
author: Tom Kluter
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.login
detection:
    selection:
        protoPayload.Servicename: 'login.googleapis.com'
        protoPayload.metadata.event.eventName:
            - 'suspicious_login_less_secure_app'
            - 'suspicious_login'
            - 'suspicious_programmatic_login'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate logins
level: medium

title: User Access Blocked by Azure Conditional Access
id: 9a60e676-26ac-44c3-814b-0c2a8b977adf
status: test
description: |
    Detect access has been blocked by Conditional Access policies.
    The access policy does not allow token issuance which might be sights≈ of unauthorizeed login to valid accounts.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: User State Changed From Guest To Member
id: 8dee7a0d-43fd-4b3c-8cd1-605e189d195e
status: test
description: Detects the change of user type from "Guest" to "Member" for potential elevation of privilege.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-06-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: 'UserManagement'
        OperationName: 'Update user'
        properties.message: '"displayName":"UserType","oldValue":"[\"Guest\"]","newValue":"[\"Member\"]"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium

title: Users Authenticating To Other Azure AD Tenants
id: 5f521e4b-0105-4b72-845b-2198a54487b9
status: test
description: Detect when users in your Azure AD tenant are authenticating to other Azure AD Tenants.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-06-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        HomeTenantId: 'HomeTenantID'
    filter:
        ResourceTenantId|contains: 'HomeTenantID'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium

title: Azure AD Only Single Factor Authentication Required
id: 28eea407-28d7-4e42-b0be-575d5ba60b2c
status: test
description: Detect when users are authenticating without MFA being required.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: low

title: Failed Authentications From Countries You Do Not Operate Out Of
id: 28870ae4-6a13-4616-bd1a-235a7fad7458
status: test
description: Detect failed authentications from countries you do not operate out of.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
    selection1:
        Location|contains: '<Countries you DO operate out of e,g GB, use OR for multiple>'
    condition: not selection and not selection1
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: low

title: Github New Secret Created
id: f9405037-bc97-4eb7-baba-167dad399b83
status: test
description: Detects when a user creates action secret for the organization, environment, codespaces or repository.
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2023-01-20
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-organization#audit-log-actions
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'codespaces.create_an_org_secret'
            - 'environment.create_actions_secret'
            - 'org.create_actions_secret'
            - 'repo.create_actions_secret'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This detection cloud be noisy depending on the environment. It is recommended to keep a check on the new secrets when created and validate the "actor".
level: low

title: Github Self Hosted Runner Changes Detected
id: f8ed0e8f-7438-4b79-85eb-f358ef2fbebd
status: test
description: |
    A self-hosted runner is a system that you deploy and manage to execute jobs from GitHub Actions on GitHub.com.
    This rule detects changes to self-hosted runners configurations in the environment. The self-hosted runner configuration changes once detected,
    it should be validated from GitHub UI because the log entry may not provide full context.
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2023-01-27
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/hosting-your-own-runners/about-self-hosted-runners#about-self-hosted-runners
    - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-organization#search-based-on-operation
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.collection
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1526
    - attack.t1213.003
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'org.remove_self_hosted_runner'
            - 'org.runner_group_created'
            - 'org.runner_group_removed'
            - 'org.runner_group_runner_removed'
            - 'org.runner_group_runners_added'
            - 'org.runner_group_runners_updated'
            - 'org.runner_group_updated'
            - 'repo.register_self_hosted_runner'
            - 'repo.remove_self_hosted_runner'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Allowed self-hosted runners changes in the environment.
    - A self-hosted runner is automatically removed from GitHub if it has not connected to GitHub Actions for more than 14 days.
    - An ephemeral self-hosted runner is automatically removed from GitHub if it has not connected to GitHub Actions for more than 1 day.
level: low

title: Sign-ins by Unknown Devices
id: 4d136857-6a1a-432a-82fc-5dd497ee5e7c
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for Sign-ins by unknown devices from non-Trusted locations.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        AuthenticationRequirement: singleFactorAuthentication
        ResultType: 0
        NetworkLocationDetails: '[]'
        DeviceDetail.deviceId: ''
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low