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Sigma detection rules

5 rules indexed · SIEM-agnostic detection content
Sigma is the open generic signature format for SIEM systems. Each rule below converts to native syntax for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and other SIEMs. Expand any rule to see its raw YAML.

Detection rules

5 shown of 5
high
Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent
Detects a potentially suspicious parent of "csc.exe", which could be a sign of payload delivery.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id b730a276-6b63-41b8-bcf8-55930c8fc6ee
view Sigma YAML
title: Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent
id: b730a276-6b63-41b8-bcf8-55930c8fc6ee
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious parent of "csc.exe", which could be a sign of payload delivery.
references:
    - https://www.uptycs.com/blog/warzonerat-can-now-evade-with-process-hollowing
    - https://reaqta.com/2017/11/short-journey-darkvnc/
    - https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-11
modified: 2026-03-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218.005
    - attack.t1027.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\csc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'csc.exe'
    selection_parent_generic:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_parent_powershell:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - '-Encoded '
            - 'FromBase64String'
    selection_parent_susp_location:
        - ParentCommandLine|re: '(?:[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata|%(?:[Ll]ocal)?[Aa]pp[Dd]ata%|\\[Aa]pp[Dd]ata\\(?:[Ll]ocal(?:[Ll]ow)?|[Rr]oaming))\\[^\\]{1,256}$'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - '\Temporary Internet'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    filter_main_programfiles:
        # Note: this is a generic filter. You could baseline execution in your env for a more robust rule
        ParentImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
            - 'C:\Program Files\' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    filter_main_sdiagnhost:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    filter_main_w3p:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe' # https://twitter.com/gabriele_pippi/status/1206907900268072962
    filter_optional_chocolatey:
        ParentImage: 'C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe' # Chocolatey https://chocolatey.org/
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection'
    filter_optional_ansible:
        # Note: As ansible is widely used we exclude it with this generic filter.
        # A better option would be to filter based on script content basis or other marker while hunting
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # '{"failed":true,"msg":"Ansible requires PowerShell v3.0 or newer"}'
            - 'JwB7ACIAZgBhAGkAbABlAGQAIgA6AHQAcgB1AGUALAAiAG0AcwBnACIAOgAiAEEAbgBzAGkAYgBsAGUAIAByAGUAcQB1AGkAcgBlAHMAIABQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsACAAdgAzAC4AMAAgAG8AcgAgAG4AZQB3AGUAcgAiAH0AJw'
            - 'cAewAiAGYAYQBpAGwAZQBkACIAOgB0AHIAdQBlACwAIgBtAHMAZwAiADoAIgBBAG4AcwBpAGIAbABlACAAcgBlAHEAdQBpAHIAZQBzACAAUABvAHcAZQByAFMAaABlAGwAbAAgAHYAMwAuADAAIABvAHIAIABuAGUAdwBlAHIAIgB9ACcA'
            - 'nAHsAIgBmAGEAaQBsAGUAZAAiADoAdAByAHUAZQAsACIAbQBzAGcAIgA6ACIAQQBuAHMAaQBiAGwAZQAgAHIAZQBxAHUAaQByAGUAcwAgAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAIAB2ADMALgAwACAAbwByACAAbgBlAHcAZQByACIAfQAnA'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_parent_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
high
Visual Basic Command Line Compiler Usage
Detects successful code compilation via Visual Basic Command Line Compiler that utilizes Windows Resource to Object Converter.
status test author Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative id 7b10f171-7f04-47c7-9fa2-5be43c76e535
view Sigma YAML
title: Visual Basic Command Line Compiler Usage
id: 7b10f171-7f04-47c7-9fa2-5be43c76e535
status: test
description: Detects successful code compilation via Visual Basic Command Line Compiler that utilizes Windows Resource to Object Converter.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Vbc/
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-07
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\vbc.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\cvtres.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Utilization of this tool should not be seen in enterprise environment
level: high
medium
Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it in other stages.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id dcaa3f04-70c3-427a-80b4-b870d73c94c4
view Sigma YAML
title: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
id: dcaa3f04-70c3-427a-80b4-b870d73c94c4
status: test
description: Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it in other stages.
references:
    - https://securityboulevard.com/2019/08/agent-tesla-evading-edr-by-removing-api-hooks/
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c6993447-d1d8-414e-b856-675325e5aa09/
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.md#atomic-test-1---compile-after-delivery-using-cscexe
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-08-24
modified: 2026-03-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\csc.exe'
    selection_susp_location_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' # User execution
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Windows\Temp\' # Admin execution
    selection_susp_location_2:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    selection_susp_location_3:
        CommandLine|re: '(?:[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata|%(?:[Ll]ocal)?[Aa]pp[Dd]ata%|\\[Aa]pp[Dd]ata\\(?:[Ll]ocal(?:[Ll]ow)?|[Rr]oaming))\\[^\\]{1,256}$'
    filter_main_programfiles:
        # Note: this is a generic filter. You could baseline execution in your env for a more robust rule
        ParentImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
            - 'C:\Program Files\' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    filter_main_sdiagnhost:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe' # https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    filter_main_w3p:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe' # https://twitter.com/gabriele_pippi/status/1206907900268072962
    filter_optional_chocolatey:
        ParentImage: # Chocolatey https://chocolatey.org/
            - 'C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\tools\shimgen.exe'
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection'
    filter_optional_ansible:
        # Note: As ansible is widely used we exclude it with this generic filter.
        # A better option would be to filter based on script content basis or other marker while hunting
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # '{"failed":true,"msg":"Ansible requires PowerShell v3.0 or newer"}'
            - 'JwB7ACIAZgBhAGkAbABlAGQAIgA6AHQAcgB1AGUALAAiAG0AcwBnACIAOgAiAEEAbgBzAGkAYgBsAGUAIAByAGUAcQB1AGkAcgBlAHMAIABQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsACAAdgAzAC4AMAAgAG8AcgAgAG4AZQB3AGUAcgAiAH0AJw'
            - 'cAewAiAGYAYQBpAGwAZQBkACIAOgB0AHIAdQBlACwAIgBtAHMAZwAiADoAIgBBAG4AcwBpAGIAbABlACAAcgBlAHEAdQBpAHIAZQBzACAAUABvAHcAZQByAFMAaABlAGwAbAAgAHYAMwAuADAAIABvAHIAIABuAGUAdwBlAHIAIgB9ACcA'
            - 'nAHsAIgBmAGEAaQBsAGUAZAAiADoAdAByAHUAZQAsACIAbQBzAGcAIgA6ACIAQQBuAHMAaQBiAGwAZQAgAHIAZQBxAHUAaQByAGUAcwAgAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAIAB2ADMALgAwACAAbwByACAAbgBlAHcAZQByACIAfQAnA'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_susp_location_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software from program files - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897
    - Legitimate Microsoft software - https://twitter.com/gabriele_pippi/status/1206907900268072962
    - Ansible
level: medium
medium
Potential Application Whitelisting Bypass via Dnx.EXE
Detects the execution of Dnx.EXE. The Dnx utility allows for the execution of C# code. Attackers might abuse this in order to bypass application whitelisting.
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community id 81ebd28b-9607-4478-bf06-974ed9d53ed7
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Application Whitelisting Bypass via Dnx.EXE
id: 81ebd28b-9607-4478-bf06-974ed9d53ed7
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of Dnx.EXE. The Dnx utility allows for the execution of C# code.
    Attackers might abuse this in order to bypass application whitelisting.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Csi/
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-04-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1027.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dnx.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of dnx.exe by legitimate user
level: medium
low
Dynamic CSharp Compile Artefact
When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created as a part of the process. Certain processes are not typically observed compiling C# code, but can do so without touching disk. This can be used to unpack a payload for execution
status test author frack113 id e4a74e34-ecde-4aab-b2fb-9112dd01aed0
view Sigma YAML
title: Dynamic CSharp Compile Artefact
id: e4a74e34-ecde-4aab-b2fb-9112dd01aed0
status: test
description: |
    When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created as a part of the process.
    Certain processes are not typically observed compiling C# code, but can do so without touching disk.
    This can be used to unpack a payload for execution
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.md#atomic-test-2---dynamic-c-compile
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.cmdline'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low
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