title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - System
id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_id:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection1:
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ImagePath|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ImagePath|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: selection_id and (selection1 or selection2 or selection3 or selection4)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack
id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
related:
    - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
      type: obsolete
    - id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack - Image Load
id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
related:
    - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
      type: obsolete
    - id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File
id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security
id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6
related:
    - id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    event_id:
        EventID: 4697
    selection1:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ServiceFileName|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: event_id and 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security
id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2023-03-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
    false_positives:
        RelativeTargetName:
            - 'atsvc'
            - 'samr'
            - 'lsarpc'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'winreg'
            - 'netlogon'
            - 'srvsvc'
            - 'protected_storage'
            - 'wkssvc'
            - 'browser'
            - 'netdfs'
            - 'svcctl'
            - 'spoolss'
            - 'ntsvcs'
            - 'LSM_API_service'
            - 'HydraLsPipe'
            - 'TermSrv_API_service'
            - 'MsFteWds'
            - 'sql\query'
            - 'eventlog'
    condition: selection1 and not false_positives
falsepositives:
    - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
id: 021310d9-30a6-480a-84b7-eaa69aeb92bb
related:
    - id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
      type: derived
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # Looking for the string \\*\IPC$
    filter_keywords:
        - 'samr'
        - 'lsarpc'
        - 'winreg'
        - 'netlogon'
        - 'srvsvc'
        - 'protected_storage'
        - 'wkssvc'
        - 'browser'
        - 'netdfs'
        - 'svcctl'
        - 'spoolss'
        - 'ntsvcs'
        - 'LSM_API_service'
        - 'HydraLsPipe'
        - 'TermSrv_API_service'
        - 'MsFteWds'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
    NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
    under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
    extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
    Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains: '\nxc-windows-latest\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Temp\_MEI'
              - '\nxc\data\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml

title: HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution
id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options.
references:
    - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/
author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec)
date: 2024-01-29
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpMove.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe
    selection_cli_computer:
        # In its current implementation the "computername" flag is required in all actions
        CommandLine|contains: 'computername='
    selection_cli_actions:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'action=create'
            - 'action=dcom'
            - 'action=executevbs'
            - 'action=hijackdcom'
            - 'action=modschtask'
            - 'action=modsvc'
            - 'action=query'
            - 'action=scm'
            - 'action=startservice'
            - 'action=taskscheduler'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Impacket PsExec Execution
id: 32d56ea1-417f-44ff-822b-882873f5f43b
status: test
description: Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-12-14
modified: 2022-09-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName|contains:
            - 'RemCom_stdin'
            - 'RemCom_stdout'
            - 'RemCom_stderr'
    condition: selection1
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec
id: 6fb63b40-e02a-403e-9ffd-3bcc1d749442
related:
    - id: 1a17ce75-ff0d-4f02-9709-2b7bb5618cf0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation
references:
    - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
date: 2021-01-21
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|re: '^%systemroot%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$'
        ServiceName|re: '(^[a-zA-Z]{4}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{8}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{16}$)'
        ServiceStartType: 3  # on-demand start, see https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4697
        ServiceType: '0x10'
    filter:
        ServiceName: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Possible, different agents with a 8 character binary and a 4, 8 or 16 character service name
level: high

title: Metasploit SMB Authentication
id: 72124974-a68b-4366-b990-d30e0b2a190d
status: test
description: Alerts on Metasploit host's authentications on the domain.
references:
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e961201e0aed/lib/rex/proto/smb/client.rb
author: Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
date: 2020-05-06
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID:
            - 4625
            - 4624
        LogonType: 3
        AuthenticationPackageName: 'NTLM'
        WorkstationName|re: '^[A-Za-z0-9]{16}$'
    selection2:
        EventID: 4776
        Workstation|re: '^[A-Za-z0-9]{16}$'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Linux hostnames composed of 16 characters.
level: high

title: Potential CobaltStrike Service Installations - Registry
id: 61a7697c-cb79-42a8-a2ff-5f0cdfae0130
status: test
description: |
    Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement.
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/tech-tuesday-workshop-cobalt-strike-detection-log-analysis-119395
author: Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-06-29
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        - TargetObject|contains: '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services'
        - TargetObject|contains|all:
              - '\System\ControlSet'
              - '\Services'
    selection_details:
        - Details|contains|all:
              - 'ADMIN$'
              - '.exe'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - '%COMSPEC%'
              - 'start'
              - 'powershell'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Protected Storage Service Access
id: 45545954-4016-43c6-855e-eae8f1c369dc
status: test
description: Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. Potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-10
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|contains: 'IPC'
        RelativeTargetName: 'protected_storage'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters
id: 5bb68627-3198-40ca-b458-49f973db8752
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 execution without parameters as observed when running Metasploit windows/smb/psexec exploit module
references:
    - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
date: 2021-01-31
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'rundll32'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives may occur if a user called rundll32 from CLI with no options
level: high

title: Rundll32 UNC Path Execution
id: 5cdb711b-5740-4fb2-ba88-f7945027afac
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)
references:
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/rundll32-the-infamous-proxy-for-executing-malicious-code
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: SMB Create Remote File Admin Share
id: b210394c-ba12-4f89-9117-44a2464b9511
status: test
description: Look for non-system accounts SMB accessing a file with write (0x2) access mask via administrative share (i.e C$).
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/f7a58156dbfc9b019f17f638b8c62d22e557d350/playbooks/WIN-201012004336.yaml
    - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/lateral_movement/SDWIN-200806015757.html?highlight=create%20file
author: Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-08-06
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|endswith: 'C$'
        AccessMask: '0x2'
    filter_main_subjectusername:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    filter_optional_local_ip:
        IpAddress: '::1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PsExec Execution
id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName|endswith:
            - '-stdin'
            - '-stdout'
            - '-stderr'
    filter:
        RelativeTargetName|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection1 and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
related:
    - id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
      type: derived
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path|contains|all:
            - '\\'
            - '\IPC$'
        name|endswith:
            - '-stdin'
            - '-stdout'
            - '-stderr'
    filter:
        name|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
id: f6c68d5f-e101-4b86-8c84-7d96851fd65c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-02-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0
status: test
description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-21
modified: 2023-07-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ' http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
id: 7707a579-e0d8-4886-a853-ce47e4575aaa
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: smbexec.py Service Installation
id: 52a85084-6989-40c3-8f32-091e12e13f09
status: test
description: Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/33058eb2fde6976ea62e04bc7d6b629d64d44712/examples/smbexec.py#L286-L296
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/edef71f17bc1240f9f8c957bbda98662951ac3ec/examples/smbexec.py#L60 # Old service name
author: Omer Faruk Celik
date: 2018-03-20
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service_name:
        ServiceName: 'BTOBTO'
    selection_service_image:
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '.bat & del '
            - '__output 2^>^&1 >'
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_service_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder
id: 855bc8b5-2ae8-402e-a9ed-b889e6df1900
status: test
description: Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2019-12-30
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1039
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\\*\\*$' # example \\SVR_NAME\ADMIN$
            - '\Sysvol\'
    selection_other_tools:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\robocopy.exe'
              - '\xcopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'robocopy.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
    selection_cmd_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cmd_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'copy'
    selection_pwsh_img:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy-item'
            - 'copy '
            - 'cpi '
            - ' cp '
            - 'move '
            - ' move-item'
            - ' mi '
            - ' mv '
    condition: selection_target and (selection_other_tools or all of selection_cmd_* or all of selection_pwsh_*)
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
level: medium

title: DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe
id: 214e8f95-100a-4e04-bb31-ef6cba8ce07e
status: test
description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
    - https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/
    - https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608
author: OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2018-11-28
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName: spoolss
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - 'Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :)'
level: medium

title: PUA - CSExec Default Named Pipe
id: f318b911-ea88-43f4-9281-0de23ede628e
related:
    - id: 9e77ed63-2ecf-4c7b-b09d-640834882028
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects default CSExec pipe creation
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
    - https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-07
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains: '\csexecsvc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator activity
level: medium

title: PUA - RemCom Default Named Pipe
id: d36f87ea-c403-44d2-aa79-1a0ac7c24456
related:
    - id: 9e77ed63-2ecf-4c7b-b09d-640834882028
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects default RemCom pipe creation
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
    - https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-07
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains: '\RemCom'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator activity
level: medium

title: Password Provided In Command Line Of Net.EXE
id: d4498716-1d52-438f-8084-4a603157d131
status: test
description: Detects a when net.exe is called with a password in the command line
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
date: 2021-12-09
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ':*\\'
            - '/USER:* *'
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine|endswith: ' '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Remote Service Activity via SVCCTL Named Pipe
id: 586a8d6b-6bfe-4ad9-9d78-888cd2fe50c3
status: test
description: Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329155141/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-26-remote-windows.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2024-08-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName: svcctl
        AccessList|contains: 'WriteData'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: SMB Spoolss Name Piped Usage
id: bae2865c-5565-470d-b505-9496c87d0c30
status: test
description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
    - https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/
    - https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608
author: OTR (Open Threat Research), @neu5ron
date: 2018-11-28
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path|endswith: 'IPC$'
        name: spoolss
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Domain Controllers that are sometimes, commonly although should not be, acting as printer servers too
level: medium

title: Suspicious New-PSDrive to Admin Share
id: 1c563233-030e-4a07-af8c-ee0490a66d3a
status: test
description: Adversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.md#atomic-test-2---map-admin-share-powershell
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/new-psdrive?view=powershell-7.2
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-PSDrive'
            - '-psprovider '
            - 'filesystem'
            - '-root '
            - '\\\\'
            - '$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Unsigned or Unencrypted SMB Connection to Share Established
id: 8d91f6e4-9f3b-4c21-ae41-2c5b7d9f7a12
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects SMB server connections to shares without signing or encryption enabled.
    This could indicate potential lateral movement activity using unsecured SMB shares.
author: Mohamed Abdelghani
date: 2025-10-19
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/overview-server-message-block-signing
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: smbserver-connectivity
detection:
    selection_shares:
        EventID: 4000
        ShareName|contains:
            - 'IPC$'
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - 'C$'
    selection_status:
        - SigningUsed: 'false'
        - EncyptionUsed: 'false' # Note: typo in the original event field name
    filter_main_local_ips:
        - ClientAddress|cidr:
              # IPv4
              # - '10.0.0.0/8'
              - '127.0.0.0/8'
              - '169.254.0.0/16'
              # - '172.16.0.0/12'
              # - '192.168.0.0/16'
              # IPv6
              - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
              - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
              - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
        # The filters below cover the XML raw log
        - ClientAddress|contains:
              # IPv6
              - '00000000000000000000000000000001' # ::1 - IPv6 loopback
              - 'FE80000000000000' # fe80:: - IPv6 link-local addresses
              - 'FC00000000000000' # fc00:: - IPv6 private addresses
              # IPv4
              # The "?" are meant to represent the port
              # - '0200????C0A8' # 192.168.
              # - '0200????AC' # 172.
              # - '0200????0A' # 10.
              - '0200????7F' # 127
              - '0200????A9FE' # 169.254.
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Connections from local or private IP addresses to SMB shares without signing or encryption enabled for older systems or misconfigured environments. Apply additional tuning as needed.
level: medium

title: Windows Admin Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 3abd6094-7027-475f-9630-8ab9be7b9725
related:
    - id: f117933c-980c-4f78-b384-e3d838111165
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an admin share is mounted using net.exe
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, wagga
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ' \\\\*\\*$'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators
level: medium

title: Access To ADMIN$ Network Share
id: 098d7118-55bc-4912-a836-dc6483a8d150
status: test
description: Detects access to ADMIN$ network share
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5140
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-04
modified: 2024-01-16
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5140
        ShareName: 'Admin$'
    filter_main_computer_account:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: low

title: Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: f117933c-980c-4f78-b384-e3d838111165
related:
    - id: 3abd6094-7027-475f-9630-8ab9be7b9725
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-02
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' use '
            - ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activity by administrators and scripts
level: low