title: Changes to Device Registration Policy
id: 9494bff8-959f-4440-bbce-fb87a208d517
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for changes to the device registration policy.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#device-registrations-and-joins-outside-policy
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1484
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: 'Policy'
        ActivityDisplayName: 'Set device registration policies'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Chopper Webshell Process Pattern
id: fa3c117a-bc0d-416e-a31b-0c0e80653efb
status: test
description: Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_origin:
        - Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '&ipconfig&echo'
            - '&quser&echo'
            - '&whoami&echo'
            - '&c:&echo'
            - '&cd&echo'
            - '&dir&echo'
            - '&echo [E]'
            - '&echo [S]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Chromium Browser Headless Execution To Mockbin Like Site
id: 1c526788-0abe-4713-862f-b520da5e5316
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a Chromium based browser process with the "headless" flag and a URL pointing to the mockbin.org service (which can be used to exfiltrate data).
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/steal-it-campaign
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
    selection_headless:
        CommandLine|contains: '--headless'
    selection_url:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://run.mocky'
            - '://mockbin'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_mockbin_abuse/info.yml

title: Cisco Clear Logs
id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
status: test
description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion
references:
    - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/nexus5000/sw/command/reference/sysmgmt/n5k-sysmgmt-cr/n5k-sm_cmds_c.html
    - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios/12_2sr/12_2sra/feature/guide/srmgtint.html#wp1127609
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'clear logging'
        - 'clear archive'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands
level: high

title: Cisco Crypto Commands
id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d
status: test
description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed
references:
    - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/a1/sec-a1-cr-book/sec-a1-cr-book_chapter_0111.html
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553.004
    - attack.t1552.004
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'crypto pki export'
        - 'crypto pki import'
        - 'crypto pki trustpoint'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates
level: high

title: Cisco Disabling Logging
id: 9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e
status: test
description: Turn off logging locally or remote
references:
    - https://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/security/command/reference/sec_a2.pdf
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-11
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'no logging'
        - 'no aaa new-model'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Cisco Local Accounts
id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
status: test
description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'username'
        - 'aaa'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often
level: high

title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
    - https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
    - https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
    - https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection1:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
    selection2a:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - Remove-Item
            - rm
    selection2b:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ConsoleHost_history.txt
            - (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
    condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Clipboard Data Collection Via OSAScript
id: 7794fa3c-edea-4cff-bec7-267dd4770fd7
related:
    - id: 1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects possible collection of data from the clipboard via execution of the osascript binary
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1115
    - attack.t1059.002
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osascript'
            - ' -e '
            - 'clipboard'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Cmd.EXE Missing Space Characters Execution Anomaly
id: a16980c2-0c56-4de0-9a79-17971979efdd
status: test
description: |
    Detects Windows command lines that miss a space before or after the /c flag when running a command using the cmd.exe.
    This could be a sign of obfuscation of a fat finger problem (typo by the developer).
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1562072617552678912
    - https://ss64.com/nt/cmd.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:  # missing space before the /c
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd.exe/c'
            - '\cmd/c'  # just cmd/c would be prone to false positives
            - '"cmd/c'
            - 'cmd.exe/k'
            - '\cmd/k'  # just cmd/k would be prone to false positives
            - '"cmd/k'
            - 'cmd.exe/r'
            - '\cmd/r'  # just cmd/r would be prone to false positives
            - '"cmd/r'
    selection2: # special cases verified via Virustotal Enterprise search
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/cwhoami'
            - '/cpowershell'
            - '/cschtasks'
            - '/cbitsadmin'
            - '/ccertutil'
            - '/kwhoami'
            - '/kpowershell'
            - '/kschtasks'
            - '/kbitsadmin'
            - '/kcertutil'
    selection3:  # missing space after the /c
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd.exe /c'
            - 'cmd /c'
            - 'cmd.exe /k'
            - 'cmd /k'
            - 'cmd.exe /r'
            - 'cmd /r'
    filter_generic:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd /r '
    filter_fp:
        - CommandLine|contains: 'AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\resources\app\node_modules'
        - CommandLine|endswith: 'cmd.exe/c .'
        - CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c'
    condition: 1 of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CobaltStrike Load by Rundll32
id: ae9c6a7c-9521-42a6-915e-5aaa8689d529
status: test
description: Rundll32 can be use by Cobalt Strike with StartW function to load DLLs from the command line.
references:
    - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/
author: Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-06-01
modified: 2022-09-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_rundll:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'rundll32.exe'
              - 'rundll32 '
    selection_params:
        CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' StartW'
            - ',StartW'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe Patterns
id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7
related:
    - id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a # Regex
      type: similar
    - id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2 # Generic
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a named pipe with a pattern found in CobaltStrike malleable C2 profiles
references:
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
    - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - stp.1k
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection_malleable_profile_generic:
        - PipeName|startswith:
              - '\DserNamePipe'
              - '\f4c3'
              - '\f53f'
              - '\fullduplex_'
              - '\mojo.5688.8052.183894939787088877'
              - '\mojo.5688.8052.35780273329370473'
              - '\MsFteWds'
              - '\msrpc_'
              - '\mypipe-f'
              - '\mypipe-h'
              - '\ntsvcs'
              - '\PGMessagePipe'
              - '\rpc_'
              - '\scerpc'
              - '\SearchTextHarvester'
              - '\spoolss'
              - '\win_svc'
              - '\win\msrpc_'
              - '\windows.update.manager'
              - '\wkssvc'
        - PipeName:
              - '\demoagent_11'
              - '\demoagent_22'
    selection_malleable_profile_catalog_change_listener:
        PipeName|startswith: '\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-'
        PipeName|endswith: '-0,'
    filter_main_generic:
        PipeName:
            - '\wkssvc'
            - '\spoolss'
            - '\scerpc'
            - '\ntsvcs'
            - '\SearchTextHarvester'
            - '\PGMessagePipe'
            - '\MsFteWds'
    filter_optional_websense:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files\Websense\'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Websense\'
        PipeName|startswith:
            - '\DserNamePipeR'
            - '\DserNamePipeW'
    condition: 1 of selection_malleable_profile_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Chrome instances using the exact same pipe name "mojo.xxx"
    - Websense Endpoint using the pipe name "DserNamePipe(R|W)\d{1,5}"
level: high

title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security
id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6
related:
    - id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    event_id:
        EventID: 4697
    selection1:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ServiceFileName|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: event_id and 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Code Executed Via Office Add-in XLL File
id: 36fbec91-fa1b-4d5d-8df1-8d8edcb632ad
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
    Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'new-object '
            - '-ComObject '
            - '.application'
            - '.RegisterXLL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Code Injection by ld.so Preload
id: 7e3c4651-c347-40c4-b1d4-d48590fdf684
status: test
description: Detects the ld.so preload persistence file. See `man ld.so` for more information.
references:
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.006
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        - '/etc/ld.so.preload'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Rare temporary workaround for library misconfiguration
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Blocked Driver Load With Revoked Certificate
id: 9b72b82d-f1c5-4632-b589-187159bc6ec1
status: test
description: Detects blocked load attempts of revoked drivers
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3023 # The driver %2 is blocked from loading as the driver has been revoked by Microsoft.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Blocked Image Load With Revoked Certificate
id: 6f156c48-3894-4952-baf0-16193e9067d2
status: test
description: Detects blocked image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3036 # Windows is unable to verify the integrity of the file %2 because the signing certificate has been revoked.  Check with the publisher to see if a new signed version of the kernel module is available.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Blocked Image/Driver Load For Policy Violation
id: e4be5675-4a53-426a-8c81-a8bb2387e947
status: test
description: Detects blocked load events that did not meet the authenticode signing level requirements or violated the code integrity policy.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1590434950335320065
    - https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/40fe118976734578f83e5e839b9c63ae7a4af82d/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md#windows-codeintegrity-operational-log
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-10
modified: 2023-06-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3077 # Code Integrity determined that a process (%4) attempted to load %2 that did not meet the %5 signing level requirements or violated code integrity policy (Policy ID:%XX).
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Disallowed File For Protected Processes Has Been Blocked
id: 5daf11c3-022b-4969-adb9-365e6c078c7c
status: test
description: Detects block events for files that are disallowed by code integrity for protected processes
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3104 # Windows blocked file %2 which has been disallowed for protected processes.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Revoked Image Loaded
id: 881b7725-47cc-4055-8000-425823344c59
status: test
description: Detects image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 3032 # Code Integrity determined a revoked image %2 is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a new signed version of the image is available.
            - 3035 # Code Integrity determined a revoked image %2 is loaded into the system. The image is allowed to load because kernel mode debugger is attached.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Revoked Kernel Driver Loaded
id: 320fccbf-5e32-4101-82b8-2679c5f007c6
status: test
description: Detects the load of a revoked kernel driver
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 3021 # Code Integrity determined a revoked kernel module %2 is loaded into the system.  Check with the publisher to see if a new signed version of the kernel module is available.
            - 3022 # Code Integrity determined a revoked kernel module %2 is loaded into the system. The image is allowed to load because kernel mode debugger is attached.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Unmet WHQL Requirements For Loaded Kernel Module
id: 2f8cd7a0-9d5a-4f62-9f8b-2c951aa0dd1f
status: test
description: Detects loaded kernel modules that did not meet the WHQL signing requirements.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
modified: 2023-06-14
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 3082 # Code Integrity determined kernel module %2 that did not meet the WHQL requirements is loaded into the system. However, due to code integrity auditing policy, the image was allowed to load
            - 3083 # Code Integrity determined kernel module %2 that did not meet the WHQL requirements is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a WHQL compliant kernel module is available
    filter_optional_vmware:
        FileNameBuffer:
            - 'system32\drivers\vsock.sys'
            - 'System32\drivers\vmci.sys'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Image Loaded
id: c92c24e7-f595-493f-9c98-53d5142f5c18
status: test
description: Detects loaded unsigned image on the system
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3037 # Code Integrity determined an unsigned image %2 is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a signed version of the image is available.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Kernel Module Loaded
id: 951f8d29-f2f6-48a7-859f-0673ff105e6f
status: test
description: Detects the presence of a loaded unsigned kernel module on the system.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3001 # Code Integrity determined an unsigned kernel module %2 is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a signed version of the kernel module is available
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Commands to Clear or Remove the Syslog - Builtin
id: e09eb557-96d2-4de9-ba2d-30f712a5afd3
status: test
description: Detects specific commands commonly used to remove or empty the syslog
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fc614fb4bda24ae8ca2c44e812d12c0fab6dd7a097472a35dd12ded053ab8474
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-10
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        - 'rm /var/log/syslog'
        - 'rm -r /var/log/syslog'
        - 'rm -f /var/log/syslog'
        - 'rm -rf /var/log/syslog'
        - 'mv /var/log/syslog'
        - ' >/var/log/syslog'
        - ' > /var/log/syslog'
    falsepositives:
        - '/syslog.'
    condition: selection and not falsepositives
falsepositives:
    - Log rotation
level: high

title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
    LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
    Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
    - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.localto.net'
            - '.localtonet.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high

title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux
id: c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
    LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
    Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
    - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.localto.net'
            - '.localtonet.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high

title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
id: 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of ngrok
level: high

title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
    - id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high

title: Conhost.exe CommandLine Path Traversal
id: ee5e119b-1f75-4b34-add8-3be976961e39
status: test
description: detects the usage of path traversal in conhost.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/06/indirect-command-execution/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'conhost'
        CommandLine|contains: '/../../'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Control Panel Items
id: 0ba863e6-def5-4e50-9cea-4dd8c7dc46a4
status: test
description: Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
references:
    - https://ired.team/offensive-security/code-execution/code-execution-through-control-panel-add-ins
author: Kyaw Min Thein, Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_)
date: 2020-06-22
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.002
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_reg_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add'
            - 'CurrentVersion\Control Panel\CPLs'
    selection_cpl:
        CommandLine|endswith: '.cpl'
    filter_cpl_sys:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\System32\'
            - '%System%'
            - '|C:\Windows\system32|'
    filter_cpl_igfx:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'regsvr32 '
            - ' /s '
            - 'igfxCPL.cpl'
    condition: all of selection_reg_* or (selection_cpl and not 1 of filter_cpl_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Copy .DMP/.DUMP Files From Remote Share Via Cmd.EXE
id: 044ba588-dff4-4918-9808-3f95e8160606
status: test
description: Detects usage of the copy builtin cmd command to copy files with the ".dmp"/".dump" extension from a remote share
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2023-09-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: copy \\<host>\\<folder>\\process.dmp C:\Users\process.dmp
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy '
            - ' \\\\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.dmp'
            - '.dump'
            - '.hdmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Copy From VolumeShadowCopy Via Cmd.EXE
id: c73124a7-3e89-44a3-bdc1-25fe4df754b1
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the builtin "copy" command that targets a shadow copy (sometimes used to copy registry hives that are in use)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # cmd /c copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM\
        # There is an additional "\" to escape the special "?"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy '
            - '\\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Backup scenarios using the commandline
level: high

title: Copy Passwd Or Shadow From TMP Path
id: fa4aaed5-4fe0-498d-bbc0-08e3346387ba
status: test
description: Detects when the file "passwd" or "shadow" is copied from tmp path
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/
    - https://twitter.com/Joseliyo_Jstnk/status/1620131033474822144
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/cp'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
    selection_file:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'passwd'
            - 'shadow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data
id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
references:
    - https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
    - car.2013-07-001
    - attack.s0404
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_esent_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\esentutl.exe'
    selection_esent_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - 'vss'
            - ' /m '
            - ' /y '
    selection_susp_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\config\RegBack\sam'
            - '\config\RegBack\security'
            - '\config\RegBack\system'
            - '\config\sam'
            - '\config\security'
            - '\config\system '        # space needed to avoid false positives with \config\systemprofile\
            - '\repair\sam'
            - '\repair\security'
            - '\repair\system'
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    condition: all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_paths
falsepositives:
    - Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator.
level: high

title: Create Volume Shadow Copy with Powershell
id: afd12fed-b0ec-45c9-a13d-aa86625dac81
status: test
description: Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1&viewFallbackFrom=powershell-7
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.ds0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - Win32_ShadowCopy
            - ').Create('
            - ClientAccessible
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: CreateDump Process Dump
id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
related:
    - id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
            - ' --full '
            - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
            - ' --name '
            - '.dmp '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high

title: Creation Exe for Service with Unquoted Path
id: 8c3c76ca-8f8b-4b1d-aaf3-81aebcd367c9
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references.
    Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        # Feel free to add more
        TargetFilename: 'C:\program.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Creation of a Local Hidden User Account by Registry
id: 460479f3-80b7-42da-9c43-2cc1d54dbccd
status: test
description: Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387530414185664538
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-03
modified: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '$\(Default)'
        Image|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_add_local_hidden_user/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Create Hidden User in Registry
      technique: T1564.002
      atomic_guid: 173126b7-afe4-45eb-8680-fa9f6400431c

title: Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
id: 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\fgdump-log'
              - '\kirbi'
              - '\pwdump'
              - '\pwhashes'
              - '\wce_ccache'
              - '\wce_krbtkts'
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\cachedump.exe'
              - '\cachedump64.exe'
              - '\DumpExt.dll'
              - '\DumpSvc.exe'
              - '\Dumpy.exe'
              - '\fgexec.exe'
              - '\lsremora.dll'
              - '\lsremora64.dll'
              - '\NTDS.out'
              - '\procdump.exe'
              - '\procdump64.exe'
              - '\procdump64a.exe'
              - '\pstgdump.exe'
              - '\pwdump.exe'
              - '\SAM.out'
              - '\SECURITY.out'
              - '\servpw.exe'
              - '\servpw64.exe'
              - '\SYSTEM.out'
              - '\test.pwd'
              - '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files/info.yml

title: Credential Dumping Activity By Python Based Tool
id: f8be3e82-46a3-4e4e-ada5-8e538ae8b9c9
related:
    - id: 4b9a8556-99c4-470b-a40c-9c8d02c77ed0
      type: obsolete
    - id: 7186e989-4ed7-4f4e-a656-4674b9e3e48b
      type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects LSASS process access for potential credential dumping by a Python-like tool such as LaZagne or Pypykatz.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/bh4b3sh/status/1303674603819081728
    - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
author: Bhabesh Raj, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2023-11-27
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0349
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        CallTrace|contains|all:
            - '_ctypes.pyd+'
            - ':\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll+'
            - ':\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'python27.dll+'
            - 'python3*.dll+'
        GrantedAccess: '0x1FFFFF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Attempt Via Svchost
id: 174afcfa-6e40-4ae9-af64-496546389294
status: test
description: Detects when a process tries to access the memory of svchost to potentially dump credentials.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florent Labouyrie
date: 2021-04-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_access
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        GrantedAccess: '0x143a'
    filter_main_known_processes:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Attempt Via WerFault
id: e5b33f7d-eb93-48b6-9851-09e1e610b6d7
status: test
description: Detects process LSASS memory dump using Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump or Taskmgr based on the CallTrace pointing to ntdll.dll, dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll for win10, server2016 and up.
references:
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump/commit/578116faea3d278d53d70ea932e2bbfe42569507
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2012-06-27
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess: '0x1FFFFF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual failures in lsass.exe that trigger a crash dump (unlikely)
    - Unknown cases in which WerFault accesses lsass.exe
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - Security
id: f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52
related:
    - id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high

title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - System
id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high

title: Credentials In Files
id: 53b1b378-9b06-4992-b972-dde6e423d2b4
status: test
description: Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep and laZagne
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md
author: 'Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '/grep'
        CommandLine|contains: 'password'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'laZagne'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Credentials In Files - Linux
id: df3fcaea-2715-4214-99c5-0056ea59eb35
status: test
description: 'Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep'
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md
author: 'Igor Fits, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2023-04-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'EXECVE'
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'grep'
            - 'password'
    condition: selection and keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Critical Hive In Suspicious Location Access Bits Cleared
id: 39f919f3-980b-4e6f-a975-8af7e507ef2b
related:
    - id: 839dd1e8-eda8-4834-8145-01beeee33acd
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects events from the Kernel-General ETW indicating that the access bits of a hive with a system like hive name located in the temp directory have been reset.
    This occurs when an application tries to access a hive and the hive has not be recognized since the last 7 days (by default).
    Registry hive dumping utilities such as QuarksPwDump were seen emitting this behavior.
references:
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/b20da2336de0f342d31ef4794959d28c8d3ba5ba/ETW/Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-15
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 16
        Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General
        HiveName|contains:
            - '\Temp\SAM'
            - '\Temp\SECURITY'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Cross Site Scripting Strings
id: 65354b83-a2ea-4ea6-8414-3ab38be0d409
status: test
description: Detects XSS attempts injected via GET requests in access logs
references:
    - https://github.com/payloadbox/xss-payload-list
    - https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/contexts
author: Saw Win Naung, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2021-08-15
modified: 2022-06-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1189
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    select_method:
        cs-method: 'GET'
    keywords:
        - '=<script>'
        - '=%3Cscript%3E'
        - '=%253Cscript%253E'
        - '<iframe '
        - '%3Ciframe '
        - '<svg '
        - '%3Csvg '
        - 'document.cookie'
        - 'document.domain'
        - ' onerror='
        - ' onresize='
        - ' onload="'
        - 'onmouseover='
        - '${alert'
        - 'javascript:alert'
        - 'javascript%3Aalert'
    filter:
        sc-status: 404
    condition: select_method and keywords and not filter
falsepositives:
    - JavaScripts,CSS Files and PNG files
    - User searches in search boxes of the respective website
    - Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as "User Agent" strings and more response codes
level: high

title: Crypto Miner User Agent
id: fa935401-513b-467b-81f4-f9e77aa0dd78
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by crypto miners in proxy logs
references:
    - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/da22b3e6c45825f3ac1f208255126cb8585cd4fc/src/base/kernel/Platform_win.cpp#L65
    - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/427b6516e0550200c17ca28675118f0fffcc323f/src/version.h
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|startswith:
        # XMRig
            - 'XMRig '
        # CCMiner
            - 'ccminer'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high