Deployable detection rules
3 vendor-native detections · ready to paste into your SIEM · cross-linked to ATT&CK
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Detections
3 shown of 3Linux Auditd Clipboard Data Copy
The following analytic detects the use of the Linux 'xclip' command to copy data from the clipboard. It leverages Linux Auditd telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to clipboard operations. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit clipboard data to capture sensitive information such as passwords or IP addresses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks within the environment.
Show query
`linux_auditd` execve_command IN ("*xclip*", "*clipboard*") AND execve_command IN ("*-o*", "*-selection *", "*-sel *" )
| rename host as dest
| rename comm as process_name
| rename exe as process
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY argc execve_command dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_auditd_clipboard_data_copy_filter`Linux Clipboard Data Copy
The following analytic detects the use of the Linux 'xclip' command to copy data from the clipboard. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to clipboard operations. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit clipboard data to capture sensitive information such as passwords or IP addresses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks within the environment.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=xclip Processes.process IN ("*-o *", "*-sel *", "*-selection *", "*clip *","*clipboard*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_clipboard_data_copy_filter`Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command 'Get-Clipboard' to retrieve clipboard data. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify instances where this command is used. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or other confidential data copied to the clipboard. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially compromising user accounts and other critical assets.
Show query
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-Clipboard*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_clipboard_data_via_get_clipboard_filter`Showing 1-3 of 3