Deployable detection rules
15 vendor-native detections · ready to paste into your SIEM · cross-linked to ATT&CK
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Detections
15 shown of 15Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to firewall rule registry settings that allow inbound traffic on specific ports with a public profile. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on registry paths and values indicative of such changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to grant remote access to a machine by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized remote access, potentially leading to further exploitation, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules\\*" Registry.registry_value_data = "*|Action=Allow|*" Registry.registry_value_data = "*|Dir=In|*" Registry.registry_value_data = "*|LPort=*") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`
Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule
The following analytic detects a suspicious PowerShell command that allows inbound traffic to a specific local port within the public profile. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify commands containing keywords like "firewall," "Inbound," "Allow," and "-LocalPort." This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to establish remote access by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to the machine, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.
Show query
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*firewall*" ScriptBlockText = "*Inbound*" ScriptBlockText = "*Allow*" ScriptBlockText = "*-LocalPort*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`Remote Desktop Network Traffic
The following analytic detects unusual Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic on TCP/3389 by filtering out known RDP sources and destinations, focusing on atypical connections within the network. This detection leverages network traffic data to identify potentially unauthorized RDP access. Monitoring this activity is crucial for a SOC as unauthorized RDP access can indicate an attacker's attempt to control networked systems, leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further network compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data breaches or complete system and network control loss.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic
WHERE All_Traffic.dest_port=3389
AND
All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination
AND
All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source
AND
All_Traffic.action="allowed"
BY All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port
All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dvc All_Traffic.src_ip
All_Traffic.src_port All_Traffic.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter`Remote Desktop Process Running On System
The following analytic detects the execution of the remote desktop process (mstsc.exe) on systems where it is not typically run. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, filtering out systems categorized as common RDP sources. This activity is significant because unauthorized use of mstsc.exe can indicate lateral movement or unauthorized remote access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain remote control of a system, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or further network compromise.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process=*mstsc.exe
AND
Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter`Windows Default RDP File Creation By Non MSTSC Process
This detection monitors the creation or modification of the Default.rdp file by non mstsc.exe process, typically found in the user's Documents folder. This file is automatically generated or updated by the Remote Desktop Connection client (mstsc.exe) when a user initiates an RDP session. It stores connection settings such as the last-used hostname, screen size, and other preferences. The presence or update of this file strongly suggests that an RDP session has been launched from the system. Since this file is commonly overlooked, it can serve as a valuable artifact in identifying remote access activity, including potential lateral movement or attacker-controlled sessions.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name != mstsc.exe
BY _time span=1h Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| rename process_guid as proc_guid
| join proc_guid, _time [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
WHERE Filesystem.file_name=default.rdp
BY _time span=1h Filesystem.dest
Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
Filesystem.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| rename process_guid as proc_guid
| fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid]
| dedup file_create_time
| table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid
| `windows_default_rdp_file_creation_by_non_mstsc_process_filter`Windows Default Rdp File Unhidden
This detection identifies the use of attrib.exe to remove hidden (-h) or system (-s) attributes from the Default.rdp file, which is automatically created in a user's Documents folder when a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session is initiated using mstsc.exe. The Default.rdp file stores session configuration details such as the remote host address and screen settings. Unhiding this file is uncommon in normal user behavior and may indicate that an attacker or red team operator is attempting to access or manipulate RDP connection history that was previously hidden—either by default or as part of an earlier anti-forensics effort. This activity may represent part of a broader pattern of reconnaissance or staging for credential reuse, lateral movement, or forensic analysis evasion. Monitoring for this behavior can help uncover suspicious manipulation of user artifacts and highlight interactive attacker activity on a compromised host.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name = "attrib.exe" Processes.process IN("*-s*", "*-h*") Processes.process = "*default.rdp*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_default_rdp_file_unhidden_filter`Windows MSTSC RDP Commandline
The following analytic detects the use of the mstsc.exe command-line, which is commonly used to initiate Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections. This detection focuses on instances where mstsc.exe is executed with specific parameters that may indicate suspicious or unauthorized remote access attempts. Monitoring command-line arguments such as /v:<target> for direct connections or /admin for administrative sessions can help identify potential misuse or lateral movement within a network.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name = "mstsc.exe" Processes.process = "*/v:*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_mstsc_rdp_commandline_filter`Windows RDP Bitmap Cache File Creation
This detection identifies the creation of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) bitmap cache files on a Windows system, typically located in the user’s profile under the Terminal Server Client cache directory. These files (*.bmc, cache*.bin) are generated when a user initiates an RDP session using the built-in mstsc.exe client. Their presence can indicate interactive remote access activity and may be useful in detecting lateral movement or unauthorized RDP usage. Monitoring this behavior is especially important, as attackers may attempt to delete or suppress these artifacts to evade forensic analysis.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Terminal Server Client\\Cache\\*.bmc", "*\\Terminal Server Client\\Cache\\cache*.bin") by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_rdp_bitmap_cache_file_creation_filter`Windows RDP Client Launched with Admin Session
This detection identifies the execution of the Windows Remote Desktop Client (mstsc.exe) with the "/v" and /admin command-line arguments. The "/v" flag specifies the remote host to connect to, while the /admin flag initiates a connection to the target system’s console session, often used for administrative purposes. This combination may indicate that a user or attacker is performing privileged remote access, potentially to manage a system without disrupting existing user sessions. While such usage may be legitimate for IT administrators, it is less common in typical user behavior. Threat actors may abuse this capability during lateral movement to maintain stealthy access to high-value systems. Monitoring for this pattern can help detect interactive hands-on-keyboard activity, privilege abuse, or attempts to access critical infrastructure without leaving typical login traces associated with non-admin RDP sessions.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name = "mstsc.exe" Processes.process = "*/v:*" Processes.process = "*/admin*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_rdp_client_launched_with_admin_session_filter`Windows RDP Login Session Was Established
The following analytic detects instances where a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) login session was established, as indicated by Windows Security Event ID 4624 with Logon Type 10. This event confirms that a user has not only provided valid credentials but has also initiated a full interactive RDP session. It is a key indicator of successful remote access to a Windows system. When correlated with Event ID 1149, which logs RDP authentication success, this analytic helps distinguish between mere credential acceptance and actual session establishment—critical for effective monitoring and threat detection.
Show query
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY action app authentication_method
dest dvc process
process_id process_name process_path
signature signature_id src
src_port status subject
user user_group vendor_product
Logon_Type
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_rdp_login_session_was_established_filter`Windows RDP Server Registry Entry Created
This detection identifies the creation of registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\, which occur when a user initiates a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection using the built-in Windows RDP client (mstsc.exe). These registry entries store information about previously connected remote hosts, including usernames and display settings. Their creation is a strong indicator that an outbound RDP session was initiated from the system. While the presence of these keys is normal during legitimate RDP use, their appearance can be used to track remote access activity, especially in environments where RDP is tightly controlled. In post-compromise scenarios, these artifacts may be created by threat actors using RDP for lateral movement or command-and-control. Monitoring the creation of these registry entries can help defenders detect initial use of RDP from a compromised host, particularly when correlated with unusual user behavior, logon patterns, or network activity.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\Servers\\*" Registry.action != deleted by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_rdp_server_registry_entry_created_filter`
Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution
The following analytic detects the execution of the RDPWInst.exe tool, which is an RDP wrapper library used to enable remote desktop host support and concurrent RDP sessions. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and specific command-line arguments. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse this tool to establish unauthorized RDP connections, facilitating remote access and potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and further compromise of the targeted host.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name="RDPWInst.exe"
OR
Processes.original_file_name="RDPWInst.exe"
)
AND Processes.process IN ("* -i*", "* -s*", "* -o*", "* -w*", "* -r*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_remote_service_rdpwinst_tool_execution_filter`Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows firewall to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "netsh.exe" to allow TCP port 3389. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to gain remote access to a compromised host, a common tactic for lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the system, leading to potential data exfiltration or further network compromise.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name = "netsh.exe"
OR
Processes.original_file_name= "netsh.exe"
)
AND Processes.process = "*firewall*" AND Processes.process = "*add*" AND Processes.process = "*protocol=TCP*" AND Processes.process = "*localport=3389*" AND Processes.process = "*action=allow*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_remote_services_allow_rdp_in_firewall_filter`Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance
The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to enable remote desktop assistance on a targeted machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the "Control\\Terminal Server\\fAllowToGetHelp" registry path. This activity is significant because enabling remote assistance via registry is uncommon and often associated with adversaries or malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to remotely access and control the compromised host, leading to potential data exfiltration or further system compromise.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\fAllowToGetHelp*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_remote_assistance_filter`
Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable
The following analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry to enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a targeted machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the "fDenyTSConnections" registry value. This activity is significant as enabling RDP via registry is uncommon and often associated with adversaries or malware attempting to gain remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
Show query
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\fDenyTSConnections*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_rdp_enable_filter`
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