title: JexBoss Command Sequence
id: 8ec2c8b4-557a-4121-b87c-5dfb3a602fae
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command sequence that JexBoss
references:
    - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-312A
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-24
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'bash -c /bin/bash'
            - '&/dev/tcp/'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux
id: 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl.
  This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.
references:
    - https://support.kaspersky.com/KES4Linux/12.0.0/en-US/197929.htm
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Add the list of shells allowed in your environment that can be used to run init.d scripts.
            - '/systemctl'
            - '/bash'
            - '/sh'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'kesl'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administrator manually stopping Kaspersky services
level: high

title: Kavremover Dropped Binary LOLBIN Usage
id: d047726b-c71c-4048-a99b-2e2f50dc107d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a signed binary dropped by Kaspersky Lab Products Remover (kavremover) which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary commands and binaries.
references:
    - https://nasbench.medium.com/lolbined-using-kaspersky-endpoint-security-kes-installer-to-execute-arbitrary-commands-1c999f1b7fea
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' run run-cmd '
    filter_main_legit_parents:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cleanapi.exe' # When launched from KES installer
            - '\kavremover.exe' # When launched from kavremover.exe
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Kerberos Manipulation
id: f7644214-0eb0-4ace-9455-331ec4c09253
status: test
description: Detects failed Kerberos TGT issue operation. This can be a sign of manipulations of TGT messages by an attacker.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-10
modified: 2024-01-16
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1212
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 675
            - 4768
            - 4769
            - 4771
        Status:
            - '0x9'
            - '0xA'
            - '0xB'
            - '0xF'
            - '0x10'
            - '0x11'
            - '0x13'
            - '0x14'
            - '0x1A'
            - '0x1F'
            - '0x21'
            - '0x22'
            - '0x23'
            - '0x24'
            - '0x26'
            - '0x27'
            - '0x28'
            - '0x29'
            - '0x2C'
            - '0x2D'
            - '0x2E'
            - '0x2F'
            - '0x31'
            - '0x32'
            - '0x3E'
            - '0x3F'
            - '0x40'
            - '0x41'
            - '0x43'
            - '0x44'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Faulty legacy applications
level: high

title: Kernel Memory Dump Via LiveKD
id: c7746f1c-47d3-43d6-8c45-cd1e54b6b0a2
status: test
description: Detects execution of LiveKD with the "-m" flag to potentially dump the kernel memory
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/livekd
    - https://4sysops.com/archives/creating-a-complete-memory-dump-without-a-blue-screen/
    - https://kb.acronis.com/content/60892
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\livekd.exe'
              - '\livekd64.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'livekd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -m'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely in production environment
level: high

title: KrbRelayUp Service Installation
id: e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80
status: test
description: Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
references:
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
author: Sittikorn S, Tim Shelton
date: 2022-05-11
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'KrbSCM'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LOL-Binary Copied From System Directory
id: f5d19838-41b5-476c-98d8-ba8af4929ee2
related:
    - id: fff9d2b7-e11c-4a69-93d3-40ef66189767
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a known LOLBIN from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directories to another on disk in order to bypass detections based on locations.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14e722855605ba78dc1d21153f0e1be90e7528149f2cd2d7d6eba8ef27534bdc/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-29
modified: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'copy '
    selection_tools_pwsh:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy-item'
            - ' copy '
            - 'cpi '
            - ' cp '
    selection_tools_other:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\robocopy.exe'
              - '\xcopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'robocopy.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
    selection_target_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\System32'
            - '\SysWOW64'
            - '\WinSxS'
    selection_target_lolbin:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: add more binaries to increase coverage
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\ie4uinit.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_tools_* and all of selection_target_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction
id: a0a278fe-2c0e-4de2-ac3c-c68b08a9ba98
status: test
description: Detects Access to LSASS Process
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-08-26
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        Path|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    filter_thor:
        ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\thor64.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'
    filter_exact:
        ProcessName:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
    filter_begins:
        ProcessName|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\'
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\Installer\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe
    - Some Taskmgr.exe related activity
level: high

title: LSASS Access From Potentially White-Listed Processes
id: 4be8b654-0c01-4c9d-a10c-6b28467fc651
status: test
description: |
    Detects a possible process memory dump that uses a white-listed filename like TrolleyExpress.exe as a way to dump the LSASS process memory without Microsoft Defender interference
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-10
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\TrolleyExpress.exe'  # Citrix
            - '\ProcessDump.exe'     # Cisco Jabber
            - '\dump64.exe'          # Visual Studio
        GrantedAccess|endswith:
            - '10'
            - '30'
            - '50'
            - '70'
            - '90'
            - 'B0'
            - 'D0'
            - 'F0'
            - '18'
            - '38'
            - '58'
            - '78'
            - '98'
            - 'B8'
            - 'D8'
            - 'F8'
            - '1A'
            - '3A'
            - '5A'
            - '7A'
            - '9A'
            - 'BA'
            - 'DA'
            - 'FA'
            - '0x14C2'  # https://github.com/b4rtik/ATPMiniDump/blob/76304f93b390af3bb66e4f451ca16562a479bdc9/ATPMiniDump/ATPMiniDump.c
            - 'FF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LSASS Dump Keyword In CommandLine
id: ffa6861c-4461-4f59-8a41-578c39f3f23e
related:
    - id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to dump or create a dump of the lsass process.
references:
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
author: E.M. Anhaus, Tony Lambert, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'lsass.dmp'
              - 'lsass.zip'
              - 'lsass.rar'
              - 'Andrew.dmp'
              - 'Coredump.dmp'
              - 'NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
              - 'lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
              - 'lsassdump'
              - 'lsassdmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'lsass'
              - '.dmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'SQLDmpr'
              - '.mdmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'nanodump'
              - '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name
id: 9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3
status: test
description: Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the "dump" keyword in its image name.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-10
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|contains: 'dump'
        GrantedAccess|endswith:
            - '10'
            - '30'
            - '50'
            - '70'
            - '90'
            - 'B0'
            - 'D0'
            - 'F0'
            - '18'
            - '38'
            - '58'
            - '78'
            - '98'
            - 'B8'
            - 'D8'
            - 'F8'
            - '1A'
            - '3A'
            - '5A'
            - '7A'
            - '9A'
            - 'BA'
            - 'DA'
            - 'FA'
            - '0x14C2'  # https://github.com/b4rtik/ATPMiniDump/blob/76304f93b390af3bb66e4f451ca16562a479bdc9/ATPMiniDump/ATPMiniDump.c
            - 'FF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass
level: high

title: LSASS Process Crashed - Application
id: a18e0862-127b-43ca-be12-1a542c75c7c5
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).
    This could be the cause of a provoked crash by techniques such as Lsass-Shtinkering to dump credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-erref/596a1078-e883-4972-9bbc-49e60bebca55
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-07
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'lsass.exe'
        ExceptionCode: 'c0000001' # STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate crashing of the lsass process
level: high

title: LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder
id: 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625
status: test
description: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash'
date: 2022-12-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\'
        TargetFilename|contains: 'lsass.exe.'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate dump of the process by the operating system due to a crash of lsass
level: high

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE
id: 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364
status: test
description: Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-10-19
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/987e3ca988ae3cff4b9f6e388c139c05bf44bbb8/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#L1
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\taskmgr.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\lsass'
            - '.DMP'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare case of troubleshooting by an administrator or support that has to be investigated regardless
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_taskmgr_lsass_dump/info.yml

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Files
id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
related:
    - id: db2110f3-479d-42a6-94fb-d35bc1e46492
      type: obsolete
    - id: 5e3d3601-0662-4af0-b1d2-36a05e90c40a
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials.
references:
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=procdump+lsass
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
    - https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/1a9b026b477587becfb62df9677cede619d42030/src/main.rs#L35
    - https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2024-10-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\Andrew.dmp'
            - '\Coredump.dmp'
            - '\lsass.dmp'
            - '\lsass.rar'
            - '\lsass.zip'
            - '\NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
            - '\PPLBlade.dmp'  # https://github.com/tastypepperoni/PPLBlade
            - '\rustive.dmp' # https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/main/src/main.rs#L35
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
            - '\lsassdmp'
            - '\lsassdump'
    selection_3:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\lsass'
            - '.dmp'
    selection_4:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'SQLDmpr'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.mdmp'
    selection_5:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\nanodump'
            - '\proc_' # NativeDump pattern https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LSASS Process Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE
id: fe63010f-8823-4864-a96b-a7b4a0f7b929
status: test
description: Detects findstring commands that include the keyword lsass, which indicates recon actviity for the LSASS process PID
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_findstr_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'FIND.EXE'
              - 'FINDSTR.EXE'
    selection_findstr_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'lsass'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /i "lsass'
            - ' /i lsass.exe'
            - 'findstr "lsass'
            - 'findstr lsass'
            - 'findstr.exe "lsass'
            - 'findstr.exe lsass'
    condition: all of selection_findstr_* or selection_special
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_lsass/info.yml

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
id: 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables
            - \winword.exe
            - \excel.exe
            - \powerpnt.exe
            - \msaccess.exe
            - \mspub.exe
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \visio.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - \finger.exe
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - \notepad.exe
            - \AcroRd32.exe
            - \RdrCEF.exe
            - \mshta.exe
            - \hh.exe
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
            - '.diagcab'
            - '.appx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Executable
id: f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.ocx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Script
id: 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.scf'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
related:
    - id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac # bitsadmin dedicated rule
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
    Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            - '\expand.exe'
            - '\extrac32.exe'
            - '\replace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\ftp.exe'
            - '\Ldifde.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
    selection_locations:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml

title: Linux Command History Tampering
id: fdc88d25-96fb-4b7c-9633-c0e417fdbd4e
status: test
description: |
    Detects commands that try to clear or tamper with the Linux command history.
    This technique is used by threat actors in order to evade defenses and execute commands without them being recorded in files such as "bash_history" or "zsh_history".
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.md
    - https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/2016/06/20/covering-your-bash-shell-tracks-antiforensics
    - https://www.cadosecurity.com/spinning-yarn-a-new-linux-malware-campaign-targets-docker-apache-hadoop-redis-and-confluence/
author: Patrick Bareiss
date: 2019-03-24
modified: 2024-04-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'cat /dev/null >*sh_history'
        - 'cat /dev/zero >*sh_history'
        - 'chattr +i*sh_history'
        - 'echo "" >*sh_history'
        - 'empty_bash_history'
        - 'export HISTFILESIZE=0'
        - 'history -c'
        - 'history -w'
        - 'ln -sf /dev/null *sh_history'
        - 'ln -sf /dev/zero *sh_history'
        - 'rm *sh_history'
        - 'shopt -ou history'
        - 'shopt -uo history'
        - 'shred *sh_history'
        - 'truncate -s0 *sh_history'
        # - 'unset HISTFILE'  # prone to false positives
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Linux Crypto Mining Indicators
id: 9069ea3c-b213-4c52-be13-86506a227ab1
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners
references:
    - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --cpu-priority='
            - '--donate-level=0'
            - ' -o pool.'
            - ' --nicehash'
            - ' --algo=rx/0 '
            - 'stratum+tcp://'
            - 'stratum+udp://'
            # Sub process started by xmrig - the most popular Monero crypto miner - unknown if this causes any false positives
            - 'sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on'
            # base64 encoded: --donate-level=
            - 'LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9'
            - '0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP'
            - 'tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD'
            # base64 encoded: stratum+tcp:// and stratum+udp://
            - 'c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly'
            - 'N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v'
            - 'zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL'
            - 'c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly'
            - 'N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v'
            - 'zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of crypto miners
level: high

title: Linux Crypto Mining Pool Connections
id: a46c93b7-55ed-4d27-a41b-c259456c4746
status: stable
description: Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool
references:
    - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname:
            - 'pool.minexmr.com'
            - 'fr.minexmr.com'
            - 'de.minexmr.com'
            - 'sg.minexmr.com'
            - 'ca.minexmr.com'
            - 'us-west.minexmr.com'
            - 'pool.supportxmr.com'
            - 'mine.c3pool.com'
            - 'xmr-eu1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-eu2.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-asia1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-jp1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-au1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr.2miners.com'
            - 'xmr.hashcity.org'
            - 'xmr.f2pool.com'
            - 'xmrpool.eu'
            - 'pool.hashvault.pro'
            - 'moneroocean.stream'
            - 'monerocean.stream'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of crypto miners
level: high

title: Linux HackTool Execution
id: a015e032-146d-4717-8944-7a1884122111
status: test
description: Detects known hacktool execution based on image name.
references:
    - https://github.com/Gui774ume/ebpfkit
    - https://github.com/pathtofile/bad-bpf
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
    - https://github.com/t3l3machus/hoaxshell
    - https://github.com/t3l3machus/Villain
    - https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc
    - https://github.com/1N3/Sn1per
    - https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2023-01-03
modified: 2024-09-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_c2_frameworks:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/crackmapexec'
            - '/havoc'
            - '/merlin-agent'
            - '/merlinServer-Linux-x64'
            - '/msfconsole'
            - '/msfvenom'
            - '/ps-empire server'
            - '/ps-empire'
            - '/sliver-client'
            - '/sliver-server'
            - '/Villain.py'
    selection_c2_framework_cobaltstrike:
        Image|contains:
            - '/cobaltstrike'
            - '/teamserver'
    selection_scanners:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/autorecon'
            - '/httpx'
            - '/legion'
            - '/naabu'
            - '/netdiscover'
            - '/nuclei'
            - '/recon-ng'
    selection_scanners_sniper:
        Image|contains: '/sniper'
    selection_web_enum:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/dirb'
            - '/dirbuster'
            - '/eyewitness'
            - '/feroxbuster'
            - '/ffuf'
            - '/gobuster'
            - '/wfuzz'
            - '/whatweb'
    selection_web_vuln:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/joomscan'
            - '/nikto'
            - '/wpscan'
    selection_exploit_tools:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/aircrack-ng'
            - '/bloodhound-python'
            - '/bpfdos'
            - '/ebpfki'
            - '/evil-winrm'
            - '/hashcat'
            - '/hoaxshell.py'
            - '/hydra'
            - '/john'
            - '/ncrack'
            # default binary: https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/releases/download/v1.0.0/nxc-ubuntu-latest
            - '/nxc-ubuntu-latest'
            - '/pidhide'
            - '/pspy32'
            - '/pspy32s'
            - '/pspy64'
            - '/pspy64s'
            - '/setoolkit'
            - '/sqlmap'
            - '/writeblocker'
    selection_linpeas:
        # covers: all linux versions listed here: https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases
        Image|contains: '/linpeas'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Linux Keylogging with Pam.d
id: 49aae26c-450e-448b-911d-b3c13d178dfc
status: test
description: Detect attempt to enable auditing of TTY input
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.md
    - https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_tty_audit
    - https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/sec-configuring_pam_for_auditing
    - https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-05-24
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1056.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_path_events:
        type: PATH
        name:
            - '/etc/pam.d/system-auth'
            - '/etc/pam.d/password-auth'
    selection_tty_events:
        type:
            - 'TTY'
            - 'USER_TTY'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative work
level: high

title: Linux Recon Indicators
id: 0cf7a157-8879-41a2-8f55-388dd23746b7
status: test
description: Detects events with patterns found in commands used for reconnaissance on linux systems
references:
    - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/blob/0d701080bbf92efd464e97d71a70f97c6f2cd658/linuxprivchecker.py
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1592.004
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -name .htpasswd'
            - ' -perm -4000 '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: high

title: Linux Webshell Indicators
id: 818f7b24-0fba-4c49-a073-8b755573b9c7
status: test
description: Detects suspicious sub processes of web server processes
references:
    - https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/web-shells-101-using-php-introduction-web-shells-part-2/
    - https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-12-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_general:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/httpd'
            - '/lighttpd'
            - '/nginx'
            - '/apache2'
            - '/node'
            - '/caddy'
    selection_tomcat:
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/bin/java'
            - 'tomcat'
    selection_websphere:  # ? just guessing
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/bin/java'
            - 'websphere'
    sub_processes:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/whoami'
            - '/ifconfig'
            - '/ip'
            - '/bin/uname'
            - '/bin/cat'
            - '/bin/crontab'
            - '/hostname'
            - '/iptables'
            - '/netstat'
            - '/pwd'
            - '/route'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and sub_processes
falsepositives:
    - Web applications that invoke Linux command line tools
level: high

title: Live Memory Dump Using Powershell
id: cd185561-4760-45d6-a63e-a51325112cae
status: test
description: Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/get-storagediagnosticinfo?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-StorageDiagnosticInfo'
            - '-IncludeLiveDump'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Diagnostics
level: high

title: LiveKD Driver Creation By Uncommon Process
id: 059c5af9-5131-4d8d-92b2-de4ad6146712
related:
    - id: 16fe46bb-4f64-46aa-817d-ff7bec4a2352
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver by a process image other than "livekd.exe".
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\LiveKdD.SYS'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\livekd.exe'
            - '\livek64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators might rename LiveKD before its usage which could trigger this. Add additional names you use to the filter
level: high

title: LiveKD Kernel Memory Dump File Created
id: 814ddeca-3d31-4265-8e07-8cc54fb44903
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file that has the same name as the default LiveKD kernel memory dump.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\livekd.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - In rare occasions administrators might leverage LiveKD to perform live kernel debugging. This should not be allowed on production systems. Investigate and apply additional filters where necessary.
level: high

title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process
id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8
related:
    - id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process.
    This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows.
    It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/
    - https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-destruction-software-BiBi-which-consumes-a-lot-of-processor-resources-to-wipe-Windows-computer-data--iThome.html
author: Luc Génaux
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\RstrtMgr.dll'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RstrtMgr.dll'
    selection_folders_1:
        Image|contains:
            # Note: increase coverage by adding more suspicious paths
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Processes related to software installation
level: high

title: Loading Diagcab Package From Remote Path
id: 50cb47b8-2c33-4b23-a2e9-4600657d9746
status: test
description: Detects loading of diagcab packages from a remote path, as seen in DogWalk vulnerability
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1539679555908141061
    - https://twitter.com/j00sean/status/1537750439701225472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: diagnosis-scripted
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 101
        PackagePath|contains: '\\\\' # Example would be: \\webdav-test.herokuapp.com@ssl\DavWWWRoot\package
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate package hosted on a known and authorized remote location
level: high

title: Loading of Kernel Module via Insmod
id: 106d7cbd-80ff-4985-b682-a7043e5acb72
status: test
description: |
    Detects loading of kernel modules with insmod command.
    Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand.
    Adversaries may use LKMs to obtain persistence within the system or elevate the privileges.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.md
    - https://linux.die.net/man/8/insmod
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/kmod.8.html
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-11-02
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1547.006
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        comm: insmod
        exe: /usr/bin/kmod
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Local Privilege Escalation Indicator TabTip
id: bc2e25ed-b92b-4daa-b074-b502bdd1982b
status: test
description: Detects the invocation of TabTip via CLSID as seen when JuicyPotatoNG is used on a system in brute force mode
references:
    - https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-07
modified: 2023-04-14
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-DistributedCOM'
        EventID: 10001
        param1: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\TabTip.exe'  # Binary starting/started
        param2: 2147943140                                                       # ERROR id
        param3: '{054AAE20-4BEA-4347-8A35-64A533254A9D}'                         # DCOM Server
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host
id: c830f15d-6f6e-430f-8074-6f73d6807841
status: test
description: Detect changes of syslog daemons configuration files
references:
    - self experience
author: Mikhail Larin, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name:
            - /etc/syslog.conf
            - /etc/rsyslog.conf
            - /etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: high

title: Lolbas OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe Proxy Download
id: 3aff0be0-7802-4a7e-a4fa-c60c74bc5e1d
status: test
description: |
    Detects setting a custom URL for OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe to download a file from the Internet without executing any
    anomalous executables with suspicious arguments. The downloaded file will be in C:\Users\redacted\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\StandaloneUpdaterreSignInSettingsConfig.json
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OneDriveStandaloneUpdater/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-28
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OneDrive\UpdateOfficeConfig\UpdateRingSettingURLFromOC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Lsass Full Dump Request Via DumpType Registry Settings
id: 33efc23c-6ea2-4503-8cfe-bdf82ce8f719
status: test
description: Detects the setting of the "DumpType" registry value to "2" which stands for a "Full Dump". Technique such as LSASS Shtinkering requires this value to be "2" in order to dump LSASS.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wer/collecting-user-mode-dumps
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash'
date: 2022-12-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LocalDumps\DumpType'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LocalDumps\lsass.exe\DumpType'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Full Dump
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate application that needs to do a full dump of their process
level: high

title: Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs DLL
id: a49fa4d5-11db-418c-8473-1e014a8dd462
status: test
description: Detects adversaries leveraging the MiniDump export function from comsvcs.dll via rundll32 to perform a memory dump from lsass.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
    - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-20
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CallTrace|contains: 'comsvcs.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MMC Executing Files with Reversed Extensions Using RTLO Abuse
id: 9cfe4b27-1e56-48b4-b7a8-d46851c91a44
status: experimental
description: Detects malicious behavior where the MMC utility (`mmc.exe`) executes files with reversed extensions caused by Right-to-Left Override (RLO) abuse, disguising them as document formats.
references:
    - https://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode5.2.0/ch02.pdf
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-to-left_override
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.014
    - attack.t1036.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MMC.exe'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains: # While looking at these files the prefix of their name will look something like csm.pdf, but in reality it is msc file
            - 'cod.msc'  # Reversed `.doc`
            - 'fdp.msc'  # Reversed `.pdf`
            - 'ftr.msc'  # Reversed `.rtf`
            - 'lmth.msc'  # Reversed `.html`
            - 'slx.msc'  # Reversed `.xls`
            - 'tdo.msc'  # Reversed `.odt`
            - 'xcod.msc'  # Reversed `.docx`
            - 'xslx.msc'  # Reversed `.xlsx`
            - 'xtpp.msc'  # Reversed `.pptx`
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions using MMC to execute misnamed `.msc` files.
    - Unconventional but non-malicious usage of RLO or reversed extensions.
level: high

title: MMC Spawning Windows Shell
id: 05a2ab7e-ce11-4b63-86db-ab32e763e11d
status: test
description: Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
author: Karneades, Swisscom CSIRT
date: 2019-08-05
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
    selection2:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
        - Image|contains: '\BITSADMIN'
    condition: all of selection*
level: high

title: MMC20 Lateral Movement
id: f1f3bf22-deb2-418d-8cce-e1a45e46a5bd
status: test
description: Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view?usp=sharing
author: '@2xxeformyshirt (Security Risk Advisors) - rule; Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea)'
date: 2020-03-04
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '-Embedding'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: MSDT Execution Via Answer File
id: 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab).
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-13
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af '
    filter_main_pcwrun:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pcwrun.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Possible undocumented parents of "msdt" other than "pcwrun".
level: high

title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content,
    such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications
    containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and
    execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection.
references:
    - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
    - https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
    - https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-22
modified: 2025-05-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1218.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - cve.2020-1599
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'mshta.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.7z'
            - '.avi'
            - '.bat'
            - '.bmp'
            - '.conf'
            - '.csv'
            - '.dll'
            - '.doc'
            - '.gif'
            - '.gz'
            - '.ini'
            - '.jpe'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.json'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.log'
            - '.mkv'
            - '.mp3'
            - '.mp4'
            - '.pdf'
            - '.png'
            - '.ppt'
            - '.rar'
            - '.rtf'
            - '.svg'
            - '.tar'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.txt'
            - '.xls'
            - '.xml'
            - '.yaml'
            - '.yml'
            - '.zip'
            - 'vbscript'
            # - '.chm'  # could be prone to false positives
            # - '.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: MSSQL Add Account To Sysadmin Role
id: 08200f85-2678-463e-9c32-88dce2f073d1
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker tries to backdoor the MSSQL server by adding a backdoor account to the sysadmin fixed server role
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-13
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log'
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 33205
        Data|contains|all:
            - 'object_name:sysadmin'
            - 'statement:alter server role [sysadmin] add member '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate administrative activity
level: high

title: MSSQL Disable Audit Settings
id: 350dfb37-3706-4cdc-9e2e-5e24bc3a46df
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker calls the "ALTER SERVER AUDIT" or "DROP SERVER AUDIT" transaction in order to delete or disable audit logs on the server
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-server-audit-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/alter-server-audit-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-13
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log'
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 33205
        Data|contains:
            - 'statement:ALTER SERVER AUDIT'
            - 'statement:DROP SERVER AUDIT'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This event should only fire when an administrator is modifying the audit policy. Which should be a rare occurrence once it's set up
level: high

title: MSSQL SPProcoption Set
id: b3d57a5c-c92e-4b48-9a79-5f124b7cf964
status: test
description: Detects when the a stored procedure is set or cleared for automatic execution in MSSQL. A stored procedure that is set to automatic execution runs every time an instance of SQL Server is started
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/sp-procoption-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-13
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy to monitor for "sp_procoption" must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log'
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 33205
        Data|contains|all:
            - 'object_name:sp_procoption'
            - 'statement:EXEC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the feature by administrators (rare)
level: high

title: MSSQL XPCmdshell Option Change
id: d08dd86f-681e-4a00-a92c-1db218754417
status: test
description: |
    Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure setting is changed.
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 15457
        Data|contains: 'xp_cmdshell'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate enable/disable of the setting
    - Note that since the event contain the change for both values. This means that this will trigger on both enable and disable
level: high

title: MSSQL XPCmdshell Suspicious Execution
id: 7f103213-a04e-4d59-8261-213dddf22314
status: test
description: Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure is used to execute commands
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy to monitor for "xp_cmdshell" must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log (Follow this tutorial https://dba.stackexchange.com/questions/103183/is-there-any-way-to-monitor-execution-of-xp-cmdshell-in-sql-server-2012)'
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 33205
        Data|contains|all:
            # You can modify this to include specific commands
            - 'object_name:xp_cmdshell'
            - 'statement:EXEC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document
id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd
related:
    - id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_value:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords'
    selection_paths:
        TargetObject|contains:
            # Note: add more locations where you don't expect a user to executed macro enabled docs
            - '/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/'
            - '/AppData/Local/Temp/'
            - '/PerfLogs/'
            - 'C:/Users/Public/'
            - 'file:///D:/'
            - 'file:///E:/'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines
id: f26c6093-6f14-4b12-800f-0fcb46f5ffd0
status: test
description: Detects base64 encoded strings used in hidden malicious PowerShell command lines
references:
    - http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/09/21/searching-for-content-in-base-64-strings/
author: John Lambert (rule)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_hidden:
        CommandLine|contains: ' hidden '
    selection_encoded:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AGkAdABzAGEAZABtAGkAbgAgAC8AdAByAGEAbgBzAGYAZQByA'
            - 'aXRzYWRtaW4gL3RyYW5zZmVy'
            - 'IAaQB0AHMAYQBkAG0AaQBuACAALwB0AHIAYQBuAHMAZgBlAHIA'
            - 'JpdHNhZG1pbiAvdHJhbnNmZX'
            - 'YgBpAHQAcwBhAGQAbQBpAG4AIAAvAHQAcgBhAG4AcwBmAGUAcg'
            - 'Yml0c2FkbWluIC90cmFuc2Zlc'
            - 'AGMAaAB1AG4AawBfAHMAaQB6AGUA'
            - 'JABjAGgAdQBuAGsAXwBzAGkAegBlA'
            - 'JGNodW5rX3Npem'
            - 'QAYwBoAHUAbgBrAF8AcwBpAHoAZQ'
            - 'RjaHVua19zaXpl'
            - 'Y2h1bmtfc2l6Z'
            - 'AE8ALgBDAG8AbQBwAHIAZQBzAHMAaQBvAG4A'
            - 'kATwAuAEMAbwBtAHAAcgBlAHMAcwBpAG8Abg'
            - 'lPLkNvbXByZXNzaW9u'
            - 'SQBPAC4AQwBvAG0AcAByAGUAcwBzAGkAbwBuA'
            - 'SU8uQ29tcHJlc3Npb2'
            - 'Ty5Db21wcmVzc2lvb'
            - 'AE8ALgBNAGUAbQBvAHIAeQBTAHQAcgBlAGEAbQ'
            - 'kATwAuAE0AZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtA'
            - 'lPLk1lbW9yeVN0cmVhb'
            - 'SQBPAC4ATQBlAG0AbwByAHkAUwB0AHIAZQBhAG0A'
            - 'SU8uTWVtb3J5U3RyZWFt'
            - 'Ty5NZW1vcnlTdHJlYW'
            - '4ARwBlAHQAQwBoAHUAbgBrA'
            - '5HZXRDaHVua'
            - 'AEcAZQB0AEMAaAB1AG4Aaw'
            - 'LgBHAGUAdABDAGgAdQBuAGsA'
            - 'LkdldENodW5r'
            - 'R2V0Q2h1bm'
            - 'AEgAUgBFAEEARABfAEkATgBGAE8ANgA0A'
            - 'QASABSAEUAQQBEAF8ASQBOAEYATwA2ADQA'
            - 'RIUkVBRF9JTkZPNj'
            - 'SFJFQURfSU5GTzY0'
            - 'VABIAFIARQBBAEQAXwBJAE4ARgBPADYANA'
            - 'VEhSRUFEX0lORk82N'
            - 'AHIAZQBhAHQAZQBSAGUAbQBvAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAGEAZA'
            - 'cmVhdGVSZW1vdGVUaHJlYW'
            - 'MAcgBlAGEAdABlAFIAZQBtAG8AdABlAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkA'
            - 'NyZWF0ZVJlbW90ZVRocmVhZ'
            - 'Q3JlYXRlUmVtb3RlVGhyZWFk'
            - 'QwByAGUAYQB0AGUAUgBlAG0AbwB0AGUAVABoAHIAZQBhAGQA'
            - '0AZQBtAG0AbwB2AGUA'
            - '1lbW1vdm'
            - 'AGUAbQBtAG8AdgBlA'
            - 'bQBlAG0AbQBvAHYAZQ'
            - 'bWVtbW92Z'
            - 'ZW1tb3Zl'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high