Home/CVE/The InPost PL WordPress plugin before 1.9.1 does not verify that the request originates from the legitimate buyer before
CVE
CVE-2026-9702
The InPost PL WordPress plugin before 1.9.1 does not verify that the request originates from the legitimate buyer before
The InPost PL WordPress plugin before 1.9.1 does not verify that the request originates from the legitimate buyer before allowing the WooCommerce order parcel-locker destination to be updated, allowing unauthenticated attackers to silently redirect the shipping destination of any pending or processing order on the site.
HIGH · CVSS 7.5
EPSS 0.00208
EPSS exploitation odds0.21% · top 88%
Schedule remediation
- SSVC automatable: yes - attacks can be scripted at scale
- CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
No Sigma yet — build one →
YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
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How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-9702, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked.
EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal.
CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score.
Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits.
PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
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Exploitation evidence
1 of 7 sources
Corroboration score 8/100 ·
emerging.
This counts how many independent sources have exploitation evidence, and separates two different things:
confirmed in-the-wild use (CISA KEV, Microsoft MSRC, ransomware activity) from
exploit / PoC availability (Metasploit, ExploitDB, Nuclei, public PoCs). A template or PoC existing means
an attack is possible and easy - it is not, on its own, proof the CVE is being exploited in the wild.
Exploit / PoC available
public PoC
EPSS exploitation probability
0.21%
Top 88%odds of exploitation in the next 30 days
CVSS metric silhouette
shape grows toward worst-case
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
poc
Automatable
yes
Tech impact
partial
CVSS vector breakdown
Exploitability - how they get in
Attack Vector
Network
Adjacent
Local
Physical
Attack Complexity
Low
High
Privileges Required
None
Low
High
User Interaction
None
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Changed
Impact - what breaks
Confidentiality
None
Low
High
Integrity
None
Low
High
Availability
None
Low
High
VECTOR
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N◆
ATT&CK techniques
1Techniques this CVE enables. Pills with a solid outline are high confidence - named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei, or human-curated by CTID; the rest are inferred from the weakness type using MITRE's CVE Mapping Methodology and the CWE → CAPEC chain. Broad, generic-weakness guesses are filtered out. A small N× marks a technique that N independent sources agree on.
▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques🔗
References & Sources
1Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.