CVE-2026-57079
Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..".
A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.
- No active-exploitation, high-EPSS, or public-exploit signals - routine patching cadence
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NATT&CK techniques
1Techniques this CVE enables. Pills with a solid outline are high confidence - named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei, or human-curated by CTID; the rest are inferred from the weakness type using MITRE's CVE Mapping Methodology and the CWE → CAPEC chain. Broad, generic-weakness guesses are filtered out. A small N× marks a technique that N independent sources agree on.
▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniquesCAPEC attack patterns
5Attack patterns this CVE enables - the bridge from weakness to ATT&CK technique.