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CVE-2026-56446

MISP allowed a site administrator to configure an arbitrary filesystem path for the NDJSON error log used by JsonLogTool

MISP allowed a site administrator to configure an arbitrary filesystem path for the NDJSON error log used by JsonLogTool. Because log entries can include attacker-controlled content, an authenticated attacker with site administrator privileges could direct log output to a PHP file in a web-accessible directory and inject PHP code through logged data. Accessing the resulting file could lead to remote code execution with the privileges of the web server process.

The fix restricts log destinations to existing directories beneath APP/tmp/logs or /var/log, requires absolute paths, rejects stream wrappers and traversal-related input, and limits filenames to .log or .ndjson extensions while disallowing executable extension segments.

Monitor
  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-56446, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

ATT&CK techniques

4

Techniques this CVE enables. Pills with a solid outline are high confidence - named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei, or human-curated by CTID; the rest are inferred from the weakness type using MITRE's CVE Mapping Methodology and the CWE → CAPEC chain. Broad, generic-weakness guesses are filtered out. A small marks a technique that N independent sources agree on.

▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques

CAPEC attack patterns

3
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References & Sources

1
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.