Home/CVE/In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels
CVE

CVE-2026-53358

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen() l2cap_chan_close() removes the channel from conn-chan_l, which must be done under conn-lock. cleanup_listen() runs under the parent sk_lock, so acquiring conn-lock would invert the established conn-lock - chan-lock - sk_lock order. Instead of calling l2cap_chan_close() directly, schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel asynchronously. The timeout handler already acquires conn-lock and chan-lock in the correct order. The timer is only armed when chan-conn is still set: if it is already NULL, l2cap_conn_del() has already processed this channel (l2cap_chan_del + l2cap_sock_teardown_cb + l2cap_sock_close_cb), so there is nothing left to do. If l2cap_conn_del() races in after the timer is armed, __clear_chan_timer() inside l2cap_chan_del() cancels it.

if the timer has already fired, the handler returns harmlessly because chan-conn was cleared.

Monitor
  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-53358, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).