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CVE

CVE-2026-53308

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: max77705: Free allocated workqueue a

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: max77705: Free allocated workqueue and fix removal order Use devm interface for allocating workqueue to fix two bugs at the same time: 1. Driver leaks the memory on remove(), because the workqueue is not destroyed. 2. Driver allocates workqueue and then registers interrupt handlers with devm interface.

This means that probe error paths will not use a reversed order, but first destroy the workqueue and then, via devm release handlers, free the interrupt. The interrupt handler schedules work on this exact workqueue, thus if interrupt is hit in this short time window - after destroying workqueue, but before devm() frees the interrupt - the schedulled work will lead to use of freed memory. Change is not equivalent in the workqueue itself: use non-legacy API which does not set (__WQ_LEGACY | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM).

The workqueue is used to update power supply (power_supply_changed()) status, thus there is no point to run it for memory reclaim. Note that dev_name() is not directly used in second argument to prevent possible unlikely parsing any "%" character in device name as format.

Monitor
  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-53308, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
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References & Sources

2
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.