Home/CVE/In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions i
CVE

CVE-2026-46275

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions i

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths Vulnerabilities leading to Use-After-Free (UAF) and Null Pointer Dereference (NPD) conditions were observed in the lifecycle management of hci_uart. The primary issue arises because the workqueues (init_ready and write_work) are only flushed/cancelled if the HCI_UART_PROTO_READY flag is set during TTY close. If a hangup occurs before setup completes, hci_uart_tty_close() skips the teardown of these workqueues and proceeds to free the hu struct.

When the scheduled work executes later, it blindly dereferences the freed hu struct. Furthermore, several data races and UAFs were identified in the teardown sequence: 1. Calling hci_uart_flush() from hci_uart_close() without effectively disabling write_work causes a race condition where both can concurrently double-free hu-tx_skb.

This happens because protocol timers can concurrently invoke hci_uart_tx_wakeup() and requeue write_work. 2. Calling hci_free_dev(hdev) before hu-proto-close(hu) causes a UAF when vendor specific protocol close callbacks dereference hu-hdev. 3. In the initialization error paths, failing to take the proto_lock write lock before clearing PROTO_READY leads to races with active readers.

Additionally, hci_uart_tty_receive() accesses hu-hdev outside the read lock, leading to UAFs if the initialization error path frees hdev concurrently. Fix these synchronization and lifecycle issues by: 1. Re-ordering hci_uart_tty_close() to clear HCI_UART_PROTO_READY first, followed immediately by a cancel_work_sync(&hu-write_work).

Clearing the flag locks out concurrent protocol timers from successfully invoking hci_uart_tx_wakeup(), effectively rendering the cancellation permanent and preventing the tx_skb double-free. 2. Note: Clearing PROTO_READY early causes hci_uart_close() to skip hu-proto-flush(). This is perfectly safe in the tty_close path because hu-proto-close() executes shortly after, which intrinsically purges all protocol SKB queues and tears down the state. 3.

Relocating hu-proto-close(hu) strictly prior to hci_free_dev(hdev) across all close and error paths to prevent vendor-level UAFs. 4. Moving the hdev-stat.byte_rx increment in hci_uart_tty_receive() inside the proto_lock read-side critical section to safely synchronize with device unregistration. 5. Adding cancel_work_sync(&hu-write_work) to hci_uart_close() to safely flush the workqueue before hci_uart_flush() is invoked via the HCI core. 6.

Utilizing cancel_work_sync() instead of disable_work_sync() across all paths to prevent permanently breaking user-space retry capabilities.

EPSS 0.00024
Schedule remediation
  • Public exploit or PoC is available
  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
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How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-46275, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

Public Exploits & PoCs

1
These PoC and exploit links come from public sources and are not verified to be safe or functional. Review the code before running anything, and treat unverified entries as untrusted.
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Fixed versions by distribution

13
The package version that resolves this CVE on each Linux distribution, from the vendor’s published security data. fixed in shows a patched version exists; open means the package is listed as affected with no fix yet.
suse sle15kernel-default open
suse sle15kernel-default-base open
suse sle15kernel-default-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-extra open
suse sle15kernel-default-livepatch open
suse sle15kernel-default-livepatch-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-man open
suse sle15kernel-devel open
suse sle15kernel-devel-rt open
suse sle15kernel-macros open
suse sle15kernel-source open
suse sle15kernel-source-rt open
suse sle15reiserfs-kmp-default open

Scoring & Timeline

Published to NVD08 Jun 2026 · 04:16 PM

Vendor Advisories

2
suse-csafopenSUSE-SU-2026:11014-1
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