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CVE

CVE-2026-46242

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file-f_ep under file-f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op-release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op-release is ep_eventpoll_release() - ep_clear_and_put() - ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded -refs hlist_head is exactly where epi-fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep-mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep-refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file()

the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi-dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi-dying) fast-path bailout stays.

HIGH · CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.00013
Schedule remediation
  • CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
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How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-46242, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

ATT&CK techniques

1

Techniques this CVE enables - linked via CWECAPECATT&CK. High◆ = named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei templates.

▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques
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Fixed versions by distribution

14
The package version that resolves this CVE on each Linux distribution, from the vendor’s published security data. fixed in shows a patched version exists; open means the package is listed as affected with no fix yet.
suse sle15cluster-md-kmp-default open
suse sle15dlm-kmp-default open
suse sle15gfs2-kmp-default open
suse sle15kernel-default open
suse sle15kernel-default-base open
suse sle15kernel-default-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-livepatch open
suse sle15kernel-default-livepatch-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-man open
suse sle15kernel-devel open
suse sle15kernel-macros open
suse sle15kernel-source open
suse sle15ocfs2-kmp-default open
suse sle15reiserfs-kmp-default open

Scoring & Timeline

7.8
HIGH · CVSS v3.1 · 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD30 May 2026 · 01:16 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Vendor Advisories

2
suse-csafopenSUSE-SU-2026:10954-1
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References & Sources

3
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