Home/CVE/In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libata-scsi: avoid Non-NCQ command starvation
CVE

CVE-2026-45855

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libata-scsi: avoid Non-NCQ command starvation

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libata-scsi: avoid Non-NCQ command starvation When a non-NCQ command is issued while NCQ commands are being executed, ata_scsi_qc_issue() indicates to the SCSI layer that the command issuing should be deferred by returning SCSI_MLQUEUE_XXX_BUSY. This command deferring is correct and as mandated by the ACS specifications since NCQ and non-NCQ commands cannot be mixed. However, in the case of a host adapter using multiple submission queues, when the target device is under a constant load of NCQ commands, there are no guarantees that requeueing the non-NCQ command will be executed later and it may be deferred again repeatedly as other submission queues can constantly issue NCQ commands from different CPUs ahead of the non-NCQ command.

This can lead to very long delays for the execution of non-NCQ commands, and even complete starvation for these commands in the worst case scenario. Since the block layer and the SCSI layer do not distinguish between queueable (NCQ) and non queueable (non-NCQ) commands, libata-scsi SAT implementation must ensure forward progress for non-NCQ commands in the presence of NCQ command traffic. This is similar to what SAS HBAs with a hardware/firmware based SAT implementation do.

Implement such forward progress guarantee by limiting requeueing of non-NCQ commands from ata_scsi_qc_issue(): when a non-NCQ command is received and NCQ commands are in-flight, do not force a requeue of the non-NCQ command by returning SCSI_MLQUEUE_XXX_BUSY and instead return 0 to indicate that the command was accepted but hold on to the qc using the new deferred_qc field of struct ata_port. This deferred qc will be issued using the work item deferred_qc_work running the function ata_scsi_deferred_qc_work() once all in-flight commands complete, which is checked with the port qc_defer() callback return value indicating that no further delay is necessary. This check is done using the helper function ata_scsi_schedule_deferred_qc() which is called from ata_scsi_qc_complete().

This thus excludes this mechanism from all internal non-NCQ commands issued by ATA EH. When a port deferred_qc is non NULL, that is, the port has a command waiting for the device queue to drain, the issuing of all incoming commands (both NCQ and non-NCQ) is deferred using the regular busy mechanism. This simplifies the code and also avoids potential denial of service problems if a user issues too many non-NCQ commands.

Finally, whenever ata EH is scheduled, regardless of the reason, a deferred qc is always requeued so that it can be retried once EH completes. This is done by calling the function ata_scsi_requeue_deferred_qc() from ata_eh_set_pending(). This avoids the need for any special processing for the deferred qc in case of NCQ error, link or device reset, or device timeout.

EPSS 0.00024
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  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-45855, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
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Fixed versions by distribution

8
The package version that resolves this CVE on each Linux distribution, from the vendor’s published security data. fixed in shows a patched version exists; open means the package is listed as affected with no fix yet.
suse sle15kernel-default open
suse sle15kernel-default-base open
suse sle15kernel-default-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-man open
suse sle15kernel-devel open
suse sle15kernel-macros open
suse sle15kernel-source open
suse sle15reiserfs-kmp-default open

Scoring & Timeline

Published to NVD27 May 2026 · 02:16 PM

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