Home/CVE/In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through f
CVE

CVE-2026-43503

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()-flags when moving frags from source to destination. __pskb_copy_fclone() defers the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs, type} and never touches skb_shinfo()-flags.

skb_shift() moves frag descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched. As a result, the destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as false. The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c, esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to <local>' rule -- or any other nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via authencesn-ESN stray writes. Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors were actually moved from the source. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand() share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own.

they need no change. The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list(). The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and the head_frag + memcpy path)

the latter chains the incoming skb whole onto p's frag_list. Downstream skb_segment() reads only skb_shinfo(p)-flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker. The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue into a freshly allocated nskb. The helper falls into the same family and warrants the same fix for consistency.

no TCP TX-side in-place writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently. The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the new frag_skb's flag into nskb. Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.

HIGH · CVSS 8.8 EPSS 0.00013
Schedule remediation
  • CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
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How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-43503, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
📦

Fixed versions by distribution

31
The package version that resolves this CVE on each Linux distribution, from the vendor’s published security data. fixed in shows a patched version exists; open means the package is listed as affected with no fix yet.
oracle allkernel-uek open
oracle allkernel-uek-container open
oracle allkernel-uek-container-debug fixed in 0:5.4.17-2136.356.4.1.el8uek
oracle allkernel-uek-debug fixed in 0:5.4.17-2136.356.4.1.el8uek
oracle allkernel-uek-debug-devel open
oracle allkernel-uek-devel open
oracle allkernel-uek-tools fixed in 0:5.4.17-2136.356.4.1.el7uek
suse sle15cluster-md-kmp-default fixed in 0:6.4.0-150600.23.115.1
suse sle15cluster-md-kmp-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15dlm-kmp-default fixed in 0:5.14.21-150500.55.166.1
suse sle15dlm-kmp-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15gfs2-kmp-default fixed in 0:5.14.21-150500.55.166.1
suse sle15gfs2-kmp-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15kernel-64kb fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.53.55.1
suse sle15kernel-azure fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.53.55.1
suse sle15kernel-default fixed in 0:6.4.0-150600.23.115.1
suse sle15kernel-default-base fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.53.55.1.150700.17.33.1
suse sle15kernel-default-extra fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.53.55.1
suse sle15kernel-docs fixed in 0:6.4.0-150600.23.115.1
suse sle15kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_7_54-rt fixed in 0:1-150700.1.3.1
suse sle15kernel-macros fixed in 0:5.14.21-150400.24.219.1
suse sle15kernel-obs-build fixed in 0:5.14.21-150400.24.219.1
suse sle15kernel-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15kernel-source fixed in 0:6.4.0-150600.23.115.1
suse sle15kernel-source-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15kernel-syms fixed in 0:5.14.21-150400.24.219.1
suse sle15kernel-syms-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15kernel-zfcpdump fixed in 0:5.14.21-150400.24.219.1
suse sle15ocfs2-kmp-default fixed in 0:5.14.21-150500.55.166.1
suse sle15ocfs2-kmp-rt fixed in 0:6.4.0-150700.7.54.1
suse sle15reiserfs-kmp-default fixed in 0:6.4.0-150600.23.115.1

Scoring & Timeline

8.8
HIGH · CVSS v3.1 · 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD23 May 2026 · 12:17 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Vendor Advisories

24
suse-csafSUSE-SU-2026:2310-1
suse-csafopenSUSE-SU-2026:10954-1
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