Home/CVE/In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: contpte: fix set_access_flags() no-op check
CVE

CVE-2026-43486

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: contpte: fix set_access_flags() no-op check

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: contpte: fix set_access_flags() no-op check for SMMU/ATS faults contpte_ptep_set_access_flags() compared the gathered ptep_get() value against the requested entry to detect no-ops. ptep_get() ORs AF/dirty from all sub-PTEs in the CONT block, so a dirty sibling can make the target appear already-dirty. When the gathered value matches entry, the function returns 0 even though the target sub-PTE still has PTE_RDONLY set in hardware. For a CPU with FEAT_HAFDBS this gathered view is fine, since hardware may set AF/dirty on any sub-PTE and CPU TLB behavior is effectively gathered across the CONT range.

But page-table walkers that evaluate each descriptor individually (e.g. a CPU without DBM support, or an SMMU without HTTU, or with HA/HD disabled in CD.TCR) can keep faulting on the unchanged target sub-PTE, causing an infinite fault loop. Gathering can therefore cause false no-ops when only a sibling has been updated: - write faults: target still has PTE_RDONLY (needs PTE_RDONLY cleared) - read faults: target still lacks PTE_AF Fix by checking each sub-PTE against the requested AF/dirty/write state (the same bits consumed by __ptep_set_access_flags()), using raw per-PTE values rather than the gathered ptep_get() view, before returning no-op. Keep using the raw target PTE for the write-bit unfold decision.

Per Arm (DDI 0487) D8.7.1 ("The Contiguous bit"), any sub-PTE in a CONT range may become the effective cached translation and software must maintain consistent attributes across the range.

EPSS 0.00023
Monitor
  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-43486, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
📦

Fixed versions by distribution

17
The package version that resolves this CVE on each Linux distribution, from the vendor’s published security data. fixed in shows a patched version exists; open means the package is listed as affected with no fix yet.
suse sle15cluster-md-kmp-default open
suse sle15dlm-kmp-default open
suse sle15gfs2-kmp-default open
suse sle15kernel-default open
suse sle15kernel-default-base open
suse sle15kernel-default-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-extra open
suse sle15kernel-default-livepatch open
suse sle15kernel-default-livepatch-devel open
suse sle15kernel-default-man open
suse sle15kernel-devel open
suse sle15kernel-devel-rt open
suse sle15kernel-macros open
suse sle15kernel-source open
suse sle15kernel-source-rt open
suse sle15ocfs2-kmp-default open
suse sle15reiserfs-kmp-default open

Scoring & Timeline

Published to NVD13 May 2026 · 04:16 PM
SOC and Response
CVE triage
Stack monitoring
Am I affected
IOC triage
KEV catalog
Recently exploited
Daily brief
Change tracking
Detection Engineering
Coverage workspace
Detection coverage
Coverage check
Telemetry ceiling
SIEM query builder
Sigma rules
SIEM rules
YARA rules
Network rules
D3FEND
Threat Hunting
Threat actors
ATT&CK techniques
Attack paths
Indicators
Atomic tests
Red Team and Pentest
Exploitability triage
Recon pack
Attack paths
CAPEC patterns
Adversary emulation
Compliance and GRC
Framework mapping
Control assessment
Audit view
Coverage report
Atlas Search Threat actors Techniques Tools & malware CWE CAPEC KEV catalog Package vulns
About All capabilities Pricing API docs Live status Privacy policy Terms of service
threatengine.sh