In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/net: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() sqe-len is __u32 but gets stored into sr-len which is int. When userspace passes sqe-len values exceeding INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF), sr-len overflows to a negative value. This negative value propagates through the bundle recv/send path: 1. io_recv(): sel.val = sr-len (ssize_t gets -1) 2. io_recv_buf_select(): arg.max_len = sel-val (size_t gets 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) 3. io_ring_buffers_peek(): buf-len is not clamped because max_len is astronomically large 4. iov[].iov_len = 0xFFFFFFFF flows into io_bundle_nbufs() 5. io_bundle_nbufs(): min_t(int, 0xFFFFFFFF, ret) yields -1, causing ret to increase instead of decrease, creating an infinite loop that reads past the allocated iov[] array This results in a slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() from the kmalloc-64 slab, as nbufs increments past the allocated iovec entries.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ae05c8 by task exp/145 Call Trace: io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160 io_recv_finish+0x117/0xe20 io_recv+0x2db/0x1160 Fix this by rejecting negative sr-len values early in both io_sendmsg_prep() and io_recvmsg_prep(). Since sqe-len is __u32, any value > INT_MAX indicates overflow and is not a valid length.