In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix stack buffer overflow in hci_le_big_create_sync hci_le_big_create_sync() uses DEFINE_FLEX to allocate a struct hci_cp_le_big_create_sync on the stack with room for 0x11 (17) BIS entries. However, conn-num_bis can hold up to HCI_MAX_ISO_BIS (31) entries, validated against ISO_MAX_NUM_BIS (0x1f) in the caller hci_conn_big_create_sync(). When conn-num_bis is between 18 and 31, the memcpy that copies conn-bis into cp-bis writes up to 14 bytes past the stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack memory.

This is trivially reproducible: binding an ISO socket with bc_num_bis = ISO_MAX_NUM_BIS (31) and calling listen() will eventually trigger hci_le_big_create_sync() from the HCI command sync worker, causing a KASAN-detectable stack-out-of-bounds write: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in hci_le_big_create_sync+0x256/0x3b0 Write of size 31 at addr ffffc90000487b48 by task kworker/u9:0/71 Fix this by changing the DEFINE_FLEX count from the incorrect 0x11 to HCI_MAX_ISO_BIS, which matches the maximum number of BIS entries that conn-bis can actually carry.