In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. Three cases can overflow: KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + resp-payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) + resp-ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp-payload_sz is __u32 and resp-ngroups is __s32. Each addition can wrap in unsigned int.

the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry-msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size.

userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject resp-ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC boundary.

with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed. This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request side.