title: Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel
id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9
related:
    - id: 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed.
    Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327
author: '@Kostastsale'
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Excel\Security'
            - 'PythonFunctionWarnings'
        CommandLine|contains: ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Excel.EXE DCOM Lateral Movement Via ActivateMicrosoftApp
id: 551d9c1f-816c-445b-a7a6-7a3864720d60
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious child processes of Excel which could be an indicator of lateral movement leveraging the "ActivateMicrosoftApp" Excel DCOM object.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application-3c016d0d9922
    - https://github.com/grayhatkiller/SharpExShell
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/api/excel.xlmsapplication
author: Aaron Stratton
date: 2023-11-13
tags:
    - attack.t1021.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\excel.exe'
    selection_child:
        - OriginalFileName:
          - 'foxprow.exe'
          - 'schdplus.exe'
          - 'winproj.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
          - '\foxprow.exe'
          - '\schdplus.exe'
          - '\winproj.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Excel Add-in - Registry
id: 961e33d1-4f86-4fcf-80ab-930a708b2f82
status: test
description: Detect potential persistence via the creation of an excel add-in (XLL) file to make it run automatically when Excel is started.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4ae9580a1a8772db87a1b6cdb0d03e5af231e966/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-15
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Office\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Excel\Options'
        Details|startswith: '/R '
        Details|endswith: '.xll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel - Registry
id: 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44
related:
    - id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed.
    Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale
date: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Excel\Security\PythonFunctionWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Microsoft Excel Add-In Loaded From Uncommon Location
id: af4c4609-5755-42fe-8075-4effb49f5d44
related:
    - id: c5f4b5cb-4c25-4249-ba91-aa03626e3185
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Microsoft Excel loading an Add-In (.xll) file from an uncommon location
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/lnk-between-browsers
    - https://wazuh.com/blog/detecting-xll-files-used-for-dropping-fin7-jssloader-with-wazuh/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\excel.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            # Note: Add or remove locations from this list based on your internal policy
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Tasks\'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '.xll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some tuning might be required to allow or remove certain locations used by the rule if you consider them as safe locations
level: medium

title: Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application
id: fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06
status: test
description: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
    - https://twitter.com/MaD_c4t/status/1623414582382567424
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote-abuse
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/new-attacks-old-tricks-how-onenote-malware-is-evolving/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/17f2d378-6d11-4d6f-8340-954b04f35e83/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-09
modified: 2023-02-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenotem.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OneNote\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious extensions
            - '.bat'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.htm'
            - '.html'
            - '.js'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives should be very low with the extensions list cited. Especially if you don't heavily utilize OneNote.
    - Occasional FPs might occur if OneNote is used internally to share different embedded documents
level: high

title: Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Generic rule for suspicious office application child processes
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-e34e43eb5666427602ddf488b2bf3b545bd9aae81af3e6f6c7949f9652abdf18
    - https://micahbabinski.medium.com/detecting-onenote-one-malware-delivery-407e9321ecf0
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
    selection_opt_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'bitsadmin.exe'
              - 'CertOC.exe'
              - 'CertUtil.exe'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'CMSTP.EXE'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'curl.exe'
              - 'HH.exe'
              - 'IEExec.exe'
              - 'InstallUtil.exe'
              - 'javaw.exe'
              - 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - 'msdt.exe'
              - 'MSHTA.EXE'
              - 'msiexec.exe'
              - 'Msxsl.exe'
              - 'odbcconf.exe'
              - 'pcalua.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'REGSVR32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'ScriptRunner.exe'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'WorkFolders.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\AppVLP.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certoc.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cmstp.exe'
              - '\control.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\ieexec.exe'
              - '\installutil.exe'
              - '\javaw.exe'
              - '\mftrace.exe'
              - '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - '\msbuild.exe'
              - '\msdt.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\msidb.exe'
              - '\msiexec.exe'
              - '\msxsl.exe'
              - '\odbcconf.exe'
              - '\pcalua.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regasm.exe'
              - '\regsvcs.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\scrcons.exe'
              - '\scriptrunner.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\svchost.exe'
              - '\verclsid.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\workfolders.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_opt_explorer:
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.hta'
            - '.vb'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps'
            - '.scr'
            - '.pif'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
    selection_opt_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
    filter_teams:
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
    filter_onedrive:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
        Image|endswith: '\FileCoAuth.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_opt_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - File located in the AppData folder with trusted signature
level: high

title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
    When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\exported\'
            - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OneNote Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location
id: 7fd164ba-126a-4d9c-9392-0d4f7c243df0
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with the ".one"/".onepkg" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing OneNote attachments
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
modified: 2023-09-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            # Note: add more common locations for drops such as download folders and the like. Or baseline legitimate locations and alert on everything else
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.one'
            - '.onepkg'
    filter_main_onenote:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\ONENOTE.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of ".one" or ".onepkg" files from those locations
level: medium

title: Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory
id: fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3
related:
    - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
      type: obsolete
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments.
    This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code.
references:
    - https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/
    - https://thecyberexpress.com/rogue-rdp-files-used-in-ukraine-cyberattacks/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-22
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_extension:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.cpl'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.rdp'
            - '.svg'
            - '.vba'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_location:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_'
              - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\'
              - '\Content.Outlook\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments
level: high

title: Suspicious Outlook Macro Created
id: 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
related:
    - id: 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Form
id: c3edc6a5-d9d4-48d8-930e-aab518390917
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new Outlook form which can contain malicious code
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=76
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=79
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/outlook/concepts/outlook-forms/create-an-outlook-form
    - https://www.slipstick.com/developer/custom-form/clean-outlooks-forms-cache/
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-10
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\FORMS\IPM'
            - '\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Forms' # Windows XP
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of outlook forms
level: high

title: Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder
id: a018fdc3-46a3-44e5-9afb-2cd4af1d4b39
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
references:
    - Internal Research
date: 2019-10-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains: '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook
id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
related:
    - id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d # Outlook Child Processes
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).
references:
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=49
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        Image|startswith: '\\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process
id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Office Child Processes
      type: derived
    - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723 # Outlook Remote Child Process
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'        # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\msdt.exe'           # CVE-2022-30190
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'        # https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
            - '\wmic.exe'           # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # Several FPs with rundll32.exe
            # We started excluding specific use cases and ended up commenting out the rundll32.exe sub processes completely
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # filter_outlook_photoviewer:  # https://twitter.com/Luke_Hamp/status/1495919717760237568
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains: '\PhotoViewer.dll'
            # filter_outlook_printattachments:  # https://twitter.com/KickaKamil/status/1496238278659485696
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains|all:
            #     - 'shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL'
            #     - '\SYSTEM32\SPOOL\DRIVERS\'
    condition: selection # and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled
id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # Registry variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook LoadMacroProviderOnBoot Setting
id: 396ae3eb-4174-4b9b-880e-dc0364d78a19
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook setting "LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" which if enabled allows the automatic loading of any configured VBA project/module
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot'
        Details|contains: '0x00000001'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Today Page
id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
related:
    - id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook today page.
    An attacker can set a custom page to execute arbitrary code and link to it via the registry values "URL" and "UserDefinedUrl".
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=74
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-10
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Today\'
    selection_value_stamp:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Stamp'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_value_url:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\URL'
            - '\UserDefinedUrl'
    filter_main_office:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page
id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
related:
    - id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page.
    An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution and persistence by editing the WebView registry keys.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/outlook-home-page-feature-is-missing-in-folder-properties-d207edb7-aa02-46c5-b608-5d9dbed9bd04?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\WebView\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\URL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled
id: e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
author: '@ScoubiMtl'
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\Level'
        Details|contains: '0x00000001' # Enable all Macros
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
related:
    - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
      type: similar
    - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 # ProcCreation variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New Outlook Macro Created
id: 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
related:
    - id: 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
author: '@ScoubiMtl'
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User genuinely creates a VB Macro for their email
level: medium

title: Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook
id: 9a0b8719-cd3c-4f0a-90de-765a4cb3f5ed
status: test
description: Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=58
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\outlvba.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: medium

title: Outlook Security Settings Updated - Registry
id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # EnableUnsafeClientMailRules
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry values related to outlook security settings
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137/T1137.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/troubleshoot/security/information-about-email-security-settings
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Security\'
    filter_main_outlook:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: medium

title: Suspicious Scan Loop Network
id: f8ad2e2c-40b6-4117-84d7-20b89896ab23
status: test
description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
    - https://ss64.com/nt/for.html
    - https://ss64.com/ps/foreach-object.html
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_loop:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'for '
            - 'foreach '
    selection_tools:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'nslookup'
            - 'ping'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script
level: medium

title: Suspicious Usage of For Loop with Recursive Directory Search in CMD
id: 2782fbd8-b662-4eb5-9962-5bfbfb671e7b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious usage of the cmd.exe 'for /f' loop combined with the 'tokens=' parameter and a recursive directory listing.
    This pattern may indicate an attempt to discover and execute system binaries dynamically, for example powershell, a technique sometimes used by attackers to evade detection.
    This behavior has been observed in various malicious lnk files.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/29837d0d3202758063185828c8f8d9e0b7b42b365c8941cc926d2d7c7bae2fb3
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2025-11-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tokens:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'for /f'
            - 'tokens='
            - 'in ('
            - 'dir'
    selection_tokens_parent:
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'for /f'
            - 'tokens='
            - 'in ('
            - 'dir'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Malicious DLL File Dropped in the Teams or OneDrive Folder
id: 1908fcc1-1b92-4272-8214-0fbaf2fa5163
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of a malicious DLL file in the location where the OneDrive or Team applications
    Upon execution of the Teams or OneDrive application, the dropped malicious DLL file ("iphlpapi.dll") is sideloaded
references:
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/27/targeted-attacks-being-carried-out-via-dll-sideloading/
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'iphlpapi.dll'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess Event
id: 25cde13e-8e20-4c29-b949-4e795b76f16f
status: test
description: Detects an access to authentication tokens and accounts of Microsoft Teams desktop application.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2022-09-16
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter:
        ProcessName|contains: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Microsoft Teams Sensitive File Access By Uncommon Applications
id: 65744385-8541-44a6-8630-ffc824d7d4cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects file access attempts to sensitive Microsoft teams files (leveldb, cookies) by an uncommon process.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blog/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2024-07-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_access
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        FileName|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter_main_legit_location:
        # Note: its best to filter the full path to avoid false negatives
        Image|endswith: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Renamed Microsoft Teams Execution
id: 88f46b67-14d4-4f45-ac2c-d66984f22191
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft Teams binary.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'msteams.exe'
            - 'teams.exe'
    filter_main_legit_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msteams.exe'
            - '\teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Command Targeting Teams Sensitive Files
id: d2eb17db-1d39-41dc-b57f-301f6512fa75
status: test
description: |
    Detects a commandline containing references to the Microsoft Teams database or cookies files from a process other than Teams.
    The database might contain authentication tokens and other sensitive information about the logged in accounts.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2022-09-16
modified: 2023-12-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter_main_legit_locations:
        Image|endswith: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium