Home/CVE/soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Arithmetic overflow can be triggered in the `Bytes::slice`, `Vec::slice
CVE

CVE-2026-24889

soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Arithmetic overflow can be triggered in the `Bytes::slice`, `Vec::slice

soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Arithmetic overflow can be triggered in the Bytes::slice, Vec::slice, and Prng::gen_range (for u64) methods in the soroban-sdk in versions up to and including 25.0.1, 23.5.1, and 25.0.2. Contracts that pass user-controlled or computed range bounds to Bytes::slice, Vec::slice, or Prng::gen_range may silently operate on incorrect data ranges or generate random numbers from an unintended range, potentially resulting in corrupted contract state.

Note that the best practice when using the soroban-sdk and building Soroban contracts is to always enable overflow-checks = true. The stellar contract init tool that prepares the boiler plate for a Soroban contract, as well as all examples and docs, encourage the use of configuring overflow-checks = true on release profiles so that these arithmetic operations fail rather than silently wrap. Contracts are only impacted if they use overflow-checks = false either explicitly or implicitly.

It is anticipated the majority of contracts could not be impacted because the best practice encouraged by tooling is to enable overflow-checks. The fix available in 25.0.1, 23.5.1, and 25.0.2 replaces bare arithmetic with checked_add / checked_sub, ensuring overflow traps regardless of the overflow-checks profile setting. As a workaround, contract workspaces can be configured with a profile available in the GitHub Securtity Advisory to enable overflow checks on the arithmetic operations.

This is the best practice when developing Soroban contracts, and the default if using the contract boilerplate generated using stellar contract init. Alternatively, contracts can validate range bounds before passing them to slice or gen_range to ensure the conversions cannot overflow.

MEDIUM · CVSS 5.3 EPSS 0.00022
Schedule remediation
  • SSVC automatable: yes - attacks can be scripted at scale
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0

Weakness Classification

Affected Products & Versions

3
stellar rs-soroban-sdk>= 23.0.0 and < 23.5.1
stellar rs-soroban-sdk>= 25.0.0 and < 25.0.2

Affected Packages

1
Language-ecosystem packages (from OSV) tied to this CVE, with the version that fixes it - the dependency-level detail NVD doesn’t carry.
crates.io soroban-sdk MODERATE fixed in 25.0.2

Scoring & Timeline

5.3
MEDIUM · CVSS v3.1 · security-advisories@github.com
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD28 Jan 2026 · 10:15 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial
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