Home/CVE/Incorrect default permissions for some Intel(R) NPU Driver software installers before version 32.0.100.4511 within Ring
CVE

CVE-2026-20718

Incorrect default permissions for some Intel(R) NPU Driver software installers before version 32.0.100.4511 within Ring

Incorrect default permissions for some Intel(R) NPU Driver software installers before version 32.0.100.4511 within Ring 3: User Applications may allow an escalation of privilege. Unprivileged software adversary with an authenticated user combined with a high complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are present without special internal knowledge and requires active user interaction.

The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (high), integrity (high) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts.

EPSS 0.00014
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  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
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▸ How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-20718, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
◆

ATT&CK techniques

2

Techniques this CVE enables - linked via CWECAPECATT&CK. High◆ = named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei templates.

T1083 · File and Directory Discovery T1574.010 · Services File Permissions Weakness
▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques
▤

CAPEC attack patterns

3

Attack patterns this CVE enables - the bridge from weakness to ATT&CK technique.

CAPEC-CAPEC-1 · Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs CAPEC-CAPEC-127 · Directory Indexing CAPEC-CAPEC-81 · Web Server Logs Tampering
⬡

Weakness Classification

CWE-276Incorrect Default Permissions
▣

Scoring & Timeline

Published to NVD12 May 2026 · 05:16 PM
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
SSVC asks the questions that actually drive patch urgency: is it being exploited, can attacks be automated, and how total is the impact.
🔗

References & Sources

1
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.
https://intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01424.html
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