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CVE

CVE-2026-12480

Keras versions up to and including 3.13.2 are vulnerable to an arbitrary HDF5 file read due to an incomplete fix for CVE

Keras versions up to and including 3.13.2 are vulnerable to an arbitrary HDF5 file read due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-1669. The vulnerability resides in the H5IOStore._verify_dataset() and file_editor.py methods, which fail to check the dataset.is_virtual property of HDF5 datasets. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious .keras model archive or .h5 weights file containing a Virtual Dataset (VDS) that references external HDF5 files on the victim's filesystem.

When the victim loads the model using keras.models.load_model() or keras.saving.load_model(), the external file is transparently read, leading to potential information disclosure. Fixed in versions 3.12.2 and 3.14.1.

MEDIUM · CVSS 5.5 EPSS 0.00127
EPSS exploitation odds0.13% · top 97%
Monitor
  • No active-exploitation, high-EPSS, or public-exploit signals - routine patching cadence
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-12480, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

Severity & exploitation scoring

View on NVD →
CVSS base score
5.5
MEDIUMCVSS v3.0 · [email protected]
EPSS exploitation probability
0.13%
Top 97%odds of exploitation in the next 30 days
CVSS metric silhouette
VectorComplexityPrivilegesInteractionScopeConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
shape grows toward worst-case
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
poc
Automatable
no
Tech impact
partial
CVSS vector breakdown
Exploitability - how they get in
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Impact - what breaks
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
VECTORCVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

ATT&CK techniques

4

Techniques this CVE enables. Pills with a solid outline are high confidence - named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei, or human-curated by CTID; the rest are inferred from the weakness type using MITRE's CVE Mapping Methodology and the CWE → CAPEC chain. Broad, generic-weakness guesses are filtered out. A small marks a technique that N independent sources agree on.

▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques

Weakness Classification

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References & Sources

2
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.