Home/CVE/syracom AG Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket 3.4.0.x contains an authentication bypass vu
CVE

CVE-2026-12225

syracom AG Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket 3.4.0.x contains an authentication bypass vu

syracom AG Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket 3.4.0.x contains an authentication bypass vulnerability. An attacker with valid credentials for a user account can bypass the two-factor authentication flow by sending HTTP requests with a crafted User-Agent header containing specific strings such as AtlassianMobileApp or JIRA. When such a User-Agent is present, the plugin does not enforce the configured 2FA checks for protected web resources.

Successful exploitation allows the attacker to access the affected Atlassian application as the compromised user without completing 2FA. If the compromised account has administrative privileges, the attacker can access administrative functionality and may disable the 2FA plugin or make arbitrary administrative changes. The issue is fixed in version 3.5.0.0.

Monitor
  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-12225, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

ATT&CK techniques

4

CAPEC attack patterns

2

Attack patterns this CVE enables - the bridge from weakness to ATT&CK technique.

Scoring & Timeline

Published to NVD16 Jun 2026 · 12:16 PM
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