Home/CVE/The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src
CVE

CVE-2026-10664

The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src

The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src/wifi_mgmt.c copied TWT (Target Wake Time) flow entries from an nrf_wifi_umac_event_power_save_info event into the fixed-size twt_flows[WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS] (8-element) array of a caller-supplied struct wifi_ps_config, looping over event-provided num_twt_flows without validating it against WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS or checking event_len. When num_twt_flows exceeds 8, the handler writes past the destination array (which is typically on the caller's stack, e.g. the wifi ps shell command) -- an out-of-bounds write of ~40-byte TWT entries -- and reads twt_flow_info[i] past the event buffer. The event is delivered by the nRF70 co-processor firmware in response to a host-initiated power-save GET, so reaching the overflow requires the firmware to emit a malformed or out-of-range event.

the trust boundary is host-to-trusted-coprocessor rather than a direct remote-AP write, with over-the-air influence on the flow count being indirect and bounded by the 3-bit TWT flow-id space. Affected: builds with CONFIG_NRF70_STA_MODE on releases through v4.4.0. The fix rejects events with num_twt_flows > WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS or with event_len shorter than the claimed entries, and adds a NULL check on the caller buffer.

MEDIUM · CVSS 5 EPSS 0.00143
EPSS exploitation odds0.14% · top 95%
Monitor
  • No active-exploitation, high-EPSS, or public-exploit signals - routine patching cadence
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-10664, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

Severity & exploitation scoring

View on NVD →
CVSS base score
5
MEDIUMCVSS v3.1 · [email protected]
EPSS exploitation probability
0.14%
Top 95%odds of exploitation in the next 30 days
CVSS metric silhouette
VectorComplexityPrivilegesInteractionScopeConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
shape grows toward worst-case
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
poc
Automatable
no
Tech impact
partial
CVSS vector breakdown
Exploitability - how they get in
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Impact - what breaks
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
VECTORCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Lifecycle
  1. 12 Jul 2026Published to NVD
  2. 13 Jul 2026Last modified
Every entry is a recorded date - NVD publish/modify, CISA KEV add, public exploit disclosure. No inferred events.
Attack path
Full kill chain

ATT&CK techniques

1

Techniques this CVE enables. Pills with a solid outline are high confidence - named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei, or human-curated by CTID; the rest are inferred from the weakness type using MITRE's CVE Mapping Methodology and the CWE → CAPEC chain. Broad, generic-weakness guesses are filtered out. A small marks a technique that N independent sources agree on.

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Weakness Classification

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References & Sources

2
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.