Home/CVE/In ServerCo getssl version 2.49 and prior, the ACME challenge token returned to the client was not strictly validated ag
CVE

CVE-2026-10303

In ServerCo getssl version 2.49 and prior, the ACME challenge token returned to the client was not strictly validated ag

In ServerCo getssl version 2.49 and prior, the ACME challenge token returned to the client was not strictly validated against RFC 8555 before being used in challenge-file handling, allowing a maliciously crafted token to influence local path/filename usage during validation. An attacker who can supply ACME challenge responses to getssl (for example, a malicious or compromised CA endpoint, or an on-path adversary able to tamper with that response path) could exploit this to achieve unauthorized file write/path traversal effects, usually with elevated privileges, ultimately allowing for remote command injection. This issue appears related in spirit to CVE-2023-38198, and is an instance of CWE-73, "External control of file name or path." Other ACME shell script handlers may be affected by similar issues.

HIGH · CVSS 7.4
Schedule remediation
  • CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-10303, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

Scoring & Timeline

7.4
HIGH · CVSS v3.1 · 44488dab-36db-4358-99f9-bc116477f914
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD16 Jun 2026 · 08:16 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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