A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0.0 through 4.20.0.0 where a malicious Domain Admin user in the ROOT domain can get the API key and secret key of user-accounts of Admin role type in the same domain. This operation is not appropriately restricted and allows the attacker to assume control over higher-privileged user-accounts. A malicious Domain Admin attacker can impersonate an Admin user-account and gain access to sensitive APIs and resources that could result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of infrastructure managed by CloudStack.

Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.19.3.0 or 4.20.1.0, which fixes the issue with the following: Strict validation on Role Type hierarchy: the caller's role must be equal to or higher than the target user's role. API privilege comparison: the caller must possess all privileges of the user they are operating on. * Two new domain-level settings (restricted to the default admin): - role.types.allowed.for.operations.on.accounts.of.same.role.type: Defines which role types are allowed to act on users of the same role type. Default: "Admin, DomainAdmin, ResourceAdmin". - allow.operations.on.users.in.same.account: Allows/disallows user operations within the same account. Default: true.