Sigma rules for CVE-2024-41159
4 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2024-41159
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application
id: fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06
status: test
description: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
- https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
- https://twitter.com/MaD_c4t/status/1623414582382567424
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote-abuse
- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/new-attacks-old-tricks-how-onenote-malware-is-evolving/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/17f2d378-6d11-4d6f-8340-954b04f35e83/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-09
modified: 2023-02-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\onenote.exe'
- '\onenotem.exe'
- '\onenoteim.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OneNote\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
# TODO: Add more suspicious extensions
- '.bat'
- '.chm'
- '.cmd'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.htm'
- '.html'
- '.js'
- '.lnk'
- '.ps1'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.wsf'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- False positives should be very low with the extensions list cited. Especially if you don't heavily utilize OneNote.
- Occasional FPs might occur if OneNote is used internally to share different embedded documents
level: high
title: Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775
related:
- id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Generic rule for suspicious office application child processes
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-e34e43eb5666427602ddf488b2bf3b545bd9aae81af3e6f6c7949f9652abdf18
- https://micahbabinski.medium.com/detecting-onenote-one-malware-delivery-407e9321ecf0
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
selection_opt_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'bitsadmin.exe'
- 'CertOC.exe'
- 'CertUtil.exe'
- 'Cmd.Exe'
- 'CMSTP.EXE'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'curl.exe'
- 'HH.exe'
- 'IEExec.exe'
- 'InstallUtil.exe'
- 'javaw.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- 'msdt.exe'
- 'MSHTA.EXE'
- 'msiexec.exe'
- 'Msxsl.exe'
- 'odbcconf.exe'
- 'pcalua.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'RegAsm.exe'
- 'RegSvcs.exe'
- 'REGSVR32.exe'
- 'RUNDLL32.exe'
- 'schtasks.exe'
- 'ScriptRunner.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- 'WorkFolders.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\AppVLP.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\certoc.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cmstp.exe'
- '\control.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\ieexec.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
- '\mftrace.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\msdt.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msidb.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\msxsl.exe'
- '\odbcconf.exe'
- '\pcalua.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regasm.exe'
- '\regsvcs.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scrcons.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\verclsid.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\workfolders.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_opt_explorer:
Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '.hta'
- '.vb'
- '.wsh'
- '.js'
- '.ps'
- '.scr'
- '.pif'
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
selection_opt_paths:
Image|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Windows\Tasks\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
- '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
filter_teams:
Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
filter_onedrive:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
Image|endswith: '\FileCoAuth.exe'
CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_opt_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- File located in the AppData folder with trusted signature
level: high
title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
- https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '\exported\'
- '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OneNote Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location
id: 7fd164ba-126a-4d9c-9392-0d4f7c243df0
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with the ".one"/".onepkg" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing OneNote attachments
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
- https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
modified: 2023-09-19
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
# Note: add more common locations for drops such as download folders and the like. Or baseline legitimate locations and alert on everything else
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
- ':\Temp\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.one'
- '.onepkg'
filter_main_onenote:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
Image|endswith: '\ONENOTE.EXE'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of ".one" or ".onepkg" files from those locations
level: medium