title: Suspicious Uninstall of Windows Defender Feature via PowerShell
id: c443012c-7928-43bf-ac20-7eda5efe61ad
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of PowerShell with Uninstall-WindowsFeature or Remove-WindowsFeature cmdlets to disable or remove the Windows Defender GUI feature, a common technique used by adversaries to evade defenses.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.windows.servermanager.migration/uninstall-windowsfeature
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware
author: yxinmiracle
date: 2025-08-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_uninstall:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Uninstall-WindowsFeature'
            - 'Remove-WindowsFeature' # Only supported in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 2012 R2
    selection_cli_defender_feature:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Windows-Defender'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Defender Context Menu Removed
id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b
related:
    - id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to delete the Windows Defender context menu handler registry keys.
    This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
    Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/
    - https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'del'
            - 'Remove-Item'
            - 'ri '
    selection_reg_path:
        CommandLine|contains: '\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - May be part of a system customization or "debloating" script, but this is highly unusual in a managed corporate environment.
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Defender Registry Key Tampering Via Reg.EXE
id: 452bce90-6fb0-43cc-97a5-affc283139b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to tamper with different Windows Defender registry keys in order to disable some important features related to protection and detection
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
    - https://github.com/swagkarna/Defeat-Defender-V1.2.0/tree/ae4059c4276da6f6303b8f53cdff085ecae88a91
    - https://www.elevenforum.com/t/video-guide-how-to-completely-disable-microsoft-defender-antivirus.14608/page-2
    - https://tria.ge/241231-j9yatstqbm/behavioral1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-22
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_root_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_root_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    selection_dword_0:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - 'd 0'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
            - 'EnableControlledFolderAccess'
            - 'MpEnablePus'
            - 'PUAProtection'
            - 'SpynetReporting'
            - 'SubmitSamplesConsent'
            - 'TamperProtection'
    selection_dword_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - 'd 1'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DisableAccess'
            - 'DisableAntiSpyware'
            - 'DisableAntiSpywareRealtimeProtection'
            - 'DisableAntiVirus'
            - 'DisableAntiVirusSignatures'
            - 'DisableArchiveScanning'
            - 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
            - 'DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
            - 'DisableCloudProtection'
            - 'DisableConfig'
            - 'DisableEnhancedNotifications'
            - 'DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
            - 'DisableIOAVProtection'
            - 'DisableNetworkProtection'
            - 'DisableOnAccessProtection'
            - 'DisablePrivacyMode'
            - 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
            - 'DisableRoutinelyTakingAction'
            - 'DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
            - 'DisableScriptScanning'
            - 'DisableSecurityCenter'
            - 'Notification_Suppress'
            - 'SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine'
    condition: all of selection_root_* and 1 of selection_dword_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate use by administrators to test software (should always be investigated)
level: high

title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6
related:
    - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events.
    By setting the 'Start' value to '0' for the 'DefenderApiLogger' or 'DefenderAuditLogger' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events
    from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
    - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions
author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start'
            - '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start'
    selection_reg_add:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add'
            - '0'
    filter_main_enable:
        CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high

title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0
status: test
description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-21
modified: 2023-07-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ' http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification Via CommandLine
id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
related:
    - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification.
    The AutoLogger event tracing session records events that occur early in the operating system boot process.
    Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in.
    Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'reg.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'add '
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - 'si ' # Set-ItemProperty alias
    selection_cli_base:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
    selection_cli_key:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Start' # Key used to disable specific autologger session like EventLog-Application, EventLog-System etc.
            - 'Enabled' # Key used to disable specific provider of autologger session
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autologger_session_registry_modification/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0

title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
    - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
    This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
    - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
    - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
           # Add more script interpreters as needed
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\bun.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - 'trufflehog.exe'
              - 'gitleaks.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'trufflehog'
              - 'gitleaks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml

title: Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: 7dbbcac2-57a0-45ac-b306-ff30a8bd2981
related:
    - id: aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467 # AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects tampering of AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) related registry values via command line tools such as reg.exe or PowerShell.
    AMSI provides a generic interface for applications and services to integrate with antimalware products.
    Adversaries may disable AMSI to evade detection of malicious scripts and code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/arttoolkit/arttoolkit.github.io/blob/16d6230d009e58fd6f773f5317fd4d14c1f26004/_wadcoms/AMSI-Bypass-Jscript_amsienable.md
    - https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/02/macros-and-more-with-sharpshooter-v2-0/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings'
            - 'AmsiEnable'
    selection_reg_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: 'add'
    selection_powershell_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_powershell_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - 'sp '
    condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_reg_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_amsi_registry_tampering/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0

title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Signing Bypass Via Windows Developer Features
id: a383dec4-deec-4e6e-913b-ed9249670848
related:
    - id: b110ebaf-697f-4da1-afd5-b536fa27a2c1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the user to install untrusted packages.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SystemSettingsAdminFlows.EXE'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: 'TurnOnDeveloperFeatures'
    selection_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DeveloperUnlock'
            - 'EnableSideloading'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MMC Spawning Windows Shell
id: 05a2ab7e-ce11-4b63-86db-ab32e763e11d
status: test
description: Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
author: Karneades, Swisscom CSIRT
date: 2019-08-05
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
    selection2:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
        - Image|contains: '\BITSADMIN'
    condition: all of selection*
level: high

title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference
id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
related:
    - id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_remove:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
    selection_tamper:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
            - '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows
id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
related:
    - id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
      type: similar
    - id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
      type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
    RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
    However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
    - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
    - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1219.002
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_meshagent:
        - CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
    filter_main_legitimate:
        Image|endswith: '\meshagent.exe'
    condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - 'Wuauclt'
            - 'Wuauclt.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE
id: 51cbac1e-eee3-4a90-b1b7-358efb81fa0a
status: test
description: Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iobit-forums-hacked-to-spread-ransomware-to-its-members/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Namespace:\\\\root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Defender Definition Files Removed
id: 9719a8aa-401c-41af-8108-ced7ec9cd75c
status: test
description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by removing Windows Defender Definition Files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-07
modified: 2023-07-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: MpCmdRun.exe
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -RemoveDefinitions'
            - ' -All'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
    - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pwsh_binary:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
    selection_sc_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'WinDefend'
            - 'start=disabled'
    condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
    - 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high

title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder
id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
related:
    - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
      type: derived
    - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
      type: derived
    - id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 # PsScript High
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Acl '
            - '-AclObject '
    selection_paths:
        # Note: Add more suspicious paths
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-Path "C:\Windows'
            - "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
            - '-Path %windir%'
            - '-Path $env:windir'
    selection_permissions:
        # Note: Add more suspicious permissions
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FullControl'
            - 'Allow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
id: e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e
status: test
description: Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md#atomic-test-1---disable-windows-iis-http-logging
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - 'config'
            - 'section:httplogging'
            - 'dontLog:true'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Trace ETW Session Tamper Via Logman.EXE
id: cd1f961e-0b96-436b-b7c6-38da4583ec00
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "logman" utility in order to disable or delete Windows trace sessions
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1359039665232306183?s=21
    - https://ss64.com/nt/logman.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-11
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1685.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\logman.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Logman.exe'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'stop '
            - 'delete '
    selection_service:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Circular Kernel Context Logger'
            - 'EventLog-' # Cover multiple traces starting with EventLog-*
            - 'SYSMON TRACE'
            - 'SysmonDnsEtwSession'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate deactivation by administrative staff
    - Installer tools that disable services, e.g. before log collection agent installation
level: high

title: Python Spawning Pretty TTY on Windows
id: 480e7e51-e797-47e3-8d72-ebfce65b6d8d
related:
    - id: 899133d5-4d7c-4a7f-94ee-27355c879d90
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects python spawning a pretty tty
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'python.exe' # no \ bc of e.g. ipython.exe
            - 'python3.exe'
            - 'python2.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'import pty'
            - '.spawn('
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'from pty import spawn'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Credential Guard Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
related:
    - id: 73921b9c-cafd-4446-b0c6-fdb0ace42bc0
      type: similar
    - id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to add, modify, or delete Windows Credential Guard related registry keys or values via command line tools such as Reg.exe or PowerShell.
    Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
    Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
    The rule matches suspicious command lines that target DeviceGuard or LSA registry paths and manipulate keys like EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity, RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures, or LsaCfgFlags.
    Such activity may indicate an attempt to disable or tamper with Credential Guard, potentially exposing sensitive credentials for misuse.
references:
    - https://woshub.com/disable-credential-guard-windows/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceguard
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # add/modify
            - 'add '
            - 'New-ItemProperty '
            - 'Set-ItemProperty '
            - 'si '  # SetItem Alias
            # delete
            - 'delete '
            - 'del '
            - 'Remove-ItemProperty '
            - 'rp '
    selection_key_base:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Control\DeviceGuard'
            - '\Control\LSA'
            - 'Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard'
    selection_key_specific:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity'
            - 'RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures'
            - 'LsaCfgFlags'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_credential_guard_registry_tampering/info.yml

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs
id: 3a6586ad-127a-4d3b-a677-1e6eacdf8fde
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-05-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            # - '\cmd.exe'  # too many false positives
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    filter_ccmcache:
        CurrentDirectory|contains: '\ccmcache\'
    filter_amazon:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # FP - Amazon Workspaces
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\setup-scheduledtask.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\set-selfhealing.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\check-workspacehealth.ps1'
            - '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_nessus:
        CommandLine|contains: '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_sccm_install:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\splash.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\SMSSETUP\BIN\'
            - '\autorun.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
    - Microsoft SCCM
level: high

title: Remote LSASS Process Access Through Windows Remote Management
id: aa35a627-33fb-4d04-a165-d33b4afca3e8
status: stable
description: Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/
author: Patryk Prauze - ING Tech
date: 2019-05-20
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: ':\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe'
    filter_main_access:
        GrantedAccess: '0x80000000'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Trusted Path Bypass via Windows Directory Spoofing
id: 0cbe38c0-270c-41d9-ab79-6e5a9a669290
related:
    - id: 4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can bypass Windows trusted path verification.
    This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC.
references:
    - https://x.com/Wietze/status/1933495426952421843
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.007
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\Windows \System32\'  # Note the space between "Windows" and "System32"
            - ':\Windows \SysWOW64\'  # Note the space between "Windows" and "SysWOW64"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List For Potential Suspicious Application
id: 9e2575e7-2cb9-4da1-adc8-ed94221dca5e
related:
    - id: cde0a575-7d3d-4a49-9817-b8004a7bf105
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows Firewall exception list for an application located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7123e948-c91e-49e0-a813-00e8d72ab393/#
author: frack113
date: 2023-02-26
modified: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2004 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 10)
            - 2071 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 11)
            - 2097
        ApplicationPath|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    filter_main_block:
        Action: 2 # Block
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: All Rules Have Been Deleted From The Windows Firewall Configuration
id: 79609c82-a488-426e-abcf-9f341a39365d
status: test
description: Detects when a all the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-17
modified: 2024-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2033 # All rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration on this computer
            - 2059 # All rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration on this computer. (Windows 11)
    filter_main_svchost:
        ModifyingApplication|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
    filter_optional_msmpeng:
        ModifyingApplication|contains|all:
            - ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created
id: 1bbf25b9-8038-4154-a50b-118f2a32be27
status: test
description: Detects the creation of suspicious accounts similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON, such as using additional spaces. Created as an covering detection for exclusion of Logon Type 3 from ANONYMOUS LOGON accounts.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1189469425482829824
author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573
date: 2019-10-31
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1136.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4720
        SamAccountName|contains|all:
            - 'ANONYMOUS'
            - 'LOGON'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Important Windows Event Auditing Disabled
id: ab4561b1-6c7e-48a7-ad08-087cfb9ce8f1
related:
    - id: 69aeb277-f15f-4d2d-b32a-55e883609563
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where system auditing for important events such as "Process Creation" or "Logon" events is disabled.
references:
    - https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1dkrldTTlN3La-OjWtkWJBb4hVk6vfsSMBFBERs6R8zA/edit
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ad1bfd3d28aa0ccc9656240f845022518ef65a2e/documentation/logsource-guides/windows/service/security.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-20
modified: 2023-11-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: dfd8c0f4-e6ad-4e07-b91b-f2fca0ddef64
detection:
    selection_state_success_and_failure:
        EventID: 4719
        SubcategoryGuid:
            # Note: Add or remove GUID as you see fit in your env
            - '{0CCE9210-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Security State Change
            - '{0CCE9211-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Security System Extension
            - '{0CCE9212-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit System Integrity
            - '{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Logon
            - '{0CCE921B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Special Logon
            - '{0CCE922B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Process Creation
            - '{0CCE922F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Audit Policy Change
            - '{0CCE9230-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Authentication Policy Change
            - '{0CCE9235-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit User Account Management
            - '{0CCE9236-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Computer Account Management
            - '{0CCE9237-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Security Group Management
            - '{0CCE923F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Credential Validation
            - '{0CCE9240-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations
            - '{0CCE9242-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Kerberos Authentication Service
        AuditPolicyChanges|contains:
            - '%%8448' # This is "Success removed"
            - '%%8450' # This is "Failure removed"
    selection_state_success_only:
        EventID: 4719
        SubcategoryGuid: '{0CCE9217-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Account Lockout
        AuditPolicyChanges|contains: '%%8448'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Windows Filtering Platform Blocked Connection From EDR Agent Binary
id: bacf58c6-e199-4040-a94f-95dea0f1e45a
status: test
description: |
    Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents.
    Adversaries may use WFP filters to prevent Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents from reporting security events.
references:
    - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
    - https://github.com/amjcyber/EDRNoiseMaker
    - https://ghoulsec.medium.com/misc-series-4-forensics-on-edrsilencer-events-428b20b3f983
author: '@gott_cyber'
date: 2024-01-08
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Connection needs to be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5157
        Application|endswith:
            - '\AmSvc.exe' # Cybereason
            - '\cb.exe' # Carbon Black EDR
            - '\CETASvc.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\CNTAoSMgr.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\CrAmTray.exe' # Cybereason
            - '\CrsSvc.exe' # Cybereason
            - '\CSFalconContainer.exe' # CrowdStrike Falcon
            - '\CSFalconService.exe' # CrowdStrike Falcon
            - '\CybereasonAV.exe' # Cybereason
            - '\CylanceSvc.exe' # Cylance
            - '\cyserver.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
            - '\CyveraService.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
            - '\CyvrFsFlt.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
            - '\EIConnector.exe' # ESET Inspect
            - '\elastic-agent.exe' # Elastic EDR
            - '\elastic-endpoint.exe' # Elastic EDR
            - '\EndpointBasecamp.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe' # Cybereason
            - '\filebeat.exe' # Elastic EDR
            - '\fortiedr.exe' # FortiEDR
            - '\hmpalert.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\hurukai.exe' # Harfanglab EDR
            - '\LogProcessorService.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\mcsagent.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\mcsclient.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
            - '\MsSense.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
            - '\Ntrtscan.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\PccNTMon.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\QualysAgent.exe' # Qualys EDR
            - '\RepMgr.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
            - '\RepUtils.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
            - '\RepUx.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
            - '\RepWAV.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
            - '\RepWSC.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
            - '\sedservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\SenseCncProxy.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
            - '\SenseIR.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
            - '\SenseNdr.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
            - '\SenseSampleUploader.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
            - '\SentinelAgent.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\SentinelAgentWorker.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\SentinelHelperService.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\SentinelServiceHost.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\SentinelStaticEngine.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe' # SentinelOne
            - '\sfc.exe' # Cisco Secure Endpoint (Formerly Cisco AMP)
            - '\sophos ui.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophosfilescanner.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophosfs.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophoshealth.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophosips.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophosLivequeryservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophosnetfilter.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophosntpservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sophososquery.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\sspservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
            - '\TaniumClient.exe' # Tanium
            - '\TaniumCX.exe' # Tanium
            - '\TaniumDetectEngine.exe' # Tanium
            - '\TMBMSRV.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\TmCCSF.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\TmListen.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\TmWSCSvc.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\Traps.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
            - '\winlogbeat.exe' # Elastic EDR
            - '\WSCommunicator.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
            - '\xagt.exe' # Trellix EDR
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Windows Defender Threat Detected
id: 57b649ef-ff42-4fb0-8bf6-62da243a1708
status: stable
description: Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus
author: Ján Trenčanský
date: 2020-07-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 1006 # The antimalware engine found malware or other potentially unwanted software.
            - 1015 # The antimalware platform detected suspicious behavior.
            - 1116 # The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.
            - 1117 # he antimalware platform performed an action to protect your system from malware or other potentially unwanted software.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Windows Defender Configuration Changes
id: 801bd44f-ceed-4eb6-887c-11544633c0aa
related:
    - id: 1321dc4e-a1fe-481d-a016-52c45f0c8b4f
      type: similar
    - id: a3ab73f1-bd46-4319-8f06-4b20d0617886
      type: similar
    - id: 91903aba-1088-42ee-b680-d6d94fe002b0
      type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious changes to the Windows Defender configuration
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide
    - https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/#DisableAntiSpyware
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-06
modified: 2023-11-24
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5007 # The antimalware platform configuration changed.
        NewValue|contains:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious values
            - '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware '
            # - '\Windows Defender\Features\TamperProtection ' # Might produce FP
            - '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableRemovableDriveScanning '
            - '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan '
            - '\Windows Defender\SpyNet\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen '
            - '\Real-Time Protection\SpyNetReporting '
            # Exclusions changes are covered in 1321dc4e-a1fe-481d-a016-52c45f0c8b4f
            # Exploit guard changes are covered in a3ab73f1-bd46-4319-8f06-4b20d0617886
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator activity (must be investigated)
level: high

title: Windows Defender Grace Period Expired
id: 360a1340-398a-46b6-8d06-99b905dc69d2
related:
    - id: fe34868f-6e0e-4882-81f6-c43aa8f15b62
      type: obsolete
status: stable
description: |
    Detects the expiration of the grace period of Windows Defender. This means protection against viruses, spyware, and other potentially unwanted software is disabled.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide#event-id-5101
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://craigclouditpro.wordpress.com/2020/03/04/hunting-malicious-windows-defender-activity/
author: Ján Trenčanský, frack113
date: 2020-07-28
modified: 2023-11-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5101 # The antimalware platform is expired.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high