Sigma rules for CVE-2023-33955
8 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2023-33955
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
id: a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
status: test
description: Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
references:
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
- https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: okta
service: okta
detection:
selection_event:
eventType: 'policy.evaluate_sign_on'
target.displayName: 'Okta Admin Console'
selection_positive:
- debugContext.debugData.behaviors|contains: 'POSITIVE'
- debugContext.debugData.logOnlySecurityData|contains: 'POSITIVE'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- When an admin begins using the Admin Console and one of Okta's heuristics incorrectly identifies the behavior as being unusual.
level: high
title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
- https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
- https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
- https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1070.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection1:
ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
selection2a:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Remove-Item
- rm
selection2b:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- ConsoleHost_history.txt
- (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Use of CSharp Interactive Console
id: a9e416a8-e613-4f8b-88b8-a7d1d1af2f61
status: test
description: Detects the execution of CSharp interactive console by PowerShell
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/detecting-attacks-leveraging-the-net-framework/
author: Michael R. (@nahamike01)
date: 2020-03-08
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1127
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\csi.exe'
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
OriginalFileName: 'csi.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Possible depending on environment. Pair with other factors such as net connections, command-line args, etc.
level: high
title: AWS Console GetSigninToken Potential Abuse
id: f8103686-e3e8-46f3-be72-65f7fcb4aa53
status: test
description: |
Detects potentially suspicious events involving "GetSigninToken".
An adversary using the "aws_consoler" tool can leverage this console API to create temporary federated credential that help obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised (the original access key) and enables the adversary to pivot from the AWS CLI to console sessions without the need for MFA using the new access key issued in this request.
references:
- https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/analysis-of-intrusion-campaign-targeting-telecom-and-bpo-companies/
author: Chester Le Bron (@123Le_Bron)
date: 2024-02-26
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.007
- attack.t1550.001
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'signin.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'GetSigninToken'
filter_main_console_ua:
userAgent|contains: 'Jersey/${project.version}'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- GetSigninToken events will occur when using AWS SSO portal to login and will generate false positives if you do not filter for the expected user agent(s), see filter. Non-SSO configured roles would be abnormal and should be investigated.
level: medium
title: AWS Successful Console Login Without MFA
id: 77caf516-34e5-4df9-b4db-20744fea0a60
status: experimental
description: |
Detects successful AWS console logins that were performed without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
This alert can be used to identify potential unauthorized access attempts, as logging in without MFA can indicate compromised credentials or misconfigured security settings.
references:
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/vulnerabilities/iam-user-without-mfa/
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
author: Thuya@Hacktilizer, Ivan Saakov
date: 2025-10-18
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'NO'
responseElements.ConsoleLogin: 'Success'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: medium
title: PowerShell Console History Logs Deleted
id: ff301988-c231-4bd0-834c-ac9d73b86586
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the PowerShell console History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
logsource:
category: file_delete
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Console CodePage Lookup Via CHCP
id: 7090adee-82e2-4269-bd59-80691e7c6338
status: test
description: Detects use of chcp to look up the system locale value as part of host discovery
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/chcp
author: _pete_0, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-02-21
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1614.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
ParentCommandLine|contains|windash:
- ' -c '
- ' -r '
- ' -k '
Image|endswith: '\chcp.com'
CommandLine|endswith:
- 'chcp'
- 'chcp '
- 'chcp '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- During Anaconda update the 'conda.exe' process will eventually execution the 'chcp' command.
- Discord was seen using chcp to look up code pages
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_chcp_codepage_lookup/info.yml
title: Potential PowerShell Console History Access Attempt via History File
id: f4ff7323-b5fc-4323-8b52-6b9408e15788
status: experimental
description: |
Detects potential access attempts to the PowerShell console history directly via history file (ConsoleHost_history.txt).
This can give access to plaintext passwords used in PowerShell commands or used for general reconnaissance.
references:
- https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2018/11/08/powershell-history-file.html
author: Luc Génaux
date: 2025-04-03
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ConsoleHost_history.txt'
- '(Get-PSReadLineOption).HistorySavePath'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate access of the console history file is possible
level: medium