title: AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted Or Updated
id: d2656e78-c069-4571-8220-9e0ab5913f19
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects successful deletion or disabling of an AWS GuardDuty detector, possibly by an attacker trying to avoid detection of its malicious activities.
    Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost.
    Verify with the user identity that this activity is legitimate.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDetector.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateDetector.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_suspend-disable.html
    - https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/719-39f-9cd/
    - https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/enterprise-edition/policy-reference/aws-policies/aws-general-policies/ensure-aws-guardduty-detector-is-enabled
    - https://docs.stellarcyber.ai/5.2.x/Using/ML/Alert-Rule-Based-Potentially_Malicious_AWS_Activity.html
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_GuardDutyDisabled.yaml
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_guardduty_detector_deletion.toml
    - https://help.fortinet.com/fsiem/Public_Resource_Access/7_4_0/rules/PH_RULE_AWS_GuardDuty_Detector_Deletion.htm
    - https://research.splunk.com/sources/5d8bd475-c8bc-4447-b27f-efa508728b90/
    - https://suktech24.com/2025/07/17/aws-threat-detection-rule-guardduty-detector-disabled-or-suspended/
    - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T156001#atomic-test-46---aws---guardduty-suspension-or-deletion
author: suktech24
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1685.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_event_source:
        eventSource: 'guardduty.amazonaws.com'
    selection_action_delete:
        eventName: 'DeleteDetector'
    selection_action_update:
        eventName: 'UpdateDetector'
        requestParameters.enable: 'false'
    selection_status_success:
        errorCode: 'Success'
    selection_status_null:
        errorCode: null
    condition: selection_event_source and 1 of selection_action_* and 1 of selection_status_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate detector deletion by an admin (e.g., during account decommissioning).
    - Temporary disablement for troubleshooting (verify via change management tickets).
    - Automated deployment tools (e.g. Terraform) managing GuardDuty state.
level: high

title: Malicious Usage Of IMDS Credentials Outside Of AWS Infrastructure
id: 352a918a-34d8-4882-8470-44830c507aa3
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an instance identity has taken an action that isn't inside SSM.
    This can indicate that a compromised EC2 instance is being used as a pivot point.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-identity-roles.html
    - https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/aws-ec2-imds-what-you-need-to-know/
    - https://www.packetmischief.ca/2023/07/31/amazon-ec2-credential-exfiltration-how-it-happens-and-how-to-mitigate-it/#lifting-credentials-from-imds-this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1078.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        userIdentity.arn|re: '.+:assumed-role/aws:.+'
    filter_main_generic:
        - eventSource: 'ssm.amazonaws.com'
        - eventName: 'RegisterManagedInstance'
        - sourceIPAddress: 'AWS Internal'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - A team has configured an EC2 instance to use instance profiles that grant the option for the EC2 instance to talk to other AWS Services
level: high

title: AWS User Login Profile Was Modified
id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users.
    An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
author: toffeebr33k
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'UpdateLoginProfile'
    filter_main_user_identity:
        userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user account administration
level: high

title: AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
id: db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'GetLoginProfile'
            - 'CreateLoginProfile'
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM LoginProfile listing and/or creation
level: high

title: AWS GuardDuty Important Change
id: 6e61ee20-ce00-4f8d-8aee-bedd8216f7e3
status: test
description: Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/guardduty__whitelist_ip/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-11
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_source:
        eventSource: guardduty.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateIPSet
    condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
    - Valid change in the GuardDuty (e.g. to ignore internal scanners)
level: high

title: Potential Malicious Usage of CloudTrail System Manager
id: 38e7f511-3f74-41d4-836e-f57dfa18eead
status: test
description: |
    Detect when System Manager successfully executes commands against an instance.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/v8.6.0/rules/integrations/aws/initial_access_via_system_manager.toml
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
modified: 2025-12-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_event:
        eventName: 'SendCommand'
        eventSource: 'ssm.amazonaws.com'
    selection_status_success:
        errorCode: 'Success'
    selection_status_null:
        errorCode: null
    condition: selection_event and 1 of selection_status_*
falsepositives:
    - There are legitimate uses of SSM to send commands to EC2 instances
    - Legitimate users may have to use SSM to perform actions against machines in the Cloud to update or maintain them
level: high

title: AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
id: db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: daniel.bohannon@permiso.io (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: PutUserPolicy
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
        requestParameters|contains|all:
            - '"arn:aws:s3:::<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>/*"'
            - '"s3:GetObject"'
            - '"Allow"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 browser with accidental creation of default Inline IAM policy without changing default S3 bucket name placeholder value
level: high

title: AWS KMS Imported Key Material Usage
id: 1279262f-1464-422f-ac0d-5b545320c526
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the import or deletion of key material in AWS KMS, which can be used as part of ransomware attacks. This activity is uncommon and provides a high certainty signal.
references:
    - https://www.chrisfarris.com/post/effective-aws-ransomware/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/ct-importkeymaterial.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/ct-deleteimportedkeymaterial.html
author: toopricey
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1608.003
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'kms.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'ImportKeyMaterial'
            - 'DeleteImportedKeyMaterial'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use cases for imported key material are rare, but may include, Organizations with hybrid cloud architectures that import external key material for compliance requirements.
    - Development or testing environments that simulate external key management scenarios. Even in these cases, such activity is typically infrequent and should not add significant noise.
level: high

title: Password Spray Activity
id: 28ecba0a-c743-4690-ad29-9a8f6f25a6f9
status: test
description: Indicates that a password spray attack has been successfully performed.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#password-spray
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'passwordSpray'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Azure AD Account Credential Leaked
id: 19128e5e-4743-48dc-bd97-52e5775af817
status: test
description: Indicates that the user's valid credentials have been leaked.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#leaked-credentials
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1589
    - attack.reconnaissance
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'leakedCredentials'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A rare hash collision.
level: high

title: Activity From Anonymous IP Address
id: be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8
status: test
description: Identifies that users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#activity-from-anonymous-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'riskyIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Suspicious Browser Activity
id: 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6
status: test
description: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-browser
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousBrowser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: New Country
id: adf9f4d2-559e-4f5c-95be-c28dff0b1476
status: test
description: Detects sign-ins from new countries. The detection considers past activity locations to determine new and infrequent locations.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#new-country
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'newCountry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Failure Rate
id: a3f55ebd-0c01-4ed6-adc0-8fb76d8cd3cd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'maliciousIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
id: 36440e1c-5c22-467a-889b-593e66498472
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
id: 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malware-linked-ip-address-deprecated
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'malwareInfectedIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Using an IP address that is shared by many users
level: high

title: Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
id: ceb55fd0-726e-4656-bf4e-b585b7f7d572
status: test
description: Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-manipulation-rules
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
level: high

title: Unfamiliar Sign-In Properties
id: 128faeef-79dd-44ca-b43c-a9e236a60f49
status: test
description: Detects sign-in with properties that are unfamiliar to the user. The detection considers past sign-in history to look for anomalous sign-ins.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#unfamiliar-sign-in-properties
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'unfamiliarFeatures'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User changing to a new device, location, browser, etc.
level: high

title: Atypical Travel
id: 1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e
status: test
description: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#atypical-travel
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'unlikelyTravel'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Anomalous User Activity
id: 258b6593-215d-4a26-a141-c8e31c1299a6
status: test
description: Indicates that there are anomalous patterns of behavior like suspicious changes to the directory.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anomalous-user-activity
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anomalousUserActivity'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Azure AD Threat Intelligence
id: a2cb56ff-4f46-437a-a0fa-ffa4d1303cba
status: test
description: Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-sign-in
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-user
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'investigationsThreatIntelligence'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Impossible Travel
id: b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a
status: test
description: Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#impossible-travel
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'impossibleTravel'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Connecting to a VPN, performing activity and then dropping and performing additional activity.
level: high

title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication
id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc
status: test
description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-03-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        userAgent|contains:
            - 'BAV2ROPC'
            - 'CBAinPROD'
            - 'CBAinTAR'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Known Legacy Accounts
level: high

title: Suspicious SignIns From A Non Registered Device
id: 572b12d4-9062-11ed-a1eb-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects risky authentication from a non AD registered device without MFA being required.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-01-10
modified: 2025-07-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection_main:
        Status: 'Success'
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
        RiskState: 'atRisk'
    selection_empty1:
        DeviceDetail.trusttype: ''
    selection_empty2:
        DeviceDetail.trusttype: null
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_empty*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
        Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Service Account misconfigured
    - Misconfigured Systems
    - Vulnerability Scanners
level: high

title: Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices
id: 4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        DeviceDetail.isCompliant: 'false'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols
id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e
status: test
description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ActivityDetails: Sign-ins
        ClientApp:
            - Other client
            - IMAP
            - POP3
            - MAPI
            - SMTP
            - Exchange ActiveSync
            - Exchange Web Services
        Username: 'UPN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication
level: high

title: Roles Assigned Outside PIM
id: b1bc08d1-8224-4758-a0e6-fbcfc98c73bb
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-assigned-outside-of-privileged-identity-management
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.
level: high

title: Roles Activated Too Frequently
id: 645fd80d-6c07-435b-9e06-7bc1b5656cba
status: test
description: Identifies when the same privilege role has multiple activations by the same user.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-activated-too-frequently
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'sequentialActivationRenewalsAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate where if active time period for a role is set too short.
level: high

title: Roles Activation Doesn't Require MFA
id: 94a66f46-5b64-46ce-80b2-75dcbe627cc0
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role can be activated without performing mfa.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-dont-require-multi-factor-authentication-for-activation
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'noMfaOnRoleActivationAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if user is performing MFA at sign-in.
level: high

title: Too Many Global Admins
id: 7bbc309f-e2b1-4eb1-8369-131a367d67d3
status: test
description: Identifies an event where there are there are too many accounts assigned the Global Administrator role.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#there-are-too-many-global-administrators
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'tooManyGlobalAdminsAssignedToTenantAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if threshold setting in PIM is too low.
level: high

title: Stale Accounts In A Privileged Role
id: e402c26a-267a-45bd-9615-bd9ceda6da85
status: test
description: Identifies when an account hasn't signed in during the past n number of days.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#potential-stale-accounts-in-a-privileged-role
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'staleSignInAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high

title: Roles Are Not Being Used
id: 8c6ec464-4ae4-43ac-936a-291da66ed13d
status: test
description: Identifies when a user has been assigned a privilege role and are not using that role.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#administrators-arent-using-their-privileged-roles
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'redundantAssignmentAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high

title: Invalid PIM License
id: 58af08eb-f9e1-43c8-9805-3ad9b0482bd8
status: test
description: Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#the-organization-doesnt-have-microsoft-entra-premium-p2-or-microsoft-entra-id-governance
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'invalidLicenseAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if licenses have expired.
level: high

title: Application URI Configuration Changes
id: 0055ad1f-be85-4798-83cf-a6da17c993b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.
    URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Update Application Sucess- Property Name AppAddress
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation
id: 039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d
status: test
description: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Request Approved/Denied
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual admin using PIM.
level: high

title: Bulk Deletion Changes To Privileged Account Permissions
id: 102e11e3-2db5-4c9e-bc26-357d42585d21
status: test
description: Detects when a user is removed from a privileged role. Bulk changes should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Remove eligible member (permanent)
            - Remove eligible member (eligible)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legtimate administrator actions of removing members from a role
level: high

title: Temporary Access Pass Added To An Account
id: fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce
status: test
description: Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account. TAPs added to priv accounts should be investigated
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Admin registered security info
        Status: Admin registered temporary access pass method for user
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator adding a legitimate temporary access pass
level: high

title: User Added To Privilege Role
id: 49a268a4-72f4-4e38-8a7b-885be690c5b5
status: test
description: Detects when a user is added to a privileged role.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Add eligible member (permanent)
            - Add eligible member (eligible)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legtimate administrator actions of adding members from a role
level: high

title: PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled
id: aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd
status: test
description: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Disable PIM Alert
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice.
level: high

title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via AuditLogs
id: ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
    This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
    This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#assignment-and-elevation
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: 'Administrative'
        OperationName: 'Assigns the caller to user access admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high

title: Users Added to Global or Device Admin Roles
id: 11c767ae-500b-423b-bae3-b234450736ed
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for users added to device admin roles.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#device-administrator-roles
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Category: RoleManagement
        OperationName|contains|all:
            - 'Add'
            - 'member to role'
        TargetResources|contains:
            - '7698a772-787b-4ac8-901f-60d6b08affd2'
            - '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes
id: 1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1
status: test
description: Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update Application
            - Update Service principal
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame
id: 6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
status: test
description: Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#short-lived-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Add user
            - Delete user
        Status: Success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legit administrative action
level: high

title: Changes To PIM Settings
id: db6c06c4-bf3b-421c-aa88-15672b88c743
status: test
description: Detects when changes are made to PIM roles
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Update role setting in PIM
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legit administrative PIM setting configuration changes
level: high

title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via ActivityLogs
id: 09438caa-07b1-4870-8405-1dbafe3dad95
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
    This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
    This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftauthorization
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high

title: Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies
id: 13f2d3f5-6497-44a7-bf5f-dc13ffafe5dc
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith.
author: Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher
references:
    - https://labs.jumpsec.com/tokensmith-bypassing-intune-compliant-device-conditional-access/
    - https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/TokenSmith
date: 2025-01-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: audit
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        Operation: 'UserLoggedIn'
        ApplicationId: '9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223'
        ResultStatus: 'Success'
        RequestType: 'Cmsi:Cmsi'
    filter_main_bjectid:
        ObjectId: '0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000' # Microsoft Intune seen when mobile devices are enrolled
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Antivirus Web Shell Detection
id: fdf135a2-9241-4f96-a114-bb404948f736
status: test
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell.
    It's highly recommended to tune this rule to the specific strings used by your anti virus solution by downloading a big WebShell repository from e.g. github and checking the matches.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://github.com/tennc/webshell
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bd1d52289203866645e556e2766a21d2275877fbafa056a76fe0cf884b7f8819/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/308487ed28a3d9abc1fec7ebc812d4b5c07ab025037535421f64c60d3887a3e8/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7d3cb8a8ff28f82b07f382789247329ad2d7782a72dde9867941f13266310c80/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e841675a4b82250c75273ebf0861245f80c6a1c3d5803c2d995d9d3b18d5c4b5/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a80042c61a0372eaa0c2c1e831adf0d13ef09feaf71d1d20b216156269045801/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b219f7d3c26f8bad7e175934cd5eda4ddb5e3983503e94ff07d39c0666821b7e/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b8702acf32fd651af9f809ed42d15135f842788cd98d81a8e1b154ee2a2b76a2/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/13ae8bfbc02254b389ab052aba5e1ba169b16a399d9bc4cb7414c4a73cd7dc78/detection
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith:
              - 'ASP.'
              - 'IIS/BackDoor'
              - 'JAVA/Backdoor'
              - 'JSP.'
              - 'Perl.'
              - 'PHP.'
              - 'Troj/ASP'
              - 'Troj/JSP'
              - 'Troj/PHP'
              - 'VBS/Uxor' # looking for 'VBS/' would also find downloader's and droppers meant for desktops
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'ASP_' # looking for 'VBS_' would also find downloader's and droppers meant for desktops
              - 'ASP:'
              - 'ASP.Agent'
              - 'ASP/'
              # - 'ASP/Agent'
              - 'Aspdoor'
              - 'ASPXSpy'
              - 'Backdoor.ASP'
              - 'Backdoor.Java'
              - 'Backdoor.JSP'
              - 'Backdoor.PHP'
              - 'Backdoor.VBS'
              - 'Backdoor/ASP'
              - 'Backdoor/Java'
              - 'Backdoor/JSP'
              - 'Backdoor/PHP'
              - 'Backdoor/VBS'
              - 'C99shell'
              - 'Chopper'
              - 'filebrowser'
              - 'JSP_'
              - 'JSP:'
              - 'JSP.Agent'
              - 'JSP/'
              # - 'JSP/Agent'
              - 'Perl:'
              - 'Perl/'
              - 'PHP_'
              - 'PHP:'
              - 'PHP.Agent'
              - 'PHP/'
              # - 'PHP/Agent'
              - 'PHPShell'
              - 'PShlSpy'
              - 'SinoChoper'
              - 'Trojan.ASP'
              - 'Trojan.JSP'
              - 'Trojan.PHP'
              - 'Trojan.VBS'
              - 'VBS.Agent'
              - 'VBS/Agent'
              - 'Webshell'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
id: c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c
status: test
description: |
    Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection_path:
        Filename|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '/www/'
            # - '\Client\'
            - '\inetpub\'
            - '\tsclient\'
            - 'apache'
            - 'nginx'
            - 'tomcat'
            - 'weblogic'
    selection_ext:
        Filename|endswith:
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dat'
            - '.ear'
            - '.gif'
            - '.hta'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.msc'
            - '.php'
            - '.pl'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.py'
            - '.pyc'
            - '.rb'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.sh'
            - '.svg'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wll'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.xml'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Antivirus Hacktool Detection
id: fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith:
              - 'ATK/'  # Sophos
              - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
              - 'HKTL'
              - 'HTOOL'
              - 'PWS.'
              - 'PWSX'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              # - 'FRP.'
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'Adfind'
              - 'Brutel'
              - 'BruteR'
              - 'Cobalt'
              - 'COBEACON'
              - 'Cometer'
              - 'DumpCreds'
              - 'FastReverseProxy'
              - 'Hacktool'
              - 'Havoc'
              - 'Impacket'
              - 'Keylogger'
              - 'Koadic'
              - 'Mimikatz'
              - 'Nighthawk'
              - 'PentestPowerShell'
              - 'Potato'
              - 'PowerSploit'
              - 'PowerSSH'
              - 'PshlSpy'
              - 'PSWTool'
              - 'PWCrack'
              - 'PWDump'
              - 'Rozena'
              - 'Rusthound'
              - 'Sbelt'
              - 'Seatbelt'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              - 'SharpDump'
              - 'SharpHound'
              - 'Shellcode'
              - 'Sliver'
              - 'Snaffler'
              - 'SOAPHound'
              - 'Splinter'
              - 'Swrort'
              - 'TurtleLoader'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high