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CVE

CVE-2023-25194

A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Connect API. This requires access to a Kafka Conne

A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Connect API. This requires access to a Kafka Connect worker, and the ability to create/modify connectors on it with an arbitrary Kafka client SASL JAAS config and a SASL-based security protocol, which has been possible on Kafka Connect clusters since Apache Kafka Connect 2.3.0. When configuring the connector via the Kafka Connect REST API, an authenticated operator can set the sasl.jaas.config property for any of the connector's Kafka clients to "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule", which can be done via the producer.override.sasl.jaas.config, consumer.override.sasl.jaas.config, or admin.override.sasl.jaas.config properties.

This will allow the server to connect to the attacker's LDAP server and deserialize the LDAP response, which the attacker can use to execute java deserialization gadget chains on the Kafka connect server. Attacker can cause unrestricted deserialization of untrusted data (or) RCE vulnerability when there are gadgets in the classpath. Since Apache Kafka 3.0.0, users are allowed to specify these properties in connector configurations for Kafka Connect clusters running with out-of-the-box configurations.

Before Apache Kafka 3.0.0, users may not specify these properties unless the Kafka Connect cluster has been reconfigured with a connector client override policy that permits them. Since Apache Kafka 3.4.0, we have added a system property ("-Dorg.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules") to disable the problematic login modules usage in SASL JAAS configuration. Also by default "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule" is disabled in Apache Kafka Connect 3.4.0.

We advise the Kafka Connect users to validate connector configurations and only allow trusted JNDI configurations. Also examine connector dependencies for vulnerable versions and either upgrade their connectors, upgrading that specific dependency, or removing the connectors as options for remediation. Finally, in addition to leveraging the "org.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules" system property, Kafka Connect users can also implement their own connector client config override policy, which can be used to control which Kafka client properties can be overridden directly in a connector config and which cannot.

HIGH · CVSS 8.8 EPSS 0.94055
Act now
  • EPSS ≥ 0.50 - high probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
  • EPSS percentile: top 0% of all CVEs by exploitation likelihood
  • Reliable Metasploit module available (rank: Excellent) - weaponised exploit code
  • Public exploit or PoC is available
  • CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
NVDCVE.orgCISAVulnersExploit-DBGitHub PoCVulnCheck KEVGreyNoise
▸ How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2023-25194, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
◆

ATT&CK techniques

1

Techniques this CVE enables - linked via CWECAPECATT&CK. High◆ = named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei templates.

T1078 · Valid Accounts
▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques
▤

CAPEC attack patterns

1

Attack patterns this CVE enables - the bridge from weakness to ATT&CK technique.

CAPEC-CAPEC-586 · Object Injection
⬡

Weakness Classification

CWE-502Deserialization of Untrusted Data
▤

Affected Products & Versions

1
apache kafka connect>= 2.3.0 and <= 3.3.2
▤

Affected Packages

1
Language-ecosystem packages (from OSV) tied to this CVE, with the version that fixes it - the dependency-level detail NVD doesn’t carry.
Maven org.apache.kafka:connect HIGH fixed in 3.4.0
⚠

Public Exploits & PoCs

17
These PoC and exploit links come from public sources and are not verified to be safe or functional. Review the code before running anything, and treat unverified entries as untrusted.
nucleiApache Druid Kafka Connect - Remote Code Executionhigh
pocohnonoyesyes/CVE-2023-25194 (nomi-sec)
pocvulncheck-oss/cve-2023-25194 (nomi-sec)
pocYongYe-Security/CVE-2023-25194 (nomi-sec)
poc12442RF/POC (trickest)
pocARPSyndicate/cvemon (trickest)
pocAvento/Apache_Druid_JNDI_Vuln (trickest)
pocCVEDB/PoC-List (trickest)
pocCVEDB/awesome-cve-repo (trickest)
pocCVEDB/top (trickest)
pocDMW11525708/wiki (trickest)
pocJ1ezds/Vulnerability-Wiki-page (trickest)
pocLern0n/Lernon-POC (trickest)
pocProbiusOfficial/Awsome-Sec.CTF-Videomaker (trickest)
pocThreekiii/Awesome-POC (trickest)
pocThreekiii/CVE (trickest)
pocpacketstormsecurity.com · Apache-Druid-JNDI-Injection-Remote-Code-Execution.htmlpacketstormsecurity.com
⚙

Metasploit Modules

1
Weaponised exploit modules in the Metasploit Framework. Rank is Metasploit’s reliability rating - Excellent/Great/Good means dependable, real-world exploit code (a strong “act now” signal), not a fragile PoC.
Excellentexploit/multi/http/apache_druid_cve_2023_251942023-02-07
▣

Scoring & Timeline

8.8
HIGH · CVSS v3.1 · [email protected]
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD07 Feb 2023 · 08:15 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
poc
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
SSVC asks the questions that actually drive patch urgency: is it being exploited, can attacks be automated, and how total is the impact.
⚑

Vendor Advisories

3
rhsaRHSA-2023:3223Important
rhsaRHSA-2023:1241Moderate
oracle-cpuoracle-cpu-Oracle-Banking-APIs-13676--CVE-2023-25194
🔗

References & Sources

2
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.
https://kafka.apache.org/cve-listMitigationVendor Advisory
https://lists.apache.org/thread/vy1c7fqcdqvq5grcqp6q5jyyb302khyzMailing ListMitigation
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