title: Potential SAM Database Dump
id: 4e87b8e2-2ee9-4b2a-a715-4727d297ece0
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files that look like exports of the local SAM (Security Account Manager)
references:
    - https://github.com/search?q=CVE-2021-36934
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210725081645/https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-36934
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=%22reg.exe+save%22+sam
    - https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal
    - https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\Temp\sam'
              - '\sam.sav'
              - '\Intel\sam'
              - '\sam.hive'
              - '\Perflogs\sam'
              - '\ProgramData\sam'
              - '\Users\Public\sam'
              - '\AppData\Local\sam'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\sam'
              - '_ShadowSteal.zip'       # https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal
              - '\Documents\SAM.export'  # https://github.com/n3tsurge/CVE-2021-36934/
              - ':\sam'
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\hive_sam_'             # https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare
              - '\sam.save'
              - '\sam.export'
              - '\~reg_sam.save'
              - '\sam_backup'
              - '\sam.bck'
              - '\sam.backup'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare cases of administrative activity
level: high

title: VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump Via Sqlcmd.EXE
id: b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53
status: test
description: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
    - https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools:
        Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
    selection_query:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SELECT'
            - 'TOP'
            - '[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
id: ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652
related:
    - id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.
references:
    - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
    - https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24
    - https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-ransomware-gang-exploiting-large-corporations/
    - https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/adexplorer-on-engagements
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-14
modified: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\ADExp.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AdExp'
        - Description: 'Active Directory Editor'
        - Product: 'Sysinternals ADExplorer'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: 'snapshot'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious paths
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Shim Database Patching Activity
id: bf344fea-d947-4ef4-9192-34d008315d3a
status: test
description: Detects installation of new shim databases that try to patch sections of known processes for potential process injection or persistence.
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/pillowmint-fin7s-monkey-thief/
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-01
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            # Note: add other application to increase coverage
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\WmiPrvSe.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Shim Database In Uncommon Location
id: 6b6976a3-b0e6-4723-ac24-ae38a737af41
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a new shim database where the file is located in a non-default location
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
    - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/
    - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Erickson/Asia-14-Erickson-Persist-It-Using-And-Abusing-Microsofts-Fix-It-Patches.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-01
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB\'
            - '\DatabasePath'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Details|contains: ':\Windows\AppPatch\Custom'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RDS Database Security Group Modification
id: 14f3f1c8-02d5-43a2-a191-91ffb52d3015
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the security group entries for RDS databases.
    This can indicate that a misconfiguration has occurred which potentially exposes the database to the public internet, a wider audience within the VPC or that removal of valid rules has occurred which could impact the availability of the database to legitimate services and users.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'rds.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'CreateDBSecurityGroup'
            - 'DeleteDBSecurityGroup'
            - 'RevokeDBSecurityGroupIngress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Creation of a new Database that needs new security group rules
level: medium

title: Google Cloud SQL Database Modified or Deleted
id: f346bbd5-2c4e-4789-a221-72de7685090d
status: test
description: Detect when a Cloud SQL DB has been modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/admin-api/rest/v1beta4/users/update
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name:
            - cloudsql.instances.create
            - cloudsql.instances.delete
            - cloudsql.users.update
            - cloudsql.users.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - SQL Database being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - SQL Database modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: New Custom Shim Database Created
id: ee63c85c-6d51-4d12-ad09-04e25877a947
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.
    The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-2---new-shim-database-files-created-in-the-default-shim-database-directory
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence
    - https://liberty-shell.com/sec/2020/02/25/shim-persistence/
    - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-29
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Windows\apppatch\Custom\'
            - ':\Windows\apppatch\CustomSDB\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_new_shim_database/info.yml

title: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool
id: 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).
    Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
references:
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml
    - https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
    - https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2021-10-08
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName: '\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
            - ':\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\mmc.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe'
            - ':\Windows\WID\Binn\sqlwriter.exe'
            - '\AzureADConnect.exe'
            - '\Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
            - '\Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe'
            - '\Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe'
            - '\sqlservr.exe'
            - '\tssdis.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664
related:
    - id: ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.
references:
    - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
    - https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24
    - https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-ransomware-gang-exploiting-large-corporations/
    - https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/adexplorer-on-engagements
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-14
modified: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\ADExp.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AdExp'
        - Description: 'Active Directory Editor'
        - Product: 'Sysinternals ADExplorer'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'snapshot'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE
id: 517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8
related:
    - id: 18ee686c-38a3-4f65-9f44-48a077141f42
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe.
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence
author: Markus Neis
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sdbinst.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sdbinst.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '.sdb'
    filter_optional_iis:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Expected behavior for IIS Express (e.g. https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/15d4ff941f77f7bdfc9dfb2399b7b952a0a2c860976ef3e835998ff4796e5e91?environmentId=120)
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb'
            - ':\Program Files\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Uncommon Extension Shim Database Installation Via Sdbinst.EXE
id: 18ee686c-38a3-4f65-9f44-48a077141f42
related:
    - id: 517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects installation of a potentially suspicious new shim with an uncommon extension using sdbinst.exe.
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/8ee690e43a379cbce8c9d61107442c36bd9be3d3/Other/Undocumented-Flags-Sdbinst.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-01
modified: 2024-01-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\sdbinst.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sdbinst.exe'
    filter_main_legit_ext:
        CommandLine|contains: '.sdb'
    filter_main_legit_extensions:
        # ParentImage|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - ' -c'
              - ' -f'
              - ' -mm'
              - ' -t'
        - CommandLine|contains: ' -m -bg'
    filter_main_null:
        CommandLine: null
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine: ''
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Veeam Backup Database Suspicious Query
id: 696bfb54-227e-4602-ac5b-30d9d2053312
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious SQL queries using SQLCmd targeting the Veeam backup databases in order to steal information.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sql:
        Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'VeeamBackup'
            - 'From '
    selection_db:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'BackupRepositories'
            - 'Backups'
            - 'Credentials'
            - 'HostCreds'
            - 'SmbFileShares'
            - 'Ssh_creds'
            - 'VSphereInfo'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: SCM Database Privileged Operation
id: dae8171c-5ec6-4396-b210-8466585b53e9
status: test
description: Detects non-system users performing privileged operation os the SCM database
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-08-15
modified: 2022-09-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4674
        ObjectType: 'SC_MANAGER OBJECT'
        ObjectName: 'servicesactive'
        PrivilegeList: 'SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'
    filter:
        SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4'
        ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\services.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: SCM Database Handle Failure
id: 13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669
status: test
description: Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2022-07-11
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1010
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4656
        ObjectType: 'SC_MANAGER OBJECT'
        ObjectName: 'ServicesActive'
        AccessMask: '0xf003f'  # is used in the reference; otherwise too many FPs
        # Keywords: 'Audit Failure' <-> in the ref 'Keywords':-9214364837600034816
    filter:
        SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# triggering on many hosts in some environments
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via Shim Database Modification
id: dfb5b4e8-91d0-4291-b40a-e3b0d3942c45
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.
    The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-3---registry-key-creation-andor-modification-events-for-sdb
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
    - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-30
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB\'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\'
    filter_main_empty_string:
        Details: ''
    filter_main_empty_value:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_main_null:
        Details: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule
level: medium