Sigma rules for CVE-2022-34665
59 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2022-34665
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Renamed Visual Studio Code Tunnel Execution
id: 2cf29f11-e356-4f61-98c0-1bdb9393d6da
status: test
description: Detects renamed Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-28
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1219
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image_only_tunnel:
OriginalFileName: null
CommandLine|endswith: '.exe tunnel'
selection_image_tunnel_args:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '.exe tunnel'
- '--accept-server-license-terms'
selection_image_tunnel_service:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'tunnel '
- 'service'
- 'internal-run'
- 'tunnel-service.log'
selection_parent_tunnel:
ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' tunnel'
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/d /c '
- '\servers\Stable-'
- 'code-server.cmd'
filter_main_parent_code:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\code-tunnel.exe'
- '\code.exe'
filter_main_image_code:
Image|endswith:
- '\code-tunnel.exe'
- '\code.exe'
condition: (1 of selection_image_* and not 1 of filter_main_image_*) or (selection_parent_tunnel and not 1 of filter_main_parent_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Network Connection Initiated To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain
id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 # Net Connection DevTunnels
type: similar
- id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1 # DNS VsCode
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b # DNS DevTunnels
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects network connections to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration
author: Kamran Saifullah
date: 2023-11-20
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1572
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith: '.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this.
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Remote File Creation
id: 56e05d41-ce99-4ecd-912d-93f019ee0b71
status: test
description: |
Detects the creation of file by the "node.exe" process in the ".vscode-server" directory. Could be a sign of remote file creation via VsCode tunnel feature
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains: '\servers\Stable-'
Image|endswith: '\server\node.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\.vscode-server\data\User\History\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: DNS Query To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain
id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 # Net Connection DevTunnels
type: similar
- id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 # Net Connection VsCode
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b # DNS DevTunnels
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects DNS query requests to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration
author: citron_ninja
date: 2023-10-25
modified: 2023-11-20
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith: '.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this.
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Execution
id: 90d6bd71-dffb-4989-8d86-a827fedd6624
status: test
description: Detects Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), citron_ninja
date: 2023-10-25
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1219
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_only_tunnel:
OriginalFileName: null
CommandLine|endswith: '.exe tunnel'
selection_tunnel_args:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '.exe tunnel'
- '--accept-server-license-terms'
selection_parent_tunnel:
ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' tunnel'
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/d /c '
- '\servers\Stable-'
- 'code-server.cmd'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel
level: medium
title: Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Arbitrary Binary Execution
id: a20391f8-76fb-437b-abc0-dba2df1952c6
related:
- id: 65c3ca2c-525f-4ced-968e-246a713d164f
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects child processes of Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe that can be used to execute any other binary
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1463526834918854661
- https://gist.github.com/nasbench/a989ce64cefa8081bd50cf6ad8c491b5
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2023-04-11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use by developers as part of NodeJS development with Visual Studio Tools
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Shell Execution
id: f4a623c2-4ef5-4c33-b811-0642f702c9f1
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a shell (powershell, bash, wsl...) via Visual Studio Code tunnel. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel and execute arbitrary commands on the system.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|contains: '\servers\Stable-'
ParentImage|endswith: '\server\node.exe'
ParentCommandLine|contains: '.vscode-server' # Technically one can host its own local server instead of using the VsCode one. And that would probably change the name (requires further research)
# Note: Child processes (ie: shells) can be whatever technically (with some efforts)
selection_child_1:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '\terminal\browser\media\shellIntegration.ps1'
selection_child_2:
Image|endswith:
- '\wsl.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel and running code from there
level: medium
title: Malicious PE Execution by Microsoft Visual Studio Debugger
id: 15c7904e-6ad1-4a45-9b46-5fb25df37fd2
status: test
description: |
There is an option for a MS VS Just-In-Time Debugger "vsjitdebugger.exe" to launch specified executable and attach a debugger.
This option may be used adversaries to execute malicious code by signed verified binary.
The debugger is installed alongside with Microsoft Visual Studio package.
references:
- https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990758590020452353
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Vsjitdebugger/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/debugger/debug-using-the-just-in-time-debugger?view=vs-2019
author: Agro (@agro_sev), Ensar Şamil (@sblmsrsn), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\vsjitdebugger.exe'
reduction1:
Image|endswith: '\vsimmersiveactivatehelper*.exe'
reduction2:
Image|endswith: '\devenv.exe'
condition: selection and not (reduction1 or reduction2)
falsepositives:
- The process spawned by vsjitdebugger.exe is uncommon.
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Service Installation
id: 30bf1789-379d-4fdc-900f-55cd0a90a801
status: test
description: Detects the installation of VsCode tunnel (code-tunnel) as a service.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'tunnel '
- 'service'
- 'internal-run'
- 'tunnel-service.log'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate installation of code-tunnel as a service
level: medium
title: Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Renamed Execution
id: 65c3ca2c-525f-4ced-968e-246a713d164f
related:
- id: a20391f8-76fb-437b-abc0-dba2df1952c6
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects renamed execution of "Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary binaries
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1463526834918854661
- https://gist.github.com/nasbench/a989ce64cefa8081bd50cf6ad8c491b5
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
OriginalFileName: 'Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe'
filter_main_legit_name:
Image|endswith: '\Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Potential Persistence Via Visual Studio Tools for Office
id: 9d15044a-7cfe-4d23-8085-6ebc11df7685
status: test
description: Detects persistence via Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins in Office applications.
references:
- https://twitter.com/_vivami/status/1347925307643355138
- https://vanmieghem.io/stealth-outlook-persistence/
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-01-10
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
- attack.t1137.006
- attack.persistence
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Word\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Excel\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Office\Powerpoint\Addins\'
- '\Software\Microsoft\VSTO\Security\Inclusion\'
filter_main_system:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe' # e.g. default Evernote installation
filter_main_office_click_to_run:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
filter_main_integrator:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
filter_main_office_apps:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE'
- 'C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\Office'
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\Integrator.exe'
- '\OneNote.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\Teams.exe'
- '\visio.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
filter_main_vsto:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\'
Image|endswith: '\VSTOInstaller.exe'
filter_optional_avg:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Antivirus.AsOutExt\'
filter_optional_avast:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Avast.AsOutExt\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Addin Installation
level: medium
title: HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution
id: 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory.
It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\WCE.exe'
- '\WCE64.exe'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- 'IMPHASH=136F0A8572C058A96436C82E541E4C41'
- 'IMPHASH=589657C64DDE88533186C39F82FA1F50'
- 'IMPHASH=6BFE09EFCB4FFDE061EBDBAFC4DB84CF'
- 'IMPHASH=7D490037BF450877E6D0287BDCFF8D2E'
- 'IMPHASH=8AB93B061287C79F3088C5BC7E7D97ED'
- 'IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F'
- 'IMPHASH=BA434A7A729EEC20E136CA4C32D6C740'
- 'IMPHASH=BD1D1547DA13C0FCB6C15E86217D5EB8'
- 'IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID
id: a4b25073-8947-489c-a8dd-93b41c23f26d
status: test
description: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID.
references:
- https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1785051227568632263
- https://www.cloudcoffee.ch/microsoft-365/configure-windows-laps-in-microsoft-intune/
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487
author: andrewdanis
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
category: 'Device'
activityType|contains: 'Recover device local administrator password'
additionalDetails.additionalInfo|contains: 'Successfully recovered local credential by device id'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Approved activity performed by an Administrator.
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender - PSClassic
id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
related:
- id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
type: similar
status: test
description: Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-07
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_classic_provider_start
detection:
selection_set_mppreference:
Data|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_options_bool_allow:
Data|contains:
- '-dbaf $true'
- '-dbaf 1'
- '-dbm $true'
- '-dbm 1'
- '-dips $true'
- '-dips 1'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
- '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
- '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
- '-MAPSReporting $false'
- '-MAPSReporting 0'
- '-drdsc $true'
- '-drdsc 1'
- '-drtm $true'
- '-drtm 1'
- '-dscrptsc $true'
- '-dscrptsc 1'
- '-dsmndf $true'
- '-dsmndf 1'
- '-dsnf $true'
- '-dsnf 1'
- '-dss $true'
- '-dss 1'
selection_options_actions_func:
Data|contains:
- 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'htdefac Allow'
- 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'ltdefac Allow'
- 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'mtdefac Allow'
- 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'stdefac Allow'
condition: selection_set_mppreference and 1 of selection_options_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference - ScriptBlockLogging
id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
related:
- id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_remove:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
selection_tamper:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
- '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender - ScriptBlockLogging
id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
related:
- id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps
- https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/
author: frack113, elhoim, Tim Shelton (fps, alias support), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_options_disabling_preference:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_options_disabling_function:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-dbaf $true'
- '-dbaf 1'
- '-dbm $true'
- '-dbm 1'
- '-dips $true'
- '-dips 1'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
- '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
- '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
- '-MAPSReporting $false'
- '-MAPSReporting 0'
- '-drdsc $true'
- '-drdsc 1'
- '-drtm $true'
- '-drtm 1'
- '-dscrptsc $true'
- '-dscrptsc 1'
- '-dsmndf $true'
- '-dsmndf 1'
- '-dsnf $true'
- '-dsnf 1'
- '-dss $true'
- '-dss 1'
selection_other_default_actions_allow:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_other_default_actions_func:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'htdefac Allow'
- 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'ltdefac Allow'
- 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'mtdefac Allow'
- 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'stdefac Allow'
condition: all of selection_options_disabling_* or all of selection_other_default_actions_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high
title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
- https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
- https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
- https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1070.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection1:
ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
selection2a:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Remove-Item
- rm
selection2b:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- ConsoleHost_history.txt
- (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder - PsScript
id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478
related:
- id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
type: derived
- id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
type: derived
- id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1222
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
selection_cmdlet:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Set-Acl '
- '-AclObject '
selection_paths:
# Note: Add more suspicious paths
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-Path "C:\Windows'
- '-Path "C:/Windows'
- "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
- "-Path 'C:/Windows"
- '-Path C:\\Windows'
- '-Path C:/Windows'
- '-Path $env:windir'
- '-Path "$env:windir'
- "-Path '$env:windir"
selection_permissions:
# Note: Add more suspicious permissions
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'FullControl'
- 'Allow'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
- id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_generic:
Image|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- '\sihost.exe'
- '\smss.exe'
- '\wininit.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.ps1'
- '.txt'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
selection_special:
Image|endswith:
- '\dllhost.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.ps1'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
- '\sysvol\'
- '\Policies\'
- '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.ps1'
- '.bat'
filter_main_clipchamp:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
- '.ps1'
filter_main_powershell_preview:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe' # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
# - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
TargetFilename|contains:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File
id: 68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OskSupport.dll'
selection2:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe'
TargetFilename: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename
id: 129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d
status: test
description: |
Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder.
Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2024-06-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_dump:
Image|startswith: ':\Program Files'
Image|contains: '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
Image|endswith: '\dump64.exe'
selection_tools_procdump:
- OriginalFileName: 'procdump'
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' -ma ' # Full Dump
- ' -mp ' # Mini Plus
condition: selection_dump and 1 of selection_tools_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Service Tampering
id: ce72ef99-22f1-43d4-8695-419dcb5d9330
related:
- id: eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90
type: obsolete
- id: 6783aa9e-0dc3-49d4-a94a-8b39c5fd700b
type: obsolete
- id: 7fd4bb39-12d0-45ab-bb36-cebabc73dc7b
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus/Genshin%20Impact%20Figure%2010.jpg
- https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/delete-method-in-class-win32-service
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 , X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2025-08-27
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tools_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'psservice.exe'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'sc.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- '\PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\PsService.exe'
- '\PsService64.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sc.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # wmic process call win32_service where name='servicename' delete
selection_tools_cli:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' delete '
- '.delete()' # Get-WmiObject win32_service -Filter "name='$serviceName'" ).delete()
- ' pause ' # Covers flags from: PsService and Sc.EXE
- ' stop ' # Covers flags from: PsService.EXE, Net.EXE and Sc.EXE
- 'Stop-Service '
- 'Remove-Service '
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'config'
- 'start=disabled'
selection_services:
CommandLine|contains:
- '143Svc'
- 'Acronis VSS Provider'
- 'AcronisAgent'
- 'AcrSch2Svc'
- 'AdobeARMservice'
- 'AHS Service'
- 'Antivirus'
- 'Apache4'
- 'ARSM'
- 'aswBcc'
- 'AteraAgent'
- 'Avast Business Console Client Antivirus Service'
- 'avast! Antivirus'
- 'AVG Antivirus'
- 'avgAdminClient'
- 'AvgAdminServer'
- 'AVP1'
- 'BackupExec'
- 'bedbg'
- 'BITS'
- 'BrokerInfrastructure'
- 'CASLicenceServer'
- 'CASWebServer'
- 'Client Agent 7.60'
- 'Core Browsing Protection'
- 'Core Mail Protection'
- 'Core Scanning Server'
- 'DCAgent'
- 'dwmrcs'
- 'EhttpSr'
- 'ekrn'
- 'Enterprise Client Service'
- 'epag'
- 'EPIntegrationService'
- 'EPProtectedService'
- 'EPRedline'
- 'EPSecurityService'
- 'EPUpdateService'
- 'EraserSvc11710'
- 'EsgShKernel'
- 'ESHASRV'
- 'FA_Scheduler'
- 'FirebirdGuardianDefaultInstance'
- 'FirebirdServerDefaultInstance'
- 'FontCache3.0.0.0'
- 'HealthTLService'
- 'hmpalertsvc'
- 'HMS'
- 'HostControllerService'
- 'hvdsvc'
- 'IAStorDataMgrSvc'
- 'IBMHPS'
- 'ibmspsvc'
- 'IISAdmin'
- 'IMANSVC'
- 'IMAP4Svc'
- 'instance2'
- 'KAVFS'
- 'KAVFSGT'
- 'kavfsslp'
- 'KeyIso'
- 'klbackupdisk'
- 'klbackupflt'
- 'klflt'
- 'klhk'
- 'KLIF'
- 'klim6'
- 'klkbdflt'
- 'klmouflt'
- 'klnagent'
- 'klpd'
- 'kltap'
- 'KSDE1.0.0'
- 'LogProcessorService'
- 'M8EndpointAgent'
- 'macmnsvc'
- 'masvc'
- 'MBAMService'
- 'MBCloudEA'
- 'MBEndpointAgent'
- 'McAfeeDLPAgentService'
- 'McAfeeEngineService'
- 'MCAFEEEVENTPARSERSRV'
- 'McAfeeFramework'
- 'MCAFEETOMCATSRV530'
- 'McShield'
- 'McTaskManager'
- 'mfefire'
- 'mfemms'
- 'mfevto'
- 'mfevtp'
- 'mfewc'
- 'MMS'
- 'mozyprobackup'
- 'mpssvc'
- 'MSComplianceAudit'
- 'MSDTC'
- 'MsDtsServer'
- 'MSExchange'
- 'msftesq1SPROO'
- 'msftesql$PROD'
- 'msftesql$SQLEXPRESS'
- 'MSOLAP$SQL_2008'
- 'MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC'
- 'MSOLAP$TPS'
- 'MSOLAP$TPSAMA'
- 'MSOLAPSTPS'
- 'MSOLAPSTPSAMA'
- 'mssecflt'
- 'MSSQ!I.SPROFXENGAGEMEHT'
- 'MSSQ0SHAREPOINT'
- 'MSSQ0SOPHOS'
- 'MSSQL'
- 'MSSQLFDLauncher$'
- 'MySQL'
- 'NanoServiceMain'
- 'NetMsmqActivator'
- 'NetPipeActivator'
- 'netprofm'
- 'NetTcpActivator'
- 'NetTcpPortSharing'
- 'ntrtscan'
- 'nvspwmi'
- 'ofcservice'
- 'Online Protection System'
- 'OracleClientCache80'
- 'OracleDBConsole'
- 'OracleMTSRecoveryService'
- 'OracleOraDb11g_home1'
- 'OracleService'
- 'OracleVssWriter'
- 'osppsvc'
- 'PandaAetherAgent'
- 'PccNTUpd'
- 'PDVFSService'
- 'POP3Svc'
- 'postgresql-x64-9.4'
- 'POVFSService'
- 'PSUAService'
- 'Quick Update Service'
- 'RepairService'
- 'ReportServer'
- 'ReportServer$'
- 'RESvc'
- 'RpcEptMapper'
- 'sacsvr'
- 'SamSs'
- 'SAVAdminService'
- 'SAVService'
- 'ScSecSvc'
- 'SDRSVC'
- 'SearchExchangeTracing'
- 'sense'
- 'SentinelAgent'
- 'SentinelHelperService'
- 'SepMasterService'
- 'ShMonitor'
- 'Smcinst'
- 'SmcService'
- 'SMTPSvc'
- 'SNAC'
- 'SntpService'
- 'Sophos'
- 'SQ1SafeOLRService'
- 'SQL Backups'
- 'SQL Server'
- 'SQLAgent'
- 'SQLANYs_Sage_FAS_Fixed_Assets'
- 'SQLBrowser'
- 'SQLsafe'
- 'SQLSERVERAGENT'
- 'SQLTELEMETRY'
- 'SQLWriter'
- 'SSISTELEMETRY130'
- 'SstpSvc'
- 'storflt'
- 'svcGenericHost'
- 'swc_service'
- 'swi_filter'
- 'swi_service'
- 'swi_update'
- 'Symantec'
- 'sysmon'
- 'TeamViewer'
- 'Telemetryserver'
- 'ThreatLockerService'
- 'TMBMServer'
- 'TmCCSF'
- 'TmFilter'
- 'TMiCRCScanService'
- 'tmlisten'
- 'TMLWCSService'
- 'TmPfw'
- 'TmPreFilter'
- 'TmProxy'
- 'TMSmartRelayService'
- 'tmusa'
- 'Tomcat'
- 'Trend Micro Deep Security Manager'
- 'TrueKey'
- 'UFNet'
- 'UI0Detect'
- 'UniFi'
- 'UTODetect'
- 'vds'
- 'Veeam'
- 'VeeamDeploySvc'
- 'Veritas System Recovery'
- 'vmic'
- 'VMTools'
- 'vmvss'
- 'VSApiNt'
- 'VSS'
- 'W3Svc'
- 'wbengine'
- 'WdNisSvc'
- 'WeanClOudSve'
- 'Weems JY'
- 'WinDefend'
- 'wmms'
- 'wozyprobackup'
- 'WPFFontCache_v0400'
- 'WRSVC'
- 'wsbexchange'
- 'WSearch'
- 'wscsvc'
- 'Zoolz 2 Service'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators or tools shutting down the services due to upgrade or removal purposes. If you experience some false positive, please consider adding filters to the parent process launching this command and not removing the entry
level: high
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process
id: 0058b9e5-bcd7-40d4-9205-95ca5a16d7b2
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img_1:
Image: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
selection_img_2:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
ParentCommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc" /s'
selection_integrity:
IntegrityLevel:
- 'High'
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384' # System
- 'S-1-16-12288' # High
condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_integrity
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Uninstall of Windows Defender Feature via PowerShell
id: c443012c-7928-43bf-ac20-7eda5efe61ad
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of PowerShell with Uninstall-WindowsFeature or Remove-WindowsFeature cmdlets to disable or remove the Windows Defender GUI feature, a common technique used by adversaries to evade defenses.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.windows.servermanager.migration/uninstall-windowsfeature
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware
author: yxinmiracle
date: 2025-08-22
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_cli_uninstall:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Uninstall-WindowsFeature'
- 'Remove-WindowsFeature' # Only supported in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 2012 R2
selection_cli_defender_feature:
CommandLine|contains: 'Windows-Defender'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Defender Context Menu Removed
id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b
related:
- id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to delete the Windows Defender context menu handler registry keys.
This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
references:
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/
- https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'powershell_ise.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'reg.exe'
selection_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'ri '
selection_reg_path:
CommandLine|contains: '\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- May be part of a system customization or "debloating" script, but this is highly unusual in a managed corporate environment.
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Defender Registry Key Tampering Via Reg.EXE
id: 452bce90-6fb0-43cc-97a5-affc283139b3
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to tamper with different Windows Defender registry keys in order to disable some important features related to protection and detection
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
- https://github.com/swagkarna/Defeat-Defender-V1.2.0/tree/ae4059c4276da6f6303b8f53cdff085ecae88a91
- https://www.elevenforum.com/t/video-guide-how-to-completely-disable-microsoft-defender-antivirus.14608/page-2
- https://tria.ge/241231-j9yatstqbm/behavioral1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-22
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_root_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_root_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
- 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center'
- 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
selection_dword_0:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' add '
- 'd 0'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
- 'EnableControlledFolderAccess'
- 'MpEnablePus'
- 'PUAProtection'
- 'SpynetReporting'
- 'SubmitSamplesConsent'
- 'TamperProtection'
selection_dword_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' add '
- 'd 1'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DisableAccess'
- 'DisableAntiSpyware'
- 'DisableAntiSpywareRealtimeProtection'
- 'DisableAntiVirus'
- 'DisableAntiVirusSignatures'
- 'DisableArchiveScanning'
- 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
- 'DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
- 'DisableCloudProtection'
- 'DisableConfig'
- 'DisableEnhancedNotifications'
- 'DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
- 'DisableIOAVProtection'
- 'DisableNetworkProtection'
- 'DisableOnAccessProtection'
- 'DisablePrivacyMode'
- 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
- 'DisableRoutinelyTakingAction'
- 'DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
- 'DisableScriptScanning'
- 'DisableSecurityCenter'
- 'Notification_Suppress'
- 'SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine'
condition: all of selection_root_* and 1 of selection_dword_*
falsepositives:
- Rare legitimate use by administrators to test software (should always be investigated)
level: high
title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6
related:
- id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events.
By setting the 'Start' value to '0' for the 'DefenderApiLogger' or 'DefenderAuditLogger' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events
from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique.
references:
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
- https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions
author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_reg_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start'
- '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start'
selection_reg_add:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'add'
- '0'
filter_main_enable:
CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Highly unlikely
level: high
title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0
status: test
description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-21
modified: 2023-07-25
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' use '
- ' http'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification Via CommandLine
id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
related:
- id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification.
The AutoLogger event tracing session records events that occur early in the operating system boot process.
Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in.
Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
- https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\reg.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'reg.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_cli_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'add '
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'si ' # Set-ItemProperty alias
selection_cli_base:
CommandLine|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
selection_cli_key:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Start' # Key used to disable specific autologger session like EventLog-Application, EventLog-System etc.
- 'Enabled' # Key used to disable specific provider of autologger session
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autologger_session_registry_modification/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0
title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
- id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
- https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
- https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
- https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552
- attack.collection
- attack.execution
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
# Add more script interpreters as needed
- '\node.exe'
- '\bun.exe'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- 'trufflehog.exe'
- 'gitleaks.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'trufflehog'
- 'gitleaks'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml
title: Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: 7dbbcac2-57a0-45ac-b306-ff30a8bd2981
related:
- id: aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467 # AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects tampering of AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) related registry values via command line tools such as reg.exe or PowerShell.
AMSI provides a generic interface for applications and services to integrate with antimalware products.
Adversaries may disable AMSI to evade detection of malicious scripts and code execution.
references:
- https://github.com/arttoolkit/arttoolkit.github.io/blob/16d6230d009e58fd6f773f5317fd4d14c1f26004/_wadcoms/AMSI-Bypass-Jscript_amsienable.md
- https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/02/macros-and-more-with-sharpshooter-v2-0/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_key:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings'
- 'AmsiEnable'
selection_reg_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_reg_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'add'
selection_powershell_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_powershell_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'sp '
condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_reg_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_amsi_registry_tampering/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0
title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
- CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'DownloadFile'
- 'url'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Signing Bypass Via Windows Developer Features
id: a383dec4-deec-4e6e-913b-ed9249670848
related:
- id: b110ebaf-697f-4da1-afd5-b536fa27a2c1
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the user to install untrusted packages.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'SystemSettingsAdminFlows.EXE'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains: 'TurnOnDeveloperFeatures'
selection_options:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DeveloperUnlock'
- 'EnableSideloading'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: MMC Spawning Windows Shell
id: 05a2ab7e-ce11-4b63-86db-ab32e763e11d
status: test
description: Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC
references:
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
author: Karneades, Swisscom CSIRT
date: 2019-08-05
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
ParentImage|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
selection2:
- Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- Image|contains: '\BITSADMIN'
condition: all of selection*
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference
id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
related:
- id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_remove:
CommandLine|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
selection_tamper:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
- '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high
title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows
id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
related:
- id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
type: similar
- id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
- https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
- https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1219.002
- attack.t1036.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_meshagent:
- CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
- OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
filter_main_legitimate:
Image|endswith: '\meshagent.exe'
condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|endswith:
- 'Wuauclt'
- 'Wuauclt.exe'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE
id: 51cbac1e-eee3-4a90-b1b7-358efb81fa0a
status: test
description: Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iobit-forums-hacked-to-spread-ransomware-to-its-members/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: '/Namespace:\\\\root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Defender Definition Files Removed
id: 9719a8aa-401c-41af-8108-ced7ec9cd75c
status: test
description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by removing Windows Defender Definition Files
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-07
modified: 2023-07-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
- OriginalFileName: MpCmdRun.exe
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -RemoveDefinitions'
- ' -All'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
- https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_pwsh_binary:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_pwsh_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
selection_sc_binary:
- Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'stop'
- 'WinDefend'
selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'delete'
- 'WinDefend'
selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'config'
- 'WinDefend'
- 'start=disabled'
condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
- 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high
title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder
id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
related:
- id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
type: derived
- id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
type: derived
- id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 # PsScript High
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
selection_cmdlet:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Set-Acl '
- '-AclObject '
selection_paths:
# Note: Add more suspicious paths
CommandLine|contains:
- '-Path "C:\Windows'
- "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
- '-Path %windir%'
- '-Path $env:windir'
selection_permissions:
# Note: Add more suspicious permissions
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FullControl'
- 'Allow'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
id: e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e
status: test
description: Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md#atomic-test-1---disable-windows-iis-http-logging
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'set'
- 'config'
- 'section:httplogging'
- 'dontLog:true'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Trace ETW Session Tamper Via Logman.EXE
id: cd1f961e-0b96-436b-b7c6-38da4583ec00
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "logman" utility in order to disable or delete Windows trace sessions
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1359039665232306183?s=21
- https://ss64.com/nt/logman.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-11
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
- attack.t1685.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\logman.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Logman.exe'
selection_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'stop '
- 'delete '
selection_service:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Circular Kernel Context Logger'
- 'EventLog-' # Cover multiple traces starting with EventLog-*
- 'SYSMON TRACE'
- 'SysmonDnsEtwSession'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate deactivation by administrative staff
- Installer tools that disable services, e.g. before log collection agent installation
level: high
title: Python Spawning Pretty TTY on Windows
id: 480e7e51-e797-47e3-8d72-ebfce65b6d8d
related:
- id: 899133d5-4d7c-4a7f-94ee-27355c879d90
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects python spawning a pretty tty
references:
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- 'python.exe' # no \ bc of e.g. ipython.exe
- 'python3.exe'
- 'python2.exe'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'import pty'
- '.spawn('
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains: 'from pty import spawn'
condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Credential Guard Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
related:
- id: 73921b9c-cafd-4446-b0c6-fdb0ace42bc0
type: similar
- id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects attempts to add, modify, or delete Windows Credential Guard related registry keys or values via command line tools such as Reg.exe or PowerShell.
Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
The rule matches suspicious command lines that target DeviceGuard or LSA registry paths and manipulate keys like EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity, RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures, or LsaCfgFlags.
Such activity may indicate an attempt to disable or tamper with Credential Guard, potentially exposing sensitive credentials for misuse.
references:
- https://woshub.com/disable-credential-guard-windows/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceguard
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-26
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'reg.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
# add/modify
- 'add '
- 'New-ItemProperty '
- 'Set-ItemProperty '
- 'si ' # SetItem Alias
# delete
- 'delete '
- 'del '
- 'Remove-ItemProperty '
- 'rp '
selection_key_base:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Control\DeviceGuard'
- '\Control\LSA'
- 'Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard'
selection_key_specific:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity'
- 'RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures'
- 'LsaCfgFlags'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_credential_guard_registry_tampering/info.yml
title: Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs
id: 3a6586ad-127a-4d3b-a677-1e6eacdf8fde
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.
references:
- https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-05-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
# - '\cmd.exe' # too many false positives
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\wmiprvse.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\nslookup.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
filter_ccmcache:
CurrentDirectory|contains: '\ccmcache\'
filter_amazon:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
# FP - Amazon Workspaces
- '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\setup-scheduledtask.ps1'
- '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\set-selfhealing.ps1'
- '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\check-workspacehealth.ps1'
- '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
filter_nessus:
CommandLine|contains: '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
filter_sccm_install:
ParentImage|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
- '\splash.hta'
- '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
- '\SMSSETUP\BIN\'
- '\autorun.hta'
- '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts
- Microsoft SCCM
level: high
title: Remote LSASS Process Access Through Windows Remote Management
id: aa35a627-33fb-4d04-a165-d33b4afca3e8
status: stable
description: Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
references:
- https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/
author: Patryk Prauze - ING Tech
date: 2019-05-20
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.006
- attack.s0002
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
SourceImage|endswith: ':\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe'
filter_main_access:
GrantedAccess: '0x80000000'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high