Sigma rules for CVE-2022-24521
200 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2022-24521
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Antivirus Password Dumper Detection
id: 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a4edfbd42595d5bddb442c82a02cf0aaa10893c1bf79ea08b9ce576f82749448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
- Signature|startswith: 'PWS'
- Signature|contains:
- 'Certify'
- 'DCSync'
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'DumpLsass'
- 'DumpPert'
- 'HTool/WCE'
- 'Kekeo'
- 'Lazagne'
- 'LsassDump'
- 'Mimikatz'
- 'MultiDump'
- 'Nanodump'
- 'NativeDump'
- 'Outflank'
- 'PShlSpy'
- 'PSWTool'
- 'PWCrack'
- 'PWDump'
- 'PWS.'
- 'PWSX'
- 'pypykatz'
- 'Rubeus'
- 'SafetyKatz'
- 'SecurityTool'
- 'SharpChrome'
- 'SharpDPAPI'
- 'SharpDump'
- 'SharpKatz'
- 'SharpS.' # Sharpsploit, e.g. 530ea2ff9049f5dfdfa0a2e9c27c2e3c0685eb6cbdf85370c20a7bfae49f592d
- 'ShpKatz'
- 'TrickDump'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Hacktool Execution - Imphash
id: 24e3e58a-646b-4b50-adef-02ef935b9fc8
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Hashes|contains: # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
- IMPHASH=BCCA3C247B619DCD13C8CDFF5F123932 # PetitPotam
- IMPHASH=3A19059BD7688CB88E70005F18EFC439 # PetitPotam
- IMPHASH=bf6223a49e45d99094406777eb6004ba # PetitPotam
- IMPHASH=23867A89C2B8FC733BE6CF5EF902F2D1 # JuicyPotato
- IMPHASH=A37FF327F8D48E8A4D2F757E1B6E70BC # JuicyPotato
- IMPHASH=F9A28C458284584A93B14216308D31BD # JuicyPotatoNG
- IMPHASH=6118619783FC175BC7EBECFF0769B46E # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=959A83047E80AB68B368FDB3F4C6E4EA # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=563233BFA169ACC7892451F71AD5850A # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=87575CB7A0E0700EB37F2E3668671A08 # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=13F08707F759AF6003837A150A371BA1 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=1781F06048A7E58B323F0B9259BE798B # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=233F85F2D4BC9D6521A6CAAE11A1E7F5 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=24AF2584CBF4D60BBE5C6D1B31B3BE6D # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=632969DDF6DBF4E0F53424B75E4B91F2 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=713C29B396B907ED71A72482759ED757 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=749A7BB1F0B4C4455949C0B2BF7F9E9F # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=8628B2608957A6B0C6330AC3DE28CE2E # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=8B114550386E31895DFAB371E741123D # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=94CB940A1A6B65BED4D5A8F849CE9793 # PwDumpX
- IMPHASH=9D68781980370E00E0BD939EE5E6C141 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=B18A1401FF8F444056D29450FBC0A6CE # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=CB567F9498452721D77A451374955F5F # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=730073214094CD328547BF1F72289752 # Htran
- IMPHASH=17B461A082950FC6332228572138B80C # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=DC25EE78E2EF4D36FAA0BADF1E7461C9 # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=819B19D53CA6736448F9325A85736792 # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=829DA329CE140D873B4A8BDE2CBFAA7E # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=C547F2E66061A8DFFB6F5A3FF63C0A74 # PPLDump
- IMPHASH=0588081AB0E63BA785938467E1B10CCA # PPLDump
- IMPHASH=0D9EC08BAC6C07D9987DFD0F1506587C # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=BC129092B71C89B4D4C8CDF8EA590B29 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=4DA924CF622D039D58BCE71CDF05D242 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=E7A3A5C377E2D29324093377D7DB1C66 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=9A9DBEC5C62F0380B4FA5FD31DEFFEDF # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=AF8A3976AD71E5D5FDFB67DDB8DADFCE # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=0C477898BBF137BBD6F2A54E3B805FF4 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=0CA9F02B537BCEA20D4EA5EB1A9FE338 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=3AB3655E5A14D4EEFC547F4781BF7F9E # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=E6F9D5152DA699934B30DAAB206471F6 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=3AD59991CCF1D67339B319B15A41B35D # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=FFDD59E0318B85A3E480874D9796D872 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=0CF479628D7CC1EA25EC7998A92F5051 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=07A2D4DCBD6CB2C6A45E6B101F0B6D51 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=D6D0F80386E1380D05CB78E871BC72B1 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055 # HandleKatz
- IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650 # HandleKatz
- IMPHASH=ADA161BF41B8E5E9132858CB54CAB5FB # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=2A1BC4913CD5ECB0434DF07CB675B798 # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=11083E75553BAAE21DC89CE8F9A195E4 # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=A23D29C9E566F2FA8FFBB79267F5DF80 # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=4A07F944A83E8A7C2525EFA35DD30E2F # CreateMiniDump
- IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF58B0BE688 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=14C4E4C72BA075E9069EE67F39188AD8 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=3C782813D4AFCE07BBFC5A9772ACDBDC # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=7D010C6BB6A3726F327F7E239166D127 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=89159BA4DD04E4CE5559F132A9964EB3 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=6F33F4A5FC42B8CEC7314947BD13F30F # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=5834ED4291BDEB928270428EBBAF7604 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=5A8A8A43F25485E7EE1B201EDCBC7A38 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=DC7D30B90B2D8ABF664FBED2B1B59894 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=41923EA1F824FE63EA5BEB84DB7A3E74 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=3DE09703C8E79ED2CA3F01074719906B # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F # WCE
- IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2 # WCE
- IMPHASH=32089B8851BBF8BC2D014E9F37288C83 # Sliver Stagers
- IMPHASH=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690 # Dumpert
- IMPHASH=03866661686829d806989e2fc5a72606 # Dumpert
- IMPHASH=e57401fbdadcd4571ff385ab82bd5d6d # Dumpert
- IMPHASH=84B763C45C0E4A3E7CA5548C710DB4EE # SysmonEnte
- IMPHASH=19584675D94829987952432E018D5056 # SysmonQuiet
- IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B # ShaprEvtMute Hook
- IMPHASH=885C99CCFBE77D1CBFCB9C4E7C1A3313 # Forkatz
- IMPHASH=22A22BC9E4E0D2F189F1EA01748816AC # PPLKiller
- IMPHASH=7FA30E6BB7E8E8A69155636E50BF1B28 # PPLKiller
- IMPHASH=96DF3A3731912449521F6F8D183279B1 # Backstab
- IMPHASH=7E6CF3FF4576581271AC8A313B2AAB46 # Backstab
- IMPHASH=51791678F351C03A0EB4E2A7B05C6E17 # Backstab
- IMPHASH=25CE42B079282632708FC846129E98A5 # Forensia
- IMPHASH=021BCCA20BA3381B11BDDE26B4E62F20 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=59223B5F52D8799D38E0754855CBDF42 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=81E75D8F1D276C156653D3D8813E4A43 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=17244E8B6B8227E57FE709CCAD421420 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=5B76DA3ACDEDC8A5CDF23A798B5936B4 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=CB2B65BB77D995CC1C0E5DF1C860133C # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=40445337761D80CF465136FAFB1F63E6 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=8A790F401B29FA87BC1E56F7272B3AA6 # EDRSilencer
- IMPHASH=B50199E952C875241B9CE06C971CE3C1 # EventLogCrasher
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of one of these tools
level: critical
title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution
id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
related:
- id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters
references:
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
- https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-04-20
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558.003
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\Rubeus.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Rubeus.exe'
- Description: 'Rubeus'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'asreproast '
- 'dump /service:krbtgt '
- 'dump /luid:0x'
- 'kerberoast '
- 'createnetonly /program:'
- 'ptt /ticket:'
- '/impersonateuser:'
- 'renew /ticket:'
- 'asktgt /user:'
- 'harvest /interval:'
- 's4u /user:'
- 's4u /ticket:'
- 'hash /password:'
- 'golden /aes256:'
- 'silver /user:'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone
id: c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity
references:
- https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1420053502554951689
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1464566846594691073?s=20
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden
date: 2021-11-27
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
Image|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: WCE wceaux.dll Access
id: 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67
status: test
description: Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host
references:
- https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-14
modified: 2025-01-30
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.s0005
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4656
- 4663
ObjectName|endswith: '\wceaux.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Default File
id: 93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8
related:
- id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default dump file used by Outflank Dumpert tool. A process dumper, which dumps the lsass process memory
references:
- https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-04
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: 'dumpert.dmp'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Very unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - Credential Dumping Tools Named Pipe Created
id: 961d0ba2-3eea-4303-a930-2cf78bbfcc5e
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipe creation
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- https://image.slidesharecdn.com/zeronights2017kheirkhabarov-171118103000/75/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment-57-2048.jpg?cb=1666035799
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.004
- attack.t1003.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName|contains:
- '\cachedump'
- '\lsadump'
- '\wceservicepipe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: critical
title: HackTool - Inveigh Execution
id: b99a1518-1ad5-4f65-bc95-1ffff97a8fd0
status: test
description: Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool
references:
- https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-24
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\Inveigh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- '\Inveigh.exe'
- '\Inveigh.dll'
- Description: 'Inveigh'
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' -SpooferIP'
- ' -ReplyToIPs '
- ' -ReplyToDomains '
- ' -ReplyToMACs '
- ' -SnifferIP'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Very unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - SafetyKatz Execution
id: b1876533-4ed5-4a83-90f3-b8645840a413
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool SafetyKatz via PE information and default Image name
references:
- https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\SafetyKatz.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'SafetyKatz.exe'
- Description: 'SafetyKatz'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Execution
id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
status: test
description: Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory
references:
- https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-04
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Hashes|contains: 'MD5=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690'
- CommandLine|contains: 'Dumpert.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Very unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution
id: 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory.
It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\WCE.exe'
- '\WCE64.exe'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- 'IMPHASH=136F0A8572C058A96436C82E541E4C41'
- 'IMPHASH=589657C64DDE88533186C39F82FA1F50'
- 'IMPHASH=6BFE09EFCB4FFDE061EBDBAFC4DB84CF'
- 'IMPHASH=7D490037BF450877E6D0287BDCFF8D2E'
- 'IMPHASH=8AB93B061287C79F3088C5BC7E7D97ED'
- 'IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F'
- 'IMPHASH=BA434A7A729EEC20E136CA4C32D6C740'
- 'IMPHASH=BD1D1547DA13C0FCB6C15E86217D5EB8'
- 'IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique
id: 55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597
related:
- id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process
references:
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-26
modified: 2022-12-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: 'Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\lsass.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Renamed Whoami Execution
id: f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection
references:
- https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1033
- car.2016-03-001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
filter:
Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
id: 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f
status: test
description: Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
references:
- https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '-NoExit -Command [Console]::OutputEncoding=[Text.UTF8Encoding]::UTF8'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts
id: 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86
related:
- id: 73e733cc-1ace-3212-a107-ff2523cc9fc3
type: derived
status: test
description: |
focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including
Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads
that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
references:
- https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/
- https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt
author: 'ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_4103:
Payload|contains:
- '$DoIt'
- 'harmj0y'
- 'mattifestation'
- '_RastaMouse'
- 'tifkin_'
- '0xdeadbeef'
condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
- 'Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments.'
level: critical
title: Silence.EDA Detection
id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
status: test
description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf
author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-04-03
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.004
- attack.t1572
- attack.impact
- attack.t1529
- attack.g0091
- attack.s0363
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
empire:
# better to randomise the order
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'System.Diagnostics.Process'
- 'Stop-Computer'
- 'Restart-Computer'
- 'Exception in execution'
- '$cmdargs'
- 'Close-Dnscat2Tunnel'
dnscat:
# better to randomise the order
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'set type=$LookupType`nserver'
- '$Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String'
- 'New-RandomDNSField'
- '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)'
- '$Session.Dead = $True'
- '$Session["Driver"] -eq'
condition: empire and dnscat
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param
id: 071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed
status: test
description: Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners
references:
- https://xmrig.com/docs/miner/command-line-options
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1068
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
cmd1:
a1|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
cmd2:
a2|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
cmd3:
a3|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
cmd4:
a4|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
cmd5:
a5|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
cmd6:
a6|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
cmd7:
a7|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
condition: 1 of cmd*
falsepositives:
- Other tools that use a --cpu-priority flag
level: critical
title: HackTool - SysmonEOP Execution
id: 8a7e90c5-fe6e-45dc-889e-057fe4378bd9
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PoC that can be used to exploit Sysmon CVE-2022-41120
references:
- https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- cve.2022-41120
- attack.t1068
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\SysmonEOP.exe'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- 'IMPHASH=22F4089EB8ABA31E1BB162C6D9BF72E5'
- 'IMPHASH=5123FA4C4384D431CD0D893EEB49BBEC'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Audit CVE Event
id: 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2
status: test
description: |
Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited.
MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability.
Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.
references:
- https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232
- https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676
- https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebmW42YYveI # "CVEs in Windows Event Logs? What You Need to Know" by 13Cubed.
- https://nullsec.us/windows-event-log-audit-cve/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis
date: 2020-01-15
modified: 2022-10-22
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1203
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1211
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1212
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1210
- attack.impact
- attack.t1499.004
logsource:
product: windows
service: application
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name:
- 'Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE'
- 'Audit-CVE'
EventID: 1
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: test
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
references:
- https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: 'momyshark\?key='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
- https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102.001
- attack.t1102.003
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin
id: 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45
status: test
description: Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool
references:
- https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1511760068743766026
- https://github.com/helloexp/0day/blob/614227a7b9beb0e91e7e2c6a5e532e6f7a8e883c/00-CVE_EXP/CVE-2021-42287/sam-the-admin/sam_the_admin.py
author: elhoim
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- cve.2021-42278
- cve.2021-42287
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
service: security
product: windows
detection:
# Not adding an EventID on purpose to try to match on any event in security (including use of account), not just 4741 (computer account created)
selection1:
SamAccountName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
SamAccountName|endswith: '$'
selection2:
TargetUserName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Registry Entries For Azorult Malware
id: f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7
status: test
description: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a
author: Trent Liffick
date: 2020-05-08
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_event
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 12
- 13
TargetObject|contains: 'SYSTEM\'
TargetObject|endswith: '\services\localNETService'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
Signature|contains:
- 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
- 'Brutel'
- 'BruteR'
- 'CobaltStr'
- 'CobaltStrike'
- 'COBEACON'
- 'Cometer'
- 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
- 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
- 'Metasploit'
- 'Meterpreter'
- 'MeteTool'
- 'Mpreter'
- 'MsfShell'
- 'PowerSploit'
- 'Razy'
- 'Rozena'
- 'Sbelt'
- 'Seatbelt'
- 'Sliver'
- 'Swrort'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - F-Secure C3 Load by Rundll32
id: b18c9d4c-fac9-4708-bd06-dd5bfacf200f
status: test
description: F-Secure C3 produces DLLs with a default exported StartNodeRelay function.
references:
- https://github.com/FSecureLABS/C3/blob/11a081fd3be2aaf2a879f6b6e9a96ecdd24966ef/Src/NodeRelayDll/NodeRelayDll.cpp#L12
author: Alfie Champion (ajpc500)
date: 2021-06-02
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- '.dll'
- 'StartNodeRelay'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Antivirus Ransomware Detection
id: 4c6ca276-d4d0-4a8c-9e4c-d69832f8671f
status: test
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/43b0f7872900bd234975a0877744554f4f355dc57505517abd1ef611e1ce6916
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c312c05ddbd227cbb08958876df2b69d0f7c1b09e5689eb9d93c5b357f63eff7
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/20179093c59bca3acc6ce9a4281e8462f577ffd29fd7bf51cf2a70d106062045
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/554db97ea82f17eba516e6a6fdb9dc04b1d25580a1eb8cb755eeb260ad0bd61d
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/69fe77dd558e281621418980040e2af89a2547d377d0f2875502005ce22bc95c
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6f0f20da34396166df352bf301b3c59ef42b0bc67f52af3d541b0161c47ede05
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2022-05-12
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.t1486
- attack.impact
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
Signature|contains:
- 'BlackWorm'
- 'Chaos'
- 'Cobra'
- 'ContiCrypt'
- 'Crypter'
- 'CRYPTES'
- 'Cryptor'
- 'CylanCrypt'
- 'DelShad'
- 'Destructor'
- 'Filecoder'
- 'GandCrab'
- 'GrandCrab'
- 'Haperlock'
- 'Hiddentear'
- 'HydraCrypt'
- 'Krypt'
- 'Lockbit'
- 'Locker'
- 'Mallox'
- 'Phobos'
- 'Ransom'
- 'Ryuk'
- 'Ryzerlo'
- 'Stopcrypt'
- 'Tescrypt'
- 'TeslaCrypt'
- 'WannaCry'
- 'Xorist'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Webshell Remote Command Execution
id: c0d3734d-330f-4a03-aae2-65dacc6a8222
status: test
description: Detects possible command execution by web application/web shell
references:
- Personal Experience of the Author
- https://www.vaadata.com/blog/what-is-command-injection-exploitations-and-security-best-practices/
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
definition: |
Required auditd configuration:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execveat -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execveat -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
Change the number "33" to the ID of your WebServer user. Default: www-data:x:33:33
detection:
selection:
type: 'SYSCALL'
SYSCALL:
- 'execve'
- 'execveat'
euid: 33
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin activity
- Crazy web applications
level: critical
title: Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver
id: b7bc7038-638b-4ffd-880c-292c692209ef
status: test
description: Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell
references:
- https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1429175908905127938
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
logsource:
service: msexchange-management
product: windows
detection:
keywords_export_command:
'|all':
- 'New-ExchangeCertificate'
- ' -GenerateRequest'
- ' -BinaryEncoded'
- ' -RequestFile'
keywords_export_params:
- '\\\\localhost\\C$'
- '\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$'
- 'C:\\inetpub'
- '.aspx'
condition: keywords_export_command and keywords_export_params
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Mailbox Export to Exchange Webserver
id: 516376b4-05cd-4122-bae0-ad7641c38d48
status: test
description: Detects a successful export of an Exchange mailbox to untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell or the needed role assignment for it
references:
- https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Rich Warren, Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-04-30
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
logsource:
service: msexchange-management
product: windows
detection:
export_command:
'|all':
- 'New-MailboxExportRequest'
- ' -Mailbox '
export_params:
- '-FilePath "\\\\' # We care about any share location.
- '.aspx'
role_assignment:
'|all':
- 'New-ManagementRoleAssignment'
- ' -Role "Mailbox Import Export"'
- ' -User '
condition: (export_command and export_params) or role_assignment
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Moriya Rootkit - System
id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
status: test
description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report
references:
- https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - System
id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
- https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_id:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
selection1:
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'ADMIN$'
- '.exe'
selection2:
ImagePath|contains|all:
- '%COMSPEC%'
- 'start'
- 'powershell'
selection3:
ImagePath|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
selection4:
ImagePath|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
condition: selection_id and (selection1 or selection2 or selection3 or selection4)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - SecurityXploded Execution
id: 7679d464-4f74-45e2-9e01-ac66c5eb041a
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of SecurityXploded Tools
references:
- https://securityxploded.com/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200601000524/https://cyberx-labs.com/blog/gangnam-industrial-style-apt-campaign-targets-korean-industrial-companies/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Company: SecurityXploded
- Image|endswith: 'PasswordDump.exe'
- OriginalFileName|endswith: 'PasswordDump.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - PurpleSharp Execution
id: ff23ffbc-3378-435e-992f-0624dcf93ab4
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PurpleSharp adversary simulation tool
references:
- https://github.com/mvelazc0/PurpleSharp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-18
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
- attack.t1587
- attack.resource-development
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|contains: '\purplesharp'
- OriginalFileName: 'PurpleSharp.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'xyz123456.exe'
- 'PurpleSharp'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
id: 550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0
status: test
description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
references:
- https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
- attack.t1587.001
- attack.resource-development
logsource:
product: windows
service: msexchange-management
detection:
keywords_cmdlet:
'|all':
- 'OabVirtualDirectory'
- ' -ExternalUrl '
keywords_params:
- 'eval(request'
- 'http://f/<script'
- '"unsafe"};'
- 'function Page_Load()'
condition: keywords_cmdlet and keywords_params
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
id: e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
status: test
description: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 8001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
id: 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
id: 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
status: test
description: Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 17001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Linux Keylogging with Pam.d
id: 49aae26c-450e-448b-911d-b3c13d178dfc
status: test
description: Detect attempt to enable auditing of TTY input
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.md
- https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_tty_audit
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/sec-configuring_pam_for_auditing
- https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-05-24
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1056.001
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection_path_events:
type: PATH
name:
- '/etc/pam.d/system-auth'
- '/etc/pam.d/password-auth'
selection_tty_events:
type:
- 'TTY'
- 'USER_TTY'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative work
level: high
title: Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script
id: 189e3b02-82b2-4b90-9662-411eb64486d4
status: test
description: Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.html#potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-28
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'DumpCerts'
selection_2:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords'
selection_3:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'crypto::certificates'
- 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Mimikatz can be useful for testing the security of networks
level: high
title: Live Memory Dump Using Powershell
id: cd185561-4760-45d6-a63e-a51325112cae
status: test
description: Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/get-storagediagnosticinfo?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Get-StorageDiagnosticInfo'
- '-IncludeLiveDump'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Diagnostics
level: high
title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec
related:
- id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags
references:
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
- https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558.003
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'asreproast '
- 'dump /service:krbtgt '
- 'dump /luid:0x'
- 'kerberoast '
- 'createnetonly /program:'
- 'ptt /ticket:'
- '/impersonateuser:'
- 'renew /ticket:'
- 'asktgt /user:'
- 'harvest /interval:'
- 's4u /user:'
- 's4u /ticket:'
- 'hash /password:'
- 'golden /aes256:'
- 'silver /user:'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: HackTool - Potential Remote Credential Dumping Activity Via CrackMapExec Or Impacket-Secretsdump
id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
status: test
description: Detects default filenames output from the execution of CrackMapExec and Impacket-secretsdump against an endpoint.
references:
- https://github.com/Porchetta-Industries/CrackMapExec
- https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ff8c200fd040b04d3b5ff05449646737f836235d/examples/secretsdump.py
author: SecurityAura
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
# CommandLine|contains: 'RemoteRegistry' # Uncomment this line if you collect CommandLine data for files events from more accuracy
TargetFilename|re: '\\Windows\\System32\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\.tmp$'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - CLI
id: baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77
related:
- id: 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade
- https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-02-02
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
- '\NetworkProvider'
# filter:
# CommandLine|contains:
# - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WebClient\NetworkProvider'
# - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider'
# - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RDPNP\NetworkProvider'
# - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\P9NP\NetworkProvider' # Related to WSL remove the comment if you use WSL in your ENV
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule
level: high
title: Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped
id: 2d3cdeec-c0db-45b4-aa86-082f7eb75701
status: test
description: Detects the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.html
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1588815661085917186?cxt=HHwWhIDUyaDbzYwsAAAA
- https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-2/
author: Tim Rauch, Janantha Marasinghe, Elastic (original idea)
date: 2022-11-08
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_base_name:
- Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
selection_base_list:
CommandLine|contains: 'list '
selection_standalone:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' /config' # https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FgydDAJWIAEio34?format=png&name=900x900
- ' /xml'
# We cover the "-" version just in case :)
- ' -config'
- ' -xml'
selection_cmd_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' /@t' # Covers both "/@text:*" and "/@t:*"
- ' /text'
- ' /show'
# We cover the "-" version just in case :)
- ' -@t'
- ' -text'
- ' -show'
selection_cmd_grep:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\*'
- 'password'
condition: all of selection_base_* and (selection_standalone or all of selection_cmd_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption
id: 97dbf6e2-e436-44d8-abee-4261b24d3e41
status: test
description: Detects use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_name:
- Image|endswith: '\aspnet_regiis.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'aspnet_regiis.exe'
selection_args:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'connectionStrings'
- ' -pdf'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Hacktool Execution - PE Metadata
id: 37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed
references:
- https://github.com/cube0x0
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/metadata%253ACube0x0/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2024-01-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Company: 'Cube0x0' # Detects the use of tools created by a well-known hacktool producer named "Cube0x0", which includes his handle in all binaries as company information in the PE headers (SharpPrintNightmare, KrbRelay, SharpMapExec, etc.)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: PUA - Memory Dump Mount Via MemProcFS
id: 8a1b2c3d-4e5f-6789-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: |
Detects execution of MemProcFS a memory forensics tool with the '-device' parameter.
MemProcFS mounts physical memory as a virtual file system, allowing direct access to process memory and system structures.
Threat actors were seen abusing this utility to mount memory dumps and then extract sensitive information from processes like LSASS or extract registry hives to obtain credentials, LSA secrets, SAM data, and cached domain credentials.
MemProcFS usage that is not part of authorized forensic analysis should be treated as suspicious and warrants further investigation.
references:
- https://github.com/ufrisk/MemProcFS
- https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2024/10/05/htb-freelancer.html#
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/curling-for-data-a-dive-into-a-threat-actors-malicious-ttps
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.004
- attack.t1003.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\MemProcFS.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'MemProcFS.exe'
- Description: 'MemProcFS'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: '-device'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use during memory forensics; if not part of authorized analysis, warrants urgent investigation
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_memprocfs/info.yml
title: Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation
id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
references:
- Internal Research
- https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
IntegrityLevel:
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384'
User|contains: # covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
selection_special:
- Image|endswith:
- '\calc.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\ping.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- CommandLine|re: 'net\s+user\s+'
- CommandLine|contains:
# - 'sc stop ' # stops a system service # causes FPs
- ' -NoP ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -W Hidden ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' /decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' /urlcache ' # Used with certutil
- ' -urlcache ' # Used with certutil
- ' -e* JAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* SUVYI' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* SQBFAFgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* aWV4I' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* IAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* PAA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* aQBlAHgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- 'vssadmin delete shadows' # Ransomware
- 'reg SAVE HKLM' # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
- ' -ma ' # ProcDump
- 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
- '.downloadstring(' # PowerShell download command
- '.downloadfile(' # PowerShell download command
- ' /ticket:' # Rubeus
- 'dpapi::' # Mimikatz
- 'event::clear' # Mimikatz
- 'event::drop' # Mimikatz
- 'id::modify' # Mimikatz
- 'kerberos::' # Mimikatz
- 'lsadump::' # Mimikatz
- 'misc::' # Mimikatz
- 'privilege::' # Mimikatz
- 'rpc::' # Mimikatz
- 'sekurlsa::' # Mimikatz
- 'sid::' # Mimikatz
- 'token::' # Mimikatz
- 'vault::cred' # Mimikatz
- 'vault::list' # Mimikatz
- ' p::d ' # Mimikatz
- ';iex(' # PowerShell IEX
- 'MiniDump' # Process dumping method apart from procdump
filter_main_ping:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'ping'
- '127.0.0.1'
- ' -n '
filter_vs:
Image|endswith: '\PING.EXE'
ParentCommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
filter_config_mgr:
ParentImage|contains: ':\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
filter_java:
ParentImage|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
- ':\Program Files\Java\'
ParentImage|endswith: '\bin\javaws.exe'
Image|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
- ':\Program Files\Java\'
Image|endswith: '\bin\jp2launcher.exe'
CommandLine|contains: ' -ma '
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity
- Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
- Monitoring activity
level: high