Sigma rules for CVE-2022-0609
202 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2022-0609
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 VPN Extension
id: b64a026b-8deb-4c1d-92fd-98893209dff1
status: test
description: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1133/T1133.md#atomic-test-1---running-chrome-vpn-extensions-via-the-registry-2-vpn-extension
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1133
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
chrome_ext:
TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions'
TargetObject|endswith: 'update_url'
chrome_vpn:
TargetObject|contains:
- fdcgdnkidjaadafnichfpabhfomcebme # ZenMate VPN
- fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj # 1clickVPN
- bihmplhobchoageeokmgbdihknkjbknd # Touch VPN
- gkojfkhlekighikafcpjkiklfbnlmeio # Hola Free VPN
- jajilbjjinjmgcibalaakngmkilboobh # Astar VPN
- gjknjjomckknofjidppipffbpoekiipm # VPN Free
- nabbmpekekjknlbkgpodfndbodhijjem # Earth VPN
- kpiecbcckbofpmkkkdibbllpinceiihk # DotVPN
- nlbejmccbhkncgokjcmghpfloaajcffj # Hotspot Shield Free VPN
- omghfjlpggmjjaagoclmmobgdodcjboh # Browsec VPN
- bibjcjfmgapbfoljiojpipaooddpkpai # VPN-free.pro
- mpcaainmfjjigeicjnlkdfajbioopjko # VPN Unlimited Free
- jljopmgdobloagejpohpldgkiellmfnc # PP VPN
- lochiccbgeohimldjooaakjllnafhaid # IP Unblock
- nhnfcgpcbfclhfafjlooihdfghaeinfc # Surf VPN
- ookhnhpkphagefgdiemllfajmkdkcaim # iNinja VPN
- namfblliamklmeodpcelkokjbffgmeoo # Daily VPN
- nbcojefnccbanplpoffopkoepjmhgdgh # Hoxx VPN Proxy
- majdfhpaihoncoakbjgbdhglocklcgno # Free VPN
- lnfdmdhmfbimhhpaeocncdlhiodoblbd # VPN PROXY MASTER
- eppiocemhmnlbhjplcgkofciiegomcon # Urban Free VPN
- cocfojppfigjeefejbpfmedgjbpchcng # SaferVPN Proxy
- foiopecknacmiihiocgdjgbjokkpkohc # VPN Professional
- hhdobjgopfphlmjbmnpglhfcgppchgje # AdGuard VPN
- jgbaghohigdbgbolncodkdlpenhcmcge # Free VPN
- inligpkjkhbpifecbdjhmdpcfhnlelja # Free One Touch VPN
- higioemojdadgdbhbbbkfbebbdlfjbip # Unlimited VPN & Proxy by ibVPN
- hipncndjamdcmphkgngojegjblibadbe # RusVPN
- iolonopooapdagdemdoaihahlfkncfgg # Azino VPN
- nhfjkakglbnnpkpldhjmpmmfefifedcj # Pron VPN
- jpgljfpmoofbmlieejglhonfofmahini # Free Residential VPN
- fgddmllnllkalaagkghckoinaemmogpe # ExpressVPN
- ejkaocphofnobjdedneohbbiilggdlbi # Hotspot Shield Elite VPN Proxy
- keodbianoliadkoelloecbhllnpiocoi # Hide My IP VPN
- hoapmlpnmpaehilehggglehfdlnoegck # Tunnello VPN
- poeojclicodamonabcabmapamjkkmnnk # HMA VPN Proxy Unblocker
- dfkdflfgjdajbhocmfjolpjbebdkcjog # Free Avira Phantom VPN
- kcdahmgmaagjhocpipbodaokikjkampi # Hola VPN
- klnkiajpmpkkkgpgbogmcgfjhdoljacg # Free VPN for Chrome
- lneaocagcijjdpkcabeanfpdbmapcjjg # Hub VPN
- pgfpignfckbloagkfnamnolkeaecfgfh # Free Proxy VPN
- jplnlifepflhkbkgonidnobkakhmpnmh # Private Internet Access
- jliodmnojccaloajphkingdnpljdhdok # Turbo VPN for PC
- hnmpcagpplmpfojmgmnngilcnanddlhb # Windscribe
- ffbkglfijbcbgblgflchnbphjdllaogb # CyberGhost VPN
- kcndmbbelllkmioekdagahekgimemejo # VPN.AC
- jdgilggpfmjpbodmhndmhojklgfdlhob # Browser VPN
- bihhflimonbpcfagfadcnbbdngpopnjb # DEEPRISM VPN
- ppajinakbfocjfnijggfndbdmjggcmde # My Browser Vpn
- oofgbpoabipfcfjapgnbbjjaenockbdp # SetupVPN
- bhnhkdgoefpmekcgnccpnhjfdgicfebm # Wachee VPN
- knmmpciebaoojcpjjoeonlcjacjopcpf # Thunder Proxy
- dhadilbmmjiooceioladdphemaliiobo # Free Proxy VPN
- jedieiamjmoflcknjdjhpieklepfglin # FastestVPN Proxy
- mhngpdlhojliikfknhfaglpnddniijfh # WorkingVPN
- omdakjcmkglenbhjadbccaookpfjihpa # TunnelBear VPN
- npgimkapccfidfkfoklhpkgmhgfejhbj # BelkaVPN
- akeehkgglkmpapdnanoochpfmeghfdln # VPN Master
- gbmdmipapolaohpinhblmcnpmmlgfgje # Unblock Websites
- aigmfoeogfnljhnofglledbhhfegannp # Lethean Proxy VPN
- cgojmfochfikphincbhokimmmjenhhgk # Whoer VPN
- ficajfeojakddincjafebjmfiefcmanc # Best VPN USA
- ifnaibldjfdmaipaddffmgcmekjhiloa # FREE VPN DEWELOPMENT
- jbnmpdkcfkochpanomnkhnafobppmccn # apkfold free vpn
- apcfdffemoinopelidncddjbhkiblecc # Soul VPN
- mjolnodfokkkaichkcjipfgblbfgojpa # DotVPN
- oifjbnnafapeiknapihcmpeodaeblbkn # rderzh VPN Proxy
- plpmggfglncceinmilojdkiijhmajkjh # Red Panda VPN
- mjnbclmflcpookeapghfhapeffmpodij # Ultrareach VPN
- bblcccknbdbplgmdjnnikffefhdlobhp # FastStunnel VPN
- aojlhgbkmkahabcmcpifbolnoichfeep # VirtualShield VPN
- lcmammnjlbmlbcaniggmlejfjpjagiia # Adblock Office VPN Proxy Server
- knajdeaocbpmfghhmijicidfcmdgbdpm # Guru VPN & Proxy
- bdlcnpceagnkjnjlbbbcepohejbheilk # Malus VPN
- edknjdjielmpdlnllkdmaghlbpnmjmgb # Muscle VPN
- eidnihaadmmancegllknfbliaijfmkgo # Push VPN
- ckiahbcmlmkpfiijecbpflfahoimklke # Gom VPN
- macdlemfnignjhclfcfichcdhiomgjjb # Free Fast VPN
- chioafkonnhbpajpengbalkececleldf # BullVPN
- amnoibeflfphhplmckdbiajkjaoomgnj # HideAll VPN
- llbhddikeonkpbhpncnhialfbpnilcnc # ProxyFlow
- pcienlhnoficegnepejpfiklggkioccm # Cloud VPN
- iocnglnmfkgfedpcemdflhkchokkfeii # sVPN
- igahhbkcppaollcjeaaoapkijbnphfhb # Social VPN
- njpmifchgidinihmijhcfpbdmglecdlb # Trellonet Trellonet
- ggackgngljinccllcmbgnpgpllcjepgc # WindmillVPN
- kchocjcihdgkoplngjemhpplmmloanja # IPBurger Proxy & VPN
- bnijmipndnicefcdbhgcjoognndbgkep # Veee
- lklekjodgannjcccdlbicoamibgbdnmi # Anonymous Proxy Vpn Browser
- dbdbnchagbkhknegmhgikkleoogjcfge # Hideman VPN
- egblhcjfjmbjajhjhpmnlekffgaemgfh # Fornex VPN
- ehbhfpfdkmhcpaehaooegfdflljcnfec # WeVPN
- bkkgdjpomdnfemhhkalfkogckjdkcjkg # VPNMatic
- almalgbpmcfpdaopimbdchdliminoign # Urban Shield
- akkbkhnikoeojlhiiomohpdnkhbkhieh # Prime VPN
- gbfgfbopcfokdpkdigfmoeaajfmpkbnh # westwind
- bniikohfmajhdcffljgfeiklcbgffppl # Upnet
- lejgfmmlngaigdmmikblappdafcmkndb # uVPN
- ffhhkmlgedgcliajaedapkdfigdobcif # Nucleus VPN
- gcknhkkoolaabfmlnjonogaaifnjlfnp # FoxyProxy Standard
- pooljnboifbodgifngpppfklhifechoe # GeoProxy
- fjoaledfpmneenckfbpdfhkmimnjocfa # NordVPN
- aakchaleigkohafkfjfjbblobjifikek # ProxFlow
- dpplabbmogkhghncfbfdeeokoefdjegm # Proxy SwitchySharp
- padekgcemlokbadohgkifijomclgjgif # Proxy SwitchyOmega
- bfidboloedlamgdmenmlbipfnccokknp # PureVPN
condition: all of chrome_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Chrome Frame Helper DLL Sideloading
id: 72ca7c75-bf85-45cd-aca7-255d360e423c
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "chrome_frame_helper.dll"
references:
- https://hijacklibs.net/entries/3rd_party/google/chrome_frame_helper.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Wietze Beukema (project and research)
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2023-05-15
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\chrome_frame_helper.dll'
filter_main_path:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\'
filter_optional_user_path:
ImageLoaded|contains: '\AppData\local\Google\Chrome\Application\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File
id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image: System
TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack
id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
related:
- id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
type: obsolete
- id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1021.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image: System
TargetFilename|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack - Image Load
id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
related:
- id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
type: obsolete
- id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1021.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: image_load
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - System
id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
- https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_id:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
selection1:
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'ADMIN$'
- '.exe'
selection2:
ImagePath|contains|all:
- '%COMSPEC%'
- 'start'
- 'powershell'
selection3:
ImagePath|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
selection4:
ImagePath|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
condition: selection_id and (selection1 or selection2 or selection3 or selection4)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Wmiexec Default Output File
id: 8d5aca11-22b3-4f22-b7ba-90e60533e1fb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool
references:
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/
- https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/f4b848fa27654ca95bc0f4c73dbba8b9c2c9f30a/examples/wmiexec.py
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- TargetFilename|re: '\\Windows\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # Admin$
- TargetFilename|re: 'C:\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # C$
- TargetFilename|re: 'D:\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # D$
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe
id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2
related:
- id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7 # Patterns
type: similar
- id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a # Regex
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a named pipe as used by CobaltStrike
references:
- https://twitter.com/d4rksystem/status/1357010969264873472
- https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/detecting-cobalt-strike-default-modules-via-named-pipe-analysis/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/253
- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-25
modified: 2022-10-31
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection_MSSE:
PipeName|contains|all:
- '\MSSE-'
- '-server'
selection_postex:
PipeName|startswith: '\postex_' # Also include the pipe "\postex_ssh_"
selection_status:
PipeName|startswith: '\status_'
selection_msagent:
PipeName|startswith: '\msagent_'
selection_mojo:
PipeName|startswith: '\mojo_'
selection_interprocess:
PipeName|startswith: '\interprocess_'
selection_samr:
PipeName|startswith: '\samr_'
selection_netlogon:
PipeName|startswith: '\netlogon_'
selection_srvsvc:
PipeName|startswith: '\srvsvc_'
selection_lsarpc:
PipeName|startswith: '\lsarpc_'
selection_wkssvc:
PipeName|startswith: '\wkssvc_'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Malicious Named Pipe Created
id: fe3ac066-98bb-432a-b1e7-a5229cb39d4a
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a named pipe seen used by known APTs or malware.
references:
- https://securelist.com/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/71275/
- https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20180725233601/https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/
- https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
- https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar19-304a
- https://download.bitdefender.com/resources/files/News/CaseStudies/study/115/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-PAC-A4-en-EN1.pdf
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), blueteam0ps, elhoim
date: 2017-11-06
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName:
- '\46a676ab7f179e511e30dd2dc41bd388' # Project Sauron
- '\583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e' # SolarWinds SUNBURST malware
- '\6e7645c4-32c5-4fe3-aabf-e94c2f4370e7' # LiquidSnake
- '\9f81f59bc58452127884ce513865ed20' # Project Sauron
- '\adschemerpc' # Turla HyperStack
- '\ahexec' # Sofacy group malware
- '\AnonymousPipe' # Hidden Cobra Hoplight
- '\bc31a7' # Pacifier
- '\bc367' # Pacifier
- '\bizkaz' # Snatch Ransomware
- '\csexecsvc' # CSEXEC default
- '\dce_3d' # Qbot
- '\e710f28d59aa529d6792ca6ff0ca1b34' # Project Sauron
- '\gruntsvc' # Covenant default
- '\isapi_dg' # Uroburos Malware
- '\isapi_dg2' # Uroburos Malware
- '\isapi_http' # Uroburos Malware
- '\jaccdpqnvbrrxlaf' # PoshC2 default
- '\lsassw' # Wild Neutron APT malware
- '\NamePipe_MoreWindows' # Cloud Hopper - RedLeaves
- '\pcheap_reuse' # Pipe used by Equation Group malware
- '\Posh*' # PoshC2 default
- '\rpchlp_3' # Project Sauron
- '\sdlrpc' # Cobra Trojan
- '\svcctl' # Crackmapexec smbexec default
- '\testPipe' # Emissary Panda Hyperbro
- '\winsession' # Wild Neutron APT malware
# - '\status_*' # CS default https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/253
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe Pattern Regex
id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a
related:
- id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7 # Patterns
type: similar
- id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2 # Generic
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles
references:
- https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
- https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2022-12-31
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
- PipeName|re: '\\mojo\.5688\.8052\.(?:183894939787088877|35780273329370473)[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\wkssvc_?[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\ntsvcs[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\DserNamePipe[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\SearchTextHarvester[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\mypipe-(?:f|h)[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\windows\.update\.manager[0-9a-f]{2,3}'
- PipeName|re: '\\ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\scerpc_?[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\PGMessagePipe[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\MsFteWds[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\f4c3[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\fullduplex_[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{4}'
- PipeName|re: '\\win\\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\f53f[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\rpc_[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\spoolss_[0-9a-f]{2}'
- PipeName|re: '\\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-[0-9a-f]{3}-0,'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - DInjector PowerShell Cradle Execution
id: d78b5d61-187d-44b6-bf02-93486a80de5a
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Dinject PowerShell cradle based on the specific flags
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20211001064856/https://github.com/snovvcrash/DInjector # Original got deleted. This is a fork
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-07
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' /am51'
- ' /password'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
id: 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f
status: test
description: Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
references:
- https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '-NoExit -Command [Console]::OutputEncoding=[Text.UTF8Encoding]::UTF8'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts
id: 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86
related:
- id: 73e733cc-1ace-3212-a107-ff2523cc9fc3
type: derived
status: test
description: |
focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including
Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads
that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
references:
- https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/
- https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt
author: 'ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_4103:
Payload|contains:
- '$DoIt'
- 'harmj0y'
- 'mattifestation'
- '_RastaMouse'
- 'tifkin_'
- '0xdeadbeef'
condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
- 'Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments.'
level: critical
title: Silence.EDA Detection
id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
status: test
description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf
author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-04-03
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.004
- attack.t1572
- attack.impact
- attack.t1529
- attack.g0091
- attack.s0363
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
empire:
# better to randomise the order
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'System.Diagnostics.Process'
- 'Stop-Computer'
- 'Restart-Computer'
- 'Exception in execution'
- '$cmdargs'
- 'Close-Dnscat2Tunnel'
dnscat:
# better to randomise the order
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'set type=$LookupType`nserver'
- '$Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String'
- 'New-RandomDNSField'
- '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)'
- '$Session.Dead = $True'
- '$Session["Driver"] -eq'
condition: empire and dnscat
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: test
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
references:
- https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: 'momyshark\?key='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
- https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102.001
- attack.t1102.003
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
Signature|contains:
- 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
- 'Brutel'
- 'BruteR'
- 'CobaltStr'
- 'CobaltStrike'
- 'COBEACON'
- 'Cometer'
- 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
- 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
- 'Metasploit'
- 'Meterpreter'
- 'MeteTool'
- 'Mpreter'
- 'MsfShell'
- 'PowerSploit'
- 'Razy'
- 'Rozena'
- 'Sbelt'
- 'Seatbelt'
- 'Sliver'
- 'Swrort'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Audit CVE Event
id: 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2
status: test
description: |
Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited.
MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability.
Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.
references:
- https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232
- https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676
- https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebmW42YYveI # "CVEs in Windows Event Logs? What You Need to Know" by 13Cubed.
- https://nullsec.us/windows-event-log-audit-cve/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis
date: 2020-01-15
modified: 2022-10-22
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1203
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1211
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1212
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1210
- attack.impact
- attack.t1499.004
logsource:
product: windows
service: application
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name:
- 'Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE'
- 'Audit-CVE'
EventID: 1
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - F-Secure C3 Load by Rundll32
id: b18c9d4c-fac9-4708-bd06-dd5bfacf200f
status: test
description: F-Secure C3 produces DLLs with a default exported StartNodeRelay function.
references:
- https://github.com/FSecureLABS/C3/blob/11a081fd3be2aaf2a879f6b6e9a96ecdd24966ef/Src/NodeRelayDll/NodeRelayDll.cpp#L12
author: Alfie Champion (ajpc500)
date: 2021-06-02
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- '.dll'
- 'StartNodeRelay'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Antivirus Ransomware Detection
id: 4c6ca276-d4d0-4a8c-9e4c-d69832f8671f
status: test
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/43b0f7872900bd234975a0877744554f4f355dc57505517abd1ef611e1ce6916
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c312c05ddbd227cbb08958876df2b69d0f7c1b09e5689eb9d93c5b357f63eff7
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/20179093c59bca3acc6ce9a4281e8462f577ffd29fd7bf51cf2a70d106062045
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/554db97ea82f17eba516e6a6fdb9dc04b1d25580a1eb8cb755eeb260ad0bd61d
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/69fe77dd558e281621418980040e2af89a2547d377d0f2875502005ce22bc95c
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6f0f20da34396166df352bf301b3c59ef42b0bc67f52af3d541b0161c47ede05
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2022-05-12
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.t1486
- attack.impact
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
Signature|contains:
- 'BlackWorm'
- 'Chaos'
- 'Cobra'
- 'ContiCrypt'
- 'Crypter'
- 'CRYPTES'
- 'Cryptor'
- 'CylanCrypt'
- 'DelShad'
- 'Destructor'
- 'Filecoder'
- 'GandCrab'
- 'GrandCrab'
- 'Haperlock'
- 'Hiddentear'
- 'HydraCrypt'
- 'Krypt'
- 'Lockbit'
- 'Locker'
- 'Mallox'
- 'Phobos'
- 'Ransom'
- 'Ryuk'
- 'Ryzerlo'
- 'Stopcrypt'
- 'Tescrypt'
- 'TeslaCrypt'
- 'WannaCry'
- 'Xorist'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Moriya Rootkit - System
id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
status: test
description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report
references:
- https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Potential SMB Relay Attack Tool Execution
id: 5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1
status: test
description: Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation
references:
- https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/13/hot-potato/
- https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato
- https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/other/war-stories/domain-admin-in-30-minutes
- https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/execution/responder-with-ntlm-relay-and-empire
- https://www.localpotato.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.execution
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1557.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_pe:
Image|contains:
- 'PetitPotam'
- 'RottenPotato'
- 'HotPotato'
- 'JuicyPotato'
- '\just_dce_'
- 'Juicy Potato'
- '\temp\rot.exe'
- '\Potato.exe'
- '\SpoolSample.exe'
- '\Responder.exe'
- '\smbrelayx'
- '\ntlmrelayx'
- '\LocalPotato'
selection_script:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Invoke-Tater'
- ' smbrelay'
- ' ntlmrelay'
- 'cme smb '
- ' /ntlm:NTLMhash '
- 'Invoke-PetitPotam'
- '.exe -t * -p ' # JuicyPotatoNG pattern https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG
selection_juicypotato_enum: # appears when JuicyPotatoNG is used with -b
CommandLine|contains: '.exe -c "{'
CommandLine|endswith: '}" -z'
filter_hotpotatoes: # known goodware https://hotpot.uvic.ca/
Image|contains:
- 'HotPotatoes6'
- 'HotPotatoes7'
- 'HotPotatoes ' # Covers the following: 'HotPotatoes 6', 'HotPotatoes 7', 'HotPotatoes Help', 'HotPotatoes Tutorial'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate files with these rare hacktool names
level: critical
title: Bitbucket Unauthorized Full Data Export Triggered
id: 34d81081-03c9-4a7f-91c9-5e46af625cde
status: test
description: Detects when full data export is attempted an unauthorized user.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/secret-scanning-1157471613.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1213.003
- attack.t1586
logsource:
product: bitbucket
service: audit
definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
selection:
auditType.category: 'Data pipeline'
auditType.action: 'Unauthorized full data export triggered'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Bitbucket Unauthorized Access To A Resource
id: 7215374a-de4f-4b33-8ba5-70804c9251d3
status: test
description: Detects unauthorized access attempts to a resource.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1586
logsource:
product: bitbucket
service: audit
definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
selection:
auditType.category: 'Security'
auditType.action: 'Unauthorized access to a resource'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Access attempts to non-existent repositories or due to outdated plugins. Usually "Anonymous" user is reported in the "author.name" field in most cases.
level: critical
title: HackTool - PurpleSharp Execution
id: ff23ffbc-3378-435e-992f-0624dcf93ab4
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the PurpleSharp adversary simulation tool
references:
- https://github.com/mvelazc0/PurpleSharp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-18
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
- attack.t1587
- attack.resource-development
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|contains: '\purplesharp'
- OriginalFileName: 'PurpleSharp.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'xyz123456.exe'
- 'PurpleSharp'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
id: 550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0
status: test
description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
references:
- https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
- attack.t1587.001
- attack.resource-development
logsource:
product: windows
service: msexchange-management
detection:
keywords_cmdlet:
'|all':
- 'OabVirtualDirectory'
- ' -ExternalUrl '
keywords_params:
- 'eval(request'
- 'http://f/<script'
- '"unsafe"};'
- 'function Page_Load()'
condition: keywords_cmdlet and keywords_params
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Hacktool Execution - Imphash
id: 24e3e58a-646b-4b50-adef-02ef935b9fc8
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-04
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Hashes|contains: # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
- IMPHASH=BCCA3C247B619DCD13C8CDFF5F123932 # PetitPotam
- IMPHASH=3A19059BD7688CB88E70005F18EFC439 # PetitPotam
- IMPHASH=bf6223a49e45d99094406777eb6004ba # PetitPotam
- IMPHASH=23867A89C2B8FC733BE6CF5EF902F2D1 # JuicyPotato
- IMPHASH=A37FF327F8D48E8A4D2F757E1B6E70BC # JuicyPotato
- IMPHASH=F9A28C458284584A93B14216308D31BD # JuicyPotatoNG
- IMPHASH=6118619783FC175BC7EBECFF0769B46E # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=959A83047E80AB68B368FDB3F4C6E4EA # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=563233BFA169ACC7892451F71AD5850A # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=87575CB7A0E0700EB37F2E3668671A08 # RoguePotato
- IMPHASH=13F08707F759AF6003837A150A371BA1 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=1781F06048A7E58B323F0B9259BE798B # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=233F85F2D4BC9D6521A6CAAE11A1E7F5 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=24AF2584CBF4D60BBE5C6D1B31B3BE6D # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=632969DDF6DBF4E0F53424B75E4B91F2 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=713C29B396B907ED71A72482759ED757 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=749A7BB1F0B4C4455949C0B2BF7F9E9F # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=8628B2608957A6B0C6330AC3DE28CE2E # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=8B114550386E31895DFAB371E741123D # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=94CB940A1A6B65BED4D5A8F849CE9793 # PwDumpX
- IMPHASH=9D68781980370E00E0BD939EE5E6C141 # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=B18A1401FF8F444056D29450FBC0A6CE # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=CB567F9498452721D77A451374955F5F # Pwdump
- IMPHASH=730073214094CD328547BF1F72289752 # Htran
- IMPHASH=17B461A082950FC6332228572138B80C # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=DC25EE78E2EF4D36FAA0BADF1E7461C9 # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=819B19D53CA6736448F9325A85736792 # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=829DA329CE140D873B4A8BDE2CBFAA7E # Cobalt Strike beacons
- IMPHASH=C547F2E66061A8DFFB6F5A3FF63C0A74 # PPLDump
- IMPHASH=0588081AB0E63BA785938467E1B10CCA # PPLDump
- IMPHASH=0D9EC08BAC6C07D9987DFD0F1506587C # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=BC129092B71C89B4D4C8CDF8EA590B29 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=4DA924CF622D039D58BCE71CDF05D242 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=E7A3A5C377E2D29324093377D7DB1C66 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=9A9DBEC5C62F0380B4FA5FD31DEFFEDF # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=AF8A3976AD71E5D5FDFB67DDB8DADFCE # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=0C477898BBF137BBD6F2A54E3B805FF4 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=0CA9F02B537BCEA20D4EA5EB1A9FE338 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=3AB3655E5A14D4EEFC547F4781BF7F9E # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=E6F9D5152DA699934B30DAAB206471F6 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=3AD59991CCF1D67339B319B15A41B35D # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=FFDD59E0318B85A3E480874D9796D872 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=0CF479628D7CC1EA25EC7998A92F5051 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=07A2D4DCBD6CB2C6A45E6B101F0B6D51 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=D6D0F80386E1380D05CB78E871BC72B1 # NanoDump
- IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055 # HandleKatz
- IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650 # HandleKatz
- IMPHASH=ADA161BF41B8E5E9132858CB54CAB5FB # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=2A1BC4913CD5ECB0434DF07CB675B798 # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=11083E75553BAAE21DC89CE8F9A195E4 # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=A23D29C9E566F2FA8FFBB79267F5DF80 # DripLoader
- IMPHASH=4A07F944A83E8A7C2525EFA35DD30E2F # CreateMiniDump
- IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF58B0BE688 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=14C4E4C72BA075E9069EE67F39188AD8 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=3C782813D4AFCE07BBFC5A9772ACDBDC # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=7D010C6BB6A3726F327F7E239166D127 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=89159BA4DD04E4CE5559F132A9964EB3 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=6F33F4A5FC42B8CEC7314947BD13F30F # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=5834ED4291BDEB928270428EBBAF7604 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=5A8A8A43F25485E7EE1B201EDCBC7A38 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=DC7D30B90B2D8ABF664FBED2B1B59894 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=41923EA1F824FE63EA5BEB84DB7A3E74 # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=3DE09703C8E79ED2CA3F01074719906B # UACMe Akagi
- IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F # WCE
- IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2 # WCE
- IMPHASH=32089B8851BBF8BC2D014E9F37288C83 # Sliver Stagers
- IMPHASH=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690 # Dumpert
- IMPHASH=03866661686829d806989e2fc5a72606 # Dumpert
- IMPHASH=e57401fbdadcd4571ff385ab82bd5d6d # Dumpert
- IMPHASH=84B763C45C0E4A3E7CA5548C710DB4EE # SysmonEnte
- IMPHASH=19584675D94829987952432E018D5056 # SysmonQuiet
- IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B # ShaprEvtMute Hook
- IMPHASH=885C99CCFBE77D1CBFCB9C4E7C1A3313 # Forkatz
- IMPHASH=22A22BC9E4E0D2F189F1EA01748816AC # PPLKiller
- IMPHASH=7FA30E6BB7E8E8A69155636E50BF1B28 # PPLKiller
- IMPHASH=96DF3A3731912449521F6F8D183279B1 # Backstab
- IMPHASH=7E6CF3FF4576581271AC8A313B2AAB46 # Backstab
- IMPHASH=51791678F351C03A0EB4E2A7B05C6E17 # Backstab
- IMPHASH=25CE42B079282632708FC846129E98A5 # Forensia
- IMPHASH=021BCCA20BA3381B11BDDE26B4E62F20 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=59223B5F52D8799D38E0754855CBDF42 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=81E75D8F1D276C156653D3D8813E4A43 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=17244E8B6B8227E57FE709CCAD421420 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=5B76DA3ACDEDC8A5CDF23A798B5936B4 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=CB2B65BB77D995CC1C0E5DF1C860133C # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=40445337761D80CF465136FAFB1F63E6 # EDRSandBlast
- IMPHASH=8A790F401B29FA87BC1E56F7272B3AA6 # EDRSilencer
- IMPHASH=B50199E952C875241B9CE06C971CE3C1 # EventLogCrasher
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of one of these tools
level: critical
title: Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used
id: d00a9a72-2c09-4459-ad03-5e0a23351e36
status: test
description: Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies.
references:
- https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961
- https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/
- https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger
author: xknow @xknow_infosec
date: 2019-03-24
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
- attack.t1001.003
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
AttributeValue|contains: '*'
AttributeLDAPDisplayName:
- 'primaryInternationalISDNNumber'
- 'otherFacsimileTelephoneNumber'
- 'primaryTelexNumber'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Companies, who may use these default LDAP-Attributes for personal information
level: high
title: OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
id: 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.collection
- attack.t1021
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 5000
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Linux
id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
related:
- id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
- https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
- https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
- https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552
- attack.execution
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
# Add more script interpreters as needed
- '/node'
- '/bun'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- '/trufflehog'
- '/gitleaks'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'trufflehog'
- 'gitleaks'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
title: VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump Via Sqlcmd.EXE
id: b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53
status: test
description: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
- https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tools:
Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
selection_query:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'SELECT'
- 'TOP'
- '[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
- id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
- https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
- https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
- https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552
- attack.collection
- attack.execution
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
# Add more script interpreters as needed
- '\node.exe'
- '\bun.exe'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- 'trufflehog.exe'
- 'gitleaks.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'trufflehog'
- 'gitleaks'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml
title: SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access
id: 24c77512-782b-448a-8950-eddb0785fc71
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Chromium-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84d9edaaaa2c5511144521b0e4af726d1c7276ce/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-2---steal-chrome-cookies-windows
- https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/
author: TropChaud
date: 2022-12-19
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1539
- attack.t1555.003
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_sql:
- Product: SQLite
- Image|endswith:
- '\sqlite.exe'
- '\sqlite3.exe'
selection_chromium:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\User Data\' # Most common folder for user profile data among Chromium browsers
- '\Opera Software\' # Opera
- '\ChromiumViewer\' # Sleipnir (Fenrir)
selection_data:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Login Data' # Passwords
- 'Cookies'
- 'Web Data' # Credit cards, autofill data
- 'History'
- 'Bookmarks'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: SQLite Firefox Profile Data DB Access
id: 4833155a-4053-4c9c-a997-777fcea0baa7
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Firefox and other Gecko-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-1---steal-firefox-cookies-windows
- https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-08
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1539
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_sql:
- Product: SQLite
- Image|endswith:
- '\sqlite.exe'
- '\sqlite3.exe'
selection_firefox:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cookies.sqlite'
- 'places.sqlite' # Bookmarks, history
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Outlook Macro Created
id: 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
related:
- id: 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
references:
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1137
- attack.t1008
- attack.t1546
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM'
filter:
Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook LoadMacroProviderOnBoot Setting
id: 396ae3eb-4174-4b9b-880e-dc0364d78a19
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook setting "LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" which if enabled allows the automatic loading of any configured VBA project/module
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1137
- attack.t1008
- attack.t1546
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot'
Details|contains: '0x00000001'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled
id: e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
references:
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
author: '@ScoubiMtl'
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1137
- attack.t1008
- attack.t1546
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\Level'
Details|contains: '0x00000001' # Enable all Macros
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Exports Critical Registry Keys To a File
id: 82880171-b475-4201-b811-e9c826cd5eaa
related:
- id: f0e53e89-8d22-46ea-9db5-9d4796ee2f8a
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the export of a crital Registry key to a file.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
- https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1012
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -E '
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'hklm'
- 'hkey_local_machine'
selection_cli_3:
CommandLine|endswith:
- '\system'
- '\sam'
- '\security'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation
level: high
title: HackTool - PCHunter Execution
id: fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20231210115125/http://www.xuetr.com/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1012
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
Image|endswith:
- '\PCHunter64.exe'
- '\PCHunter32.exe'
selection_pe:
- OriginalFileName: 'PCHunter.exe'
- Description: 'Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools'
selection_hashes:
Hashes|contains:
- 'SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025'
- 'MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7'
- 'SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32'
- 'IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF'
- 'SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB'
- 'MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14'
- 'SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C'
- 'IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: SAM Registry Hive Handle Request
id: f8748f2c-89dc-4d95-afb0-5a2dfdbad332
status: test
description: Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190725-SAMRegistryHiveHandleRequest/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1012
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4656
ObjectType: 'Key'
ObjectName|endswith: '\SAM'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: SysKey Registry Keys Access
id: 9a4ff3b8-6187-4fd2-8e8b-e0eae1129495
status: test
description: Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190625-RegKeyAccessSyskey/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1012
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4656
- 4663
ObjectType: 'key'
ObjectName|endswith:
- 'lsa\JD'
- 'lsa\GBG'
- 'lsa\Skew1'
- 'lsa\Data'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
status: test
description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1021
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 2000
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
id: ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1021
- attack.t1078
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 4002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt
id: 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3
status: test
description: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 12001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - SSH New Connection Attempt
id: cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1021
- attack.t1078
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 4000
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: OpenCanary - SNMP OID Request
id: e9856028-fd4e-46e6-b3d1-10f7ceb95078
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SNMP service on an OpenCanary node has had an OID request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1016
- attack.t1021
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 13001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: HackTool - NetExec Execution
id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
status: experimental
description: |
Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec.
NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration
In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems.
Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/
- https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
- https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Chirag Damani
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1018
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\nxc.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' ftp '
- ' ldap '
- ' mssql '
- ' nfs '
- ' rdp '
- ' smb '
- ' ssh '
- ' vnc '
- ' winrm '
- ' wmi '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml
title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
related:
- id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_name:
- Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'Cmd.Exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
selection_args:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'echo'
- '>'
- '\\\\.\\pipe\\'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)
level: high
title: OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
id: 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1021.001
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 14001
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Publicly Accessible RDP Service
id: 1fc0809e-06bf-4de3-ad52-25e5263b7623
status: test
description: |
Detects connections from routable IPs to an RDP listener. Which is indicative of a publicly-accessible RDP service.
author: Josh Brower @DefensiveDepth
date: 2020-08-22
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.001
logsource:
product: zeek
service: rdp
detection:
selection:
id.orig_h|cidr:
- '::1/128' # IPv6 loopback
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- '2620:83:8000::/48'
- 'fc00::/7' # IPv6 private addresses
- 'fe80::/10' # IPv6 link-local addresses
# approved_rdp:
# dst_ip:
# - x.x.x.x
condition: not selection # and not approved_rdp
falsepositives:
- Although it is recommended to NOT have RDP exposed to the internet, verify that this is a) allowed b) the server has not already been compromised via some brute force or remote exploit since it has been exposed to the internet. Work to secure the server if you are unable to remove it from being exposed to the internet.
level: high