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Sigma rules for CVE-2021-37852

47 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2021-37852
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
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Detection rules

47 of 47
direct high
Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux
Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl. This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.
status experimental author Milad Cheraghi id 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux
id: 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl.
  This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.
references:
    - https://support.kaspersky.com/KES4Linux/12.0.0/en-US/197929.htm
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Add the list of shells allowed in your environment that can be used to run init.d scripts.
            - '/systemctl'
            - '/bash'
            - '/sh'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'kesl'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administrator manually stopping Kaspersky services
level: high
direct high
Potential Persistence Via Security Descriptors - ScriptBlock
Detects usage of certain functions and keywords that are used to manipulate security descriptors in order to potentially set a backdoor. As seen used in the DAMP project.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 2f77047c-e6e9-4c11-b088-a3de399524cd license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Persistence Via Security Descriptors - ScriptBlock
id: 2f77047c-e6e9-4c11-b088-a3de399524cd
status: test
description: Detects usage of certain functions and keywords that are used to manipulate security descriptors in order to potentially set a backdoor. As seen used in the DAMP project.
references:
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'win32_Trustee'
            - 'win32_Ace'
            - '.AccessMask'
            - '.AceType'
            - '.SetSecurityDescriptor'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '\Lsa\JD'
            - '\Lsa\Skew1'
            - '\Lsa\Data'
            - '\Lsa\GBG'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6c8fbee5-dee8-49bc-851d-c3142d02aa47 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 6c8fbee5-dee8-49bc-851d-c3142d02aa47
related:
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1628720819537936386
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sdset:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            - 'A;' # Allow Access
    selection_trustee:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';IU' # Interactively logged-on user
            - ';SU' # Service logon user
            - ';BA' # Built-in administrators
            - ';SY' # Local system
            - ';WD' # Everyone
    filter_optional_hexnode:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
status test author Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community id 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37
related:
    - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Specific Technique
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings
author: Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-16
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sdset:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            - 'D;' # Deny Access
    selection_trustee:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';IU' # Interactively logged-on user
            - ';SU' # Service logon user
            - ';BA' # Built-in administrators
            - ';SY' # Local system
            - ';WD' # Everyone
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel
Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed. Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
status test author @Kostastsale id 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel
id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9
related:
    - id: 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed.
    Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327
author: '@Kostastsale'
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Excel\Security'
            - 'PythonFunctionWarnings'
        CommandLine|contains: ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Security Service Disabled Via Reg.EXE
Detects execution of "reg.exe" to disable security services such as Windows Defender.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), John Lambert (idea), elhoim id 5e95028c-5229-4214-afae-d653d573d0ec license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Service Disabled Via Reg.EXE
id: 5e95028c-5229-4214-afae-d653d573d0ec
status: test
description: Detects execution of "reg.exe" to disable security services such as Windows Defender.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1415295021041979392
    - https://github.com/gordonbay/Windows-On-Reins/blob/e587ac7a0407847865926d575e3c46f68cf7c68d/wor.ps1
    - https://vms.drweb.fr/virus/?i=24144899
    - https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), John Lambert (idea), elhoim
date: 2021-07-14
modified: 2023-06-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg_add:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg'
            - 'add'
    selection_cli_reg_start:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'd 4'
            - 'v Start'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppIDSvc'
            - '\MsMpSvc'
            - '\NisSrv'
            - '\SecurityHealthService'
            - '\Sense'
            - '\UsoSvc'
            - '\WdBoot'
            - '\WdFilter'
            - '\WdNisDrv'
            - '\WdNisSvc'
            - '\WinDefend'
            - '\wscsvc'
            - '\wuauserv'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
direct high
Potential Tampering With Security Products Via WMIC
Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Tampering With Security Products Via WMIC
id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765
related:
    - id: b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96 # Generic Uninstall
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1355171195654709249
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/vice-society-ransomware-group-targets-manufacturing-companies.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-30
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'wmic'
            - 'product where '
            - 'call'
            - 'uninstall'
            - '/nointeractive'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'wmic'
            - 'caption like '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'call delete'
            - 'call terminate'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process '
            - 'where '
            - 'delete'
    selection_product:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%carbon%'
            - '%cylance%'
            - '%endpoint%'
            - '%eset%'
            - '%malware%'
            - '%Sophos%'
            - '%symantec%'
            - 'Antivirus'
            - 'AVG '
            - 'Carbon Black'
            - 'CarbonBlack'
            - 'Cb Defense Sensor 64-bit'
            - 'Crowdstrike Sensor'
            - 'Cylance '
            - 'Dell Threat Defense'
            - 'DLP Endpoint'
            - 'Endpoint Detection'
            - 'Endpoint Protection'
            - 'Endpoint Security'
            - 'Endpoint Sensor'
            - 'ESET File Security'
            - 'LogRhythm System Monitor Service'
            - 'Malwarebytes'
            - 'McAfee Agent'
            - 'Microsoft Security Client'
            - 'Sophos Anti-Virus'
            - 'Sophos AutoUpdate'
            - 'Sophos Credential Store'
            - 'Sophos Management Console'
            - 'Sophos Management Database'
            - 'Sophos Management Server'
            - 'Sophos Remote Management System'
            - 'Sophos Update Manager'
            - 'Threat Protection'
            - 'VirusScan'
            - 'Webroot SecureAnywhere'
            - 'Windows Defender'
    condition: 1 of selection_cli_* and selection_product
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration
level: high
direct high
Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
status test author ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113 id a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
    - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pwsh_binary:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
    selection_sc_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'WinDefend'
            - 'start=disabled'
    condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
    - 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high
direct high
Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE
Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE
id: 97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b
status: test
description: Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /priv'
            - ' -priv'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects command lines that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id fb50eb7a-5ab1-43ae-bcc9-091818cb8424 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabled IE Security Features
id: fb50eb7a-5ab1-43ae-bcc9-091818cb8424
status: test
description: Detects command lines that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-06-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -name IEHarden '
            - ' -value 0 '
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -name DEPOff '
            - ' -value 1 '
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -name DisableFirstRunCustomize '
            - ' -value 2 '
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process
Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key. This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process
id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462
related:
    - id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838 # Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt - Registry Set
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key.
    This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications.
    Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg_img:
        # Example: reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt"
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    selection_powershell_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_powershell_cmd1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'New-Item '
            - 'ni '
    selection_powershell_cmd2:
        CommandLine|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    condition: all of selection_reg_* or all of selection_powershell_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high
direct high
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security
id: ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34
related:
    - id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-11-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_cli_cmd:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded %COMSPEC%): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cmd'
            - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_cli_rundll:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    selection_cli_share:
        ServiceFileName|startswith: '\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\'  # https://twitter.com/svch0st/status/1413688851877416960?lang=en
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - Security
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
status test author Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community id 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - Security
id: 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30
related:
    - id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security
id: 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6
related:
    - id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security
id: 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1
related:
    - id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'environment'
            - 'invoke'
            - '${input)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Service Installed By Unusual Client - Security
Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
status test author Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) id c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Service Installed By Unusual Client - Security
id: c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca
related:
    - id: 71c276aa-49cd-43d2-b920-2dcd3e6962d5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.html
    - https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=create_svc_rpc
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1490608838701166596
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    service: security
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The System Security Extension audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_pid:
        - ClientProcessId: 0
        - ParentProcessId: 0
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
status test author Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community id fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
related:
    - id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_servicefilename:
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
    - id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - value
            - invoke
            - comspec
            - iex
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Security Eventlog Cleared
One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Eventlog Cleared
id: d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982
related:
    - id: f2f01843-e7b8-4f95-a35a-d23584476423
      type: obsolete
    - id: a122ac13-daf8-4175-83a2-72c387be339d
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution
references:
    - https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/SecurityEventLogCleared.yaml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-01-10
modified: 2022-02-24
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.005
    - car.2016-04-002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_517:
        EventID: 517
        Provider_Name: Security
    selection_1102:
        EventID: 1102
        Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog)
    - System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)
level: high
direct high
CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security
Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki id d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security
id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6
related:
    - id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    event_id:
        EventID: 4697
    selection1:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - '.exe'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '%COMSPEC%'
            - 'start'
            - 'powershell'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains: 'powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand'
    selection4:
        ServiceFileName|base64offset|contains: "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:"
    condition: event_id and 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security
id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
related:
    - id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
    selection2:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '${input}'
            - 'noexit'
    selection3:
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - ' /c '
            - ' /r '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
    - id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community id 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - Security
id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
related:
    - id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community id 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
    - id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - Security
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - Security
id: f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52
related:
    - id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high
direct high
PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services - Security
Detects powershell script installed as a Service
status test author oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova id 2a926e6a-4b81-4011-8a96-e36cc8c04302 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services - Security
id: 2a926e6a-4b81-4011-8a96-e36cc8c04302
related:
    - id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR) id c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security
id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Registry Set
Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events. Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing. Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Registry Set
id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838
related:
    - id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462 # Security Event Logging Disabled Via MiniNt Registry Key
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
    Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing.
    Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt\(Default)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high
direct high
Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel - Registry
Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed. Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale id 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel - Registry
id: 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44
related:
    - id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed.
    Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet.
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale
date: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Office\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Excel\Security\PythonFunctionWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration
Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows.
status test author iwillkeepwatch id eeb30123-9fbd-4ee8-aaa0-2e545bbed6dc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration
id: eeb30123-9fbd-4ee8-aaa0-2e545bbed6dc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows.
references:
    - https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Persistence/Install-SSP/
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/persistence/Install-SSP.ps1#L157
author: iwillkeepwatch
date: 2019-01-18
modified: 2026-03-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.005
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Control\Lsa\Security Packages'
            - '\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages'
    filter_main_msiexec:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\syswow64\MsiExec.exe'
    filter_main_image_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct high
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt
Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
status test author Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community id 919f2ef0-be2d-4a7a-b635-eb2b41fde044 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt
id: 919f2ef0-be2d-4a7a-b635-eb2b41fde044
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
    # Sysmon gives us HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\.. if ControlSetXX is the selected one
        - TargetObject: 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
          EventType: 'CreateKey'    # we don't want deletekey
    # key rename
        - NewName: 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
direct medium
Okta Security Threat Detected
Detects when an security threat is detected in Okta.
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger id 5c82f0b9-3c6d-477f-a318-0e14a1df73e0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Okta Security Threat Detected
id: 5c82f0b9-3c6d-477f-a318-0e14a1df73e0
status: test
description: Detects when an security threat is detected in Okta.
references:
    - https://okta.github.io/okta-help/en/prod/Content/Topics/Security/threat-insight/configure-threatinsight-system-log.htm
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-12
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: security.threat.detected
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
direct medium
Disable Security Tools
Detects disabling security tools
status test author Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id ff39f1a6-84ac-476f-a1af-37fcdf53d7c0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Security Tools
id: ff39f1a6-84ac-476f-a1af-37fcdf53d7c0
status: test
description: Detects disabling security tools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    launchctl_unload:
        Image: '/bin/launchctl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'unload'
    security_plists:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'com.objective-see.lulu.plist'                     # Objective-See firewall management utility
            - 'com.objective-see.blockblock.plist'               # Objective-See persistence locations watcher/blocker
            - 'com.google.santad.plist'                          # google santa
            - 'com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist'             # carbon black
            - 'com.carbonblack.daemon.plist'                     # carbon black
            - 'at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist'                     # Objective Development Software firewall management utility
            - 'com.tenablesecurity.nessusagent.plist'            # Tenable Nessus
            - 'com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist' # OpenDNS Umbrella
            - 'com.crowdstrike.falcond.plist'                    # Crowdstrike Falcon
            - 'com.crowdstrike.userdaemon.plist'                 # Crowdstrike Falcon
            - 'osquery'                                          # facebook osquery
            - 'filebeat'                                         # elastic log file shipper
            - 'auditbeat'                                        # elastic auditing agent/log shipper
            - 'packetbeat'                                       # elastic network logger/shipper
            - 'td-agent'                                         # fluentd log shipper
    disable_gatekeeper:
        Image: '/usr/sbin/spctl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'disable'
    condition: (launchctl_unload and security_plists) or disable_gatekeeper
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activities
level: medium
direct medium
Security Software Discovery - MacOs
Detects usage of system utilities (only grep for now) to discover security software discovery
status test author Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id 0ed75b9c-c73b-424d-9e7d-496cd565fbe0 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Software Discovery - MacOs
id: 0ed75b9c-c73b-424d-9e7d-496cd565fbe0
status: test
description: Detects usage of system utilities (only grep for now) to discover security software discovery
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1518.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    image:
        Image: '/usr/bin/grep'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'nessusd'        # nessus vulnerability scanner
            - 'santad'         # google santa
            - 'CbDefense'      # carbon black
            - 'falcond'        # crowdstrike falcon
            - 'td-agent'       # fluentd log shipper
            - 'packetbeat'     # elastic network logger/shipper
            - 'filebeat'       # elastic log file shipper
            - 'auditbeat'      # elastic auditing agent/log shipper
            - 'osqueryd'       # facebook osquery
            - 'BlockBlock'     # Objective-See persistence locations watcher/blocker
            - 'LuLu'           # Objective-See firewall management utility
    selection_cli_2: # Objective Development Software firewall management utility
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Little'
            - 'Snitch'
    condition: image and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activities
level: medium
direct medium
RDS Database Security Group Modification
Detects changes to the security group entries for RDS databases. This can indicate that a misconfiguration has occurred which potentially exposes the database to the public internet, a wider audience within the VPC or that removal of valid rules has occurred which could impact the availability of the database to legitimate services and users.
status test author jamesc-grafana id 14f3f1c8-02d5-43a2-a191-91ffb52d3015 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: RDS Database Security Group Modification
id: 14f3f1c8-02d5-43a2-a191-91ffb52d3015
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the security group entries for RDS databases.
    This can indicate that a misconfiguration has occurred which potentially exposes the database to the public internet, a wider audience within the VPC or that removal of valid rules has occurred which could impact the availability of the database to legitimate services and users.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'rds.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'CreateDBSecurityGroup'
            - 'DeleteDBSecurityGroup'
            - 'RevokeDBSecurityGroupIngress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Creation of a new Database that needs new security group rules
level: medium
direct medium
LoadBalancer Security Group Modification
Detects changes to the security groups associated with an Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) or Application Load Balancer (ALB). This can indicate that a misconfiguration allowing more traffic into the system than required, or could indicate that an attacker is attempting to enable new connections into a VPC or subnet controlled by the account.
status test author jamesc-grafana id 7a4409fc-f8ca-45f6-8006-127d779eaad9 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: LoadBalancer Security Group Modification
id: 7a4409fc-f8ca-45f6-8006-127d779eaad9
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the security groups associated with an Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) or Application Load Balancer (ALB).
    This can indicate that a misconfiguration allowing more traffic into the system than required, or could indicate that an attacker is attempting to enable new connections into a VPC or subnet controlled by the account.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'elasticloadbalancing.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'ApplySecurityGroupsToLoadBalancer'
            - 'SetSecurityGroups'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Repurposing of an ELB or ALB to serve a different or additional application
    - Changes to security groups to allow for new services to be deployed
level: medium
direct medium
Ingress/Egress Security Group Modification
Detects when an account makes changes to the ingress or egress rules of a security group. This can indicate that an attacker is attempting to open up new attack vectors in the account, that they are trying to exfiltrate data over the network, or that they are trying to allow machines in that VPC/Subnet to contact a C&C server.
status test author jamesc-grafana id 6fb77778-040f-4015-9440-572aa9b6b580 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Ingress/Egress Security Group Modification
id: 6fb77778-040f-4015-9440-572aa9b6b580
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an account makes changes to the ingress or egress rules of a security group.
    This can indicate that an attacker is attempting to open up new attack vectors in the account, that they are trying to exfiltrate data over the network, or that they are trying to allow machines in that VPC/Subnet to contact a C&C server.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress'
            - 'AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'RevokeSecurityGroupEgress'
            - 'RevokeSecurityGroupIngress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - New VPCs and Subnets being setup requiring a different security profile to those already defined
    - A single port being opened for a new service that is known to be deploying
    - Administrators closing unused ports to reduce the attack surface
level: medium
direct medium
Azure Network Security Configuration Modified or Deleted
Identifies when a network security configuration is modified or deleted.
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger id d22b4df4-5a67-4859-a578-8c9a0b5af9df license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Azure Network Security Configuration Modified or Deleted
id: d22b4df4-5a67-4859-a578-8c9a0b5af9df
status: test
description: Identifies when a network security configuration is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-08
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/DELETE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/SECURITYRULES/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/SECURITYRULES/DELETE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/JOIN/ACTION
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/PROVIDERS/MICROSOFT.INSIGHTS/DIAGNOSTICSETTINGS/WRITE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Network Security Configuration being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Network Security Configuration modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium
direct medium
Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted
Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.
status test author Austin Songer id 835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted
id: 835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6
status: test
description: Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application security group being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application security group modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium
direct medium
Disabling Security Tools
Detects disabling security tools
status test author Ömer Günal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community id e3a8a052-111f-4606-9aee-f28ebeb76776 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabling Security Tools
id: e3a8a052-111f-4606-9aee-f28ebeb76776
status: test
description: Detects disabling security tools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md
author: Ömer Günal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-06-17
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_iptables_1:
        Image|endswith: '/service'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'iptables'
            - 'stop'
    selection_iptables_2:
        Image|endswith: '/service'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ip6tables'
            - 'stop'
    selection_iptables_3:
        Image|endswith: '/chkconfig'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'iptables'
            - 'stop'
    selection_iptables_4:
        Image|endswith: '/chkconfig'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ip6tables'
            - 'stop'
    selection_firewall_1:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'firewalld'
            - 'stop'
    selection_firewall_2:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'firewalld'
            - 'disable'
    selection_carbonblack_1:
        Image|endswith: '/service'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cbdaemon'
            - 'stop'
    selection_carbonblack_2:
        Image|endswith: '/chkconfig'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cbdaemon'
            - 'off'
    selection_carbonblack_3:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cbdaemon'
            - 'stop'
    selection_carbonblack_4:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cbdaemon'
            - 'disable'
    selection_selinux:
        Image|endswith: '/setenforce'
        CommandLine|contains: '0'
    selection_crowdstrike_1:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'falcon-sensor'
    selection_crowdstrike_2:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'disable'
            - 'falcon-sensor'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
direct medium
Disabling Security Tools - Builtin
Detects disabling security tools
status test author Ömer Günal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community id 49f5dfc1-f92e-4d34-96fa-feba3f6acf36 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabling Security Tools - Builtin
id: 49f5dfc1-f92e-4d34-96fa-feba3f6acf36
related:
    - id: e3a8a052-111f-4606-9aee-f28ebeb76776
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects disabling security tools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md
author: Ömer Günal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-06-17
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: syslog
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'stopping iptables'
        - 'stopping ip6tables'
        - 'stopping firewalld'
        - 'stopping cbdaemon'
        - 'stopping falcon-sensor'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
direct medium
Manipulation of User Computer or Group Security Principals Across AD
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain..
status test author frack113 id b29a93fb-087c-4b5b-a84d-ee3309e69d08 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Manipulation of User Computer or Group Security Principals Across AD
id: b29a93fb-087c-4b5b-a84d-ee3309e69d08
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems.
    Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain..
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.md#atomic-test-3---create-a-new-domain-account-using-powershell
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.accountmanagement?view=net-8.0
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative script
level: medium
direct medium
Security Software Discovery Via Powershell Script
Detects calls to "get-process" where the output is piped to a "where-object" filter to search for security solution processes. Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus
status test author frack113, Anish Bogati, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 904e8e61-8edf-4350-b59c-b905fc8e810c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Software Discovery Via Powershell Script
id: 904e8e61-8edf-4350-b59c-b905fc8e810c
status: test
description: |
    Detects calls to "get-process" where the output is piped to a "where-object" filter to search for security solution processes.
    Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md#atomic-test-2---security-software-discovery---powershell
author: frack113, Anish Bogati, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-16
modified: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1518.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'get-process | \?'
            - 'get-process | where'
            - 'gps | \?'
            - 'gps | where'
    selection_field:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Company -like'
            - 'Description -like'
            - 'Name -like'
            - 'Path -like'
            - 'Product -like'
    selection_keywords:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            # Note: These strings are using wildcard assuming the search is using the "-like" operator.
            #       You can add specific variant with the actual process names to increase coverage
            - '\*avira\*'
            - '\*carbonblack\*'
            - '\*cylance\*'
            - '\*defender\*'
            - '\*kaspersky\*'
            - '\*malware\*'
            - '\*sentinel\*'
            - '\*symantec\*'
            - '\*virus\*'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives might occur due to the nature of the ScriptBlock being ingested as a big blob. Initial tuning is required.
    - As the "selection_cmdlet" is common in scripts the matching engine might slow down the search. Change into regex or a more accurate string to avoid heavy resource consumption if experienced
level: medium
direct medium
Security Tools Keyword Lookup Via Findstr.EXE
Detects execution of "findstr" to search for common names of security tools. Attackers often pipe the results of recon commands such as "tasklist" or "whoami" to "findstr" in order to filter out the results. This detection focuses on the keywords that the attacker might use as a filter.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 id 4fe074b4-b833-4081-8f24-7dcfeca72b42 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Security Tools Keyword Lookup Via Findstr.EXE
id: 4fe074b4-b833-4081-8f24-7dcfeca72b42
related:
    - id: fe63010f-8823-4864-a96b-a7b4a0f7b929
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "findstr" to search for common names of security tools. Attackers often pipe the results of recon commands such as "tasklist" or "whoami" to "findstr" in order to filter out the results.
    This detection focuses on the keywords that the attacker might use as a filter.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/987e3ca988ae3cff4b9f6e388c139c05bf44bbb8/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md#atomic-test-1---security-software-discovery
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
    - https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/manage-engine-vulnerability-sector-alert-tlpclear.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-10-20
modified: 2023-11-14
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1518.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'FIND.EXE'
              - 'FINDSTR.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            # Note: Add additional keywords to increase and enhance coverage
            # Note:
            #   We use the double quote variation because in cases of where the command is executed through cmd for example:
            #       cmd /c "tasklist | findstr virus"
            #   Logging utilties such as Sysmon would capture the end quote as part of findstr execution
            - ' avira'
            - ' avira"'
            - ' cb'
            - ' cb"'
            - ' cylance'
            - ' cylance"'
            - ' defender'
            - ' defender"'
            - ' kaspersky'
            - ' kaspersky"'
            - ' kes'
            - ' kes"'
            - ' mc'
            - ' mc"'
            - ' sec'
            - ' sec"'
            - ' sentinel'
            - ' sentinel"'
            - ' symantec'
            - ' symantec"'
            - ' virus'
            - ' virus"'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_security_keyword_lookup/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Security Software Discovery
      technique: T1518.001
      atomic_guid: f92a380f-ced9-491f-b338-95a991418ce2
direct medium
Service Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
Detection of sc.exe utility adding a new service with special permission which hides that service.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Service Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25
related:
    - id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 # Deny Service Access
      type: similar
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Specific Technique
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detection of sc.exe utility adding a new service with special permission which hides that service.
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
    - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1628720819537936386
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'sdset'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
direct medium
Potential Wazuh Security Platform DLL Sideloading
Detects potential DLL side loading of DLLs that are part of the Wazuh security platform
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id db77ce78-7e28-4188-9337-cf30e2b3ba9f license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Wazuh Security Platform DLL Sideloading
id: db77ce78-7e28-4188-9337-cf30e2b3ba9f
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL side loading of DLLs that are part of the Wazuh security platform
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/iron-tiger-sysupdate-adds-linux-targeting.html
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-13
modified: 2023-05-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\libwazuhshared.dll'
            - '\libwinpthread-1.dll'
    filter_main_generic:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    filter_optional_mingw64:
        # Note: Many third party apps installed in "AppData" or "ProgramData" and leverage "mingw64" make use of "libwinpthread-1.dll"
        # In production its best to make a list of these apps and replace this filter with a specific one.
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\mingw64\bin\libwinpthread-1.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Many legitimate applications leverage this DLL. (Visual Studio, JetBrains, Ruby, Anaconda, GithubDesktop, etc.)
level: medium
direct medium
Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection - Security
Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
status test author Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community id eca91c7c-9214-47b9-b4c5-cb1d7e4f2350 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection - Security
id: eca91c7c-9214-47b9-b4c5-cb1d7e4f2350
related:
    - id: e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2024-03-15
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5156
        DestPort: 88
    filter_main_lsass:
        Application|startswith:
            - '\device\harddiskvolume'
            - 'C:'
        Application|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Application|startswith:
            - '\device\harddiskvolume'
            - 'C:'
        Application|endswith:
            - '\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - '\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Application|startswith:
            - '\device\harddiskvolume'
            - 'C:'
        Application|endswith:
            - '\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - '\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_tomcat:
        Application|endswith: '\tomcat\bin\tomcat8.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Web Browsers and third party application might generate similar activity. An initial baseline is required.
level: medium
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