Sigma rules for CVE-2021-1257
109 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2021-1257
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent
id: 797011dc-44f4-4e6f-9f10-a8ceefbe566b
status: test
description: Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters
references:
- https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1182389676876980224
- https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1182391019633029120
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-11
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1546.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\EdgeTransport.exe'
filter_conhost:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
filter_oleconverter: # FP also documented in https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=18
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
Image|endswith: '\Bin\OleConverter.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: test
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
references:
- https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: 'momyshark\?key='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|endswith:
- 'Wuauclt'
- 'Wuauclt.exe'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
related:
- id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 # BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes.
Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
references:
- https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\baaupdate.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Atera Agent Installation
id: 87261fb2-69d0-42fe-b9de-88c6b5f65a43
status: test
description: Detects successful installation of Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent as recently found to be used by Conti operators
references:
- https://www.advintel.io/post/secret-backdoor-behind-conti-ransomware-operation-introducing-atera-agent
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
service: application
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1033
Provider_Name: MsiInstaller
Message|contains: AteraAgent
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Atera agent installation
level: high
title: Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation
id: c7d16cae-aaf3-42e5-9c1c-fb8553faa6fa
status: test
description: Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=8
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2022-07-12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.002
logsource:
service: msexchange-management
product: windows
# warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
selection:
EventID: 6
Data|contains: 'Install-TransportAgent'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this.
level: high
title: Windows Filtering Platform Blocked Connection From EDR Agent Binary
id: bacf58c6-e199-4040-a94f-95dea0f1e45a
status: test
description: |
Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents.
Adversaries may use WFP filters to prevent Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents from reporting security events.
references:
- https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
- https://github.com/amjcyber/EDRNoiseMaker
- https://ghoulsec.medium.com/misc-series-4-forensics-on-edrsilencer-events-428b20b3f983
author: '@gott_cyber'
date: 2024-01-08
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Connection needs to be enabled'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5157
Application|endswith:
- '\AmSvc.exe' # Cybereason
- '\cb.exe' # Carbon Black EDR
- '\CETASvc.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\CNTAoSMgr.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\CrAmTray.exe' # Cybereason
- '\CrsSvc.exe' # Cybereason
- '\CSFalconContainer.exe' # CrowdStrike Falcon
- '\CSFalconService.exe' # CrowdStrike Falcon
- '\CybereasonAV.exe' # Cybereason
- '\CylanceSvc.exe' # Cylance
- '\cyserver.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
- '\CyveraService.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
- '\CyvrFsFlt.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
- '\EIConnector.exe' # ESET Inspect
- '\elastic-agent.exe' # Elastic EDR
- '\elastic-endpoint.exe' # Elastic EDR
- '\EndpointBasecamp.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe' # Cybereason
- '\filebeat.exe' # Elastic EDR
- '\fortiedr.exe' # FortiEDR
- '\hmpalert.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\hurukai.exe' # Harfanglab EDR
- '\LogProcessorService.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\mcsagent.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\mcsclient.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
- '\MsSense.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
- '\Ntrtscan.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\PccNTMon.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\QualysAgent.exe' # Qualys EDR
- '\RepMgr.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
- '\RepUtils.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
- '\RepUx.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
- '\RepWAV.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
- '\RepWSC.exe' # Carbon Black Cloud
- '\sedservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\SenseCncProxy.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
- '\SenseIR.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
- '\SenseNdr.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
- '\SenseSampleUploader.exe' # Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus
- '\SentinelAgent.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\SentinelAgentWorker.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\SentinelHelperService.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\SentinelServiceHost.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\SentinelStaticEngine.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe' # SentinelOne
- '\sfc.exe' # Cisco Secure Endpoint (Formerly Cisco AMP)
- '\sophos ui.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophosfilescanner.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophosfs.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophoshealth.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophosips.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophosLivequeryservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophosnetfilter.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophosntpservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sophososquery.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\sspservice.exe' # Sophos EDR
- '\TaniumClient.exe' # Tanium
- '\TaniumCX.exe' # Tanium
- '\TaniumDetectEngine.exe' # Tanium
- '\TMBMSRV.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\TmCCSF.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\TmListen.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\TmWSCSvc.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\Traps.exe' # Palo Alto Networks Traps/Cortex XDR
- '\winlogbeat.exe' # Elastic EDR
- '\WSCommunicator.exe' # TrendMicro Apex One
- '\xagt.exe' # Trellix EDR
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Malware User Agent
id: 5c84856b-55a5-45f1-826f-13f37250cf4e
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by malware in proxy logs
references:
- http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
- http://www.botopedia.org/search?searchword=scan&searchphrase=all
- https://networkraptor.blogspot.com/2015/01/user-agent-strings.html
- https://perishablepress.com/blacklist/ua-2013.txt
- https://www.bluecoat.com/en-gb/security-blog/2015-05-05/know-your-agents
- https://twitter.com/kladblokje_88/status/1614673320124743681?s=12&t=joEpeVa5d58aHYNGA_To7Q
- https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FtYbfsDXoAQ1Y8M?format=jpg&name=large
- https://twitter.com/crep1x/status/1635034100213112833
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2024-04-14
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent:
# RATs
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:53.0) Gecko/20100101 Chrome /53.0' # DragonOK
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # Used by PlugX - base-lining recommended - https://community.rsa.com/thread/185439
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)' # Used by PlugX - base-lining recommended - https://community.rsa.com/thread/185439
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)' # Used by PlugX - old - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/
- 'HttpBrowser/1.0' # HTTPBrowser RAT
- '*<|>*' # Houdini / Iniduoh / njRAT
- 'nsis_inetc (mozilla)' # ZeroAccess
- 'Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)' # Dyre / Upatre
# Ghost419 https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)'
# Malware
- '*zeroup*' # W32/Renos.Downloader
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1 ; v.*' # Kazy
- '* adlib/*'
- '* tiny' # Trojan Downloader
- '* BGroom *' # Trojan Downloader
- '* changhuatong'
- '* CholTBAgent'
- 'Mozilla/5.0 WinInet'
- 'RookIE/1.0'
- 'M' # HkMain
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)' # Egamipload - old UA - probable prone to false positives
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;MSIE 7.0;Windows NT 6.0)' # Yakes
- 'backdoorbot'
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.1 (.NET CLR 3.5.30731)' # Sality
- 'Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)' # Sality
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.1 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)' # Sality
- 'Opera' # Trojan Keragany
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)' # Fareit
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT 5.0)' # Webshell's back connect
- 'MSIE' # Toby web shell
- '*(Charon; Inferno)' # Loki Bot
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/5.0)' # Fareit / Pony
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.1; Windows NT)' # https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8abbef8e58f012d45a7cb46c3c2729dcd33cf53e721ff8c59e238862aa0a9e0e/detection
- 'Mozilla/4.0(compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # MacControl malware https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d60f61f1f03a5011a0240694e110c6d370bf68a92753093186c6d14e26a15428/detection https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/osxmacontrol-back-it-again
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)' # used by Zebrocy malware https://app.any.run/tasks/7d7fa4a0-6970-4428-828b-29572abf9ceb/
# Ursnif
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64)'
# Emotet
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.3)' # https://twitter.com/webbthewombat/status/1225827092132179968
# Lockbit (https://twitter.com/kladblokje_88/status/1614673320124743681?s=12&t=joEpeVa5d58aHYNGA_To7Q)
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1)'
- 'AppleWebkit/587.38 (KHTML, like Gecko)'
- 'Chrome/91.0.4472.77'
- 'Safari/537.36'
- 'Edge/91.0.864.37'
- 'Firefox/89.0'
- 'Gecko/20100101'
# Others
- '* pxyscand*'
- '* asd'
- '* mdms'
- 'sample'
- 'nocase'
- 'Moxilla'
- 'Win32 *'
- '*Microsoft Internet Explorer*'
- 'agent *'
- 'AutoIt' # Suspicious - base-lining recommended
- 'IczelionDownLoad'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 10.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Tablet PC 2.0)' # https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thor-plugx-variant/
- 'record' # https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-1-the-return-of-the-dead/
- 'mozzzzzzzzzzz' # https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-1-the-return-of-the-dead/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0' # Quasar RAT UA https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1559994820692672519?s=20&t=g3tkNL09dZZWbFN10qDVjg
- 'Havana/0.1' # https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-alert-havanacrypt-ransomware-masquerading-as-google-update
- 'antSword/v2.1' # AntSword Webshell UA
- 'rqwrwqrqwrqw' # Racoon Stealer
- 'qwrqrwrqwrqwr' # Racoon Stealer
- 'rc2.0/client' # Racoon Stealer
- 'TakeMyPainBack' # Racoon Stealer
- 'xxx' # Racoon Stealer
- '20112211' # Racoon Stealer
- '23591' # Racoon Stealer
- '901785252112' # Racoon Stealer
- '1235125521512' # Racoon Stealer
- '125122112551' # Racoon Stealer
- 'B1D3N_RIM_MY_ASS' # Racoon Stealer
- 'AYAYAYAY1337' # Racoon Stealer
- 'iMightJustPayMySelfForAFeature' # Racoon Stealer
- 'ForAFeature' # Racoon Stealer
- 'Ares_ldr_v_*' # AresLoader
# - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:106.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/106' # seen used by AresLoader
- 'Microsoft Internet Explorer' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'CLCTR' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'uploader' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'agent' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'License' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'vb wininet' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'Client' # https://github.com/silence-is-best/c2db
- 'Lilith-Bot/3.0' # Lilith Stealer - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'svc/1.0' # SVC Loader - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'WSHRAT' # WSHRAT - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'ZeroStresser Botnet/1.5' # Zerobot - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'OK' # Nymaim - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'Project1sqlite' # DarkCloud - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'Project1' # DarkCloud - https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1558051450797690880
- 'DuckTales' # Racoon Stealer
- 'Zadanie' # Racoon Stealer
- 'GunnaWunnaBlueTips' # Racoon Stealer
- 'Xlmst' # Racoon Stealer
- 'GeekingToTheMoon' # Racoon Stealer
- 'SunShineMoonLight' # Racoon Stealer
- 'BunnyRequester' # BunnyStealer
- 'BunnyTasks' # BunnyStealer
- 'BunnyStealer' # BunnyStealer
- 'BunnyLoader_Dropper' # BunnyStealer
- 'BunnyLoader' # BunnyStealer
- 'BunnyShell' # BunnyStealer
- 'SPARK-COMMIT' # SparkRAT - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/tellmethetruth-exploitation-of-cve-2023-46604-leading-to-ransomware/
- '4B4DB4B3' # B4B3RAT - https://twitter.com/naumovax/status/1718956514491130301
- 'SouthSide' # Racoon Stealer
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Tob 1.1)' # Latrodectus loader
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Hack Tool User Agent
id: c42a3073-30fb-48ae-8c99-c23ada84b103
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings user by hack tools in proxy logs
references:
- https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb
- http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|contains:
# Vulnerability scanner and brute force tools
- '(hydra)'
- ' arachni/'
- ' BFAC '
- ' brutus '
- ' cgichk '
- 'core-project/1.0'
- ' crimscanner/'
- 'datacha0s'
- 'dirbuster'
- 'domino hunter'
- 'dotdotpwn'
- 'FHScan Core'
- 'floodgate'
- 'get-minimal'
- 'gootkit auto-rooter scanner'
- 'grendel-scan'
- ' inspath '
- 'internet ninja'
- 'jaascois'
- ' zmeu '
- 'masscan'
- ' metis '
- 'morfeus fucking scanner'
- 'n-stealth'
- 'nsauditor'
- 'pmafind'
- 'security scan'
- 'springenwerk'
- 'teh forest lobster'
- 'toata dragostea'
- ' vega/'
- 'voideye'
- 'webshag'
- 'webvulnscan'
- ' whcc/'
# SQL Injection
- ' Havij'
- 'absinthe'
- 'bsqlbf'
- 'mysqloit'
- 'pangolin'
- 'sql power injector'
- 'sqlmap'
- 'sqlninja'
- 'uil2pn'
# Hack tool
- 'ruler' # https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/using-outlook-forms-lateral-movement-persistence/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pt-PT; rv:1.9.1.2) Gecko/20090729 Firefox/3.5.2 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)' # SQLi Dumper
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: APT User Agent
id: 6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis
date: 2019-11-12
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent:
# APT Related
- 'SJZJ (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)' # APT Backspace
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0' # APT GrizzlySteppe - ChopStick - US CERT https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2017/02/10/enhanced-analysis-grizzly-steppe
- 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC' # Comment Crew Miniasp
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.4; Win32;32-bit)' # Comment Crew Miniasp
- 'webclient' # Naikon APT
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/200' # Naikon APT
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI 6.0;' # SnowGlobe Babar - yes, it is cut
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:28.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/28.0' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/2' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
- 'Mozilla/4.0' # Derusbi backdoor ELF https://github.com/fideliscyber/indicators/tree/master/FTA-1021
- 'Netscape' # Unit78020 Malware
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20100719 Firefox/1.0.7' # Unit78020 Malware
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Firefox/3.6.13 GTB7.1' # Winnti related
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0)' # Winnti related
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NETCLR 2.0.50727)' # APT17
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.1; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Win32)' # TSCookie https://app.any.run/tasks/0996b314-5133-491b-8d23-d431ffdec597
- 'Mozilla v5.1 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:6.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.1' # Delphi downloader https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/24/sednit-update-analysis-zebrocy/
- 'Mozilla/6.1 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 5.3; Trident/5.0)' # VPNFilter https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; InfoPath.1)' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) WinHttp/1.6.3.8 (WinHTTP/5.1) like Gecko' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
- 'Mozilla v5.1 *' # Sofacy Zebrocy samples
- 'MSIE 8.0' # Sofacy Azzy Backdoor from https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a80e29c0757bee05338fd5c22a542d852ad86c477068e3eb4aacc1c3e59e2eef?environmentId=100
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.2)' # https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/07/microsoft-office-vulnerabilities-used-to-distribute-felixroot-backdoor.html
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; RMS)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; DynGate)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
- 'O/9.27 (W; U; Z)' # Cmstar https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/e4328011bb2b04abc856ccd04404c9f95d67167f6c291d343e8ffa8aa2aa2099/details
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/5.0; Trident/5.0*' # KerrDown UA
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 9; *' # Suspicious 'Windows NT 9' user agent - used by APT33 malware in 2018
- 'hots scot' # Unknown iOS zero-day implant https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1176437994288484352?s=20
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT)' # https://blog.telsy.com/meeting-powerband-the-apt33-net-powerton-variant/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36' # Hidden Cobra malware
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win32; rv:47.0)' # Strong Pity loader https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1264185981118406657
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;SV1;' # Mustang Panda https://insights.oem.avira.com/new-wave-of-plugx-targets-hong-kong/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:22.0) Firefox/22.0' # BackdoorDiplomacy https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 Chrome/72.0.3626.109 Safari/537.36' # SideWalk malware used by Sparkling Goblin
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:FTS_06) Gecko/22.36.35.06 Firefox/2.0' # LitePower stager used by WRITE https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36 Edg/100.0.1185.39' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 10.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Tablet PC 2.0)' # PlugX backdoor https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thor-plugx-variant/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246001' # RedCurl Downloader APT https://www.facct.ru/blog/redcurl-2024
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Old browsers
level: high
title: Windows WebDAV User Agent
id: e09aed7a-09e0-4c9a-90dd-f0d52507347e
status: test
description: Detects WebDav DownloadCradle
references:
- https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|startswith: 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/'
cs-method: 'GET'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet
- Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents
- Legitimate WebDAV administration
level: high
title: Exploit Framework User Agent
id: fdd1bfb5-f60b-4a35-910e-f36ed3d0b32f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by exploit / pentest frameworks like Metasploit in proxy logs
references:
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent:
# Cobalt Strike https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-malleable-c2
- 'Internet Explorer *'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; InfoPath.2)' # https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2016-06-28-cobalt-strike-http-c2-redirectors-with-apache-mod_rewrite/
# Metasploit Framework - Analysis by Didier Stevens https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Metasploit RSPEC)'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.1; Windows NT)'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0; SIMBAR={7DB0F6DE-8DE7-4841-9084-28FA914B0F2E}; SLCC1; .N'
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)' # only use in proxy logs - not for detection in web server logs
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.221.6 Safari/525.13'
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0; MAAU)' # Payloads
# Metasploit Update by Florian Roth 08.07.2017
- 'Mozilla/5.0'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; SPIPE/1.0'
# - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)' # too many false positives expected
# - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko' # too many false positives expected
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0'
- 'Sametime Community Agent' # Unknown if prone to false positives - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/97095ab3113de2f046e64a64c461a1f888554401/modules/exploits/windows/http/steamcast_useragent.rb
- 'X-FORWARDED-FOR'
- 'DotDotPwn v2.1'
- 'SIPDROID'
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win32; x32; rv:60.0)' # CobaltStrike https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/
# Empire
- 'Mozilla/6.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20140205 Firefox/27.0 Iceweasel/25.3.0'
# Exploits
- '*wordpress hash grabber*'
- '*exploit*'
# Havoc
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/96.0.4664.110 Safari/537.36' # https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc/issues/519
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Crypto Miner User Agent
id: fa935401-513b-467b-81f4-f9e77aa0dd78
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by crypto miners in proxy logs
references:
- https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/da22b3e6c45825f3ac1f208255126cb8585cd4fc/src/base/kernel/Platform_win.cpp#L65
- https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/427b6516e0550200c17ca28675118f0fffcc323f/src/version.h
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|startswith:
# XMRig
- 'XMRig '
# CCMiner
- 'ccminer'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious User Agent
id: 7195a772-4b3f-43a4-a210-6a003d65caa1
status: test
description: Detects suspicious malformed user agent strings in proxy logs
references:
- https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2022-10-31
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection1:
c-useragent|startswith:
- 'user-agent' # User-Agent: User-Agent:
- 'Mozilla/3.0 '
- 'Mozilla/2.0 '
- 'Mozilla/1.0 '
- 'Mozilla ' # missing slash
- ' Mozilla/' # leading space
- 'Mozila/' # single 'l'
- 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; MS Web Services Client Protocol' # https://twitter.com/NtSetDefault/status/1303643299509567488
selection2:
c-useragent|contains:
- ' (compatible;MSIE ' # typical typo - missing space
- '.0;Windows NT ' # typical typo - missing space
- 'loader' # https://twitter.com/securityonion/status/1522614635152744453?s=20&t=gHyPTSq5A27EqKwrCd9ohg
selection3:
c-useragent:
- '_'
- 'CertUtil URL Agent' # https://twitter.com/stvemillertime/status/985150675527974912
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:60.0)' # CobaltStrike Beacon https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:28.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/28.0' # used by APT28 malware https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/inside-the-apt28-dll-backdoor-blitz.html
- 'HTTPS' # https://twitter.com/stvemillertime/status/1204437531632250880
- 'Erbium-UA-4ce7c27cb4be9d32e333bf032c88235a' # https://www.cyfirma.com/outofband/erbium-stealer-malware-report
- 'x' # Use by Racoon Stealer but could be something else
- 'xxx' # Use by Racoon Stealer but could be something else
falsepositives:
- c-useragent: 'Mozilla/3.0 * Acrobat *' # Acrobat with linked content
- cs-host|endswith: # Adobe product traffic, example: Mozilla/3.0 (compatible; Adobe Synchronizer 10.12.20000)
- '.acrobat.com'
- '.adobe.com'
- '.adobe.io'
condition: 1 of selection* and not falsepositives
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl
id: ae9d710f-dcd1-4f75-a0a5-93a73b5dda0e
status: test
description: Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/16/mac-cryptocurrency-trading-application-rebranded-bundled-malware/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/d/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found.html
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/launchctl/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-13
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1569.001
- attack.t1543.001
- attack.t1543.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/launchctl'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'submit'
- 'load'
- 'start'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities is expected to trigger false positives. Investigate the command line being passed to determine if the service or launch agent are suspicious.
level: medium
title: Potential Linux Amazon SSM Agent Hijacking
id: f9b3edc5-3322-4fc7-8aa3-245d646cc4b7
status: test
description: Detects potential Amazon SSM agent hijack attempts as outlined in the Mitiga research report.
references:
- https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazons-aws-ssm-agent-can-be-used-as-post-exploitation-rat-malware/
- https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2023/08/02/aws-instances-attackers-access/
author: Muhammad Faisal
date: 2023-08-03
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/amazon-ssm-agent'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-register '
- '-code '
- '-id '
- '-region '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate activity of system administrators
level: medium
title: Curl Web Request With Potential Custom User-Agent
id: 85de1f22-d189-44e4-8239-dc276b45379b
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with a potential custom "User-Agent". Attackers can leverage this to download or exfiltrate data via "curl" to a domain that only accept specific "User-Agent" strings
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
- https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-27
modified: 2025-12-11
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# Example: This command line would trigger the rule
# curl.exe -H "User-Agent: EvilAgent" http://malicious.example.com
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_header_flag_1:
CommandLine|re: '\s-H\s' # Must be Regex as the flag needs to be case sensitive
selection_header_flag_2:
CommandLine|contains: '--header'
selection_user_agent:
CommandLine|contains: 'User-Agent:'
condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_header_* and selection_user_agent
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_custom_user_agent/info.yml
title: Potential Amazon SSM Agent Hijacking
id: d20ee2f4-822c-4827-9e15-41500b1fff10
status: test
description: Detects potential Amazon SSM agent hijack attempts as outlined in the Mitiga research report.
references:
- https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazons-aws-ssm-agent-can-be-used-as-post-exploitation-rat-malware/
- https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2023/08/02/aws-instances-attackers-access/
author: Muhammad Faisal
date: 2023-08-02
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\amazon-ssm-agent.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-register '
- '-code '
- '-id '
- '-region '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate activity of system administrators
level: medium
title: Remote Access Tool - TacticalRMM Agent Registration to Potentially Attacker-Controlled Server
id: 2db93a3f-3249-4f73-9e68-0e77a0f8ae7e
status: experimental
description: |
Detects TacticalRMM agent installations where the --api, --auth, and related flags are used on the command line.
These parameters configure the agent to connect to a specific RMM server with authentication, client ID, and site ID.
This technique could indicate a threat actor attempting to register the agent with an attacker-controlled RMM infrastructure silently.
references:
- https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm
- https://apophis133.medium.com/powershell-script-tactical-rmm-installation-45afb639eff3
author: Ahmed Nosir (@egycondor)
date: 2025-05-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains: '\TacticalAgent\tacticalrmm.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '--api'
- '--auth'
- '--client-id'
- '--site-id'
- '--agent-type'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system administrator deploying TacticalRMM
level: medium
title: Suspicious Vsls-Agent Command With AgentExtensionPath Load
id: 43103702-5886-11ed-9b6a-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Microsoft Visual Studio vsls-agent.exe lolbin execution with a suspicious library load using the --agentExtensionPath parameter
references:
- https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1583916360404729857
author: bohops
date: 2022-10-30
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\vsls-agent.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '--agentExtensionPath'
filter:
CommandLine|contains: 'Microsoft.VisualStudio.LiveShare.Agent.'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on custom use of vsls-agent.exe
level: medium
title: MSExchange Transport Agent Installation
id: 83809e84-4475-4b69-bc3e-4aad8568612f
related:
- id: 83809e84-4475-4b69-bc3e-4aad8568612f
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=7
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: 'Install-TransportAgent'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this.
level: medium
title: MSExchange Transport Agent Installation - Builtin
id: 4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6
related:
- id: 83809e84-4475-4b69-bc3e-4aad8568612f
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=7
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: msexchange-management
detection:
selection:
- 'Install-TransportAgent'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this.
level: medium
title: Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access
id: ff151c33-45fa-475d-af4f-c2f93571f4fe
status: test
description: |
This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure AD Health monitoring agent.
This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent.
references:
- https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
- https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1012
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4656
- 4663
ObjectType: 'Key'
ObjectName: '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent'
filter:
ProcessName|contains:
- 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Mesh Agent Service Installation
id: e0d1ad53-c7eb-48ec-a87a-72393cc6cedc
status: test
description: Detects a Mesh Agent service installation. Mesh Agent is used to remotely manage computers
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-28
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_root:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
selection_service:
- ImagePath|contains: 'MeshAgent.exe'
- ServiceName|contains: 'Mesh Agent'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the tool
level: medium
title: Suspicious Base64 Encoded User-Agent
id: d443095b-a221-4957-a2c4-cd1756c9b747
related:
- id: 894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded User-Agent strings, as seen used by some malware.
references:
- https://deviceatlas.com/blog/list-of-user-agent-strings#desktop
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|startswith:
- 'Q2hyb21l' # Chrome Encoded with offset to not include padding
- 'QXBwbGVXZWJLaX' # AppleWebKit Encoded with offset to not include padding
- 'RGFsdmlr' # Dalvik Encoded with offset to not include padding
- 'TW96aWxsY' # Mozilla Encoded with offset to not include padding (as used by YamaBot)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Windows PowerShell User Agent
id: c8557060-9221-4448-8794-96320e6f3e74
status: test
description: Detects Windows PowerShell Web Access
references:
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/reference/5.1/microsoft.powershell.utility/Invoke-WebRequest
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-13
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|contains: ' WindowsPowerShell/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet
- Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents
level: medium
title: Potential Base64 Encoded User-Agent
id: 894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3
related:
- id: d443095b-a221-4957-a2c4-cd1756c9b747
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects User Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be a sign of base64 encoding.
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2022/07/yamabot.html
- https://deviceatlas.com/blog/list-of-user-agent-strings#desktop
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Brian Ingram (update)
date: 2022-07-08
modified: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|endswith: '='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: HTTP Request With Empty User Agent
id: 21e44d78-95e7-421b-a464-ffd8395659c4
status: test
description: |
Detects a potentially suspicious empty user agent strings in proxy log.
Could potentially indicate an uncommon request method.
references:
- https://twitter.com/Carlos_Perez/status/883455096645931008
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
# Empty string - as used by Powershell's (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString
c-useragent: ''
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS
id: 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x4B.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1059.002
- attack.t1137.002
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'Microsoft Word'
- 'Microsoft Excel'
- 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
- 'Microsoft OneNote'
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/curl'
- '/dash'
- '/fish'
- '/osacompile'
- '/osascript'
- '/sh'
- '/zsh'
- '/python'
- '/python3'
- '/wget'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - MacOS
id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
related:
- id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
type: similar
- id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9
type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
- https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
- https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1219.002
- attack.t1036.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_meshagent:
- CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
- OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
filter_main_legitimate:
Image|endswith:
- '/meshagent'
- '/meshagent_osx64'
condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Binary Padding - MacOS
id: 95361ce5-c891-4b0a-87ca-e24607884a96
status: test
description: Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/truncate
- https://linux.die.net/man/1/dd
author: 'Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027.001
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_truncate:
Image|endswith: '/truncate'
CommandLine|contains: '-s +'
selection_dd:
Image|endswith: '/dd'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'if=/dev/zero' # if input is not /dev/zero, then there is no null padding
- 'if=/dev/random' # high-quality random data
- 'if=/dev/urandom' # low-quality random data
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate script work
level: high
title: Suspicious Execution via macOS Script Editor
id: 6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4
status: test
description: Detects when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process.
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-7f541fbc4a4a28a92970e8bf53effea5bd934604429112c920affb457f5b2685
- https://wojciechregula.blog/post/macos-red-teaming-initial-access-via-applescript-url/
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2022-12-28
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.002
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1059.002
- attack.t1204
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1553
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '/Script Editor'
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '/curl'
- '/bash'
- '/sh'
- '/zsh'
- '/dash'
- '/fish'
- '/osascript'
- '/mktemp'
- '/chmod'
- '/php'
- '/nohup'
- '/openssl'
- '/plutil'
- '/PlistBuddy'
- '/xattr'
- '/sqlite'
- '/funzip'
- '/popen'
- Image|contains:
- 'python'
- 'perl'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: System Information Discovery Via Sysctl - MacOS
id: 6ff08e55-ea53-4f27-94a1-eff92e6d9d5c
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of "sysctl" with specific arguments that have been used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware information.
This process is primarily used to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments.
references:
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/sysctl/#
- https://evasions.checkpoint.com/techniques/macos.html
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/04/09/oceanlotus-macos-malware-update/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x1E.html
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1c547a064494a35d6b5e6b459de183ab2720a22725e082bed6f6629211f7abc1/behavior
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b4b1fc65f87b3dcfa35e2dbe8e0a34ad9d8a400bec332025c0a2e200671038aa/behavior
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1497.001
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '/sysctl'
- CommandLine|contains: 'sysctl'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'hw.'
- 'kern.'
- 'machdep.'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activities
level: medium
title: New File Exclusion Added To Time Machine Via Tmutil - MacOS
id: 9acf45ed-3a26-4062-bf08-56857613eb52
status: test
description: |
Detects the addition of a new file or path exclusion to MacOS Time Machine via the "tmutil" utility.
An adversary could exclude a path from Time Machine backups to prevent certain files from being backed up.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-12---disable-time-machine
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/tmutil/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-29
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '/tmutil'
- CommandLine|contains: 'tmutil'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'addexclusion'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrator activity
level: medium
title: Suspicious MacOS Firmware Activity
id: 7ed2c9f7-c59d-4c82-a7e2-f859aa676099
status: test
description: Detects when a user manipulates with Firmward Password on MacOS. NOTE - this command has been disabled on silicon-based apple computers.
references:
- https://github.com/usnistgov/macos_security/blob/932a51f3e819dd3e02ebfcf3ef433cfffafbe28b/rules/os/os_firmware_password_require.yaml
- https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/firmwarepasswd/
- https://support.apple.com/guide/security/firmware-password-protection-sec28382c9ca/web
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.impact
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection1:
Image: '/usr/sbin/firmwarepasswd'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'setpasswd'
- 'full'
- 'delete'
- 'check'
condition: selection1
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
title: Disk Image Mounting Via Hdiutil - MacOS
id: bf241472-f014-4f01-a869-96f99330ca8c
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to mount disk images.
references:
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/hdiutil/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/from-the-front-linesunsigned-macos-orat-malware-gambles-for-the-win/
- https://ss64.com/mac/hdiutil.html
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-10
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1560.001
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: /hdiutil
CommandLine|contains:
- 'attach '
- 'mount '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of hdiutil by administrators and users.
level: medium
title: Potential Discovery Activity Using Find - MacOS
id: 85de3a19-b675-4a51-bfc6-b11a5186c971
related:
- id: 8344c0e5-5783-47cc-9cf9-a0f7fd03e6cf
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of "find" binary in a suspicious manner to perform discovery
references:
- https://github.com/SaiSathvik1/Linux-Privilege-Escalation-Notes
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/find'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-perm -4000'
- '-perm -2000'
- '-perm 0777'
- '-perm -222'
- '-perm -o w'
- '-perm -o x'
- '-perm -u=s'
- '-perm -g=s'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Time Machine Backup Deletion Attempt Via Tmutil - MacOS
id: 452df256-da78-427a-866f-49fa04417d74
status: test
description: |
Detects deletion attempts of MacOS Time Machine backups via the native backup utility "tmutil".
An adversary may perform this action before launching a ransonware attack to prevent the victim from restoring their files.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-12---disable-time-machine
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/tmutil/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-29
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '/tmutil'
- CommandLine|contains: 'tmutil'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'delete'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate activities
level: medium
title: Hidden Flag Set On File/Directory Via Chflags - MacOS
id: 3b2c1059-ae5f-40b6-b5d4-6106d3ac20fe
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of the "chflags" utility with the "hidden" flag, in order to hide files on MacOS.
When a file or directory has this hidden flag set, it becomes invisible to the default file listing commands and in graphical file browsers.
references:
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/apt32-multi-stage-macos-trojan-innovates-on-crimeware-scripting-technique/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/04/09/oceanlotus-macos-malware-update/
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
- https://ss64.com/mac/chflags.html
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.t1564.004
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/chflags'
CommandLine|contains: 'hidden '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of chflags by administrators and users.
level: medium
title: Disk Image Creation Via Hdiutil - MacOS
id: 1cf98dc2-fcb0-47c9-8aea-654c9284d1ae
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to create a disk image.
references:
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/hdiutil/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/from-the-front-linesunsigned-macos-orat-malware-gambles-for-the-win/
- https://ss64.com/mac/hdiutil.html
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-10
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: /hdiutil
CommandLine|contains: 'create'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of hdiutil by administrators and users.
level: medium
title: Security Software Discovery - MacOs
id: 0ed75b9c-c73b-424d-9e7d-496cd565fbe0
status: test
description: Detects usage of system utilities (only grep for now) to discover security software discovery
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1518.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
image:
Image: '/usr/bin/grep'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'nessusd' # nessus vulnerability scanner
- 'santad' # google santa
- 'CbDefense' # carbon black
- 'falcond' # crowdstrike falcon
- 'td-agent' # fluentd log shipper
- 'packetbeat' # elastic network logger/shipper
- 'filebeat' # elastic log file shipper
- 'auditbeat' # elastic auditing agent/log shipper
- 'osqueryd' # facebook osquery
- 'BlockBlock' # Objective-See persistence locations watcher/blocker
- 'LuLu' # Objective-See firewall management utility
selection_cli_2: # Objective Development Software firewall management utility
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Little'
- 'Snitch'
condition: image and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate activities
level: medium
title: Scheduled Cron Task/Job - MacOs
id: 7c3b43d8-d794-47d2-800a-d277715aa460
status: test
description: Detects abuse of the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Detection will focus on crontab jobs uploaded from the tmp folder.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1053.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/crontab'
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
title: MacOS Scripting Interpreter AppleScript
id: 1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55
status: test
description: Detects execution of AppleScript of the macOS scripting language AppleScript.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.002/T1059.002.md
- https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-21
modified: 2023-02-01
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/osascript'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -e '
- '.scpt'
- '.js'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Application installers might contain scripts as part of the installation process.
level: medium
title: Time Machine Backup Disabled Via Tmutil - MacOS
id: 2c95fa8a-8b8d-4787-afce-7117ceb8e3da
status: test
description: |
Detects disabling of Time Machine (Apple's automated backup utility software) via the native macOS backup utility "tmutil".
An attacker can use this to prevent backups from occurring.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-12---disable-time-machine
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/tmutil/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-29
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '/tmutil'
- CommandLine|contains: 'tmutil'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'disable'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrator activity
level: medium
title: Suspicious Browser Child Process - MacOS
id: 0250638a-2b28-4541-86fc-ea4c558fa0c6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawned from browsers. This could be a result of a potential web browser exploitation.
references:
- https://fr.slideshare.net/codeblue_jp/cb19-recent-apt-attack-on-crypto-exchange-employees-by-heungsoo-kang
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/execution_initial_access_suspicious_browser_childproc.toml
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-04-05
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1189
- attack.t1203
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'com.apple.WebKit.WebContent'
- 'firefox'
- 'Google Chrome Helper'
- 'Google Chrome'
- 'Microsoft Edge'
- 'Opera'
- 'Safari'
- 'Tor Browser'
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/curl'
- '/dash'
- '/ksh'
- '/osascript'
- '/perl'
- '/php'
- '/pwsh'
- '/python'
- '/sh'
- '/tcsh'
- '/wget'
- '/zsh'
filter_main_generic:
CommandLine|contains: '--defaults-torrc' # Informs tor to use default config file
filter_main_ms_autoupdate:
CommandLine|contains: '/Library/Application Support/Microsoft/MAU*/Microsoft AutoUpdate.app/Contents/MacOS/msupdate' # Microsoft AutoUpdate utility
filter_main_chrome:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'Google Chrome Helper'
- 'Google Chrome'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/Volumes/Google Chrome/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/*/Resources/install.sh' # Install the Google Chrome browser
- '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework/*/Resources/keystone_promote_preflight.sh' # Updates the Google Chrome branding configuration files
- '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework/*/Resources/keystone_promote_postflight.sh' # Script that performs the post-installation tasks
filter_main_ms_edge:
ParentImage|contains: 'Microsoft Edge'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'IOPlatformExpertDevice' # Retrieves the IOPlatformUUID (parent process - Microsoft Edge)
- 'hw.model' # Retrieves model name of the computer's hardware (parent process - Microsoft Edge)
filter_main_chromerecovery:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'Google Chrome Helper'
- 'Google Chrome'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/Users/'
- '/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/recovery/'
- '/ChromeRecovery'
filter_optional_null:
# Aoids alerting for the events which do not have command-line arguments
CommandLine: null
filter_optional_empty:
# Aoids alerting for the events which do not have command-line arguments
CommandLine: ''
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate browser install, update and recovery scripts
level: medium
title: File Download Via Nscurl - MacOS
id: 6d8a7cf1-8085-423b-b87d-7e880faabbdf
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the nscurl utility in order to download files.
references:
- https://www.loobins.io/binaries/nscurl/
- https://www.agnosticdev.com/content/how-diagnose-app-transport-security-issues-using-nscurl-and-openssl
- https://gist.github.com/nasbench/ca6ef95db04ae04ffd1e0b1ce709cadd
author: Daniel Cortez
date: 2024-06-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nscurl'
CommandLine|contains:
- '--download '
- '--download-directory '
- '--output '
- '-dir '
- '-dl '
- '-ld'
- '-o '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of nscurl by administrators and users.
level: medium
title: Remote Access Tool - Potential MeshAgent Execution - MacOS
id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9
related:
- id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects potential execution of MeshAgent which is a tool used for remote access.
Historical data shows that threat actors rename MeshAgent binary to evade detection.
Matching command lines with the '--meshServiceName' argument can indicate that the MeshAgent is being used for remote access.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
- https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
- https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Environments that legitimately use MeshAgent
level: medium
title: MacOS Emond Launch Daemon
id: 23c43900-e732-45a4-8354-63e4a6c187ce
status: test
description: Detects additions to the Emond Launch Daemon that adversaries may use to gain persistence and elevate privileges.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.014/T1546.014.md
- https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-23
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1546.014
logsource:
category: file_event
product: macos
detection:
selection_1:
TargetFilename|contains: '/etc/emond.d/rules/'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.plist'
selection_2:
TargetFilename|contains: '/private/var/db/emondClients/'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
title: MacOS Network Service Scanning
id: 84bae5d4-b518-4ae0-b331-6d4afd34d00f
status: test
description: Detects enumeration of local or remote network services.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1046
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '/nc'
- '/netcat'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '/nmap'
- '/telnet'
filter:
CommandLine|contains: 'l'
condition: (selection_1 and not filter) or selection_2
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
level: low
title: GUI Input Capture - macOS
id: 60f1ce20-484e-41bd-85f4-ac4afec2c541
status: test
description: Detects attempts to use system dialog prompts to capture user credentials
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md
- https://scriptingosx.com/2018/08/user-interaction-from-bash-scripts/
author: remotephone, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1056.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/osascript'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-e'
- 'display'
- 'dialog'
- 'answer'
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'admin'
- 'administrator'
- 'authenticate'
- 'authentication'
- 'credentials'
- 'pass'
- 'password'
- 'unlock'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration tools and activities
level: low