title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack
id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
related:
    - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
      type: obsolete
    - id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack - Image Load
id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
related:
    - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
      type: obsolete
    - id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Potential XXE Exploitation Attempt In JVM Based Application
id: c4e06896-e27c-4583-95ac-91ce2279345d
status: test
description: Detects XML parsing issues, if the application expects to work with XML make sure that the parser is initialized safely.
references:
    - https://rules.sonarsource.com/java/RSPEC-2755
    - https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Processing
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'SAXParseException'
        - 'DOMException'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - If the application expects to work with XML there may be parsing issues that don't necessarily mean XXE.
level: high

title: Potential Local File Read Vulnerability In JVM Based Application
id: e032f5bc-4563-4096-ae3b-064bab588685
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential local file read vulnerability in JVM based apps.
    If the exceptions are caused due to user input and contain path traversal payloads then it's a red flag.
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords_local_file_read:
        '|all':
            - 'FileNotFoundException'
            - '/../../..'
    condition: keywords_local_file_read
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Potential JNDI Injection Exploitation In JVM Based Application
id: bb0e9cec-d4da-46f5-997f-22efc59f3dca
status: test
description: Detects potential JNDI Injection exploitation. Often coupled with Log4Shell exploitation.
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
    - https://secariolabs.com/research/analysing-and-reproducing-poc-for-log4j-2-15-0
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'com.sun.jndi.ldap.'
        - 'org.apache.logging.log4j.core.net.JndiManager'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Potential OGNL Injection Exploitation In JVM Based Application
id: 4d0af518-828e-4a04-a751-a7d03f3046ad
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential OGNL Injection exploitation, which may lead to RCE.
    OGNL is an expression language that is supported in many JVM based systems.
    OGNL Injection is the reason for some high profile RCE's such as Apache Struts (CVE-2017-5638) and Confluence (CVE-2022-26134)
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2017-5638
    - cve.2022-26134
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'org.apache.commons.ognl.OgnlException'
        - 'ExpressionSyntaxException'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Process Execution Error In JVM Based Application
id: d65f37da-a26a-48f8-8159-3dde96680ad2
status: test
description: Detects process execution related exceptions in JVM based apps, often relates to RCE
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'Cannot run program'
        - 'java.lang.ProcessImpl'
        - 'java.lang.ProcessBuilder'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Application URI Configuration Changes
id: 0055ad1f-be85-4798-83cf-a6da17c993b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.
    URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Update Application Sucess- Property Name AppAddress
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: Added Credentials to Existing Application
id: cbb67ecc-fb70-4467-9350-c910bdf7c628
status: test
description: Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-credentials
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-05-26
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.001
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update application – Certificates and secrets management
            - Update Service principal/Update Application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When credentials are added/removed as part of the normal working hours/workflows
level: high

title: Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes
id: 1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1
status: test
description: Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update Application
            - Update Service principal
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: .RDP File Created By Uncommon Application
id: fccfb43e-09a7-4bd2-8b37-a5a7df33386d
related:
    - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of a file with an ".rdp" extension by an application that doesn't commonly create such files.
references:
    - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/rogue-rdp-revisiting-initial-access-methods/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230726144748/https://blog.thickmints.dev/mintsights/detecting-rogue-rdp/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-18
modified: 2024-11-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.rdp'
        Image|endswith:
            # Covers browsers
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\CCleaner Browser\Application\CCleanerBrowser.exe'
            - '\chromium.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\microsoftedge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\Opera.exe'
            - '\Vivaldi.exe'
            - '\Whale.exe'
            # Covers email clients
            - '\olk.exe' # Outlook
            - '\Outlook.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe' # If the windows mail client is used
            - '\Thunderbird.exe'
            # Covers chat applications
            - '\Discord.exe' # Should open the browser for download, but just in case.
            - '\Keybase.exe'
            - '\msteams.exe'
            - '\Slack.exe'
            - '\teams.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Script
id: 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.scf'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    # Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
    selection1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\msaccess.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\visio.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
    selection2:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.ocx'
            - '.proj'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.scf'
            - '.scr'
            - '.sys'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    filter_main_localassembly:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    filter_optional_webex:
        Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\[email protected]
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'  # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Executable
id: f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.ocx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
related:
    - id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac # bitsadmin dedicated rule
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
    Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            - '\expand.exe'
            - '\extrac32.exe'
            - '\replace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\ftp.exe'
            - '\Ldifde.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
    selection_locations:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
id: 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables
            - \winword.exe
            - \excel.exe
            - \powerpnt.exe
            - \msaccess.exe
            - \mspub.exe
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \visio.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - \finger.exe
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - \notepad.exe
            - \AcroRd32.exe
            - \RdrCEF.exe
            - \mshta.exe
            - \hh.exe
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
            - '.diagcab'
            - '.appx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application
id: fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06
status: test
description: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
    - https://twitter.com/MaD_c4t/status/1623414582382567424
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote-abuse
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/new-attacks-old-tricks-how-onenote-malware-is-evolving/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/17f2d378-6d11-4d6f-8340-954b04f35e83/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-09
modified: 2023-02-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenotem.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OneNote\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious extensions
            - '.bat'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.htm'
            - '.html'
            - '.js'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives should be very low with the extensions list cited. Especially if you don't heavily utilize OneNote.
    - Occasional FPs might occur if OneNote is used internally to share different embedded documents
level: high

title: Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application
id: 4ae3e30b-b03f-43aa-87e3-b622f4048eed
related:
    - id: 0c79148b-118e-472b-bdb7-9b57b444cc19
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Winword/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Excel/
    - https://medium.com/@reegun/unsanitized-file-validation-leads-to-malicious-payload-download-via-office-binaries-202d02db7191
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2022-05-17
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\EXCEL.EXE'
              - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
              - '\WINWORD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Excel.exe'
              - 'POWERPNT.EXE'
              - 'WinWord.exe'
    selection_http:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
id: aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc
status: test
description: Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
references:
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57
author: Jason Lynch
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.g0046
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.exe'
            - '\EQNEDT32.exe'
            # - '\OUTLOOK.EXE' too many FPs
        Image|startswith: 'C:\users\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9
status: test
description: Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
references:
    - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\VBE7.DLL'
            - '\VBEUI.DLL'
            - '\VBE7INTL.DLL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high

title: Relevant Anti-Virus Signature Keywords In Application Log
id: 78bc5783-81d9-4d73-ac97-59f6db4f72a8
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially highly relevant antivirus events in the application log based on known virus signature names and malware keywords.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/13828b390d5f58b002e808c2c4f02fdd920e236cc8015480fa33b6c1a9300e31
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/15b57c1b68cd6ce3c161042e0f3be9f32d78151fe95461eedc59a79fc222c7ed
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5092b2672b4cb87a8dd1c2e6047b487b95995ad8ed5e9fc217f46b8bfb1b8c01
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2024-12-25
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'Adfind'
        - 'ASP/BackDoor '
        - 'ATK/'
        - 'Backdoor.ASP'
        - 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
        - 'Backdoor.JSP'
        - 'Backdoor.PHP'
        - 'Blackworm'
        - 'Brutel'
        - 'BruteR'
        - 'Chopper'
        - 'Cobalt'
        - 'COBEACON'
        - 'Cometer'
        - 'CRYPTES'
        - 'Cryptor'
        - 'Destructor'
        - 'DumpCreds'
        - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
        - 'FastReverseProxy'
        - 'Filecoder'
        - 'GrandCrab '
        - 'HackTool'
        - 'HKTL'
        - 'HTool-'
        - '/HTool'
        - '.HTool'
        - 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
        - 'Impacket'
        - 'JSP/BackDoor '
        - 'Keylogger'
        - 'Koadic'
        - 'Krypt'
        - 'Lazagne'
        - 'Metasploit'
        - 'Meterpreter'
        - 'MeteTool'
        - 'mikatz'
        - 'Mimikatz'
        - 'Mpreter'
        - 'MsfShell'
        - 'Nighthawk'
        - 'Packed.Generic.347'
        - 'PentestPowerShell'
        - 'Phobos'
        - 'PHP/BackDoor '
        - 'Potato'
        - 'PowerSploit'
        - 'PowerSSH'
        - 'PshlSpy'
        - 'PSWTool'
        - 'PWCrack'
        - 'PWDump'
        - 'Ransom'
        - 'Rozena'
        - 'Ryzerlo'
        - 'Sbelt'
        - 'Seatbelt'
        - 'SecurityTool '
        - 'SharpDump'
        - 'Shellcode'
        - 'Sliver'
        - 'Splinter'
        - 'Swrort'
        - 'Tescrypt'
        - 'TeslaCrypt'
        - 'TurtleLoader'
        - 'Valyria'
        - 'Webshell'
        # - 'FRP.'
        # - 'Locker'
        # - 'PWS.'
        # - 'PWSX'
        # - 'Razy'
        # - 'Ryuk'
    filter_optional_generic:
        - 'anti_ransomware_service.exe'
        - 'Anti-Ransomware'
        - 'Crack'
        - 'cyber-protect-service.exe'
        - 'encryptor'
        - 'Keygen'
    filter_optional_information:
        Level: 4  # Information level
    filter_optional_restartmanager:
        Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager'
    condition: keywords and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some software piracy tools (key generators, cracks) are classified as hack tools
level: high

title: LSASS Process Crashed - Application
id: a18e0862-127b-43ca-be12-1a542c75c7c5
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).
    This could be the cause of a provoked crash by techniques such as Lsass-Shtinkering to dump credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-erref/596a1078-e883-4972-9bbc-49e60bebca55
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-07
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'lsass.exe'
        ExceptionCode: 'c0000001' # STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate crashing of the lsass process
level: high

title: New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List For Potential Suspicious Application
id: 9e2575e7-2cb9-4da1-adc8-ed94221dca5e
related:
    - id: cde0a575-7d3d-4a49-9817-b8004a7bf105
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows Firewall exception list for an application located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7123e948-c91e-49e0-a813-00e8d72ab393/#
author: frack113
date: 2023-02-26
modified: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2004 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 10)
            - 2071 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 11)
            - 2097
        ApplicationPath|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    filter_main_block:
        Action: 2 # Block
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security
id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess Event
id: 25cde13e-8e20-4c29-b949-4e795b76f16f
status: test
description: Detects an access to authentication tokens and accounts of Microsoft Teams desktop application.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2022-09-16
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter:
        ProcessName|contains: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sysmon Application Crashed
id: 4d7f1827-1637-4def-8d8a-fd254f9454df
status: test
description: Detects application popup reporting a failure of the Sysmon service
references:
    - https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/f1b010ce0ee1b71e3024180de1a3e67f99701fe4/ETWProvidersManifests/Windows10/1803/W10_1803_Pro_19700101_17134.1/WEPExplorer/Application%20Popup.xml#L36
author: Tim Shelton
date: 2022-04-26
modified: 2024-01-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Popup'
        EventID: 26
        Caption:
            - 'sysmon64.exe - Application Error'
            - 'sysmon.exe - Application Error'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Application Allowed Through Exploit Guard
id: 42205c73-75c8-4a63-9db1-e3782e06fda0
status: test
description: Detects applications being added to the "allowed applications" list of exploit guard in order to bypass controlled folder settings
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/10/23/windows-defender-exploit-guard-reduce-the-attack-surface-against-next-generation-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\AllowedApplications'
    selection_paths:
        TargetObject|contains:
            # Add more paths you don't allow in your org
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Okta Application Sign-On Policy Modified or Deleted
id: 8f668cc4-c18e-45fe-ad00-624a981cf88a
status: test
description: Detects when an application Sign-on Policy is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-12
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType:
            - application.policy.sign_on.update
            - application.policy.sign_on.rule.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Okta Application Modified or Deleted
id: 7899144b-e416-4c28-b0b5-ab8f9e0a541d
status: test
description: Detects when an application is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-12
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType:
            - application.lifecycle.update
            - application.lifecycle.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown

level: medium

title: Application Using Device Code Authentication Flow
id: 248649b7-d64f-46f0-9fb2-a52774166fb5
status: test
description: |
    Device code flow is an OAuth 2.0 protocol flow specifically for input constrained devices and is not used in all environments.
    If this type of flow is seen in the environment and not being used in an input constrained device scenario, further investigation is warranted.
    This can be a misconfigured application or potentially something malicious.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Device Code
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Applications that are input constrained will need to use device code flow and are valid authentications.
level: medium

title: Added Owner To Application
id: 74298991-9fc4-460e-a92e-511aa60baec1
status: test
description: Detects when a new owner is added to an application. This gives that account privileges to make modifications and configuration changes to the application.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#new-owner
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Add owner to application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When a new application owner is added by an administrator
level: medium

title: Azure Application Gateway Modified or Deleted
id: ad87d14e-7599-4633-ba81-aeb60cfe8cd6
status: test
description: Identifies when a application gateway is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONGATEWAYS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONGATEWAYS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application gateway being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application gateway modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Owner Removed From Application or Service Principal
id: 636e30d5-3736-42ea-96b1-e6e2f8429fd6
status: test
description: Identifies when a owner is was removed from a application or service principal in Azure.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-03
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Remove owner from service principal
            - Remove owner from application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Owner being removed may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Owner removed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted
id: 835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6
status: test
description: Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application security group being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application security group modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Application Deleted
id: 410d2a41-1e6d-452f-85e5-abdd8257a823
status: test
description: Identifies when a application is deleted in Azure.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-03
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Delete application
            - Hard Delete application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application being deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Google Workspace Application Removed
id: ee2803f0-71c8-4831-b48b-a1fc57601ee4
status: test
description: Detects when an an application is removed from Google Workspace.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3
    - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings?hl=en#REMOVE_APPLICATION
    - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings?hl=en#REMOVE_APPLICATION_FROM_WHITELIST
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.admin
detection:
    selection:
        eventService: admin.googleapis.com
        eventName:
            - REMOVE_APPLICATION
            - REMOVE_APPLICATION_FROM_WHITELIST
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application being removed may be performed by a System Administrator.
level: medium

title: Google Workspace Application Access Level Modified
id: 22f2fb54-5312-435d-852f-7c74f81684ca
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an access level is changed for a Google workspace application.
    An access level is part of BeyondCorp Enterprise which is Google Workspace's way of enforcing Zero Trust model.
    An adversary would be able to remove access levels to gain easier access to Google workspace resources.
references:
    - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-application-settings
    - https://support.google.com/a/answer/9261439
author: Bryan Lim
date: 2024-01-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.admin
detection:
    selection:
        eventService: 'admin.googleapis.com'
        eventName: 'CHANGE_APPLICATION_SETTING'
        setting_name|startswith: 'ContextAwareAccess'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activities changing the access levels for an application
level: medium

title: Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP
id: 75e33ce3-ae32-4dcc-9aa8-a2a3029d6f84
status: test
description: |
    Detects an office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint)  that initiate a network connection to a non-private IP addresses.
    This rule aims to detect traffic similar to one seen exploited in CVE-2021-42292.
    This rule will require an initial baseline and tuning that is specific to your organization.
references:
    - https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-cve-2021-42292
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/microsoft-365/enterprise/urls-and-ip-address-ranges?view=o365-worldwide
author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-10
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_main_msrange_generic:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '2.16.56.0/23' # Akamai International B.V.
            - '2.17.248.0/21' # Akamai International B.V.
            - '13.107.240.0/21' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '20.184.0.0/13' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '23.61.224.0/20' # Akamai-AS
            - '20.192.0.0/10' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '23.72.0.0/13' # Akamai International B.V.
            - '23.3.88.0/22' # Akamai-AS
            - '23.216.132.0/22' # Akamai-AS
            - '40.76.0.0/14' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.10.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.103.0.0/16' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.104.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.142.136.0/22' # Microsoft Corporation - https://ipinfo.io/AS8075/51.140.0.0/14-51.142.136.0/22
            - '52.160.0.0/11' # Microsoft Corporation - https://ipinfo.io/AS8075/52.160.0.0/11
            - '95.101.96.0/21' # Akamai-As
            - '204.79.197.0/24' # Microsoft Corporation
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_1:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "outlook.cloud.microsoft",
        #       "outlook.office.com",
        #       "outlook.office365.com"
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.4.0/22'
            - '13.107.6.152/31'
            - '13.107.18.10/31'
            - '13.107.42.0/23'
            - '13.107.128.0/22'
            - '23.35.224.0/20'
            - '23.53.40.0/22'
            - '23.103.160.0/20'
            - '23.216.76.0/22'
            - '40.96.0.0/13'
            - '40.104.0.0/15'
            - '52.96.0.0/14'
            - '131.253.33.215/32'
            - '132.245.0.0/16'
            - '150.171.32.0/22'
            - '204.79.197.215/32'
            - '2603:1006::/40'
            - '2603:1016::/36'
            - '2603:1026::/36'
            - '2603:1036::/36'
            - '2603:1046::/36'
            - '2603:1056::/36'
            - '2620:1ec:4::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:4::153/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:8f0::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:900::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::153/128'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_2:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "outlook.office365.com",
        #       "smtp.office365.com"
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.6.152/31'
            - '13.107.18.10/31'
            - '13.107.128.0/22'
            - '23.103.160.0/20'
            - '40.96.0.0/13'
            - '40.104.0.0/15'
            - '52.96.0.0/14'
            - '131.253.33.215/32'
            - '132.245.0.0/16'
            - '150.171.32.0/22'
            - '204.79.197.215/32'
            - '2603:1006::/40'
            - '2603:1016::/36'
            - '2603:1026::/36'
            - '2603:1036::/36'
            - '2603:1046::/36'
            - '2603:1056::/36'
            - '2620:1ec:4::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:4::153/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:8f0::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:900::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::153/128'
        DestinationPort:
            - 143
            - 587
            - 993
            - 995
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_3:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.protection.outlook.com"
        #  ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '40.92.0.0/15'
            - '40.107.0.0/16'
            - '52.100.0.0/14'
            - '52.238.78.88/32'
            - '104.47.0.0/17'
            - '2a01:111:f400::/48'
            - '2a01:111:f403::/48'
        DestinationPort: 443
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_4:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.mail.protection.outlook.com",
        #       "*.mx.microsoft"
        #  ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '40.92.0.0/15'
            - '40.107.0.0/16'
            - '52.100.0.0/14'
            - '52.238.78.88/32'
            - '104.47.0.0/17'
            - '2a01:111:f400::/48'
            - '2a01:111:f403::/48'
        DestinationPort: 25
    filter_main_msrange_sharepoint_1:
        # SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business",
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.sharepoint.com"
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.136.0/22'
            - '40.108.128.0/17'
            - '52.104.0.0/14'
            - '104.146.128.0/17'
            - '150.171.40.0/22'
            - '2603:1061:1300::/40'
            - '2620:1ec:8f8::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:908::/46'
            - '2a01:111:f402::/48'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_office_1:
        # Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online",
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.officeapps.live.com",
        #       "*.online.office.com",
        #       "office.live.com",
        #       "office.com.akadns.net"
        # ],
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.6.171/32'
            - '13.107.18.15/32'
            - '13.107.140.6/32'
            - '20.64.0.0/10'
            - '52.108.0.0/14'
            - '52.244.37.168/32'
            - '2603:1006:1400::/40'
            - '2603:1016:2400::/40'
            - '2603:1026:2400::/40'
            - '2603:1036:2400::/40'
            - '2603:1046:1400::/40'
            - '2603:1056:1400::/40'
            - '2603:1063:2000::/38'
            - '2620:1ec:c::15/128'
            - '2620:1ec:8fc::6/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::171/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:2000::a83e:3019/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:2002::8975:2d79/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:2002::8975:2da8/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:7000::6fdd:6cd5/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:a004::bfeb:88cf/128'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_office_2:
        # Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.auth.microsoft.com",
        #       "*.msftidentity.com",
        #       "*.msidentity.com",
        #       "account.activedirectory.windowsazure.com",
        #       "accounts.accesscontrol.windows.net",
        #       "adminwebservice.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "api.passwordreset.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com",
        #       "becws.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "ccs.login.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "clientconfig.microsoftonline-p.net",
        #       "cloudapp.azure.com",
        #       "companymanager.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "device.login.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "graph.microsoft.com",
        #       "graph.windows.net",
        #       "login-us.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "login.microsoft.com",
        #       "login.microsoftonline-p.com",
        #       "login.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "login.windows.net",
        #       "logincert.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "loginex.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "nexus.microsoftonline-p.com",
        #       "passwordreset.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "provisioningapi.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "web.core.windows.net",
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '172.128.0.0/10'
            - '20.20.32.0/19'
            - '20.103.156.88/32' # msn.com
            - '20.190.128.0/18'
            - '20.231.128.0/19'
            - '40.126.0.0/18'
            - '57.150.0.0/15'
            - '2603:1006:2000::/48'
            - '2603:1007:200::/48'
            - '2603:1016:1400::/48'
            - '2603:1017::/48'
            - '2603:1026:3000::/48'
            - '2603:1027:1::/48'
            - '2603:1036:3000::/48'
            - '2603:1037:1::/48'
            - '2603:1046:2000::/48'
            - '2603:1047:1::/48'
            - '2603:1056:2000::/48'
            - '2603:1057:2::/48'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_office_3:
        # Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online
        #  "urls": [
        #       "*.compliance.microsoft.com",
        #       "*.data.microsoft.com",
        #       "*.protection.office.com",
        #       "*.security.microsoft.com",
        #       "compliance.microsoft.com",
        #       "defender.microsoft.com",
        #       "protection.office.com",
        #       "security.microsoft.com",
        #       "teams.microsoft.com",
        #  ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.64.0.0/11'
            - '13.107.6.192/32'
            - '13.107.9.192/32'
            - '13.89.179.14/32'
            - '20.40.0.0/14'
            - '20.48.0.0/12'
            - '20.64.0.0/12'
            - '52.123.0.0/16'
            - '52.108.0.0/14'
            - '52.136.0.0/13'
            - '57.150.0.0/15'
            - '80.239.150.67/32' # Arelion Sweden AB
            - '2620:1ec:4::192/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::192/128'
        DestinationPort: 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_destination_host:
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com'
        DestinationPort: 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - You may have to tune certain domains out that Excel may call out to, such as microsoft or other business use case domains.
    - Office documents commonly have templates that refer to external addresses, like "sharepoint.ourcompany.com" may have to be tuned.
    - It is highly recommended to baseline your activity and tune out common business use cases.
level: medium

title: Office Application Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Ports
id: 3b5ba899-9842-4bc2-acc2-12308498bf42
status: test
description: Detects an office suit application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) communicating to target systems over uncommon ports.
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/07/romcom-targets-ukraine-nato-membership-talks-at-nato-summit
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-12
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
    filter_main_common_ports:
        DestinationPort:
            - 53 # DNS
            - 80 # HTTP
            - 139 # NETBIOS
            - 389 # LDAP
            - 443 # HTTPS
            - 445 # SMB
            - 3268 # MSFT-GC
    filter_main_outlook_ports:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        DestinationPort:
            - 143
            - 465 # SMTP
            - 587 # SMTP
            - 993 # IMAP
            - 995 # POP3
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Other ports can be used, apply additional filters accordingly
level: medium

title: ADS Zone.Identifier Deleted By Uncommon Application
id: 3109530e-ab47-4cc6-a953-cac5ebcc93ae
related:
    - id: 7eac0a16-5832-4e81-865f-0268a6d19e4b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the "Zone.Identifier" ADS by an uncommon process. Attackers can leverage this in order to bypass security restrictions that make use of the ADS such as Microsoft Office apps.
references:
    - https://securityliterate.com/how-malware-abuses-the-zone-identifier-to-circumvent-detection-and-analysis/
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-04
modified: 2025-07-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_delete
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':Zone.Identifier'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: in some envs this activity might be performed by other software. Apply additional filters as necessary
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
    filter_optional_browsers_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_browsers_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_browsers_msedge:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Other third party applications not listed.
level: medium