An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.12.x allowing ARM guest OS users to cause a denial of service via a XENMEM_add_to_physmap hypercall. p2m-max_mapped_gfn is used by the functions p2m_resolve_translation_fault() and p2m_get_entry() to sanity check guest physical frame. The rest of the code in the two functions will assume that there is a valid root table and check that with BUG_ON(). The function p2m_get_root_pointer() will ignore the unused top bits of a guest physical frame.

This means that the function p2m_set_entry() will alias the frame. However, p2m-max_mapped_gfn will be updated using the original frame. It would be possible to set p2m-max_mapped_gfn high enough to cover a frame that would lead p2m_get_root_pointer() to return NULL in p2m_get_entry() and p2m_resolve_translation_fault().

Additionally, the sanity check on p2m-max_mapped_gfn is off-by-one allowing "highest mapped + 1" to be considered valid. However, p2m_get_root_pointer() will return NULL. The problem could be triggered with a specially crafted hypercall XENMEM_add_to_physmap{, _batch} followed by an access to an address (via hypercall or direct access) that passes the sanity check but cause p2m_get_root_pointer() to return NULL.

A malicious guest administrator may cause a hypervisor crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). Xen version 4.8 and newer are vulnerable. Only Arm systems are vulnerable. x86 systems are not affected.