title: Credentials In Files
id: 53b1b378-9b06-4992-b972-dde6e423d2b4
status: test
description: Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep and laZagne
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md
author: 'Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '/grep'
        CommandLine|contains: 'password'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'laZagne'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Malicious Usage Of IMDS Credentials Outside Of AWS Infrastructure
id: 352a918a-34d8-4882-8470-44830c507aa3
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an instance identity has taken an action that isn't inside SSM.
    This can indicate that a compromised EC2 instance is being used as a pivot point.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-identity-roles.html
    - https://ermetic.com/blog/aws/aws-ec2-imds-what-you-need-to-know/
    - https://www.packetmischief.ca/2023/07/31/amazon-ec2-credential-exfiltration-how-it-happens-and-how-to-mitigate-it/#lifting-credentials-from-imds-this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1078.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        userIdentity.arn|re: '.+:assumed-role/aws:.+'
    filter_main_generic:
        - eventSource: 'ssm.amazonaws.com'
        - eventName: 'RegisterManagedInstance'
        - sourceIPAddress: 'AWS Internal'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - A team has configured an EC2 instance to use instance profiles that grant the option for the EC2 instance to talk to other AWS Services
level: high

title: Added Credentials to Existing Application
id: cbb67ecc-fb70-4467-9350-c910bdf7c628
status: test
description: Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-credentials
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-05-26
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.001
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update application – Certificates and secrets management
            - Update Service principal/Update Application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When credentials are added/removed as part of the normal working hours/workflows
level: high

title: Credentials In Files - Linux
id: df3fcaea-2715-4214-99c5-0056ea59eb35
status: test
description: 'Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep'
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md
author: 'Igor Fits, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2023-04-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'EXECVE'
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'grep'
            - 'password'
    condition: selection and keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump Via Sqlcmd.EXE
id: b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53
status: test
description: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
    - https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools:
        Image|endswith: '\sqlcmd.exe'
    selection_query:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SELECT'
            - 'TOP'
            - '[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Pypykatz Credentials Dumping Activity
id: a29808fd-ef50-49ff-9c7a-59a9b040b404
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "pypykatz" to obtain stored credentials. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database through Windows registry where the SAM database is stored
references:
    - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-2---registry-parse-with-pypykatz
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-05
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - \pypykatz.exe
            - \python.exe
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'live'
            - 'registry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Registry Export of Third-Party Credentials
id: cc1abf27-78a3-4ac5-a51c-f3070b1d8e40
related:
    - id: 87a476dc-0079-4583-a985-dee7a20a03de
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of reg.exe to export registry paths associated with third-party credentials.
    Credential stealers have been known to use this technique to extract sensitive information from the registry.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fdc86a5b3d7df37a72c3272836f743747c47bfbc538f05af9ecf78547fa2e789/behavior
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli_save:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'save'
            - 'export'
    selection_cli_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Aerofox\Foxmail\V3.1'
            - '\Software\Aerofox\FoxmailPreview'
            - '\Software\DownloadManager\Passwords'
            - '\Software\FTPWare\COREFTP\Sites'
            - '\Software\IncrediMail\Identities'
            - '\Software\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions'
            - '\Software\Mobatek\MobaXterm'
            - '\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys'
            - '\Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs'
            - '\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password'
            - '\Software\Qualcomm\Eudora\CommandLine'
            - '\Software\RealVNC\WinVNC4'
            - '\Software\RimArts\B2\Settings'
            - '\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions'
            - '\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys'
            - '\Software\Sota\FFFTP'
            - '\Software\TightVNC\Server'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Radmin\v3.0\Server\Parameters\Radmin'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Reconnaissance For Cached Credentials Via Cmdkey.EXE
id: 07f8bdc2-c9b3-472a-9817-5a670b872f53
status: test
description: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system
references:
    - https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754243(v=ws.11).aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1003.005/T1003.005.md#atomic-test-1---cached-credential-dump-via-cmdkey
author: jmallette, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmdkey.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'cmdkey.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -l'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey
      technique: T1003.005
      atomic_guid: 56506854-89d6-46a3-9804-b7fde90791f9

title: Possible Shadow Credentials Added
id: f598ea0c-c25a-4f72-a219-50c44411c791
status: test
description: Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.4/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.html
    - https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1581300963650187264?
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink'
        # If you experience a lot of FP you could uncomment the selection below
        # There could be other cases for other tooling add them accordingly
        # AttributeValue|contains: 'B:828'
        # OperationType: '%%14674' # Value Added
    # As stated in the FP sections it's better to filter out the expected accounts that perform this operation to tighten the logic
    # Uncomment the filter below and add the account name (or any other specific field) accordingly
    # Don't forget to add it to the condition section below
    # filter:
        # SubjectUserName: "%name%"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Modifications in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute can be done legitimately by the Azure AD Connect synchronization account or the ADFS service account. These accounts can be added as Exceptions. (From elastic FP section)
level: high

title: Credentials from Password Stores - Keychain
id: b120b587-a4c2-4b94-875d-99c9807d6955
status: test
description: Detects passwords dumps from Keychain
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.md
    - https://gist.github.com/Capybara/6228955
author: Tim Ismilyaev, oscd.community, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection1:
        Image: '/usr/bin/security'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'find-certificate'
            - ' export '
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' dump-keychain '
            - ' login-keychain '
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium

title: AWS Root Credentials
id: 8ad1600d-e9dc-4251-b0ee-a65268f29add
status: test
description: Detects AWS root account usage
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
author: vitaliy0x1
date: 2020-01-21
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_usertype:
        userIdentity.type: Root
    selection_eventtype:
        eventType: AwsServiceEvent
    condition: selection_usertype and not selection_eventtype
falsepositives:
    - AWS Tasks That Require AWS Account Root User Credentials https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws_tasks-that-require-root.html
level: medium

title: Dump Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell
id: 99c49d9c-34ea-45f7-84a7-4751ae6b2cbc
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.
    Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555/T1555.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_kiddie:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Get-PasswordVaultCredentials'
            - 'Get-CredManCreds'
    selection_rename_Password:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault'
    selection_rename_credman:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider'
            - '[System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeEnvironment]::GetRuntimeDirectory())'
            - 'Collections.ArrayList'
            - 'System.CodeDom.Compiler.CompilerParameters'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Enumerate Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell
id: 603c6630-5225-49c1-8047-26c964553e0e
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.
    Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555/T1555.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - vaultcmd
            - '/listcreds:'
    selection_option:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Windows Credentials'
            - 'Web Credentials'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Esentutl Gather Credentials
id: 7df1713a-1a5b-4a4b-a071-dc83b144a101
status: test
description: Conti recommendation to its affiliates to use esentutl to access NTDS dumped file. Trickbot also uses this utilities to get MSEdge info via its module pwgrab.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/01/bazarcall-to-conti-ransomware-via-trickbot-and-cobalt-strike/
author: sam0x90
date: 2021-08-06
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.s0404
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'esentutl'
            - ' /p'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - To be determined
level: medium

title: Enumeration for Credentials in Registry
id: e0b0c2ab-3d52-46d9-8cb7-049dc775fbd1
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.
    The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs.
    Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.002/T1552.002.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    reg:
        Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' query '
            - '/t '
            - 'REG_SZ'
            - '/s'
    hive:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/f '
              - 'HKLM'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/f '
              - 'HKCU'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions'
    condition: reg and hive
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: New Generic Credentials Added Via Cmdkey.EXE
id: b1ec66c6-f4d1-4b5c-96dd-af28ccae7727
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of "cmdkey.exe" to add generic credentials.
    As an example, this can be used before connecting to an RDP session via command line interface.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md#t1021001---remote-desktop-protocol
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-03
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmdkey.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'cmdkey.exe'
    selection_cli_generic:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -g' # Generic
    selection_cli_user:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -u' # User
    selection_cli_password:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -p' # Password
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage for administration purposes
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_adding_generic_creds/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: RDP to DomainController
      technique: T1021.001
      atomic_guid: 355d4632-8cb9-449d-91ce-b566d0253d3e

title: Harvesting Of Wifi Credentials Via Netsh.EXE
id: 42b1a5b8-353f-4f10-b256-39de4467faff
status: test
description: Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe
references:
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), oscd.community
date: 2020-04-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1040
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'wlan'
            - ' s'
            - ' p'
            - ' k'
            - '=clear'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Capture Credentials with Rpcping.exe
id: 93671f99-04eb-4ab4-a161-70d446a84003
status: test
description: Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rpcping/
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/974806438316072960
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/873181705024266241
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh875578(v=ws.11)
author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\RpcPing.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\RpcPing.exe'
    selection_main_flag:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s'
    selection_cli_ntlm:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-u'
        CommandLine|contains: 'NTLM'
    selection_cli_ncacn:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-t'
        CommandLine|contains: 'ncacn_np'
    condition: all of selection_main_* and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials
id: 941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2022-08-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4648
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\winrs.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
    filter1:
        TargetServerName: 'localhost'
    filter2:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks
level: medium

title: Default Credentials Usage
id: 1a395cbc-a84a-463a-9086-ed8a70e573c7
status: experimental
description: |
    Before deploying any new asset, change all default passwords to have values consistent with administrative level accounts.
    Sigma detects default credentials usage. Sigma for Qualys vulnerability scanner. Scan type - Vulnerability Management.
references:
    - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/
    - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf
    - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf
    - https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-6406-reporting-toolbox-focused-search-lists
author: Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime
date: 2019-03-26
modified: 2025-11-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    # - CSC4
    # - CSC4.2
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-4
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AT-2
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.MA-2
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.PT-3
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.1.1
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.2
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.3
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.4
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.5
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.6
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.3.1
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.4.1
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.4.2
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.4.3
    # - ISO 27002-2013 A.9.4.4
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 2.1
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 7.1
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 7.2
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 7.3
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 8.1
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 8.2
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 8.3
    # - PCI DSS 3.2 8.7
logsource:
    product: qualys
detection:
    selection:
        host.scan.vuln:
            - 10693
            - 11507
            - 11633
            - 11804
            - 11821
            - 11847
            - 11867
            - 11931
            - 11935
            - 11950
            - 12541
            - 12558
            - 12559
            - 12560
            - 12562
            - 12563
            - 12565
            - 12587
            - 12590
            - 12599
            - 12702
            - 12705
            - 12706
            - 12907
            - 12928
            - 12929
            - 13053
            - 13178
            - 13200
            - 13218
            - 13241
            - 13253
            - 13274
            - 13296
            - 13301
            - 13327
            - 13373
            - 13374
            - 13409
            - 13530
            - 13532
            - 20065
            - 20073
            - 20081
            - 27202
            - 27358
            - 38702
            - 38719
            - 42045
            - 42417
            - 43029
            - 43220
            - 43221
            - 43222
            - 43223
            - 43225
            - 43246
            - 43431
            - 43484
            - 86857
            - 87098
            - 87106
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Outgoing Logon with New Credentials
id: def8b624-e08f-4ae1-8612-1ba21190da6b
status: test
description: Detects logon events that specify new credentials
references:
    - https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/mtp-2021-0914.pdf
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-06
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate remote administration activity
level: low