Home/CVE/The DefaultLinuxSpec function in oci/defaults.go in Docker Moby through 17.03.2-ce does not block /proc/scsi pathnames,
CVE

CVE-2017-16539

The DefaultLinuxSpec function in oci/defaults.go in Docker Moby through 17.03.2-ce does not block /proc/scsi pathnames,

The DefaultLinuxSpec function in oci/defaults.go in Docker Moby through 17.03.2-ce does not block /proc/scsi pathnames, which allows attackers to trigger data loss (when certain older Linux kernels are used) by leveraging Docker container access to write a "scsi remove-single-device" line to /proc/scsi/scsi, aka SCSI MICDROP.

MEDIUM · CVSS 5.9 EPSS 0.00444
Monitor
  • No active-exploitation, high-EPSS, or public-exploit signals - routine patching cadence
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
⬡

Weakness Classification

CWE-200Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-200Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
▤

Affected Products & Versions

1
mobyproject moby<= 17.03.2
▤

Affected Packages

1
Language-ecosystem packages (from OSV) tied to this CVE, with the version that fixes it - the dependency-level detail NVD doesn’t carry.
Go github.com/moby/moby MODERATE fixed in 17.12.0-ce
▣

Scoring & Timeline

5.9
MEDIUM · CVSS v3.1 · cve@mitre.org
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD04 Nov 2017 · 05:29 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
SSVC asks the questions that actually drive patch urgency: is it being exploited, can attacks be automated, and how total is the impact.
⚑

Vendor Advisories

5
suse-csafSUSE-SU-2025:03545-1
suse-csafSUSE-SU-2025:03540-1
suse-csafopenSUSE-SU-2025:15589-1
suse-csafopenSUSE-SU-2024:10722-1
suse-csafSUSE-SU-2018:0386-1
🔗

References & Sources

5
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.
https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/35399Issue TrackingPatchThird Party Advisory
https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/35399/commits/a21ecdf3c8a343a7c94e4c4d01b178c87ca7aaa1Issue TrackingPatchThird Party Advisory
https://marc.info/?l=linux-scsi&m=150985062200941&w=2Issue TrackingPatchThird Party Advisory
https://marc.info/?l=linux-scsi&m=150985455801444&w=2Issue TrackingPatchThird Party Advisory
https://twitter.com/ewindisch/status/926443521820774401Third Party Advisory
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