title: Suspicious Binary Writes Via AnyDesk
id: 2d367498-5112-4ae5-a06a-96e7bc33a211
status: test
description: |
    Detects AnyDesk writing binary files to disk other than "gcapi.dll".
    According to RedCanary research it is highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll,
    which is a legitimate DLL that is part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API. (See reference section for more details)
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_dlls:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\gcapi.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - Anydesk Execution From Suspicious Folder
id: 065b00ca-5d5c-4557-ac95-64a6d0b64d86
related:
    - id: b52e84a3-029e-4529-b09b-71d19dd27e94
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
    These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
    Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-20
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\AnyDesk.exe'
              - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        - Description: AnyDesk
        - Product: AnyDesk
        - Company: AnyDesk Software GmbH
    filter:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - 'Program Files (x86)\AnyDesk'
            - 'Program Files\AnyDesk'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of AnyDesk from a non-standard folder
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Silent Installation
id: 114e7f1c-f137-48c8-8f54-3088c24ce4b9
status: test
description: Detects AnyDesk Remote Desktop silent installation. Which can be used by attackers to gain remote access.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1423361119926816776?s=20
    - https://support.anydesk.com/Automatic_Deployment
author: Ján Trenčanský
date: 2021-08-06
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--install'
            - '--start-with-win'
            - '--silent'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate deployment of AnyDesk
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Incoming Connection
id: d58ba5c6-0ed7-4b9d-a433-6878379efda9
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects incoming connections to AnyDesk. This could indicate a potential remote attacker trying to connect to a listening instance of AnyDesk and use it as potential command and control channel.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/40263/
author: '@d4ns4n_ (Wuerth-Phoenix)'
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        Initiated: 'false' # If the network connection is initiated remotely (incoming), the field is set to false.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate incoming connections (e.g. sysadmin activity). Most of the time I would expect outgoing connections (initiated locally).
level: medium

title: Anydesk Temporary Artefact
id: 0b9ad457-2554-44c1-82c2-d56a99c42377
status: test
description: |
    An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
    These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
    Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2024-07-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\user.conf'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\system.conf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_anydesk_artefact/info.yml

title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Piped Password Via CLI
id: b1377339-fda6-477a-b455-ac0923f9ec2c
status: test
description: Detects piping the password to an anydesk instance via CMD and the '--set-password' flag.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # Example: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C cmd.exe /c echo J9kzQ2Y0qO |C:\ProgramData\anydesk.exe --set-password
            - '/c '
            - 'echo '
            - '.exe --set-password'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate piping of the password to anydesk
    - Some FP could occur with similar tools that uses the same command line '--set-password'
level: medium

title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Execution With Known Revoked Signing Certificate
id: 41f407b5-3096-44ea-a74f-96d04fbc41be
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8.
    Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors.
    Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate
    This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/anydesk-says-hackers-breached-its-production-servers-reset-passwords/
    - https://anydesk.com/en/changelog/windows
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\AnyDesk.exe'
        - Description: 'AnyDesk'
        - Product: 'AnyDesk'
        - Company: 'AnyDesk Software GmbH'
    selection_version:
        FileVersion|startswith:
            - '7.0.'
            - '7.1.'
            - '8.0.1'
            - '8.0.2'
            - '8.0.3'
            - '8.0.4'
            - '8.0.5'
            - '8.0.6'
            - '8.0.7'
    filter_main_uninstall:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --remove'
            - ' --uninstall'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Execution
id: b52e84a3-029e-4529-b09b-71d19dd27e94
status: test
related:
    - id: 065b00ca-5d5c-4557-ac95-64a6d0b64d86
      type: similar
description: |
    An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
    These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
    Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\AnyDesk.exe'
              - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        - Description: AnyDesk
        - Product: AnyDesk
        - Company: AnyDesk Software GmbH
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium

title: Anydesk Remote Access Software Service Installation
id: 530a6faa-ff3d-4022-b315-50828e77eef5
status: test
description: Detects the installation of the anydesk software service. Which could be an indication of anydesk abuse if you the software isn't already used.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_provider:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service:
        - ServiceName|contains|all:
              - 'AnyDesk' # Covers both AnyDesk Service and AnyDesk MSI Service
              - 'Service'
        - ImagePath|contains: 'AnyDesk'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the anydesk tool
level: medium

title: HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution
id: 7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory.
    It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.
references:
    - https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WCE.exe'
            - '\WCE64.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=136F0A8572C058A96436C82E541E4C41'
            - 'IMPHASH=589657C64DDE88533186C39F82FA1F50'
            - 'IMPHASH=6BFE09EFCB4FFDE061EBDBAFC4DB84CF'
            - 'IMPHASH=7D490037BF450877E6D0287BDCFF8D2E'
            - 'IMPHASH=8AB93B061287C79F3088C5BC7E7D97ED'
            - 'IMPHASH=A53A02B997935FD8EEDCB5F7ABAB9B9F'
            - 'IMPHASH=BA434A7A729EEC20E136CA4C32D6C740'
            - 'IMPHASH=BD1D1547DA13C0FCB6C15E86217D5EB8'
            - 'IMPHASH=E96A73C7BF33A464C510EDE582318BF2'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
    - https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID
id: a4b25073-8947-489c-a8dd-93b41c23f26d
status: test
description: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1785051227568632263
    - https://www.cloudcoffee.ch/microsoft-365/configure-windows-laps-in-microsoft-intune/
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487
author: andrewdanis
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098.005
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        category: 'Device'
        activityType|contains: 'Recover device local administrator password'
        additionalDetails.additionalInfo|contains: 'Successfully recovered local credential by device id'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Approved activity performed by an Administrator.
level: high

title: Tamper Windows Defender - PSClassic
id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
related:
    - id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-07
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_classic_provider_start
detection:
    selection_set_mppreference:
        Data|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_options_bool_allow:
        Data|contains:
            - '-dbaf $true'
            - '-dbaf 1'
            - '-dbm $true'
            - '-dbm 1'
            - '-dips $true'
            - '-dips 1'
            - '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
            - '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
            - '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
            - '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
            - '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
            - '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
            - '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
            - '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
            - '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
            - '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
            - '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
            - '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
            - '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
            - '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
            - '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
            - '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
            - '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
            - '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
            - '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
            - '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
            - '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
            - '-MAPSReporting $false'
            - '-MAPSReporting 0'
            - '-drdsc $true'
            - '-drdsc 1'
            - '-drtm $true'
            - '-drtm 1'
            - '-dscrptsc $true'
            - '-dscrptsc 1'
            - '-dsmndf $true'
            - '-dsmndf 1'
            - '-dsnf $true'
            - '-dsnf 1'
            - '-dss $true'
            - '-dss 1'
    selection_options_actions_func:
        Data|contains:
            - 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'htdefac Allow'
            - 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'ltdefac Allow'
            - 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'mtdefac Allow'
            - 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'stdefac Allow'
    condition: selection_set_mppreference and 1 of selection_options_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high

title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference - ScriptBlockLogging
id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
related:
    - id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_remove:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
    selection_tamper:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
            - '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: Tamper Windows Defender - ScriptBlockLogging
id: 14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2
related:
    - id: ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps
    - https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/
author: frack113, elhoim, Tim Shelton (fps, alias support), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_options_disabling_preference:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_options_disabling_function:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-dbaf $true'
            - '-dbaf 1'
            - '-dbm $true'
            - '-dbm 1'
            - '-dips $true'
            - '-dips 1'
            - '-DisableArchiveScanning $true'
            - '-DisableArchiveScanning 1'
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1'
            - '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true'
            - '-DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1'
            - '-DisableCatchupFullScan $true'
            - '-DisableCatchupFullScan 1'
            - '-DisableCatchupQuickScan $true'
            - '-DisableCatchupQuickScan 1'
            - '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true'
            - '-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1'
            - '-DisableIOAVProtection $true'
            - '-DisableIOAVProtection 1'
            - '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1'
            - '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning $true'
            - '-DisableRemovableDriveScanning 1'
            - '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan $true'
            - '-DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan 1'
            - '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles $true'
            - '-DisableScanningNetworkFiles 1'
            - '-DisableScriptScanning $true'
            - '-DisableScriptScanning 1'
            - '-MAPSReporting $false'
            - '-MAPSReporting 0'
            - '-drdsc $true'
            - '-drdsc 1'
            - '-drtm $true'
            - '-drtm 1'
            - '-dscrptsc $true'
            - '-dscrptsc 1'
            - '-dsmndf $true'
            - '-dsmndf 1'
            - '-dsnf $true'
            - '-dsnf 1'
            - '-dss $true'
            - '-dss 1'
    selection_other_default_actions_allow:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_other_default_actions_func:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'HighThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'htdefac Allow'
            - 'LowThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'ltdefac Allow'
            - 'ModerateThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'mtdefac Allow'
            - 'SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow'
            - 'stdefac Allow'
    condition: all of selection_options_disabling_* or all of selection_other_default_actions_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts that disable Windows Defender for troubleshooting purposes. Must be investigated.
level: high

title: Clearing Windows Console History
id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
status: test
description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
references:
    - https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/
    - https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/
    - https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection1:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
    selection2a:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - Remove-Item
            - rm
    selection2b:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ConsoleHost_history.txt
            - (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
    condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder - PsScript
id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478
related:
    - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
      type: derived
    - id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
      type: derived
    - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1222
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Acl '
            - '-AclObject '
    selection_paths:
        # Note: Add more suspicious paths
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-Path "C:\Windows'
            - '-Path "C:/Windows'
            - "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
            - "-Path 'C:/Windows"
            - '-Path C:\\Windows'
            - '-Path C:/Windows'
            - '-Path $env:windir'
            - '-Path "$env:windir'
            - "-Path '$env:windir"
    selection_permissions:
        # Note: Add more suspicious permissions
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'FullControl'
            - 'Allow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
    - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '\Policies\'
            - '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
    filter_main_clipchamp:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
            - '.ps1'
    filter_main_powershell_preview:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'  # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File
id: 68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\OskSupport.dll'
    selection2:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe'
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename
id: 129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder.
    Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2024-06-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_dump:
        Image|startswith: ':\Program Files'
        Image|contains: '\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
        Image|endswith: '\dump64.exe'
    selection_tools_procdump:
        - OriginalFileName: 'procdump'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -ma ' # Full Dump
              - ' -mp ' # Mini Plus
    condition: selection_dump and 1 of selection_tools_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Service Tampering
id: ce72ef99-22f1-43d4-8695-419dcb5d9330
related:
    - id: eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90
      type: obsolete
    - id: 6783aa9e-0dc3-49d4-a94a-8b39c5fd700b
      type: obsolete
    - id: 7fd4bb39-12d0-45ab-bb36-cebabc73dc7b
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus/Genshin%20Impact%20Figure%2010.jpg
    - https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/delete-method-in-class-win32-service
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 , X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2025-08-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1489
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'psservice.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'sc.exe'
              - 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
              - '\PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\PsService.exe'
              - '\PsService64.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\sc.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe' # wmic process call win32_service where name='servicename' delete
    selection_tools_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' delete '
              - '.delete()' # Get-WmiObject win32_service -Filter "name='$serviceName'" ).delete()
              - ' pause ' # Covers flags from: PsService and Sc.EXE
              - ' stop ' # Covers flags from: PsService.EXE, Net.EXE and Sc.EXE
              - 'Stop-Service '
              - 'Remove-Service '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'config'
              - 'start=disabled'
    selection_services:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '143Svc'
            - 'Acronis VSS Provider'
            - 'AcronisAgent'
            - 'AcrSch2Svc'
            - 'AdobeARMservice'
            - 'AHS Service'
            - 'Antivirus'
            - 'Apache4'
            - 'ARSM'
            - 'aswBcc'
            - 'AteraAgent'
            - 'Avast Business Console Client Antivirus Service'
            - 'avast! Antivirus'
            - 'AVG Antivirus'
            - 'avgAdminClient'
            - 'AvgAdminServer'
            - 'AVP1'
            - 'BackupExec'
            - 'bedbg'
            - 'BITS'
            - 'BrokerInfrastructure'
            - 'CASLicenceServer'
            - 'CASWebServer'
            - 'Client Agent 7.60'
            - 'Core Browsing Protection'
            - 'Core Mail Protection'
            - 'Core Scanning Server'
            - 'DCAgent'
            - 'dwmrcs'
            - 'EhttpSr'
            - 'ekrn'
            - 'Enterprise Client Service'
            - 'epag'
            - 'EPIntegrationService'
            - 'EPProtectedService'
            - 'EPRedline'
            - 'EPSecurityService'
            - 'EPUpdateService'
            - 'EraserSvc11710'
            - 'EsgShKernel'
            - 'ESHASRV'
            - 'FA_Scheduler'
            - 'FirebirdGuardianDefaultInstance'
            - 'FirebirdServerDefaultInstance'
            - 'FontCache3.0.0.0'
            - 'HealthTLService'
            - 'hmpalertsvc'
            - 'HMS'
            - 'HostControllerService'
            - 'hvdsvc'
            - 'IAStorDataMgrSvc'
            - 'IBMHPS'
            - 'ibmspsvc'
            - 'IISAdmin'
            - 'IMANSVC'
            - 'IMAP4Svc'
            - 'instance2'
            - 'KAVFS'
            - 'KAVFSGT'
            - 'kavfsslp'
            - 'KeyIso'
            - 'klbackupdisk'
            - 'klbackupflt'
            - 'klflt'
            - 'klhk'
            - 'KLIF'
            - 'klim6'
            - 'klkbdflt'
            - 'klmouflt'
            - 'klnagent'
            - 'klpd'
            - 'kltap'
            - 'KSDE1.0.0'
            - 'LogProcessorService'
            - 'M8EndpointAgent'
            - 'macmnsvc'
            - 'masvc'
            - 'MBAMService'
            - 'MBCloudEA'
            - 'MBEndpointAgent'
            - 'McAfeeDLPAgentService'
            - 'McAfeeEngineService'
            - 'MCAFEEEVENTPARSERSRV'
            - 'McAfeeFramework'
            - 'MCAFEETOMCATSRV530'
            - 'McShield'
            - 'McTaskManager'
            - 'mfefire'
            - 'mfemms'
            - 'mfevto'
            - 'mfevtp'
            - 'mfewc'
            - 'MMS'
            - 'mozyprobackup'
            - 'mpssvc'
            - 'MSComplianceAudit'
            - 'MSDTC'
            - 'MsDtsServer'
            - 'MSExchange'
            - 'msftesq1SPROO'
            - 'msftesql$PROD'
            - 'msftesql$SQLEXPRESS'
            - 'MSOLAP$SQL_2008'
            - 'MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC'
            - 'MSOLAP$TPS'
            - 'MSOLAP$TPSAMA'
            - 'MSOLAPSTPS'
            - 'MSOLAPSTPSAMA'
            - 'mssecflt'
            - 'MSSQ!I.SPROFXENGAGEMEHT'
            - 'MSSQ0SHAREPOINT'
            - 'MSSQ0SOPHOS'
            - 'MSSQL'
            - 'MSSQLFDLauncher$'
            - 'MySQL'
            - 'NanoServiceMain'
            - 'NetMsmqActivator'
            - 'NetPipeActivator'
            - 'netprofm'
            - 'NetTcpActivator'
            - 'NetTcpPortSharing'
            - 'ntrtscan'
            - 'nvspwmi'
            - 'ofcservice'
            - 'Online Protection System'
            - 'OracleClientCache80'
            - 'OracleDBConsole'
            - 'OracleMTSRecoveryService'
            - 'OracleOraDb11g_home1'
            - 'OracleService'
            - 'OracleVssWriter'
            - 'osppsvc'
            - 'PandaAetherAgent'
            - 'PccNTUpd'
            - 'PDVFSService'
            - 'POP3Svc'
            - 'postgresql-x64-9.4'
            - 'POVFSService'
            - 'PSUAService'
            - 'Quick Update Service'
            - 'RepairService'
            - 'ReportServer'
            - 'ReportServer$'
            - 'RESvc'
            - 'RpcEptMapper'
            - 'sacsvr'
            - 'SamSs'
            - 'SAVAdminService'
            - 'SAVService'
            - 'ScSecSvc'
            - 'SDRSVC'
            - 'SearchExchangeTracing'
            - 'sense'
            - 'SentinelAgent'
            - 'SentinelHelperService'
            - 'SepMasterService'
            - 'ShMonitor'
            - 'Smcinst'
            - 'SmcService'
            - 'SMTPSvc'
            - 'SNAC'
            - 'SntpService'
            - 'Sophos'
            - 'SQ1SafeOLRService'
            - 'SQL Backups'
            - 'SQL Server'
            - 'SQLAgent'
            - 'SQLANYs_Sage_FAS_Fixed_Assets'
            - 'SQLBrowser'
            - 'SQLsafe'
            - 'SQLSERVERAGENT'
            - 'SQLTELEMETRY'
            - 'SQLWriter'
            - 'SSISTELEMETRY130'
            - 'SstpSvc'
            - 'storflt'
            - 'svcGenericHost'
            - 'swc_service'
            - 'swi_filter'
            - 'swi_service'
            - 'swi_update'
            - 'Symantec'
            - 'sysmon'
            - 'TeamViewer'
            - 'Telemetryserver'
            - 'ThreatLockerService'
            - 'TMBMServer'
            - 'TmCCSF'
            - 'TmFilter'
            - 'TMiCRCScanService'
            - 'tmlisten'
            - 'TMLWCSService'
            - 'TmPfw'
            - 'TmPreFilter'
            - 'TmProxy'
            - 'TMSmartRelayService'
            - 'tmusa'
            - 'Tomcat'
            - 'Trend Micro Deep Security Manager'
            - 'TrueKey'
            - 'UFNet'
            - 'UI0Detect'
            - 'UniFi'
            - 'UTODetect'
            - 'vds'
            - 'Veeam'
            - 'VeeamDeploySvc'
            - 'Veritas System Recovery'
            - 'vmic'
            - 'VMTools'
            - 'vmvss'
            - 'VSApiNt'
            - 'VSS'
            - 'W3Svc'
            - 'wbengine'
            - 'WdNisSvc'
            - 'WeanClOudSve'
            - 'Weems JY'
            - 'WinDefend'
            - 'wmms'
            - 'wozyprobackup'
            - 'WPFFontCache_v0400'
            - 'WRSVC'
            - 'wsbexchange'
            - 'WSearch'
            - 'wscsvc'
            - 'Zoolz 2 Service'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or tools shutting down the services due to upgrade or removal purposes. If you experience some false positive, please consider adding filters to the parent process launching this command and not removing the entry
level: high

title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process
id: 0058b9e5-bcd7-40d4-9205-95ca5a16d7b2
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img_1:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe'
    selection_img_2:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
        ParentCommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc" /s'
    selection_integrity:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'High'
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
            - 'S-1-16-12288' # High
    condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_integrity
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Uninstall of Windows Defender Feature via PowerShell
id: c443012c-7928-43bf-ac20-7eda5efe61ad
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of PowerShell with Uninstall-WindowsFeature or Remove-WindowsFeature cmdlets to disable or remove the Windows Defender GUI feature, a common technique used by adversaries to evade defenses.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.windows.servermanager.migration/uninstall-windowsfeature
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware
author: yxinmiracle
date: 2025-08-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_uninstall:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Uninstall-WindowsFeature'
            - 'Remove-WindowsFeature' # Only supported in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 2012 R2
    selection_cli_defender_feature:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Windows-Defender'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Defender Context Menu Removed
id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b
related:
    - id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to delete the Windows Defender context menu handler registry keys.
    This action removes the "Scan with Microsoft Defender" option from the right-click menu for files, directories, and drives.
    Attackers may use this technique to hinder manual, on-demand scans and reduce the visibility of the security product.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/
    - https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'del'
            - 'Remove-Item'
            - 'ri '
    selection_reg_path:
        CommandLine|contains: '\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - May be part of a system customization or "debloating" script, but this is highly unusual in a managed corporate environment.
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Defender Registry Key Tampering Via Reg.EXE
id: 452bce90-6fb0-43cc-97a5-affc283139b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to tamper with different Windows Defender registry keys in order to disable some important features related to protection and detection
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
    - https://github.com/swagkarna/Defeat-Defender-V1.2.0/tree/ae4059c4276da6f6303b8f53cdff085ecae88a91
    - https://www.elevenforum.com/t/video-guide-how-to-completely-disable-microsoft-defender-antivirus.14608/page-2
    - https://tria.ge/241231-j9yatstqbm/behavioral1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-22
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_root_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_root_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    selection_dword_0:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - 'd 0'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
            - 'EnableControlledFolderAccess'
            - 'MpEnablePus'
            - 'PUAProtection'
            - 'SpynetReporting'
            - 'SubmitSamplesConsent'
            - 'TamperProtection'
    selection_dword_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' add '
            - 'd 1'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DisableAccess'
            - 'DisableAntiSpyware'
            - 'DisableAntiSpywareRealtimeProtection'
            - 'DisableAntiVirus'
            - 'DisableAntiVirusSignatures'
            - 'DisableArchiveScanning'
            - 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
            - 'DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
            - 'DisableCloudProtection'
            - 'DisableConfig'
            - 'DisableEnhancedNotifications'
            - 'DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
            - 'DisableIOAVProtection'
            - 'DisableNetworkProtection'
            - 'DisableOnAccessProtection'
            - 'DisablePrivacyMode'
            - 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
            - 'DisableRoutinelyTakingAction'
            - 'DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
            - 'DisableScriptScanning'
            - 'DisableSecurityCenter'
            - 'Notification_Suppress'
            - 'SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine'
    condition: all of selection_root_* and 1 of selection_dword_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate use by administrators to test software (should always be investigated)
level: high

title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6
related:
    - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events.
    By setting the 'Start' value to '0' for the 'DefenderApiLogger' or 'DefenderAuditLogger' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events
    from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
    - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions
author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start'
            - '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start'
    selection_reg_add:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add'
            - '0'
    filter_main_enable:
        CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high

title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0
status: test
description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-21
modified: 2023-07-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ' http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification Via CommandLine
id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
related:
    - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification.
    The AutoLogger event tracing session records events that occur early in the operating system boot process.
    Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in.
    Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'reg.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'add '
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - 'si ' # Set-ItemProperty alias
    selection_cli_base:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
    selection_cli_key:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Start' # Key used to disable specific autologger session like EventLog-Application, EventLog-System etc.
            - 'Enabled' # Key used to disable specific provider of autologger session
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autologger_session_registry_modification/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0

title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows
id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
related:
    - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
    This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
    - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
    - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
           # Add more script interpreters as needed
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\bun.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - 'trufflehog.exe'
              - 'gitleaks.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'trufflehog'
              - 'gitleaks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml

title: Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: 7dbbcac2-57a0-45ac-b306-ff30a8bd2981
related:
    - id: aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467 # AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects tampering of AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) related registry values via command line tools such as reg.exe or PowerShell.
    AMSI provides a generic interface for applications and services to integrate with antimalware products.
    Adversaries may disable AMSI to evade detection of malicious scripts and code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/arttoolkit/arttoolkit.github.io/blob/16d6230d009e58fd6f773f5317fd4d14c1f26004/_wadcoms/AMSI-Bypass-Jscript_amsienable.md
    - https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/02/macros-and-more-with-sharpshooter-v2-0/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings'
            - 'AmsiEnable'
    selection_reg_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: 'add'
    selection_powershell_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_powershell_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - 'sp '
    condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_reg_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_amsi_registry_tampering/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0

title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Signing Bypass Via Windows Developer Features
id: a383dec4-deec-4e6e-913b-ed9249670848
related:
    - id: b110ebaf-697f-4da1-afd5-b536fa27a2c1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the user to install untrusted packages.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SystemSettingsAdminFlows.EXE'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: 'TurnOnDeveloperFeatures'
    selection_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DeveloperUnlock'
            - 'EnableSideloading'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MMC Spawning Windows Shell
id: 05a2ab7e-ce11-4b63-86db-ab32e763e11d
status: test
description: Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
author: Karneades, Swisscom CSIRT
date: 2019-08-05
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
    selection2:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
        - Image|contains: '\BITSADMIN'
    condition: all of selection*
level: high

title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference
id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
related:
    - id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_remove:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
    selection_tamper:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
            - '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows
id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
related:
    - id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
      type: similar
    - id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
      type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
    RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
    However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
    - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
    - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1219.002
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_meshagent:
        - CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
    filter_main_legitimate:
        Image|endswith: '\meshagent.exe'
    condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-26
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - 'Wuauclt'
            - 'Wuauclt.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE
id: 51cbac1e-eee3-4a90-b1b7-358efb81fa0a
status: test
description: Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iobit-forums-hacked-to-spread-ransomware-to-its-members/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Namespace:\\\\root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Defender Definition Files Removed
id: 9719a8aa-401c-41af-8108-ced7ec9cd75c
status: test
description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by removing Windows Defender Definition Files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-07
modified: 2023-07-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: MpCmdRun.exe
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -RemoveDefinitions'
            - ' -All'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
    - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pwsh_binary:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
    selection_sc_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'WinDefend'
            - 'start=disabled'
    condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
    - 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high

title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder
id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
related:
    - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
      type: derived
    - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
      type: derived
    - id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 # PsScript High
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Acl '
            - '-AclObject '
    selection_paths:
        # Note: Add more suspicious paths
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-Path "C:\Windows'
            - "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
            - '-Path %windir%'
            - '-Path $env:windir'
    selection_permissions:
        # Note: Add more suspicious permissions
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FullControl'
            - 'Allow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
id: e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e
status: test
description: Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md#atomic-test-1---disable-windows-iis-http-logging
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - 'config'
            - 'section:httplogging'
            - 'dontLog:true'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Windows Trace ETW Session Tamper Via Logman.EXE
id: cd1f961e-0b96-436b-b7c6-38da4583ec00
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "logman" utility in order to disable or delete Windows trace sessions
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1359039665232306183?s=21
    - https://ss64.com/nt/logman.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-11
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1685.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\logman.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Logman.exe'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'stop '
            - 'delete '
    selection_service:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Circular Kernel Context Logger'
            - 'EventLog-' # Cover multiple traces starting with EventLog-*
            - 'SYSMON TRACE'
            - 'SysmonDnsEtwSession'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate deactivation by administrative staff
    - Installer tools that disable services, e.g. before log collection agent installation
level: high

title: Python Spawning Pretty TTY on Windows
id: 480e7e51-e797-47e3-8d72-ebfce65b6d8d
related:
    - id: 899133d5-4d7c-4a7f-94ee-27355c879d90
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects python spawning a pretty tty
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'python.exe' # no \ bc of e.g. ipython.exe
            - 'python3.exe'
            - 'python2.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'import pty'
            - '.spawn('
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'from pty import spawn'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Credential Guard Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
related:
    - id: 73921b9c-cafd-4446-b0c6-fdb0ace42bc0
      type: similar
    - id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to add, modify, or delete Windows Credential Guard related registry keys or values via command line tools such as Reg.exe or PowerShell.
    Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
    Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
    The rule matches suspicious command lines that target DeviceGuard or LSA registry paths and manipulate keys like EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity, RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures, or LsaCfgFlags.
    Such activity may indicate an attempt to disable or tamper with Credential Guard, potentially exposing sensitive credentials for misuse.
references:
    - https://woshub.com/disable-credential-guard-windows/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceguard
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # add/modify
            - 'add '
            - 'New-ItemProperty '
            - 'Set-ItemProperty '
            - 'si '  # SetItem Alias
            # delete
            - 'delete '
            - 'del '
            - 'Remove-ItemProperty '
            - 'rp '
    selection_key_base:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Control\DeviceGuard'
            - '\Control\LSA'
            - 'Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard'
    selection_key_specific:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity'
            - 'RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures'
            - 'LsaCfgFlags'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_credential_guard_registry_tampering/info.yml

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs
id: 3a6586ad-127a-4d3b-a677-1e6eacdf8fde
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-05-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            # - '\cmd.exe'  # too many false positives
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    filter_ccmcache:
        CurrentDirectory|contains: '\ccmcache\'
    filter_amazon:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # FP - Amazon Workspaces
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\setup-scheduledtask.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\set-selfhealing.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\check-workspacehealth.ps1'
            - '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_nessus:
        CommandLine|contains: '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_sccm_install:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\splash.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\SMSSETUP\BIN\'
            - '\autorun.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
    - Microsoft SCCM
level: high

title: Remote LSASS Process Access Through Windows Remote Management
id: aa35a627-33fb-4d04-a165-d33b4afca3e8
status: stable
description: Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/
author: Patryk Prauze - ING Tech
date: 2019-05-20
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        SourceImage|endswith: ':\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe'
    filter_main_access:
        GrantedAccess: '0x80000000'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Trusted Path Bypass via Windows Directory Spoofing
id: 0cbe38c0-270c-41d9-ab79-6e5a9a669290
related:
    - id: 4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can bypass Windows trusted path verification.
    This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC.
references:
    - https://x.com/Wietze/status/1933495426952421843
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.007
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\Windows \System32\'  # Note the space between "Windows" and "System32"
            - ':\Windows \SysWOW64\'  # Note the space between "Windows" and "SysWOW64"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List For Potential Suspicious Application
id: 9e2575e7-2cb9-4da1-adc8-ed94221dca5e
related:
    - id: cde0a575-7d3d-4a49-9817-b8004a7bf105
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows Firewall exception list for an application located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7123e948-c91e-49e0-a813-00e8d72ab393/#
author: frack113
date: 2023-02-26
modified: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2004 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 10)
            - 2071 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 11)
            - 2097
        ApplicationPath|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    filter_main_block:
        Action: 2 # Block
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high