title: Internet Explorer DisableFirstRunCustomize Enabled
id: ab567429-1dfb-4674-b6d2-979fd2f9d125
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the Internet Explorer "DisableFirstRunCustomize" value, which prevents Internet Explorer from running the first run wizard the first time a user starts the browser after installing Internet Explorer or Windows.
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/
    - https://admx.help/?Category=InternetExplorer&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.InternetExplorer::NoFirstRunCustomise
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\DisableFirstRunCustomize'
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000001)' # Home Page
            - 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Welcome To IE
    filter_main_generic:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\ie4uinit.exe'
    filter_optional_avira:
        Image|contains|all:
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\.cr\avira_'
        Details|contains: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    filter_optional_foxit:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Foxit Software\Foxit PDF Reader\FoxitPDFReader.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Foxit Software\Foxit PDF Reader\FoxitPDFReader.exe'
        Details|contains: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - As this is controlled by group policy as well as user settings. Some false positives may occur.
level: medium

title: Internet Explorer Autorun Keys Modification
id: a80f662f-022f-4429-9b8c-b1a41aaa6688
related:
    - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
    - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    ie:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer'
    ie_details:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Toolbar'
            - '\Extensions'
            - '\Explorer Bars'
    filter_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_extensions:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Extensions\{2670000A-7350-4f3c-8081-5663EE0C6C49}'
            - '\Extensions\{31D09BA0-12F5-4CCE-BE8A-2923E76605DA}'
            - '\Extensions\{789FE86F-6FC4-46A1-9849-EDE0DB0C95CA}'
            - '\Extensions\{A95fe080-8f5d-11d2-a20b-00aa003c157a}'
    filter_toolbar:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Toolbar\ShellBrowser\ITBar7Layout'
            - '\Toolbar\ShowDiscussionButton'
            - '\Toolbar\Locked'
    condition: ie and ie_details and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
    - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
level: medium

title: JScript Compiler Execution
id: 52788a70-f1da-40dd-8fbd-73b5865d6568
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of the "jsc.exe" (JScript Compiler).
    Attacker might abuse this in order to compile JScript files on the fly and bypassing application whitelisting.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
    - https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
    - https://twitter.com/DissectMalware/status/998797808907046913
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-02
modified: 2024-04-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\jsc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'jsc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use to compile JScript by developers.
# Note: Can be decreased to informational or increased to medium depending on how this utility is used.
level: low

title: Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript
id: 1cc50f3f-1fc8-4acf-b2e9-6f172e1fdebd
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-05
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'Execute'
            - 'RegRead'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: VBScript Payload Stored in Registry
id: 46490193-1b22-4c29-bdd6-5bf63907216f
status: test
description: Detects VBScript content stored into registry keys as seen being used by UNC2452 group
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
        Details|contains:
            - 'vbscript:'
            - 'jscript:'
            - 'mshtml,'
            - 'RunHTMLApplication'
            - 'Execute('
            - 'CreateObject'
            - 'window.close'
    filter:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
    filter_dotnet:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\'
        Details|contains:
            - '\Microsoft.NET\Primary Interop Assemblies\Microsoft.mshtml.dll'
            - '<\Microsoft.mshtml,fileVersion='
            - '_mshtml_dll_'
            - '<\Microsoft.mshtml,culture='
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript - PowerShell
id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a
related:
    - id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf
      type: similar
    - id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded within PowerShell scripts or commands.
    Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools.
    This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell's native registry cmdlets.
references:
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/
    - https://detect.fyi/hunting-fileless-malware-in-the-windows-registry-1339ccde00ad
date: 2025-08-13
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'CreateObject'
            - 'Wscript.shell'
            - '.RegWrite'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications.
level: medium

title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript
id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf
related:
    - id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a
      type: similar
    - id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods via common LOLBINs.
    It could be an attempt to modify the registry for persistence without using straightforward methods like regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell.
    Threat Actors may use this technique to evade detection by security solutions that monitor for direct registry modifications through traditional tools.
references:
    - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/
date: 2025-08-13
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'CreateObject'
            - 'Wscript.shell'
            - '.RegWrite'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: New BgInfo.EXE Custom VBScript Registry Configuration
id: 992dd79f-dde8-4bb0-9085-6350ba97cfb3
related:
    - id: cd277474-5c52-4423-a52b-ac2d7969902f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects setting of a new registry value related to BgInfo configuration, which can be abused to execute custom VBScript via "BgInfo.exe"
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-16
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Winternals\BGInfo\UserFields\'
        Details|startswith: '4' # WMI
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate VBScript
level: medium