CVE-2015-1796

Home/CVE/The PKIX trust engines in Shibboleth Identity Provider before 2.4.4 and OpenSAML Java (OpenSAML-J) before 2.6.5 trust ca

CVE

The PKIX trust engines in Shibboleth Identity Provider before 2.4.4 and OpenSAML Java (OpenSAML-J) before 2.6.5 trust ca

The PKIX trust engines in Shibboleth Identity Provider before 2.4.4 and OpenSAML Java (OpenSAML-J) before 2.6.5 trust candidate X.509 credentials when no trusted names are available for the entityID, which allows remote attackers to impersonate an entity via a certificate issued by a shibmd:KeyAuthority trust anchor.

MEDIUM · CVSS 4.3 EPSS 0.00166

Schedule remediation

Public exploit or PoC is available

Sigma rules2 YARA rules0

Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots

NVD CVE.org CISA Vulners Exploit-DB GitHub PoC VulnCheck KEV GreyNoise

▸ How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch

This page is every public fact about CVE-2015-1796, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.

Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:

CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.

How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.

Then what - two workflows:

Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.

Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

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Weakness Classification

CWE-2547PK - Security Features

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Affected Products & Versions

shibboleth identity provider<= 2.4.3

shibboleth opensaml java<= 2.6.4

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Affected Packages

Language-ecosystem packages (from OSV) tied to this CVE, with the version that fixes it - the dependency-level detail NVD doesn’t carry.

Maven edu.internet2.middleware:shibboleth-identityprovider MODERATE fixed in 2.4.4

Maven org.opensaml:opensaml MODERATE fixed in 2.6.5

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Public Exploits & PoCs

These PoC and exploit links come from public sources and are not verified to be safe or functional. Review the code before running anything, and treat unverified entries as untrusted.

pocARPSyndicate/cvemon (trickest)

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Sigma Hunt Rules

Exact rules name this CVE ID. Product rules name an affected product in their title. Related rules cover techniques used by actors who exploited this CVE. Showing the most relevant matches; the complete related set is on the full drill-down.

producthighAWS Identity Center Identity Provider Change

productmediumOkta Identity Provider Created

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