title: Wmiexec Default Output File
id: 8d5aca11-22b3-4f22-b7ba-90e60533e1fb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/f4b848fa27654ca95bc0f4c73dbba8b9c2c9f30a/examples/wmiexec.py
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|re: '\\Windows\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # Admin$
        - TargetFilename|re: 'C:\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # C$
        - TargetFilename|re: 'D:\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # D$
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: HackTool - QuarksPwDump Dump File
id: 847def9e-924d-4e90-b7c4-5f581395a2b4
status: test
description: Detects a dump file written by QuarksPwDump password dumper
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/QuarksPWDump.htm
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-02-10
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\SAM-'
            - '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File
id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Default File
id: 93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8
related:
    - id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default dump file used by Outflank Dumpert tool. A process dumper, which dumps the lsass process memory
references:
    - https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-04
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'dumpert.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Very unlikely
level: critical

title: HackTool - Mimikatz Kirbi File Creation
id: 9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29
related:
    - id: 034affe8-6170-11ec-844f-0f78aa0c4d66
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files created by mimikatz such as ".kirbi", "mimilsa.log", etc.
references:
    - https://cobalt.io/blog/kerberoast-attack-techniques
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE
date: 2021-11-08
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.kirbi' # Kerberos tickets
            - 'mimilsa.log' # MemSSP default file
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
id: 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Local File Read Vulnerability In JVM Based Application
id: e032f5bc-4563-4096-ae3b-064bab588685
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential local file read vulnerability in JVM based apps.
    If the exceptions are caused due to user input and contain path traversal payloads then it's a red flag.
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords_local_file_read:
        '|all':
            - 'FileNotFoundException'
            - '/../../..'
    condition: keywords_local_file_read
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Remote Encrypting File System Abuse
id: 5f92fff9-82e2-48eb-8fc1-8b133556a551
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-EFSR
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-EFSR.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d or c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid:
            - df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d
            - c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of remote file encryption
level: high

title: Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
id: c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c
status: test
description: |
    Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection_path:
        Filename|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '/www/'
            # - '\Client\'
            - '\inetpub\'
            - '\tsclient\'
            - 'apache'
            - 'nginx'
            - 'tomcat'
            - 'weblogic'
    selection_ext:
        Filename|endswith:
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dat'
            - '.ear'
            - '.gif'
            - '.hta'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.msc'
            - '.php'
            - '.pl'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.py'
            - '.pyc'
            - '.rb'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.sh'
            - '.svg'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wll'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.xml'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: History File Deletion
id: 1182f3b3-e716-4efa-99ab-d2685d04360f
status: test
description: Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity
references:
    - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2022-09-15
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rm'
            - '/unlink'
            - '/shred'
    selection_history:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '/.bash_history'
              - '/.zsh_history'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '_history'
              - '.history'
              - 'zhistory'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: high

title: Potential GobRAT File Discovery Via Grep
id: e34cfa0c-0a50-4210-9cb3-5632d08eb041
status: test
description: Detects the use of grep to discover specific files created by the GobRAT malware
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/grep'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'apached'
            - 'frpc'
            - 'sshd.sh'
            - 'zone.arm'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: BPFDoor Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Accessed
id: 808146b2-9332-4d78-9416-d7e47012d83d
status: test
description: detects BPFDoor .lock and .pid files access in temporary file storage facility
references:
    - https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-bpfdoor-telecom-networks-sleeper-cells-threat-research-report/
    - https://github.com/rapid7/Rapid7-Labs/blob/741c7196ec12a0a56b63463d1fd726ff14d3a97a/BPFDoor/rapid7_detect_bpfdoor.sh
author: Rafal Piasecki
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2026-03-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name:
            - /var/run/aepmonend.pid
            - /var/run/auditd.lock
            - /var/run/cma.lock
            - /var/run/console-kit.pid
            - /var/run/consolekit.pid
            - /var/run/daemon.pid
            - /var/run/hald-addon.pid
            - /var/run/hald-smartd.pid
            - /var/run/haldrund.pid
            - /var/run/hp-health.pid
            - /var/run/hpasmlit.lock
            - /var/run/hpasmlited.pid
            - /var/run/kdevrund.pid
            - /var/run/lldpad.lock
            - /var/run/mcelog.pid
            - /var/run/system.pid
            - /var/run/uvp-srv.pid
            - /var/run/vmtoolagt.pid
            - /var/run/xinetd.lock
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Code Executed Via Office Add-in XLL File
id: 36fbec91-fa1b-4d5d-8df1-8d8edcb632ad
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
    Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'new-object '
            - '-ComObject '
            - '.application'
            - '.RegisterXLL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder
id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
related:
    - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Temp\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
    selection_domains:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high

title: Prefetch File Deleted
id: 0a1f9d29-6465-4776-b091-7f43b26e4c89
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of a prefetch file which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hunting-for-ttps-with-prefetch-files/
author: Cedric MAURUGEON
date: 2021-09-29
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_delete
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: ':\Windows\Prefetch\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pf'
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image|endswith: ':\windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Unusual File Deletion by Dns.exe
id: 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0
related:
    - id: 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3 # FileChange version
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.html
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dns.exe'
    filter:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\dns.log'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Unusual File Modification by dns.exe
id: 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3
related:
    - id: 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0 # FileDelete version
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.html
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_change
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dns.exe'
    filter:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\dns.log'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Malicious DLL File Dropped in the Teams or OneDrive Folder
id: 1908fcc1-1b92-4272-8214-0fbaf2fa5163
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of a malicious DLL file in the location where the OneDrive or Team applications
    Upon execution of the Teams or OneDrive application, the dropped malicious DLL file ("iphlpapi.dll") is sideloaded
references:
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/27/targeted-attacks-being-carried-out-via-dll-sideloading/
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'iphlpapi.dll'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LiveKD Kernel Memory Dump File Created
id: 814ddeca-3d31-4265-8e07-8cc54fb44903
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file that has the same name as the default LiveKD kernel memory dump.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\livekd.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - In rare occasions administrators might leverage LiveKD to perform live kernel debugging. This should not be allowed on production systems. Investigate and apply additional filters where necessary.
level: high

title: Uncommon File Created by Notepad++ Updater Gup.EXE
id: 3b8f4c92-6a51-4d7e-9c3a-8e2d1f5a7b09
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) creates files in suspicious or uncommon locations.
    This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwarranted files.
references:
    - https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/v889-released/
    - https://www.heise.de/en/news/Notepad-updater-installed-malware-11109726.html
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
    - https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/
    - https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-02-03
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\gup.exe'
    filter_main_legit_paths:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Notepad++\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\'
    filter_main_temp_update_installer:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'npp.'
            - '.Installer.'
            - '.exe'
    filter_main_temp_generic_zip:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '.zip'
    filter_main_recycle_bin:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21'
    filter_main_plugins:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\plugins\JsonTools\testfiles\'
              - '\Notepad++\plugins\ComparePlugin\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - 'npp.'
              - '.portable.'
              - '\plugins\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Custom or portable Notepad++ installations in non-standard directories.
    - Legitimate update processes creating temporary files in unexpected locations.
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
    NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
    under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
    extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
    Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains: '\nxc-windows-latest\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Temp\_MEI'
              - '\nxc\data\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml

title: .RDP File Created By Uncommon Application
id: fccfb43e-09a7-4bd2-8b37-a5a7df33386d
related:
    - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of a file with an ".rdp" extension by an application that doesn't commonly create such files.
references:
    - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/rogue-rdp-revisiting-initial-access-methods/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230726144748/https://blog.thickmints.dev/mintsights/detecting-rogue-rdp/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-18
modified: 2024-11-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.rdp'
        Image|endswith:
            # Covers browsers
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\CCleaner Browser\Application\CCleanerBrowser.exe'
            - '\chromium.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\microsoftedge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\Opera.exe'
            - '\Vivaldi.exe'
            - '\Whale.exe'
            # Covers email clients
            - '\olk.exe' # Outlook
            - '\Outlook.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe' # If the windows mail client is used
            - '\Thunderbird.exe'
            # Covers chat applications
            - '\Discord.exe' # Should open the browser for download, but just in case.
            - '\Keybase.exe'
            - '\msteams.exe'
            - '\Slack.exe'
            - '\teams.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Executable File Creation
id: 74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654
status: test
description: |
    Detect creation of suspicious executable file names.
    Some strings look for suspicious file extensions, others look for filenames that exploit unquoted service paths.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/76c69e2d-01e8-49d9-9aea-fb7cc0c4d3ad/
author: frack113
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - ':\$Recycle.Bin.exe'
            - ':\Documents and Settings.exe'
            - ':\MSOCache.exe'
            - ':\PerfLogs.exe'
            - ':\Recovery.exe'
            - '.bat.exe'
            - '.sys.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: UAC Bypass Using IDiagnostic Profile - File
id: 48ea844d-19b1-4642-944e-fe39c2cc1fec
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file by "dllhost.exe" in System32 directory part of "IDiagnosticProfileUAC" UAC bypass technique
references:
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/IDiagnosticProfileUAC
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\DllHost.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious File Creation In Uncommon AppData Folder
id: d7b50671-d1ad-4871-aa60-5aa5b331fe04
status: test
description: Detects the creation of suspicious files and folders inside the user's AppData folder but not inside any of the common and well known directories (Local, Romaing, LocalLow). This method could be used as a method to bypass detection who exclude the AppData folder in fear of FPs
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # Add more as needed
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.cpl'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.msi'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.scr'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_main:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\LocalLow\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: selection and not filter_main
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - File
id: bdd8157d-8e85-4397-bb82-f06cc9c71dbb
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEInstal.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'consent.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: ISO File Created Within Temp Folders
id: 2f9356ae-bf43-41b8-b858-4496d83b2acb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a ISO file in the Outlook temp folder or in the Appdata temp folder. Typical of Qakbot TTP from end-July 2022.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Sam0x90/status/1552011547974696960
    - https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133680/malware/dll-sideloading-spread-qakbot.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
author: '@sam0x90'
date: 2022-07-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '.zip\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.iso'
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.iso'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Potential FP by sysadmin opening a zip file containing a legitimate ISO file
level: high

title: Suspicious File Write to SharePoint Layouts Directory
id: 1f0489be-b496-4ddf-b3a9-5900f2044e9c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious file writes to SharePoint layouts directory which could indicate webshell activity or post-exploitation.
    This behavior has been observed in the exploitation of SharePoint vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706 or CVE-2025-53770.
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-sharepoint-cve-2025-49704-cve-2025-49706-cve-2025-53770/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/07/22/disrupting-active-exploitation-of-on-premises-sharepoint-vulnerabilities/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-24
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\15\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\'
            - '\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.asax'
            - '.ascx'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.cer'
            - '.config'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.php'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbs'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious File Created by ArcSOC.exe
id: e890acee-d488-420e-8f20-d9b19b3c3d43
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances where the ArcGIS Server process ArcSOC.exe, which hosts REST services running on an ArcGIS
    server, creates a file with suspicious file type, indicating that it may be an executable, script file,
    or otherwise unusual.
references:
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
    - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ahk'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.au3'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.py'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    # Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
    selection1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\msaccess.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\visio.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
    selection2:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.ocx'
            - '.proj'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.scf'
            - '.scr'
            - '.sys'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    filter_main_localassembly:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    filter_optional_webex:
        Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\ODB-user@domain.com
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Adwind RAT / JRAT File Artifact
id: 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
related:
    - id: 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100
    - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2017-11-10
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java'
              - '.exe'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Retrive'
              - '.vbs'
    condition: selection
level: high

title: Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory
id: fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3
related:
    - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
      type: obsolete
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments.
    This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code.
references:
    - https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/
    - https://thecyberexpress.com/rogue-rdp-files-used-in-ukraine-cyberattacks/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-22
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_extension:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.cpl'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.rdp'
            - '.svg'
            - '.vba'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_location:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_'
              - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\'
              - '\Content.Outlook\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments
level: high

title: Potential File Extension Spoofing Using Right-to-Left Override
id: 979baf41-ca44-4540-9d0c-4fcef3b5a3a4
related:
    - id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious filenames that contain a right-to-left override character and a potentially spoofed file extensions.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/right-to-left-override/
    - https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2014/01/the-rtlo-method
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
    - https://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode5.2.0/ch02.pdf
author: Jonathan Peters (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-11-17
modified: 2026-03-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_rtlo_unicode:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\u202e'  # Unicode RTLO character
            - '[U+202E]'
            # Real char U+202E copied/pasted below
            - '‮'
    selection_extensions:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '3pm.'  # Reversed `.mp3`
            - '4pm.'  # Reversed `.mp4`
            - 'cod.'  # Reversed `.doc`
            - 'fdp.'  # Reversed `.pdf`
            - 'ftr.'  # Reversed `.rtf`
            - 'gepj.'  # Reversed `.jpeg`
            - 'gnp.'  # Reversed `.png`
            - 'gpj.'  # Reversed `.jpg`
            - 'ism.'  # Reversed `.msi`
            - 'lmth.'  # Reversed `.html`
            - 'nls.' # Reversed `.sln`
            - 'piz.'  # Reversed `.zip`
            - 'slx.'  # Reversed `.xls`
            - 'tdo.'  # Reversed `.odt`
            - 'vsc.'  # Reversed `.csv`
            - 'vwm.'  # Reversed `.wmv`
            - 'xcod.'  # Reversed `.docx`
            - 'xslx.'  # Reversed `.xlsx`
            - 'xtpp.'  # Reversed `.pptx`
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Filenames that contains scriptures such as arabic or hebrew might make use of this character
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_right_to_left_override_extension_spoofing/info.yml

title: UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File
id: 7fff6773-2baa-46de-a24a-b6eec1aba2d1
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious File Creation Activity From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder
id: cd8b36ac-8e4a-4c2f-a402-a29b8fbd5bca
related:
    - id: 5ce0f04e-3efc-42af-839d-5b3a543b76c0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects file write event from/to a fake recycle bin folder that is often used as a staging directory for malware
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cloaked-ursa-phishing/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-12
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains:
              # e.g. C:\$RECYCLER.BIN
              - 'RECYCLERS.BIN\'
              - 'RECYCLER.BIN\'
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              # e.g. C:\$RECYCLER.BIN
              - 'RECYCLERS.BIN\'
              - 'RECYCLER.BIN\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_recycle_bin_fake_exec/info.yml

title: WScript or CScript Dropper - File
id: 002bdb95-0cf1-46a6-9e08-d38c128a6127
related:
    - id: cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe
references:
    - WScript or CScript Dropper (cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846)
author: Tim Shelton
date: 2022-01-10
modified: 2026-02-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Temp'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.js'
            - '.jse'
            - '.vba'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - File
id: 62ed5b55-f991-406a-85d9-e8e8fdf18789
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\consent.exe.@'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\comctl32.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high